PRIZE   ESSAYS 

OF  THE 

AMERICAN  HISTORICAL  ASSOCIATION 


1914 


To  this  Essay  was  awarded  the 

Justin  Winsor  Prize 

IN  American  History 

for  1914 


ANGLO-AMERICAN 
ISTHMIAN   DIPLOMACY 

1815-1915 


BY 

MARY  WILHELMINE  WILLIAMS,  Ph.  D. 

ASSISTANT   PROFESSOR   OF  HISTORY   IN  GOUCHER  COLLEGE 


WASHINGTON:  AMERICAN   HISTORICAL  ASSOCIATION 

LONDON:   HUMPHREY   MILFORD 

OXFORD   UNIVERSITY   PRESS 

1916 


^■K'tri^ 


GIFT 


Copyright,  1916 

By  The  American  Historical  Association 

Washington.  D.  C. 


the  lord  BALTIMORE  rRBIt 
BALTIMORE,  MD..  U.  I.  A. 


A 


TO  MY  FATHER  AND  MY  MOTHER 
CHARLES  WILLIAMS 

AND 

CAROLINE  K.  WILLIAMS 


ivr?3883'7 


PREFACE. 

Though  the  diplomatic  relations  of  England  and  the 
United  States  over  the  Central  American  isthmus  have 
received  frequent  consideration  of  a  general  character 
by  writers  on  American  diplomacy,  no  exhaustive  study 
of  the  subject  appears  to  have  been  before  attempted. 
It  is  the  aim  of  the  following  essay  to  present  the  result 
of  a  detailed  investigation  into  Anglo-American  isth- 
mian diplomacy,  from  the  first  emergence  of  Central 
America  as  a  subject  of  diplomatic  interest  between 
the  two  countries  down  to  the  immediate  present. 

The  work  here  presented  is  to  a  large  extent  based 
upon  new  material.  Part  of  this  is  in  the  form  of 
printed  sources,  drawn  upon  to  some  degree  by  pre- 
vious writers  but  by  no  means  exhausted.  The  most 
important  writings  of  this  class  are  the  British  Parlia- 
mentary Papers  and  the  United  States  Documents. 
But  a  much  larger  and  more  valuable  contribution  was 
made  by  the  manuscript  archives  for  the  period  1815 
to  1 86 1,  found  in  the  Public  Record  Office  in  London 
and  in  the  Department  of  State  at  Washington.  Only 
a  comparatively  small  portion  of  the  archives  bearing 
upon  the  subject  of  this  study  have  been  printed,  and 
the  unprinted  material  has  hitherto  been  entirely  un- 
touched by  research  students. 

Chapter  I,  which  is  merely  introductory,  makes  no 
pretense  at  being  an  original  contribution.  The  author- 
ities upon  which  it  is  founded,  however,  have  largely 

(vii) 


viii  PREFACE 

the  character  of  sources,  and  these  have  been  used 
critically  with  a  view  to  ascertaining  the  facts  behind 
the  conflicting  statements  of  various  contemporary 
writers.  Chapters  II  to  VIII,  inclusive,  which  are 
based  to  a  considerable  but  varying  degree  upon  pre- 
viously unused  material,  are  the  most  original  part  of 
the  essay.  Access  to  manuscript  archives  made  possible 
not  only  a  presentation  of  many  hitherto  unknown 
facts,  but  also  led  to  a  new,  and,  it  is  beheved,  more 
accurate,  interpretation  of  numerous  phases  of  the 
subject  considered  by  previous  writers.  Chapter  IX, 
which  covers  a  period  subsequent  to  that  for  which 
the  archives  are  open,  presents  some  fresh  viewpoints 
resulting  from  the  new  light  thrown  upon  preceding 
events.  The  period  covered  by  chapter  X  is  too  recent 
for  a  satisfactory  treatment ;  hence,  this  chapter  aims 
primarily  to  present  in  broad  outline  the  latest  phases 
of  the  general  subject,  in  their  proper  relations.  The 
concluding  chapter,  XI,  summarizes  the  result  of  the 
whole  study. 

Certain  irregularities  appearing  in  connection  with 
the  bibliographical  citations  may  need  an  explanation. 
In  some  instances  more  than  one  authority  has  been 
cited  for  a  given  statement.  This  has  been  done  with 
two  purposes  in  view:  (i)  to  strengthen  by  a  multi- 
plication of  witnesses  statements  based  upon  non- 
documentary  writings — generally  in  the  nature  of 
travel  sketches,  largely  made  up  of  personal  observa- 
tions and  reports  from  hearsay  evidence;  (2)  to  aid 
the  reader  who  may  wish  to  make  a  further  study  of 
the  point  in  question.  The  authority  believed  to  be  the 
most  reliable  has  been  placed  first  on  the  list.  Through- 
out the  study,  writings  of  a  generally  untrustworthy 


PREFACE  ix 

character  have  been  used  only  in  a  supplementary  man- 
ner. References  to  manuscript  sources  are  in  every 
case  as  definite  as  possible.  Wherever  despatch  or  page 
numbers  exist  they  have  been  given.  Letters  in  the 
archives  from  important  diplomatic  or  consular  agents 
are  as  a  rule  numbered,  but  those  from  less  important 
agents — particularly  those  written  from  Central  Amer- 
ica— are  frequently  unnumbered.  Drafts  of  corre- 
spondence are  generally  unnumbered,  as  are  also  pri- 
vate letters  from  officials,  while  letters  from  private 
individuals  are  always  without  numbers. 

This  study  was  originally  written  as  a  thesis  under 
the  direction  of  Professor  Ephraim  D.  Adams,  in  con- 
nection with  my  candidacy  for  the  degree  of  Doctor 
of  Philosophy  at  Leland  Stanford  Junior  University. 
For  his  painstaking  supervision  of  my  work  and  for 
his  stimulating  interest  in  it,  I  am  especially  indebted 
to  Professor  Adams.  My  gratitude  is  also  due  to 
Professor  Henry  L.  Cannon  of  Stanford  University 
for  many  suggestions  which  were  of  value  in  the  later 
revision  of  the  manuscript.  Through  the  friendly  in- 
terest of  Mr.  Hubert  Hall,  Assistant  Keeper  of  the 
Public  Records,  in  London,  I  secured  access  to  the 
British  manuscript  archives,  the  most  valuable  part  of 
my  source  material.  My  sister.  Miss  Edle  Carolyn 
WiUiams,  gave  much  assistance  in  the  preparation  of 
the  accompanying  map. 

Mary  Wilhelmine  Williams. 
Wellesley,  Massachusetts, 
May  20,  1915. 


CONTENTS. 


PAGE 

Preface vii 

CHAPTER  I. 
The  British  in  Central  America  before  1815         .         i 

CHAPTER  H. 

British  Aggressions ;  American  Interest  Awak- 
ened, 1815-1850 26 

CHAPTER     HI. 
The  Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty,  April  19,  1850         .       67 

CHAPTER  IV. 

Attempts  at  Readjustment  under  the  Xew  Treaty, 
1850-1852 no 

CHAPTER  V. 

The  Bay  Islands  Colony  and  the  Xew  Interpreta- 
tion of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty,  1852-1854  .     139 

CHAPTER  VI. 

American  Defiance  of  British  Claims,  1853- 1855  .     168 

(xi) 


xii  CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  VII. 
The  Crisis,  1855- 1856 ;  Signs  of  British  Retreat     .     196 

CHAPTER  VIII. 

Adjustment  in  accordance  with  American  View, 
1856-1860 224 

CHAPTER  IX. 

Development  of  American  Opposition  to  the  Clay- 
ton-Bulwer  Treaty,  1860-1895;  End  of  Mos- 
quito Reserve,  1894 270 

CHAPTER  X. 

The  New  Canal  Treaties,  and  New  Conditions  in 
Central  America 300 

CHAPTER  XI. 
General  Resume 321 

Bibliography 331 

MAP. 

Central  America,  1850- 1860,  showing  disputed 
territory.     Facing  page  .         .         .         .198 


CHAPTER  I. 

The  British  in  Central  America  Before  1815. 

For  more  than  a  century  before  the  government  of 
the  United  States  came  into  existence,  the  subjects  of 
Great  Britain  had  been  actively  interested  in  that  part 
of  the  North  American  continent  which,  geographic- 
ally, is  included  under  the  term  "  Central  America  "/ 
By  various  and  fluctuating  degrees  of  political  control 
their  government  protected  them,  and,  in  consequence, 
there  gradually  developed  a  close  relationship  between 
Great  Britain  and  certain  parts  of  Central  America. 
It  was  the  existence  of  this  British  connection  with  the 
isthmus  and  the  fact  that  the  connection  was  time- 
honored  when  the  attention  of  the  United  States  was 
first  seriously  attracted  to  the  region  that  rendered 
subsequent  British-American  isthmian  relations  so 
complicated  and  difficult  of  adjustment.  Shortly  after 
the  United  States  had  become  a  rival  of  the  British  in 
Central  America,  so  delicate  had  the  situation  grown 
that  the  American  government,  despairing  of  any  other 
peaceful  settlement,  for  the  first  and  only  time  in  its 
history  compromised  with  the  Monroe  doctrine  and 
made  an  agreement  with  Great  Britain  which  later 
came  to  be  known  as  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty.  This 
instrument,  instead  of  removing  the  difficulty,  as  had 

^  This  account  assumes  a  general  knowledge  of  Central  American  his- 
tory on  the  part  of  the  reader.  Bancroft's  three-volume  work  is  the  best 
and  most  comprehensive  history  of  Central  America;  Fortier  and  Fick- 
len's  Central  America  and  Mexico  gives  a  good  brief  account. 

2  I 


2       ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

been  hoped,  only  magnified  it  to  an  alarming  degree 
and  brought  into  being  the  long-lived  and  vexatious 
"  Central  American  question  ". 

These  early  British  interests  were  divided  between 
three  different  portions  of  Central  America :  Belize 
Settlement,  the  Bay  Islands,  and  the  Mosquito  Shore. 
For  the  purpose  of  making  clear  the  subsequent  chap- 
ters, a  brief  account  of  the  early  English  connections 
with  the  places  named  is  here  given. 

Belize  Settlement. 

The  British  settlement  of  Belize  was  a  direct  out- 
growth of  the  buccaneering  era  in  the  Western  World. 
At  an  early  date  the  exclusive  commercial  policy  of 
Spain  tempted  the  subjects  of  other  nations  to  acquire 
a  share  in  her  prosperity  by  irregular  and  violent 
methods.  During  the  long  and  frequent  wars  they 
operated  as  privateers ;  in  times  of  peace  they  were 
undisguised  freebooters,  or  buccaneers.  As  time 
passed,  the  West  Indies  became  the  chief  centre  of 
operations  for  these  "  brethren  of  the  coast " ;  and 
from  here  they  made  daring  and  profitable  attacks 
upon  Spanish  vessels  homeward  bound  from  the  colo- 
nies.* With  the  conquest  of  Jamaica  by  Cromwell,  in 
1655,  the  strength  of  the  English  buccaneers  increased  ; 
for  the  early  governors  of  the  island  as  a  rule  not  only 
connived  at  the  marauding  expeditions,  but  at  times 
even  shared  in  the  plunder.'  Indeed,  Captain  Morgan, 
notorious  for  sacking  and  burning  many  cities  on  the 

'  For  a  detailed  account  of  the  buccaneers  see  Ilaring,  Buccaneers  in 
the  H'cst  Indies;  Burney,  Buccaneers  of  America;  Johnson,  General 
History  of  the  Pyrates;  Esqueineling,  Buccaneers  of  America. 

•Johnson,  Pyrates,  I,  25;  Long,  History  of  Jamaica,  I,  300;  Squier, 
A'otcs  on  Central  .Uncrica,  369. 


BRITISH  IN  CENTRAL  AMERICA  BEFORE  1815      3 

coasts  of  Spanish  America,  as  well  as  for  preying  upon 
Spanish  vessels,  was  knighted  by  the  British  govern- 
ment and  made  lieutenant-governor  of  Jamaica/ 

At  first,  when  attacking  Spanish  ships,  the  free- 
booters aimed  primarily  to  rob  them  of  the  wealth 
carried  from  the  mines  ;  this  accomplished,  the  vessels, 
which  frequently  carried  mahogany  or  logwood,  were 
set  afire  and  abandoned.  Almost  by  accident  a  ship- 
load of  logwood  was  spared  and  taken  to  London, 
where  the  ready  market  which  it  commanded  quickly 
revealed  its  value  to  the  buccaneers.  After  this,  log- 
wood-laden vessels  were  eagerly  captured  for  the  sake 
of  their  cargoes." 

When  Spanish  prizes  became  scarcer  the  freebooters 
gradually  took  to  cutting  their  own  logwood  on  the 
thinly-settled  portions  of  the  Spanish  coast.*  This 
change  began  a  few  years  after  the  English  took  pos- 
session of  Jamaica.'  The  new  enterprise  was  favored 
by  Modyford,  the  governor  of  the  island,  as  plundering 
Spanish  bottoms  had  come  to  be  frowned  upon  by  the 
home  government.^  Spain  was  now  too  weak  to  do 
more  than  partially  police  her  coasts  and  to  seize  the 
vessels  containing  plunder  from  her  forests ;  conse- 
quently, for  a  time  the  British  Council  for  the  Planta- 
tions approved  of  the  connivance  of  Modyford's  suc- 
cessor.* 

*  Cal.  St.  P.,  Col.,  Am.  and  W.  I.,  1675-1676,  343;  Long,  Jamaica,  I, 
301;  Haring,  Buccaneers,  205. 

'  Dampier,  Voyages,  II,  pt.  2,  p.  47;  Gibbs,  British  Honduras,  24. 

'  Dampier,  Voyages,  II,  pt.  2,  pp.  47-48;  Cal.  St.  P.,  Col.,  Am.  and 
W.  I.,  1669-1674,  121,  311,  426,  427,  428;  Gibbs,  British  Honduras,  24. 

'  Ilaring,  Buccaneers,  208-209;  Pari.  Papers,  1847,  Corns.,  LXIV, 
"  Spanish-American  Republics  ",  3. 

*  Haring,  Buccaneers,  209. 

^  Ibid.,  210;  Cal.  St.  P.,  Col.,  Am.  and  W.  I.,  1677-1680,  343,  406; 
1681-1685,  284. 


4       ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

Naturally,  log-cutting  settlements  grew  up  with  the 
development  of  this  new  British  industry.  One  of  the 
earliest  establishments  of  this  sort  was  made  in  Yuca- 
tan, on  the  Belize  River,  in  1662."  As  logwood  was 
plentiful  on  this  part  of  the  coast,  the  settlement  pros- 
pered and  was  soon  on  a  firm  basis. 

The  reprisals  of  the  Spanish  upon  the  English  log- 
wood cargoes  continued,  however,  in  spite  of  precau- 
tions ; "  therefore  in  1670  the  British  government 
attempted  to  secure  by  treaty  a  sanction  or  defense  of 
the  actions  of  its  subjects.  The  seventh  article  of  an 
agreement  made  with  Spain  in  this  year  reads : 

It  is  agreed  that  the  most  serene  King  of  Great  Britain,  his 
heirs  and  successors,  shall  have,  hold,  keep  and  enjoy  forever 
with  plenary  right  of  sovereignty,  dominion,  possession  and 
propriety,  all  those  lands,  regions,  islands,  colonies,  and  places, 
whatsoever,  being  or  situated  in  the  West  Indies,  or  any  part 
of  America,  which  the  said  King  of  Great  Britain  or  his  sub- 
jects do  at  present  hold  or  possess." 

Though  the  clause  appears  to  have  been  inserted  in 
the  treaty  ostensibly  and  primarily  for  the  purpose  of 
settling  a  dispute  over  the  possession  of  Jamaica,"  the 
British  negotiators  evidently  aimed  to  secure  a  word- 
ing which  might  include  the  British  log-cutting  settle- 
ments on  the  Belize  and  on  other  parts  of  the  Spanish 

'"  L.  L.,  "  Balize  ",  in  NouvcUes  Annates,  C,  53;  Pari.  Papers,  1847, 
Corns.,  LXIV,  "Spanish-American  Republics",  13;  Gibbs,  British 
Honduras,  26.  This  was  probably  not  the  first  Hritish  settlement  in  the 
region,  for  it  seems  that  as  early  as  1638  a  number  of  shipwrecked 
British  sailors  established  themselves  there.  Ibid.,  a6;  Lucas,  Historical 
Geography  of  the  British  Colonics.  II,  297;  Trendell,  Her  Majesty's  Col- 
onics, 347. 

"  I  taring,  Buccaneers,  211. 

"Ilertslct,  Treaties  between  Great  Britain  and  Foreign  Powers,  II, 
196197. 

'•  U.  S.  Dues.,  ser.  no.  660,  doc.  27,  p.  80. 


BRITISH  IN  CENTRAL  AMERICA  BEFORE  1815      5 

coast."  This  interpretation  was  attempted  by  the 
governors  of  Jamaica  and  by  the  Board  of  Trade," 
but  the  Spaniards  had  no  intention  of  acknowledging 
that  such  concessions  had  been  made ;  therefore  they 
continued  to  capture  the  logwood  vessels  of  the  British, 
and  repeatedly  destroyed  their  log-cutting  settle- 
ments ; "  Belize  suffered  like  the  rest,  and  in  about  the 
year  1732  the  settlers  were  driven  away  and  their 
homes  demolished.  They  promptly  returned,  however, 
and  defeated  all  further  expeditions  sent  against  them." 

Belize  was  occupied  by  the  British  under  the  equivo- 
cal title  of  1670  until  the  formation  of  the  peace  of 
1763,  which  concluded  the  Seven  Years'  War.  Whether 
or  not  the  negotiators  of  this  treaty  were  ignorant  of 
the  terms  of  that  made  in  1670  and  of  its  possible 
application  to  Belize  is  not  apparent."*  In  any  case,  by 
the  later  treaty  England  agreed  to  demolish  all  forti- 
fications erected  by  British  subjects  in  the  Bay  of 
Honduras ;  but  the  Spanish  government  permitted  the 
log-cutters  to  remain,  and  guaranteed  them  protection, 
though,  obviously,  Spain  still  held  full  sovereignty  over 
the  settlement." 

Again,  in  1779,  when  Spain  had  allied  herself  with 
the  revolting  English  colonies,  the  Spaniards  returned 
to  Belize.  This  time  the  settlement  was  pillaged  and 
many  of  its  inhabitants  taken  as  prisoners  to  Havana. 

^*  Long,  Jamaica,  1,  341;  Pari.  Papers,  1847,  Corns.,  LXIV,  "  Spanish- 
American  Republics",   13;  Gibbs,  British  Honduras,  27. 

^^  Pari.  Papers,  1847,  Corns.,  LXIV,  "Spanish-American  Republics", 
14;  Burney,  Buccaneers,  99-100. 

"Wafer,  New  Voyage  to  America,  34;  Long,  Jamaica,  I,  341;  Pari. 
Papers,     1847,    Corns.,    LXIV,    "Spanish-American    Republics",    13-14. 

"  Bancroft,  Central  America,  II,  625-628. 

"  Long,  Jamaica,  I,  342. 

^°  MacDonald,  Select  Charters,  265. 


6      ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

But  in  the  following  year  Omoa,  in  Honduras,  was 
captured  by  British  officers,  who,  by  convention  with 
the  Spanish  authorities,  arranged  for  the  redemption 
of  the  "  Baymen  ",  as  the  settlers  were  called." 

By  the  treaty  of  1783,  which  concluded  the  American 
Revolution,  Belize  still  remained  under  Spanish  sover- 
eignty, and  by  this  treaty  definite  boundaries  were  for 
the  first  time  agreed  upon  for  the  settlement.  The 
boundary  line  was  given  in  great  detail,  but,  generally 
speaking,  the  northern  limit  of  settlement  was  to  be 
Rio  Hondo,  and  the  southern,  Belize  River." 

Notwithstanding  the  stipulations  of  1783,  the  British 
continued  to  spread ;  therefore  a  treaty  made  three 
years  later  extended  the  southern  boundary  as  far  as 
the  Sibun  River.  Besides  this  extension  of  territory, 
the  new  agreement  gave  the  settlers  additional  privi- 
leges within  the  district.  Not  only  were  they  permitted 
to  cut  and  carry  away  logwood,  but  they  were  also 
allowed  to  take  mahogany  and  all  other  woods,  as  well 
as  to  gather  and  sell  all  other  uncultivated  products ; 
but  it  was  definitely  agreed  that  no  plantations  were  to 
be  made  or  factories  of  any  sort  to  be  established,  since 
the  undisputed  possession  of  the  territory  by  Spain  pre- 
cluded the  right  of  the  English  to  form  settlements  of 
that  kind."  A  Spanish  commissioner,  in  company  with 
one  representing  the  iMiglish  government,  was  to  be 
admitted  to  the  settlement  twice  a  year  to  examine  into 
the  condition  of  afTairs."^ 

'^  An».  Reg.,  1780,  "History",  212-214;  Pari.  Papers,  1847,  Corns., 
LXIV,  "  Spanish- American  Republics",  15;  Henderson,  British  Set- 
tletncnt  of  Honduras,  5-7. 

^^  Ann.  Reg.,   1783.  "State  I'apers  ",  3.14-335- 

'^^  Ibid.,  1786,  pp.  362-264. 

''Pari.  Papers,  1847,  Corns.,  I-XI\',  "  Spanisli  .Xiiu-rican  Ucpiiblics  ", 
1718. 


BRITISH  IN  CENTRAL  AMERICA  BEFORE  1815      7 

For  many  years  the  Spanish  government  held  the 
settlers  rigidly  to  the  terms  specified.  Commissioners 
made  regular  visits  for  this  purpose,  and  saw  that  the 
boundary  limits  were  not  exceeded,  as  well  as  that  the 
other  agreements  were  complied  with.  Repeatedly  they 
uprooted  and  destroyed  young  plantations  started  by 
the  residents."* 

The  jealous  vigilance  of  the  Spanish  authorities  was 
shared  by  the  rival  Spanish  wood-cutters.  This  jeal- 
ousy, and  the  fact  that  the  British  settlers  tried  con- 
stantly to  exceed  the  terms  of  the  treaty,  led  to  repeated 
threats  of  hostilities  on  the  part  of  the  Spaniards.  The 
Baymen,  who  were  not  permitted  to  erect  fortifications, 
were  alarmed  at  these  demonstrations,  and  appealed  to 
their  government  for  protection.  In  response,  Colonel 
Barrow  was  sent  to  the  place  with  both  military  and 
civil  commissions,  and  took  charge  of  affairs  as  super- 
intendent, January  i,   1797." 

In  1798,  when  England  and  Spain  were  again  at  war, 
a  determined  attempt  Avas  made  to  drive  out  the  set- 
tlers. A  combined  expedition  was  sent  from  Cam- 
peachy  and  Bacalar,  under  Governor  O'Niel  of  Yuca- 
tan. The  Baymen,  however,  prepared  for  a  desperate 
resistance.  They  burned  the  houses  on  Saint  George's 
Cay,  to  prevent  them  from  falling  into  the  hands  of  the 
enemy,  and  met  the  invaders  at  sea."°  With  the  aid  of 
a  small  naval  force  under  Captain  Moss  in  the  Merlin, 

'*  Crowe,  Gospel  in  Central  America,  196;  Gibbs,  British  Honduras,  50. 

^  Trendell,  Her  Majesty's  Colonies,  348. 

^Henderson,  British  Settlement  of  Honduras,  8;  Crowe,  Gospel  in 
Central  America,  196;  Lucas,  Historical  Geography,  II,  307.  The  popula- 
tion at  this  time,  white  and  colored,  was  probably  not  more  than  six  or 
seven  hundred.     Henderson,  British  Settlement  of  Honduras,  85. 


8      ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

they  drove  off  the  Spaniards  after  two  days'  fighting.'' 
This  appears  to  have  been  the  last  attempt  of  the 
Spanish  actively  to  interfere  with  the  Belize  settlement. 
During  the  remainder  of  the  period  previous  to  1815 
the  same  relations  prevailed  between  the  British  gov- 
ernment and  Belize  as  formerly.*  By  at  least  three 
treaties  in  this  period  England  virtually  acknowledged 
that  the  settlement  was  upon  the  basis  established  in 
1786.  The  third  article  of  the  peace  of  Amiens  of  1802 
reads : 

His  Britannic  majesty  restores  to  the  French  republic  and 
its  allies,  viz.  his  Catholic  majesty  and  the  Batavian  republic, 
all  the  possessions  and  colonies  which  respectively  belonged  to 
them,  and  which  have  been  either  occupied  or  conquered  by  the 
British  forces  during  the  course  of  the  present  war." 

The  only  exceptions  mentioned  are  the  island  of 
Trinidad  and  the  Dutch  possessions  in  Ceylon."  Again, 
in  1809,  Great  Britain  and  Spain  formed  an  alliance  in 
which  the  two  powers  agreed  upon  "  an  entire  and 
lasting  oblivion  of  all  acts  of  hostility  done  on  their 
side  in  the  course  of  the  late  wars  "  in  which  they  had 
been  engaged  against  each  other."  The  last  and  most 
important  of  these  treaties  was  that  of  1814;  it  con- 
firmed the  first  article  of  the  treaty  of  1786." 

In  view  of  what  has  just  been  said,  there  seems  to  be 
absolutely  no  basis  for  the  statement  made  by  more 

"  Bird,  "  Sketch  of  the  East  Coast  of  Central  America  ",  in  Jr.  Roy. 
Geog.  Soc,  XI,  8i;  Bancroft,  Central  America,  II,  635;  Henderson. 
British  Settlement  of  Honduras,  8;  Crowe,  Gosfel  in  Central  America, 
196-197. 

**  L.  L.,  "  Balize  ",  in  Nouvelles  Annales,  C,  54. 

"'Ann.  Reg.,  1802,  p.  609. 

»  Ibid. 

"  Ibid.,  1809,  p.  737. 

"  Ilertslet,  Treaties,  II,  2451  271. 


BRITISH  IN  CENTRAL  AMERICA  BEFORE  1815      9 

recent  writers,  that  the  victory  won  by  the  Daymen  in 
1789  was  a  conquest  of  the  Belize  territory,  and  the 
event  which  led  directly  to  the  extension  of  full  British 
sovereignty  over  the  region/'  The  victory  seems  really 
to  have  attracted  but  little  attention  from  the  home 
government,  and  it  was  not  until  after  a  lapse  of  more 
than  fifty  years  that  enlarged  claims  were  made  in  con- 
sequence of  it.  In  181 5,  and  for  many  years  subsequent 
to  that  date,  as  will  be  shown  later,  the  British  govern- 
ment merely  regarded  Belize  as  a  settlement  of  British 
subjects  upon  soil  the  sovereignty  of  which  rested  in 
Spain. 

The  Bay  Islands. 

In  the  Bay  of  Honduras,  close  to  the  shores  of  the 
Honduran  repubhc,  lie  the  Bay  Islands,  a  group  of 
some  half  dozen  islands,  of  which  Ruatan  "  is  by  far 
the  largest  and  most  important.  This  island  is  about 
thirty  miles  long  and  eight  or  nine  broad,  and  is  pos- 
sessed of  excellent  harbors,  easily  defended.^"* 

While  on  his  fourth  voyage,  in  1502,  Columbus  dis- 
covered and  took  possession  of  Ruatan  and  another 
island  of  the  group,  now  generally  known  as  Bonacca, 
in  the  names  of  the  Spanish  sovereigns.'^  The  owner- 
ship of  Spain  was  not  disputed  until  towards  the 
middle  of  the  seventeenth  century,  when  the  bucca- 
neers swarmed  in  the  western  seas."    The  advantages 

^  See  Gibbs,  British  Honduras;  Egerton,  British  Colonial  Policy, 
Keane,  Central  and  South  America;  Woodward,  Expansion  of  the  British 
Empire. 

**  Also  written  Roatan  or  Rattan. 

"Long,  Jamaica,  I,  333;  Roberts,  Central  America,  276;  Alcedo,  Dic- 
tionary of  America  and  the  West  Indies,  IV,  334. 

'°  Roberts,  Central  America,  275;  Squier,  Notes  on  Central  America, 
369.     The  name  of  Bonacca  is  sometimes  rendered  "  Guanacca  ". 

"Squier,  Notes  on  Central  America,  369;  Travis,  Clayton-Bulwer 
Treaty,  3;  Edgington,  Monroe  Doctrine,  65. 


10     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

offered  by  the  islands  as  a  rendezvous  early  appealed 
to  the  freebooters,  who  landed  on  them  in  1642.**  The 
Indians,  who  were  apparently  the  only  inhabitants  at 
the  time,  made  no  resistance  and  the  intruders  estab- 
lished themselves  on  the  islands.  From  this  retreat, 
and  particularly  from  the  sheltered  harbors  of  Ruatan, 
attacks  were  made  upon  the  Spanish.*" 

The  bishop  of  Comayagua,  however,  soon  became 
much  concerned  over  the  injurious  effect  of  the  hereti- 
cal British  upon  the  religion  of  the  natives,  and  helped 
incite  the  Spanish  authorities  to  action  against  the 
usurpers.  A  strong  force  was  organized  under  the 
leadership  of  various  colonial  officials,  and  in  August, 
1650,  the  buccaneers  were  dislodged.*"  But  no  attempt 
was  made  to  guard  Ruatan  or  the  other  islands  against 
future  seizure  by  the  British.  The  few  natives,  whom 
the  pirates  had  spared  and  enslaved,  were  too  fright- 
ened to  remain,  and  were  therefore  removed  to  the 
adjoining  coast  and  allotted  lands  by  the  government." 

From  this  time  until  1742,  when  war  existed  between 
Spain  and  England,  the  Bay  Islands  appear  to  have  had 
no  permanent  inhabitants.**  During  this  struggle,  how- 
ever, the  English  planned  to  gain  control  of  the  whole 
Atlantic  coast  of  Guatemala.  They  captured  and  forti- 
ned  several  important  places  on  the  mainland,  and  later 

"*  Strangeways,  Mosquito  Shore,  42;  Juarros,  Guatemala,  318;  Crowe, 
Cosf'el  in  Central  America,   184. 

"Juarros,  Guatemala,  319;  Crowe,  Gosfel  in  Central  America,  184; 
Squicr,  Notes  on  Central  America,  370. 

*"  Juarros,  Guatemala.  319-321;  Crowe,  Gosf^el  in  Central  America, 
184-185;   Gibbs,   British  Honduras,  25. 

■"  Scjuicr,  Xotes  on  Central  America,  370;  De  Bow's  Re-t-iew,  XXVII, 
555-556. 

**  Long,  Jamaica,  I,  335;  Juarros,  Guatemala,  3^1;  Squier,  i\'otes  on 
Central  America,  370. 


BRITISH  I.Y  CENTRAL  AMERICA  BEFORE  1813     11 

took  possession  of  Ruatan/'  Following  this,  they  made 
a  strong  efifort  to  colonize  the  island,  but  after  the 
treaty  of  Aix-la-Chapelle  the  settlements  were  broken 
up  and  the  inhabitants  removed/'  Spain  then  tried  to 
encourage  colonization,  but  her  efforts  failed ;  and  for 
some  time  the  islands,  though  recognized  as  Spanish 
territory,  seem  to  have  been  practically  deserted/" 

Later,  however,  a  few  British  appear  to  have  settled 
upon  the  islands,  but  when  war  again  broke  out,  in 
1780,  they  were  driven  away  by  the  Guatemalans,*"  and 
the  treaty  of  1783  definitely  stipulated  that  all  English 
settlers  should,  without  exception,  retire  from  the 
Spanish  continent  and  its  dependent  islands.*^  These 
terms  appear  to  have  been  evaded,  but  a  supplementary 
convention,  formed  three  years  later,  containing  more 
definite  stipulations  to  the  same  effect,"  resulted  in 
British  evacuation  of  the  coveted  territory." 

Yet  when  war  again  existed  in  1796,  they  once  more 
returned.      British   officers   transported    Caribs    from 

*^Juarros,  Guatemala,  321;  Squier,  Notes  on  Central  America,  370-371. 

**  Long,  Jamaica,  I,  335. 

^  Ibid.,  335-336.  Long,  in  his  history,  published  in  1774,  repeatedly 
urged  (I,  334,  and  passim),  the  acquisition  and  settlement  of  Ruatan  by 
England.  He  stated  (p.  333),  that  two  Jamaica  traders  had  patents  for 
grazing  mules  on  the  island. 

Squier,  Notes  on  Central  America,  371,  and  Trendell,  Her  Majesty's 
Colonies,  348,  give  the  impression  that  during  this  whole  period  the 
islands  were  definitely  held  by  the  British;  the  latter  stales  (p.  348), 
that  the  government  of  Ruatan  and  Bonacca  was  connected  with  that  of 
Belize,  and  that  the  administrative  officers  had  their  residence  on 
Ruatan.  With  regard  to  this  point,  however,  Long  seems  to  be  the  best 
authority. 

■•*  Long,  Jamaica,  I,  333;  Squier,  Notes  on  Central  America,  371. 

*''  Ann.  Reg.,  1783.  "  State  Papers",  334-335- 

"^Ibid.,   1786,  p.   263. 

*'^  Squier  seems  uncertain  upon  this  point,  Notes  on  Central  America, 
371;  but  Juarros  gives  a  clear  impression  that  the  English  abandoned  the 
islands,  Guatemala,  321. 


12     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

Saint  Vincent  and  the  Leeward  Islands  to  Ruatan  and 
made  that  place  a  penal  settlement.  A  guard  of  2,000 
negroes  was  stationed  there  for  the  defense  of  the 
islands.  As  soon,  however,  as  these  encroachments 
became  known  to  the  Spanish  colonial  officials,  steps 
were  taken  towards  the  reconquest  of  the  place ;  and 
in  May,  1797,  the  Indians  and  negroes  surrendered  to 
a  Spanish  naval  commander,  after  which  the  Spanish 
flag  was  hoisted  and  the  territory  formally  declared  a 
possession  of  Spain.**" 

After  this,  as  long  as  Spain  retained  her  dominion 
over  Guatemalan  territory,  she  remained  in  undisputed 
possession  of  the  Bay  Islands.  About  the  year  1804 
Captain  Henderson,  the  superintendent  of  Belize, 
landed  upon  Ruatan,  and,  in  writing  of  the  incident, 
stated  definitely  that  the  island  belonged  to  Spain." 
Moreover,  as  has  already  been  stated,"  a  treaty  made 
between  Spain  and  England  in  181 4  confirmed  the  first 
article  of  the  treaty  of  1786,  which  referred  to  British 
settlers  on  Central  American  territory.  Therefore,  if 
at  any  time  previous  Spanish  control  of  the  islands  had 
lapsed,  it  was  revived  at  this  time  and  distinctly  recog- 
nized by  the  British  government. 

The  Mosquito  Shore. 

During  the  period  considered  in  this  chapter  the 
term  "  Mosquito  Shore  "  was  applied  in  a  vague  way 
to  the  east  coast  of  the  captain-generalcy  of  Guate-    i 

•"Juarros,  Guatemala,  321;  Squier,  Notes  on  Central  America,  371; 
Gibbs,  British  Honduras,  53;  Galindo,  "  Notice  of  the  Caribs  in  Central 
America  ",  in  Jr.  Roy.  Geog.  Soc,  III,  290. 

"  Henderson,  British  Settlement  of  Honduras,  168;  Squier,  Notes  on 
Central  America,  372. 

"  .See  above,  p.  8. 


BRITISH  IN  CENTRAL  AMERICA  BEFORE  1815     13 

mala,  but  particularly  to  that  part  lying  between  Cape 
Honduras  and  the  mouth  of  the  San  Juan  River." 

The  name  was  derived  from  the  Moscos,  or  Mos- 
quitos,  the  semi-nomadic  population  which  inhabited 
the  district."  These  people  were  a  mixture  of  at  least 
three  races.  Those  to  whom  the  term  Mosquito  was 
originally  applied  were  American  aborigines,  partly 
composed  of  Caribs  who  invaded  the  coast  from  the 
West  Indies."  To  these  was  added,  probably  in  the 
early  part  of  the  seventeenth  century,  an  Ethiopian 
element  through  the  wreck  of  an  African  slaver  some- 
where upon  the  coast.°*  Because  of  this  infusion  of 
negro  blood,  the  name  "  Sambos  "  was  at  times  applied 
to  the  population  of  the  region,  or  at  least  to  the  more 
negroid  portion  of  it."^  As  time  passed,  traders  and  buc- 
caneers who  frequented  the  shore  contributed  a  Cau- 
casian strain  to  the  earlier  mixture ;  °^  and  more  Afri- 
can blood  was  occasionally  added  by  fugitive  slaves 
from  the  adjoining  settlements."' 

The  aboriginal  inhabitants  of  the  shore  were  never 
completely  subjugated  by  the  conquerors  of  Guate- 
mala ;  *"   but  the  cruel  treatment  which  they  suffered 

''Long,  Jamaica,  I,  314;  Pari.  Papers,  1847,  Corns.,  LXIV,  "Spanish- 
American  Republics",  27;  Kemble  Papers,  II,  419,  in  N.  Y.  Hist.  Soc, 
Colls.,   1884. 

**  Squier,  Notes  on  Central  America,  48;  Keane,  Central  and  South 
America,  II,  237;  Churchill,  Voyages,  VI,  287;  Kemble  Papers,  II,  419. 

"  Keane,  Central  and  South  America,  II,  235. 

**  Churchill,  Voyages,  VI,  293;  Henderson,  British  Settlement  of 
Honduras,  216;  Strangeways,  Mosquito  Shore,  328;  Bonnycastle,  Spanish- 
America,  I,   172. 

"Kemble  Papers,  II,  419;  Roberts,  Central  America,  152-153;  Strange- 
ways,  Mosquito  Shore,  239;  Bonnycastle,  Central  America,  I,  172. 

"Bard,  Waikna,  337-338. 

"  Scherzer,  Travels  in  Central  America,  II,  30-31;  Squier,  Notes  on 
Central  America,  208;  Keane,  Central  and  South  America,  II,  236. 

'"  Cal.  St.  P.,  Col.,  Am.  and  IV.  I.,  1669-1674,  303;  Alcedo,  Dictionary, 
III,  347;  Long,  Jamaica,  I,  315,  317;  Roberts,  Central  America,  54. 


14     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

from  the  would-be  conquerors  bred  in  them  a  deep 
hatred  for  the  Spanish  people  and  their  government." 
This  feeling  was  shared  by  the  English  buccaneers  w'ho 
infested  the  coast  and  worked  harm  to  the  Spaniards  ; " 
and  they  found  it  to  their  interest  to  foster  it  in  the 
natives.  But  while  encouraging  opposition  to  the 
Spaniards,  the  freebooters  themselves  cultivated 
friendly  relations  with  the  Indians.  They  taught  them 
the  use  of  firearms  and  won  their  favor  in  various 
ways ;  and  the  Mosquitos  in  return  helped  the  English 
in  their  attacks  on  the  Spanish  settlements."  Other 
adventurers  came  to  the  shore,  especially  from  Jamaica, 
and  traded  with  the  ]\Iosquitos  for  the  natural  products 
of  the  region."  With  the  aid  of  the  Mosquitos  as 
middlemen,  they  also  exchanged  British  goods  for  the 
gold  of  the  Spaniards,  within  the  Spanish  settlements." 
The  ]\Iosquito  coast  was  thus  made  a  sort  of  "  under- 
ground railroad "  connecting  the  Spanish  colonies, 
commercially,  with  the  outside  world. 

As  time  passed,  the  freebooters  and  other  British 
subjects  made  permanent  settlements  on  the  shore  at 
Cape  Gracias  a  Dios,  Bluefields,  and  other  points ; " 
and  thus  the  British  influence  grew.    Shortly  after  the 

"  Dampier,  Voyages,  I,  8;  Hist.  MSS.  Conim.,  Report  on  MSS.  of 
Mrs.  Stopford-Sackville,  II,  289;  Henderson,  British  Settlement  of  Hon- 
duras, 212,  225;  Roberts,  Central  America,  153. 

"Churchill,  Voyages,  VI,  286,  289,  291;  Bard,  IVaikna,  337;  Keane, 
Centra!  and  South  America,  II,  237. 

"Long,  Jamaica,  I,  315,  317;  Churchill,  Voyages,  \'I,  287;  Dampier, 
Voyages,  I,  8,  10. 

"Churchill,  Voyages,  VI,  286;  Long,  Jamaica,  I,  319-320;  Pari. 
Papers,   1847,  Coms.,  LXIV,  "  Spanish-.\nieric.iii  Republics",  29. 

"■■'Long.  Jamaica,  I,  317;  Kemble  Papers,  II,  428;  Pari.  Papers,  1847, 
Corns.,  LXIV,  "  Spanish-American  Republics  ",  29. 

**  Pari.  Papers,  1847,  "  Coms.",  LXI\',  "  .Spanish-American  Republics  ", 
36;  Bonnycastle,  Spanish-America,  1,  172;  llard,  ll'aikiia.  337. 


BRITISH  IN  CENTRAL  AMERICA  BEFORE  1815    15 

English  conquest  of  Jamaica  this  influence  was  much 
increased,  for  Oldman,  the  chief  of  the  Mosquitos,  was 
taken  to  England,  where  he  formed  some  sort  of  alli- 
ance with  the  English  government,*"  in  consequence  of 
which  the  Mosquitos  regarded  themselves  as  subjects 
of  the  King  of  England.^^  After  some  years,  however, 
the  alliance  seems  to  have  been  forgotten  by  the  Eng- 
lish government,  for  when  Jeremy,  the  heir  of  Oldman, 
came  into  power  he  was  sent  to  Jamaica,  evidently  at 
the  instigation  of  British  residents  of  the  shore,  to  ask 
for  British  protection  for  his  people."''  Whether  the 
request  was  granted  at  this  time  is  not  certain ; '"  but 
at  some  subsequent  date  the  governors  of  Jamaica 
adopted  the  plan  of  appointing  justices  of  the  peace 
for  the  shore,  who  in  addition  to  their  regular  duties 
were  empowered  to  decide  commercial  questions  of 
contracts  and  debts. '^ 

This  policy  was  continued  until  the  war  of  1739- 
1748  with  Spain.  During  this  struggle  the  British 
government  came  quickly  to  realize  the  importance  of 
the  Mosquitos  as  military  allies  and  as  agents  for  carry- 
ing on  illicit  trade  with  the  Spanish  colonies."    Gov- 

"  Oldman  received  from  the  English  king  a  "  crown  "  and  a  "  com- 
mission ",  which  were  but  a  "  lacd  hat  "  and  a  "  ridiculous  piece  of 
writing  "  purporting  that  he  should  kindly  use  and  relieve  such  straggling 
Englishmen  as  came  to  the  shore.     Churchill,  Voyages,  VI,  288. 

**  Dampier,  Voyages,  I,  pt.  2,  p.  11;  Edwards,  British  West  Indies,  V, 
203. 

*' Sloane,  History  of  Jamaica,  I,  76;  Cal.  St.  P.,  Col.,  Am.  and  IV.  I., 
1669-1674,  493;  Long,  Jamaica,  I,  316. 

"  Sloane  says  that  Albemarle,  the  governor  of  Jamaica,  did  nothing 
in  the  matter,  as  he  feared  that  it  was  a  trick  to  set  up  a  government 
of  buccaneers.  History  of  Jamaica,  I,  76;  cf.  Keasbey,  Nicaragua  Canal, 
82-84. 

"  Pari.  Papers,  1847,  Corns.,  LXI\",  "  Spanish- American  Republics  ", 
20. 

^  Ibid.,  1856,  Corns.,  LX,  "Correspondence  with  the  United  States 
respecting  Central  America  ",  202. 


i6     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

ernor  Trelawney  of  Jamaica,  in  1740,  wrote  to  the 
home  government  describing  a  plan  for  producing 
revolt  in  the  Spanish  colonies  by  aid  from  the  Mos- 
quitos."  For  the  purpose  of  executing  the  scheme, 
Captain  Robert  Hodgson  was  promptly  sent  to  the 
shore  to  take  possession  of  it  in  the  name  of  the  British 
government.'^  Hodgson  called  a  meeting  of  the  lead- 
ing Mosquitos  and  made  known  his  purpose  to  them. 
Then,  probably  through  a  liberal  use  of  promises  and 
rum,  he  secured  their  assent  to  a  series  of  articles 
which  he  drew  up."  These  articles  formally  trans- 
ferred the  sovereignty  of  the  shore  to  the  British  gov- 
ernment, and  made  a  Sambo  chief,  to  whom  the  others 
were  required  to  swear  allegiance,  the  local  ruler." 

Hodgson's  attempt  to  produce  a  revolt  of  the  back- 
country  Indians  failed,  as  did  also  Anson's  and  Ver- 
non's expeditions,  so  there  were  no  British  conquests 
in  Central  America  in  consequence  of  Trelawney 's 
scheme."  The  British  government,  however,  was  now 
determined  to  secure  a  firm  hold  upon  the  Mosquito 
Shore.  Therefore  Hodgson  was  appointed  superin- 
tendent of  the  region,  and  in  1749  he  erected  a  fort  at 
Black  River,  hoisted  a  British  flag,  and  established  a 
garrison  of  100  men  sent  from  Jamaica."    His  action 

"  U.  S.  Docs.,  ser.  no.  660,  doc.  37,  p.  8j. 

^*  Pari.  Papers,  1847,  Corns.,  LXIV,  "Spanish-American  Republics", 
29;  Bard,  Waikna,  340. 

"  U.  S.  Docs.,  ser.  no.  660,  doc.  27,  pp.  85-86;  Bard,  Waikna.  340-343- 

''*  Pari.  Papers,  1847,  Corns.,  LXIV,  "  Spanish-.Xnierican  Republics", 
29;  U.  S.  Docs.,  ser.  no.  660,  doc.  27,  p.  84;  Bard,  Waikna,  340-342; 
Scherzer,  Travels  in  Central  America,  II,  31. 

"  U.  S.  Docs.,  ser.  no.  660,  doc.  27,  p.  86;  Travis,  Clayton-Bulwer 
Treaty,  24;  Bancroft,  Central  America,  II,  601. 

''*  Pari.  Papers,  1847,  Corns.,  LXIV,  "Spanish-American  Republics", 
29;  Bard,  Waikna,  343;  Lucas,  Historical  Geography,  II,  299. 


BRITISH  IN  CENTRAL  AMERICA  BEFORE  1815    17 

really  amounted  to  a  formal  assumption  of  possession 
on  the  part  of  the  British  government.  His  function 
was  to  look  after  British  interests  generally,  and  par- 
ticularly those  of  a  commercial  nature.  This  latter 
duty  included  the  cultivation  and  preservation  of 
friendship  with  the  Mosquitos." 

In  the  autumn  of  1739,  before  the  arrival  of 
Hodgson,  the  Spanish  ambassador  to  England  had 
complained  that  the  English  of  Jamaica  incited  the 
Mosquitos  to  attacks  on  the  adjacent  Spanish  settle- 
ments.^" After  the  arrival  of  the  superintendent  and 
the  formal  occupation  of  the  region,  protests  were 
uttered  again  and  again.  In  1750  the  Spanish  threat- 
ened to  expel  the  intruders  by  force."  By  way  of  reply 
to  this,  Hodgson,  at  Trelawney's  instructions,  repre- 
sented that  the  object  in  stationing  a  superintendent  on 
the  shore  was  to  prevent  British  hostilities  against  the 
Spanish.^  For  a  time  the  Spaniards  were,  or  pre- 
tended to  be,  deceived,  and  complimented  Hodgson 
with  the  title  of  colonel  for  his  professed  services.'' 
But  the  aggressions  of  the  British  continued,  and  the 
Spanish  finally  prepared  for  hostile  action.** 

The  British  settlers,  who  numbered  about  a  thousand 
at  the  time,'°  were  alarmed  at  this,  as  was  also  Governor 
Knowles,    Trelawney's    successor.'"     Knowles    lacked 

''*  Pari.  Papers,  1847,  Corns.,  LXIV,  "Spanish-American  Republics", 
29. 

*"  Bard,  Waikna,  343. 

^'^  Ibid.;  Bancroft,  Central  America,  II,  601-602;  Keane,  Central  and 
South  America,  II,  237. 

'^  Bard,  Waikna,  343;  Bancroft,  Central  America,  II,  602. 

''Bard,  Waikna,  343-344;  Bancroft,  Central  America,  II,  602. 

**  Bard,  Waikna,  344;  Bancroft,  Central  America,  II,  602. 

''Pari.  Papers,  1847,  Corns.,  LXIV,  "  Spanish- American  Republics", 
36. 

'"  Bard,  Waikna,  344. 


i8     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

the  enthusiasm  for  British  territorial  expansion  which 
had  moved  his  predecessor ;  accordingly  he  wrote  to 
the  home  government  that  the  whole  Mosquito  affair 
was  "  a  job  ",  and  that  if  Hodgson  were  not  checked 
or  recalled  he  would  involve  the  nation  in  difficulties." 
While  waiting  for  a  reply  from  home,  Knowles  wrote 
to  the  captain-general  of  Guatemala  in  an  effort  to  pre- 
serve peace/'  In  consequence  of  these  endeavors,  a 
more  pacific  spirit  was  displayed  by  the  Spaniards." 
But  with  the  accession  of  a  new  governor  the  old  diffi- 
culties returned,  and  helped  produce  a  conflict  with 
Spain." 

By  the  treaty  of  1763  which  concluded  this  conflict, 
Great  Britain  agreed  not  only  to  demolish  all  fortifica- 
tions erected  by  British  subjects  in  the  Bay  of  Hondu- 
ras, but  also  in  "  other  places  of  the  territory  of  Spain 
in  that  part  of  the  world  ". "  In  the  following  year, 
orders  were  given  for  the  destruction  of  the  fort  at 
Black  River,  and  the  withdrawal  of  the  garrison ;  ** 
and  the  orders  were  executed."  But  the  settlers  were 
reluctant  to  leave  the  shore,  and  the  British  govern- 
ment, probably  influenced  by  Otway,  the  existing  super- 
intendent,"* soon  changed  its  policy. 

In  view  of  their  bitter  opposition  to  British  interfer- 
ence in  Mosquito  territory,  it  is  certain  that  the  Spanish 

"  Rard,   H'aikna,  344;  Travis,  Clayton-Duhvcr  Treaty,  26. 

*'  I5ar(l,  W'aikna,  344. 

*»  Travis,  Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty,  26. 

""Ibid.;  Bard,  ll'aikna,  344;   Bancroft,  Central  America,  II,  602. 

*^  Ann.  Reg..  1762,  "State  Papers",  239. 

"Pari.  Papers,  1847,  Coins.,  LXIV,  ".Spanish-American  Republics", 
30. 

■•  Travis,  Clayton-Buluer  Treaty,  26. 

**  Pari.  Papers.  1847,  Corns.,  LX1\'.  "  Spanish-.Nmerican  Republics", 
30. 


BRITISH  IN  CENTRAL  AMERICA  BEFORE  1815    19 

authorities  intended  the  terms  of  the  treaty  to  apply  to 
this  whole  territory  as  well  as  to  the  settlements  strictly 
upon  the  shores  of  the  Bay  of  Honduras ;  but  in  the 
wording  of  the  agreement  the  British  saw  a  chance  for 
evasion.  Could  the  whole  of  the  Mosquito  Shore  be 
regarded  as  lying  in  the  Bay-of-Honduras  "  part  of 
the  world  "  ?  Black  River  might  be  so  considered,  but 
not  the  settlement  at  Cape  Gracias  a  Dios,  and  surely 
not  Bluefields,  which  was  far  to  the  south  and  near  the 
mouth  of  the  San  Juan  River. 

Apparently  certain  of  good  ground  for  defense  of 
their  action,  the  British  soon  resumed  occupation  of  the 
shore,  under  pretense  that  they  had  been  imposed  upon 
by  the  Spanish  court  w^hen  they  gave  orders  for  evacu- 
ation of  the  region.°°  The  system  of  appointing  super- 
intendents was  restored.  Robert  Hodgson,  son  of  the 
first  superintendent,  held  office  from  1767  to  1775, 
when,  as  a  new  plan  of  government  was  decided  upon, 
he  was  recalled."*'  This  plan  provided  for  a  superin- 
tendent and  an  elective  council  of  twelve  members. 
With  the  approval  of  the  Jamaican  authorities  these 
officers  could  make  police  regulations  for  the  country." 

While  the  British  were  establishing  themselves  more 
firmly  upon  the  Mosquito  Shore,  the  Spanish  were  by 
no  means  passive.  They  protested  emphatically,  and  at 
times  resorted  to  retaliatory  measures ;  °^  but  the  well- 
known  weakness  of  Spain  and  the  evident  value  of  the 

'5  Ibid. 

*'  Travis,  Clayton-Buhver  Treaty,  2y. 

"  Pari.  Papers,  1847,  Corns.,  LXIV,  "  Spanish-American  Republics ", 
32;  Travis,  Clayton-Buhver  Treaty,  27. 

^^  Pari.  Papers,  1847,  Corns.,  LXIV,  "Spanish-American  Republics", 
32-34;  Bancroft,  Central  America,  II,  602-604. 


20     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

coast  led  the  British  to  take  a  more  bold  and  open  atti- 
tude than  formerly.  In  reply  to  Spanish  protests,  the 
British  government  declared  that  the  Mosquito  terri- 
tory had  never  been  conquered  by  the  Spaniards ; 
consequently,  its  king  was  an  independent  sovereign 
and  quite  capable  of  acting  politically  as  such." 

The  indignation  of  the  Spanish  government  at  these 
claims  influenced  it  to  aid  the  revolting  American  colo- 
nies in  1779."°  England,  in  retaliation  for  this  un- 
friendly act,  formed  a  daring  plan  for  indemnifying 
herself  through  conquests  from  Spain  for  the  probable 
loss  of  her  Atlantic  colonies."*  By  means  of  aid  from 
the  Mosquitos,  the  Spanish  colonial  dominions  were  to 
be  cut  into  two  parts,  along  the  line  of  the  San  Juan 
River  and  Lake  Nicarauga,  after  which  each  section 
was  to  be  conquered  separately."^  Governor  Dalling 
of  Jamaica,  with  whom  the  plan  originated,  was  put 
in  control  of  the  bold  undertaking.^"*  The  Mosquitos 
did  not  give  so  much  aid  as  had  been  counted  upon, 
however,  and  in  some  cases  even  went  over  to  the 
enemy.'***  The  rainy  season  set  in,  and  with  it  came 
disease.  Adequate  food  and  clothing  and  medical 
supplies  were  lacking,  and  the  whole  enterprise  ended 

'•'Pari.  Papers,  1847,  Corns.,  LXIV,  "Spanish-American  Republics", 
30;  Travis,  Mosquito  History,  8;  De  Botv's  Rei^eiv,  XXVII,  553. 

""Travis,  Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty,  27. 

'"  Tortier  and  Ficklcn,  Central  America  and  Mexico,  115. 

^"^  Ibid.     Cf.  Edwards,  British  West  Indies,  V,  2:2,  214. 

^0*  Kctnble  Papers,  II,  "  Preface,"  7. 

^••*  Kembte  Papers.  II,  7,  406;  Hist.  MS.S.  Comni.,  Report  on  MSS.  of 
Mrs.  Stopford-Sackville,  II,  287-388;  Crowe,  Gospel  in  Central  America, 
187. 


BRITISH  IN  CENTRAL  AMERICA  BEFORE  1815    21 

in  great  disaster/"*  Of  the  more  than  2,000  men  sent 
out  only  380  returned  to  Jamaica."' 

At  first  the  Spanish  were  also  successful  on  the 
Mosquito  coast  itself,  for  the  British  garrison  had  been 
reduced.""  The  fort  at  Black  River  was  captured  in 
March,  1782,  and  the  settlers  were  forced  to  take 
refuge  at  Cape  Gracias  a  Dios."'  But  reinforcements 
were  sent,  and  in  five  months  the  whole  region  was  in 
control  of  the  British,  in  whose  hands  it  was  when  the 
war  ended."" 

When  the  treaty  of  1783  was  being  negotiated,  the 
question  of  British  settlements  in  Central  America 
gave  considerable  anxiety  to  the  British  cabinet.  After 
the  ambitious  plans  for  conquest  of  Spanish  soil  had 
failed,  the  British  government  had  no  intention  of 
relaxing  the  hold  maintained  on  Mosquito  territory 
previous  to  the  war.  The  Spanish,  however,  were 
determined  to  drive  the  enemy  from  all  of  their  terri- 
tory except  Belize ;  therefore  the  definitive  treaty  of 
peace  stipulated  by  its  sixth  article  that  all  English 
settlers  except  those  at  Belize  should  retire  from  the 
"  Spanish  continent  "."°  The  British  cabinet  objected 
to  the  article  on  the  ground  that  it  gave  greater  con- 
cessions than  were  warranted  by  the  preliminaries,  and 
wished  to  defer  for  six  months  the  agreement  regard- 

^"^  Kemble  Papers,  II,  3-65,  passim;  Crowe,  Gospel  in  Central  America, 
187;  Fortier  and  Ficklen,  Central  America  and  Mexico,  117;  Mahan, 
Interest  of  America  in  Sea  Power,  80;  Bancroft,  Central  America,  II, 
6ii. 

i""  Crowe,  Gospel  in  Central  America,  187;  Fortier  and  Ficklen,  Central 
America  and  Mexico,  117. 

^0'' Pari.  Papers,  1847,  Corns.,  LXIV,  "  Spanish- American  Republics", 
34- 

i»8  Ibid.,  34-35- 

^"^  Ibid.,  35;  Travis,  Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty,  28. 

^'' Ann.  Reg.,  1783,  "State  Papers",  334-335. 


22     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

ing  the  question  covered  by  the  article.'"  But  as  it 
seemed  desirable  to  sign  the  treaties  as  soon  as  possible, 
Fox  pointed  out  to  the  King  that  the  British  govern- 
ment could  put  its  own  interpretation  upon  the  words 
"  Spanish  continent  ",  and  could  determine  whether 
the  Mosquito  Shore  came  under  that  description  or 
not.'"  The  King  gave  his  consent,  and  Fox  instructed 
the  Duke  of  Manchester  to  accede  to  the  objectionable 
article  unless  he  could  prevail  upon  the  other  negotia- 
tors to  defer  the  consideration  of  it."'  Further  delay 
seemed  undesirable,  and  the  treaty  was  signed  with 
this  article  unchanged. 

After  the  agreement  was  ratified  the  British  made  no 
move  towards  the  evacuation  of  the  Mosquito  Shore, 
and,  in  reply  to  the  protests  of  Spain,  declared  that  the 
shore  was  not  a  part  of  the  "  Spanish  continent ",  but 
of  the  "  American  continent  "."*  Nevertheless  the 
Spanish  government  was  determined,  and  as  England 
was  crippled  by  a  long  and  unsuccessful  war,  and  by 
discontent  at  home,  she  was  forced  to  yield.  After  a 
long  and  bitter  discussion,  the  treaty  of  1786,  which 
left  no  loophole  for  British  evasion,  was  signed."*  This 
stipulated  that  "  His  Britannic  Majesty's  subjects,  and 
the  other  colonists  who  have  hitherto  enjoyed  the  pro- 
tection of  England,  shall  evacuate  the  country  of  the 
Mosquitos,  as  well  as  the  continent  in  general,  and  the 
islands  adjacent,  without  exception,  situated  beyond  the 

"*  I'ox,  Memoirs  and  Correspondence,  II,  122,  124. 

^*  Ibid.,  123-123. 

^^  Ibid.,  124. 

^^*  Pari.  Papers,  1847,  Cams.,  LXIV,  "  Spanisli-.\niericaii  Republics", 
.■?5-36;   Bard,   JCaiA-iia,   344;   Keanc,  Central  and  South  .America.   II,  2i^. 

^^^  Pari.  Papers,  1847,  Corns.,  LXIV,  "  Spanish  Anieiiiaii  HepiiMi.s  ". 
36;  lUirney,  Buccaneers  of  .America,  102. 


BRITISH  IN  CENTRAL  AMERICA  BEFORE  1815    23 

line  hereinafter  described  ".""  The  line  referred  to 
was  the  new  and  more  comprehensive  boundary  for 
Belize  settlement. 

The  Indians  were  much  opposed  to  the  arrange- 
ment/" and  in  their  opposition  were  probably  sup- 
ported by  the  settlers,  some  of  whom  remained  in  defi- 
ance of  the  treaty,"*  and  by  the  traders."'  Several 
attempts  were  made  by  the  Spaniards  to  subjugate  the 
Indians  and  to  establish  permanent  settlements  upon 
the  coast,  but  all  in  vain.  In  1796  the  Mosquitos  re- 
captured the  last  settlement — that  on  Black  River — 
and  drove  out  the  Spaniards."^"  This  seems  to  have 
been  the  last  effort  of  Spain  to  secure  control  of  the 
Mosquito  Shore. 

After  the  treaty  of  1786  the  British  gave  up  all  open 
political  relations  with  the  Mosquitos.""  Yet  the  influ- 
ence of  the  contraband  traders,  to  whom  the  Indians 
were  still  invaluable,  did  much  towards  preserving  a 
friendly  feeling  for  Great  Britain.  This  friendliness 
was  also  fostered  by  a  continuance,  by  the  Belize 
authorities,  of  an  old  custom  of  feasting  the  leading 
Mosquitos  and  of  distributing  presents  among  them."^ 
Because  of  this  attention  the  Mosquitos  seem  to  have 

''■^'^  Ann.  Reg.,  1786,  "  State  Papers  ",  p.  263.  This  treaty  was  very  un- 
popular and  led  to  a  vote  of  censure  by  the  House  of  Lords  against  the 
government.  After  a  long,  sharp  debate  the  motion  was  defeated.  Ann. 
Reg.,  1787,  "History",  1 11- 114. 

"'  Stout,  Nicaragua,  168. 

'^^^  Pari.  Papers,  1847,  Corns.,  LXIV,  "Spanish-American  Republics", 
36;  Roberts,  Central  America,  283;  Bancroft,  Central  America,  II,  606. 

^^  Kemble  Papers,  II,  428;  Bonnycastle,  Spanish  America,  I,  174. 

^*'*  Bancroft,  Central  America,  II,  607;  Travis,  Clayton-Biilwer  Treaty, 
30. 

^^  Bard,  Waikna,  345;  Bancroft,  Central  America,  II,  606-607. 

^^  Henderson,  British  Settlement  of  Honduras,  165-182;  Edwards, 
British  West  Indies,  V,  206. 


24     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

considered  themselves  as  still  under  British  protection, 
and  the  Spanish  tacitly  permitted  them  to  do  so/"" 

As  long  as  Spain  retained  dominion  over  Central 
America,  the  British  government  refrained  from  all 
further  attempts  at  interference  with  the  Mosquitos, 
and  showed  no  special  interest  in  the  shore.  In  1814, 
by  a  treaty  already  described,  she  confirmed  Spain  in 
her  sovereignty  over  it.  Shortly  after  this  a  captain  in 
the  corps  of  royal  British  engineers,  who  had  made  a 
voyage  in  the  region,  wrote :  "  The  Mosquito  shore 
.  .  .  has  been  claimed  by  the  British.  The  English 
held  this  country  for  eighty  years,  and  abandoned  it  in 
1787  and  1788.  The  Spaniards  call  it  a  part  of  Hon- 
duras,'"" which  it  really  is,  and  claim  it  as  such." "" 
This  statement  seems  to  reflect  the  view  of  the  British 
government  at  the  time.  The  British  protectorate  no 
longer  existed,  and  British  control  on  the  shore  was  a 
thing  of  the  past. 

Such  was  the  character  of  British  influence  in  Cen- 
tral America,  extending  over  a  period  of  more  than  a 
century  and  a  half.  At  one  time  Great  Britain  had 
some  basis  for  asserting  a  legal  claim  to  all  of  the  terri- 
tory towards  which  her  interests  were  directed ;  "*  and 
at  times  she  exercised  full  control,  now  over  one  portion 
and  now  over  another,  in  disregard  of  Spanish  sover- 
eign rights,  and  frequently  in  defiance  of  treaty  stipu- 
lations. After  a  long  struggle,  largely  devoid  of 
success,  Spain  was  finally  able  to  strike  an  effective 
blow  by  the  treaty  of   1786.     By  means  of  this  she 

'^  .Stout,  Nicaragua,  168. 

"*  The  northern,  or  Ilonduran,  part  of  the  shore  had  been  described 
by  the  writer. 

'-'  liuniiycastle,  Spanish  Atnerica,  I,   171. 
*''*  The  treaty  of  1670. 


BRITISH  IN  CENTRAL  AMERICA  BEFORE  1815    25 

drove  the  British  from  the  Bay  Islands  and  from  the 
Mosquito  Shore,  but  permitted  the  retention  of  the 
BeHze  concession,  while  carefully  keeping  in  the  Span- 
ish Crown  the  sovereignty  over  Belize  territory.  The 
years  which  followed  were  largely  occupied  by  the 
French  Revolution  and  the  Napoleonic  wars.  During 
this  period,  Great  Britain,  from  lack  of  inclination  or 
lack  of  opportunity,  failed  to  recover  the  hold  which 
she  had  lost.  Therefore,  at  the  date  with  which  the 
next  chapter  opens  her  Central  American  relations 
were  on  the  same  basis  as  immediately  after  the  treaty 
of  1786. 


CHAPTER  II. 

British  Aggressions;  American  Interest 
Awakened,  i8i 5-1850. 

With  the  year  181 5  there  opened  a  new  era  for  the 
United  States.  Though  in  the  War  of  181 2  the  vision- 
ary Republican  party  had  utterly  failed  in  its  schemes 
for  conquest,  yet  the  nation  had  fought  its  battles  alone, 
and,  while  frequently  defeated  and  discouraged,  had 
finally  won  an  inspiring  victory  at  New  Orleans.  The 
conflict  roused  the  American  people  as  a  whole  to 
national  consciousness  and  filled  them  with  a  confi- 
dence in  their  own  possibilities,  hitherto  lacking.  With 
the  close  of  the  struggle  the  country  assumed  a  more 
secure  and  dignified  position  among  the  nations. 

After  this  second  war  for  independence,  the  attitude 
of  England,  especially,  was  altered  towards  the  United 
States.  She  not  only  showed  a  sincere  desire  to  refrain 
from  any  unseemly  meddling  with  American  aflfairs, 
but  even  displayed  a  real  anxiety  to  avoid  all  chances 
for  future  trouble.  Actual  concessions  were  as  a  rule 
reluctantly  granted,  but  the  discussion  of  subjects  out 
of  which  serious  differences  might  arise  was  avoided 
if  possible,  or  postponed.  It  was  this  determination  on 
the  part  of  the  British  to  maintain  a  pacific  policy  that 
prevented  embarrassing  complications  as  a  result  of 
Jackson's  violent  proceedings  in  Florida ; '  and  it  was 
undoubtedly  also  influential  in  effecting  the  temporary 

^  Reddaway,    Monro*  Doctrine,    14,    33.      Cf.    Rush,   Rtsidenct  at   the 
Court  of  London,  399-413. 

26 


AMERICAN  INTEREST  AWAKENED,  i8 15-1850      27 

arrangements  regarding  Oregon,  made  by  the  conven- 
tion of  1818/ 

Up  to  1823  nothing  had  arisen  seriously  to  disturb 
the  good  f eeHng  between  the  two  governments.  When, 
therefore,  the  "  Monroe  doctrine  "  was  first  given  ex- 
pression in  December  of  that  year,  popular  enthusiasm 
was  roused  in  America  for  the  British  government 
because  of  the  well-known  position  of  Canning  towards 
the  designs  of  the  Holy  Alliance.  Few  outside  of  the 
American  cabinet  suspected  that  the  attitude  displayed 
by  the  President's  message  was  not  welcome  to  Eng- 
land, and  might  prove  an  embarrassing  obstruction  in 
the  execution  of  plans  which  she  herself  cherished  for 
the  extension  of  power  in  the  western  world.^ 

Nevertheless,  Canning  was  decidedly  taken  aback  by 
this  independent  stand  of  the  American  government. 
However,  without  revealing  his  own  views,  and  care- 
fully refraining  from  all  open  acts  which  might  rouse 
antagonism,  he  proceeded  to  adopt  and  carry  out  a 
policy  calculated  to  render  ineffective  the  Monroe  doc-  1 
trine  in  so  far  as  it  conflicted  with  British  designs.Mil 
Canning's  general  policy  was  to  prevent  Latin  America 
from  looking  towards  the  United  States  for  help  and 
from  seeking  alliances  with  her.°    For  this  purpose  the 

-  Beauinarchais,  La  doctrine  de  Monroe,  2,  6-7. 

^  Reddaway,  Monroe  Doctrine,  88. 

■•  J.  Q.  Adams  early  discerned  the  unfriendly  character  of  Canning's 
attitude  (Adams,  Memoirs,  III,  437),  and  upon  learning  of  Canning's 
death  in  1827,  wrote  in  his  diary:  "  May  this  event,  in  the  order  of 
Providence,  avert  all  the  evils  which  he  would,  if  permitted,  have  drawn 
down  upon  us,  and  all  evil  counsels  formed  against  our  peace  and 
prosperity  be  baffled  and  defeated!"     Ibid.,  VII,  328. 

°  Chatfield  to  Palmerston,  Oct.  28,  1835,  F.  C,  Cen.  Am.,  vol.  16,  no. 
26;  Temperley,  "Later  American  Policy  of  George  Canning",  in  Am. 
Hist.  Rev.,  XI,  783,  787-788.  For  instance,  on  February  8,  1826,  Canning 
wrote  to  Vaughan:    "The  avowed  pretension  of  the  United  States  to  put 


28     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

British  government  was  to  secure  a  preponderating 
influence,  politically  and  economically,  in  the  new 
states." 

Great  Britain  was  especially  interested  in  Central 
America  because  of  early  relations  there,  and,  in  con- 
sequence of  Monroe's  proclamation,  suspected  the 
American  government  of  watching  with  particular 
attention  British  movements  in  that  quarter.  However, 
at  this  period  the  American  government  did  not  merit 
the  suspicion  directed  towards  it.  As  yet  the  United 
States  as  a  nation  had  hardly  secured  her  bearings; 
she  was  a  second  rate  power  with  an  uncertain  future. 
Her  population  numbered  but  little  more  than  ten  mil- 
lion, and  was  confined  to  the  eastern  fourth  of  the 
present  settled  area.  In  proportion  as  her  national 
strength  was  less  than  it  is  now,  so  also  were  her  inter- 
ests less  comprehensive.  The  Monroe  doctrine,  though 
boldly  uttered,  was  merely  defensive  in  aim ;  and  for 
many  years  it  was  applied  only  to  territory  actually 
contiguous  to  American  borders.  The  great  triangle 
of  Mexican  domain  shut  ofif  the  attention  of  the  United 
States  government  from  Central  America. 

Though  Central  America  as  well  as  the  other 
Spanish-American  republics  received  Monroe's  declar- 
ation with  enthusiasm  and  looked  towards  the  north 

themselves  at  tlie  head  of  the  confederacy  of  all  the  Americas,  and  to 
sway  that  confederacy  against  Europe,  ((Ireat  Britain  included),  is  not 
a  pretension  identified  with  our  interests,  or  one  that  we  can  countenance 
as  tolerable. 

"  It  is  however  a  pretension  which  there  is  no  use  in  contesting  in 
the  abstract;  but  we  must  not  say  anything  that  seems  to  admit  the 
principle."  Mass.  Hist.  Soc,  Proc,  XL\'I,  jj4;  cj.  Rush,  Th*  Court 
of  London  from  1S19  to  i8JS,  PP-  43«-433.  47 •• 

"Turner,  Rise  of  the  Neto  iVest,  222;  Paxson,  Indcfendencr  of  th* 
South  American  Republics,   i-S-js-J,  passim. 


AMERICAN  INTEREST  AWAKENED,  i8 15-1850      29 

for  protection  from  European  enemies,  there  is  nothing 
in  either  the  EngHsh  or  the  American  archives  to  show 
that,  for  the  first  two  decades  following  the  proclama- 
tion, the  United  States  government  took  any  special, 
interest  in  British  encroachments  on  the  American 
isthmus,  or  made  any  active  attempts  to  check  them.^ 
°*jRri825  the  government  was  invited  to  send  delegates 
to  a  great  pan-American  congress  at  which  was  to  be 
discussed,  among  other  questions,  the  manner  in  which 
all  colonization  of  European  powers  on  the  American 
continent  should  be  resisted.'  It  is  true  that  on  this 
occasion  much  interest  was  shown  by  the  United  States, ° 
but  in  the  instructions  given  the  American  representa- 
tives no  special  mention  was  made  of  Central  America, 
or  of  British  aggressions  in  that  region."  Moreover,  it 
should  be  borne  in  mind  that  Great  Britain  also  was 
invited  to  the  congress.  However,  as  is  well  known, 
party  opposition  to  President  Adams  prevented  the 
American  delegates  from  reaching  Panama  in  time, 
and  the  congress  itself  came  to  nothing. 

In  fact,  for  a  long  period  the  United  States  govern- 
ment not  only  ignored  Central  America  so  far  as  the 

'In  1824  the  United  States  government  decided  to  send  an  informal 
agent,  Mann,  to  Guatemala.  J.  Q.  Adams,  the  secretary  of  state,  in- 
structed Mann  that  the  first  object  of  his  mission  would  be  to  gather 
information  about  the  new  republic.  Guatemala,  Adams  wrote  in  his 
diary,  was  important  because  of  its  location  on  the  isthmus,  and  because 
of  the  "  commercial  connections,  and  lodgments  on  the  soil  by  the  British, 
with  the  neighboring  bay  of  Honduras  and  Mosquito  shore  ".  Memoirs, 
VI,  325.  No  note  of  resentment  towards  British  interests  in  Central 
America  is  evident  in  the  words  just  quoted.  If  such  resentment  had 
been  felt  by  the  American  government,  it  seems  probable  that  Adams's 
jealous  patriotism  would  have  caused  him  promptly  to  reflect  it.  See 
above,  note  4. 

'  Brit,  and  For.  State  Papers,  XIII,  307. 

^  Am.  State  Papers,  For.  Relats.,  V,  916-919;  VI,  356-366. 

"Sr«Y.  and  For.  State  Papers,  XV,  832-862. 


30     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

principles  of  the  Monroe  doctrine  were  concerned,  but 
also  quite  neglected  that  country  itself.  Only  occa- 
sionally were  agents  of  the  United  States  sent  there, 
and  those  who  were  sent  appear  to  have  lacked  both 
interest  and  efficiency."  In  their  instructions,  the 
American  agents  were  often  directed  to  emphasize  to 
the  restless  states  the  importance  of  union  to  the  main- 
tenance of  republican  government,"  but  though  the 
history  of  British  encroachments  in  Central  America 
must  have  been  pretty  well  known  to  the  Washington 
authorities,  nothing  appears  in  the  instructions  regard- 
ing the  matter;  furthermore,  the  despatches  of  the 
^agents  contain  no  allusion  to  it. 

Meanwhile  the  British  improved  their  opportunity. 
During  the  last  years  of  Spanish  control  and  in  th^ 
period  of  the  Central  American  confederation  they 
advanced  but  slowly,  largely  content  to  keep  ofT  all 
intruders  and  to  hold  the  ground  previously  gained." 
At  this  time  a  desire  to  be  on  good  terms  with  the 
United  States,  as  well  as  the  lack  of  special  interest, 
prevented  the  British  government  itself  from  adopting 
a  very  strong  policy  in  Central  America,  though  its 
agents  in  the  region  displayed  much  aggressiveness. 
But  almost  simultaneously  with  the  dissolution  of  the 
confederation  in  1839,  and  the  consequent  loss  of  power 
of  united  resistance,  appeared  a  greater  jealousy  of 

"  Dept.  of  State,  Inst.,  Am.  States,  vol.  15,  p.  15;  Squier  to  Clayton, 
Aug.  20,   1849,  Dept.  of  State,  Des.,  Guat.,  vol.  2. 

"  Dept.  of  Slate,  Inst.,  Am.   States,  vol.   14,  p.  aia,  and  passim. 

"  Schenley  to  I'lanta,  May  21,  1826,  F.  O.,  Cen.  Am.,  vol.  5;  Memor- 
andum from  the  British  Tremier,  1829,  C.  O.,  Hond.,  vol.  40;  Palmerston 
to  Granville,  Oct.  4,  1831,  ibid.,  vol.  42;  Granville  to  Palmerston,  Oct.  34, 
1831,  ibid. 


AMERICAN  INTEREST  AWAKENED,  i8 15-1850      31 

American  designs,  which  overcame  the  earHer  hesita- 
tion, and  the  policy  of  the  government  became  as 
aggressive  as  its  agents  could  desire.  With  the  ap- 
proval of  their  superiors,  the  British  representatives 
intrigued  to  prevent  further  union,"  and  set  one  v^eak 
state  or  warring  faction  against  the  other  to  the  advan- 
tage of  their  country,  and  at  the  same  time  extended 
their  hold  upon  Central  American  territory.  The  Brit- 
ish interference  to  prevent  a  closer  union  of  states  will 
be  shown  later,  but  attention  is  now  directed  to  the 
British  plan  of  acquiring  more  territory. 

In  the  early  part  of  the  period  under  consideration 
the  center  of  British  influence  was  Belize.  During  the 
last  years  of  Spanish  sovereignty,  when  commissioners 
no  longer  visited  the  region,  the  settlers  gradually 
spread  south  of  the  Sibun  River  into  Guatemalan  terri- 
tory, and  at  the  time  of  Central  American  independence 
had  reached  the  Sarstoon."  After  the  overthrow  of 
Spanish  power,  the  British  government  was  anxious 
to  preserve  to  the  settlers  the  rights  granted  by  Spain. 
Consequently,  suspicious  over  the  wording  of  a  treaty 
of  alliance  made  between  Guatemala  and  Colombia  in 
1825,"  it  required  a  distinct  declaration  from  each  state 
that  neither  designed  to  arrogate  pretensions  to  a  terri- 
torial authority  which  might  possibly  clash  with  British 
possessory  rights  in  Belize."  In  a  treaty  made  with 
Mexico  in  1826,  Great  Britain  also  secured  the  intro- 
duction of  a  clause  guaranteeing  to  the  British  at  Belize 

"  Froebel,  Seven  Years  in  Central  America,  193-194;  Scherzer,  Travels 
in  Central  America,  II,  31. 

"  Codd  to  Goderich,  Nov.  24,  1827,  C.  O.,  Hond.,  vol.  38. 

^*  Brit,  and  For.  State  Papers,  XII,  802-811. 

"  Chatfield  to  Palmerston,  Feb.  3,  1834,  F.  O.,  Cen.  Am.,  vol.   14. 


32     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

the  same  terms  as  were  given  by  Spain  forty  years 
before." 

Bad  feeling  arose  between  the  Central  American 
confederation  and  the  British  settlers  almost  immedi- 
ately." As  a  result  of  complaints  from  the  latter  the 
British  colonial  secretary  consulted  the  legal  adviser 
of  the  Crown  regarding  the  status  of  Belize.  That 
official,  basing  his  judgment  upon  the  treaties  of  1802, 
1809,  and  1814,  referred  to  in  the  preceding  chapter, 
gave  the  opinion  that  the  treaties  of  1783  and  1786 
were  still  in  force.'"  This  decision  prevented  the  estab- 
lishment of  full  British  sovereignty  over  the  territory, 
for  which  the  settlers  had  hoped ;  °'  consequently  the 
inimical  relations  continued.  Soon  complaints  against 
the  Central  Americans  were  again  made  to  the  home 
government,  accompanied  by  the  statement  that  the 
unfriendly  Central  American  attitude  was  caused  by 
the  presence  of  people  from  the  United  States.*^  A 
little  later  the  superintendent  announced  that  North 
Americans  were  planning  to  settle  in  the  region  be- 
tween the  Sibun  and  the  Sarstoon  rivers.^  This  report 
seemed  to  rouse  the  British  premier  to  consider  the 
situation  seriously.  He  admitted  as  undeniable  the 
right  of  Spain  to  the  Belize  territory,  but  felt  it  desir- 
able to  determine  whether  she  would  not  relinquish  her 

*' BWt.  ar,d  For.  State  Patters,  XIV,  6^5.  A  little  later  an  attempt  to 
secure  the  same  agreement  with  Central  .\merica  failed  because  the 
Central  .Xmerican  agent  in  I_x)ndon  lacked  the  necessary  powers.  Edging- 
ton,  Monroe  Doctrine,  64. 

'»  Codd  to  Rathurst,  Feb.  6,  1825,  F.  O.,  Cen.  Am.,  vol.  4. 

^^  Robinson  to  Rathurst,  July  8,  1825,  C.  O.,  Hond.,  vol.  36. 

^  Codd  to  Goderich,  Nov.  24,  1827,  ibid.,  vol.  38. 

"Schenley  to  Planta,  May  31,  1826,  F.  O.,  Cen.  Am.,  vol.  5. 

•^  Memorandum  of  Rritish  rrcmier,  1829,  C.  O.,  Hond.,  vol.  40.  Tli< 
report  was  evidently  false,  for  nothing  further  was  said  regarding  the 
matter. 


AMERICAN  INTEREST  AWAKENED,  1815-1850      33 

claims.  Should  she  be  unwilling  to  do  this,  he  thought 
it  might  be  well  to  regard  the  territory  as  a  part  of  the 
state  of  Guatemala,  and  to  offer  the  Central  American 
government  an  earlier  recognition  in  return  for  the 
cession  of  it.^ 

Nothing  resulted  from  the  suggestion  at  the  time, 
how^ever,  but  w^hen  the  Liberals  under  lead  of  jMorazan 
gained  control  of  the  Central  American  government 
they  demanded  that  the  British  settlers  retreat  to  the 
territory  beyond  the  Sibun,  the  southern  boundary 
established  by  the  treaty  of  1786."  This  led  the  British 
agents  to  support  the  Serviles,  who  were  more  indiffer- 
ent to  British  encroachments,  and  to  work  for  the 
overthrow  of  Morazan."*  The  demand  of  the  Liberals 
also  caused  Palmerston  to  oppose  a  suggestion ""  to 
settle  the  strife  by  means  of  a  treaty  with  Guatemala," 
and  to  instruct  Chatfield,  the  British  consul,  to  refrain 
from  all  discussion  of  the  question  of  boundaries  with 
the  Central  American  government,  warning  him  not  to 
give  them  any  reason  to  think  that  the  British  govern- 
ment considered  the  question  one  with  which  they  had 
any  concern."' 

Insistent  upon  maintaining  w'hat  it  regarded  as  its 
rights,  the  Central  American  government  confirmed  a 
cession  of  tracts  of  territory  between  the  Sibun  and  the 
Sarstoon,  made  by  the  state  of  Guatemala,  to  a  land 

*«  Ibid. 

**  Cockburn  to  Goderich,  Jan.  26,  1833,  F.  O.,  Cen.  Am.,  vol.  13,  no.  52. 

^Chatfield  to  Palmerston,  Feb.  3,  1834,  F.  O.,  Am.,  vol.  14;  Squier, 
Nicaragua,  II,  412-414;  Stephens,  Central  America,  II,  47-49. 

"  Backhouse  to  Cockburn,  Feb.  19,  1834,  C.  O.,  Hond.,  vol.  45. 

**  Cockburn  to  Goderich,  Jan.  30,  1833,  F.  O.,  Cen.  Am.,  vol.  13. 

*•  Palmerston  to  Chatfield,  Mar.  19,  1834,  ibid.,  vol.  14,  no.  s;  Pal- 
merston to  Chatfield,  Sept.  22,  1834,  ibid.,  vol.  15. 


34     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

company  and  to  one  Colonel  Galindo,'*  an  Irishman  by 
birth,  but  a  Central  American  by  adoption."  This 
roused  Cockburn,  the  Belize  superintendent,  to  declare 
that  the  British  government  would  resist  to  the  utmost 
all  encroachments  upon  this  territory.'^  As  Chatfield, 
true  to  his  instructions,  had  refused  to  discuss  the 
question  of  boundaries,  the  Guatemalan  government 
decided  to  send  Galindo  to  London  to  secure  terms." 
He  was  to  go  by  way  of  Washington  and  endeavor  to 
secure  American  aid  against  the  British.  But  Chatfield, 
anticipating  this  move,^*  notified  Vaughan,  the  English 
minister  to  the  United  States."  Vaughan  took  the  hint 
and  later  wrote  to  Palmerston  that  he  "  had  no  difficulty 
in  convincing  ]\Ir.  Forsyth  that  the  United  States  could 
not  possibly  listen  to  any  such  proposal  from  Colonel 
Galindo  ".  ^^  Therefore,  when  Galindo  made  known 
his  errand,  he  was  informed  that  the  United  States 
government  deemed  it  inexpedient  to  interfere  in  the 
matter.  He  then  proceeded  to  London,  but  the  British 
government  refused  to  receive  him  as  a  diplomatic 
agent  on  the  ground  that  he  was  a  British  subject,  and 
his  mission  ended  in  failure." 

Meanwhile  the  quarrel  between  the  British  settlers 
and  the  Central  American  government  had  increased  in 
bitterness,    partly    because    of    discriminatory    duties 

'■'Chatfield  to  Palmerston,  Nov.  13,  1834,  C.  O.,  Hond.,  vol.  47,  no.  23. 

*'  U.  S.  Docs.,  ser.  no.  660,  doc.  27,  pp.  12-13. 

"  Chatfield  to  Palmerston,  Nov.  13,  1834,  C.  C,  Hond.,  vol.  47,  no.  23; 
Palmerston  to  Chatfield,  May  13,  1836,  F.  O.,  Cen.  Am.,  vol.  18,  no.  7. 

"  U.  S.  Docs.,  ser.  no.  660,  doc.  27,  p.  12. 

**  Chatfield  to  Palmerston,  Dec.  29,  1834,  V.  C,  Cen.  Am.,  vol.  14,  no. 
29. 

"Chatfield  to  Vaughan,  Dec.  29,  1834,  F.  O.,  Cen.  Am.,  vol.  14; 
Chatfield  to  Vaughan,  Jan.   10,  1835,  F.  O.,  Cen.  Am.  vol.  16. 

"•  Vaughan  to  Palmerston,  July  4,   1835,  C.  O.,  Hond.,  vol.  47. 

"  U.  S.  Docs.,  ser.  no.  660,  doc.  27,  pp.  3-13. 


AMERICAN  INTEREST  AWAKENED,  i8 15-1850      35 

charged  by  the  latter  upon  all  goods  coming  into  the 
republic  from  Belize.**  Coiisequently  the  residents 
took  matters  into  their  own  hands  ;  they  held  a  conven- 
tion, changed  the  name  of  the  place  to  British  Hon- 
duras, adopted  a  colonial  form  of  government,**  and, 
in  November,  1834,  sent  a  petition  to  London  asking 
that  the  settlement  be  declared  a  regular  British 
colony/' 

As  a  result,  the  British  government  decided  to  settle 
the  whole  question.  Its  plan  involved  a  definite  recog- 
nition of  sovereignty  over  the  Belize  territory  as  still 
existing  in  the  Spanish  Crown,  for  the  purpose  of 
securing  the  relinquishment  of  this  sovereignty  to 
Great  Britain.  Accordingly,  in  March,  1835,  Villiers, 
the  British  representative  at  Aladrid,  was  instructed  to 
try  to  obtain  from  the  Spanish  government  a  conces- 
sion to  the  whole  tract  of  land  occupied  by  the  Belize 
settlers,  as  far  south  as  the  Sarstoon.**  Villiers 
broached  the  matter  to  the  Spanish  foreign  secretary,*^ 
hinting  that  if  the  cession  was  not  made  the  settlement 
would  be  declared  a  British  colony  anyway.**  He 
received  an  encouraging  reply  from  the  secretary,**  but 
the  question  seems  never  to  have  been  considered  by 
the  Spanish  government,  and  the  English  ambassador 
thought  it  inexpedient  to  press  the  matter."    Palmer- 

^  Chatfield  to  Palmerston,  Dec.  30,  1834,  F.  O.,  Cen.  Am.,  vol.  14,  no. 
28. 

'*  Keasbey,  Nicaragua  Canal,  171;  Walker,  Ocean  to  Ocean,  so. 

■*"  U.  S.  Docs.,  ser.  no.  660,  doc.  27,  p.  4;  Crowe,  Gospel  in  Central 
America,  206. 

*i  Wellington  to  Villiers,  Mar.  12,  1835,  F.  O.,  Spain,  vol.  439.  no.  iP; 

■"Villiers  to  Wellington,  April  8,  1835,  ibid.,  vol.  441,  no.  61. 

«  Miller  to  Glenelg,  May  18,  1835,  C.  O.,  Hond.,  vol.  47. 

**  Ibid. 

*'  Palmerston  to  Glenelg,  Sept.  13,  1838,  F.  O.,  Cen.  Am.,  vol.  21. 


36     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

ston  thereupon  determined  that  it  was  best  to  "  let  the 
Spaniards  quietly  forget  it "/"  and  to  permit  whatever 
interests  and  claims  the  latter  possessed  to  lapse. 

The  continued  lack  of  interest  in  Belize  on  the  part 
of  the  United  States  made  this  policy  a  safe  one  for 
the  British  government ;  and  though  the  settlers  were 
dissatisfied  with  the  equivocal  situation,  their  govern- 
ment consistently  maintained  its  former  stand,  unwill- 
ing needlessly  to  attract  the  attention  of  the  American 
or  the  Spanish  governments  to  the  region.  In  Novem- 
ber, 1840,  a  new  superintendent,  Macdonald,  pro- 
claimed the  law  of  England  to  be  the  law  of  the 
"  settlement  or  colony  of  British  Honduras  ",  and  sent 
a  new  petition  to  the  home  government ; "  But  as 
Aberdeen  thought  it  unwise  again  to  open  the  question, 
and  feared  that  a  declaration  of  British  sovereignty 
over  Belize  would  be  offensive  to  Spanish  dignity," 
nothing  was  done.  Again,  in  1846,  Belize,  was  heard 
from.  A  petition  presented  to  the  British  government 
in  behalf  of  Belize  merchants  asked  that  goods  from 
Belize  be  admitted  at  British  ports  free  from  the  dis- 
criminating duty  charged  upon  foreign  goods."  But 
the  Colonial  Office  replied  that  the  sovereignty  of  Belize 
territory  rested  not  in  Great  Britain,  but  in  Spain, 
under  the  treaties  of  1783  and  1786.°"  Therefore  the 
petition  could  not  be  granted.  This  seems  to  have  been 
the  last  attempt  of  the  Belize  settlers  for  a  long  period 
to  put  themselves  on  a  complete  colonial  basis. 

"  ralmerston  to  Glenelg,  Sept.  15,  1838,  F.  O.,  Cen.  Am.,  vol.  21; 
Strangeways  to  Stephen,  Mar.  20,  1839,  C.  O.,  Ilond.,  vol.  56. 

*' Crowe,  Gospel  in  Central  America,  305-206;  Gibbs,  British  Honduras, 
50. 

"Canning  to  Hope,  Dec.   13,  1841,  C.  0.,  Hond.,  vol.  61. 

•"  Il.iwes  to  Parker,  Oct.  12,  1846,  ibid.,  vol.  71. 

"  Ibid. 


AMERICAN  INTEREST  AWAKENED,  iS  15-1850      37 

For  many  years  the  British  agents  in  Central  America 
tried  to  rouse  their  government  to  the  importance  of 
securing  the  island  of  Ruatan,"  and  in  1830  the  Belize 
superintendent,  hoping  to  be  sustained  in  his  act,  seized 
the  island,  on  the  excuse  that  the  Central  Americans 
had  refused  to  return  fugitive  slaves."  But  remon- 
strance being  made  by  the  Central  American  authori- 
ties, the  seizure  was  disavowed  by  the  British  govern- 
ment, and  the  island  abandoned."^'  The  English  authori- 
ties were  nevertheless  alive  to  the  value  of  Ruatan, 
and,  while  from  policy  they  could  not  countenance  an 
occupation  of  it  by  their  subjects,  they  kept  close  watch 
lest  other  nations  seize  it.°*  When  Villiers  was  in- 
structed regarding  Belize,  he  was  also  directed  to  try 
to  secure  from  the  Spanish  government  the  cession  of 
Ruatan  and  Bonacca,^'  but  his  efforts  in  this  regard  were 
equally  fruitless. 

As  the  right  of  Great  Britain  to  the  islands  was,  in 
the  opinion  of  the  British  government,  "  to  say  the 
least,  exceedingly  questionable  ",°^  it  was  felt  that  the 
revival  of  a  dominant  claim  might  by  objected  to  by 
other  European  powers,  and  by  the  United  States ; " 
therefore  the  same  policy  was  pursued  as  with  Belize. 

^^  Schenley  to  Planta,  May  31,  1826,  F.  O.,  Cen.  Am.,  vol.  5;  Cockburn 
to  Goderich,  Jan.  30,  1833,  ibid.,  vol.  13,  no.  52;  Cooke  to  Howickl,  Aug. 
i3i  1831,  ibid.,  vol.  11;  Prowett  to  Glenelg,  April  15,  1837,  C.  O.,  Hond., 
vol.  51:    Grey  to  Backhouse,  Nov.  30,  1837,  ibid. 

'*  Squier,  Notes  oti  Central  America,  372-373. 

"  Ibid. 

**  Palmerston  to  Granville,  Oct.  4,  1831,  C.  O.,  Hond.,  vol.  42;  Gran- 
ville to  Palmerston,  Oct.  24,  183 1,  ibid.;  Chatfield  to  Palmerston,  Oct.  8, 

1838,  F.  O.,  Cen.  Am.,  vol.  20,  no.  58;  Palmerston  to  Chatfield,  Sept.  21, 

1839,  ibid.,  vol.  22,  no.  7. 

"Wellington  to  Villiers,  Mar.  12,  1835,  F.  O.,  Spain,  vol.  4,  no.  21. 
"  Colonial   Office   Memorandum   of  Correspondence   respecting  Ruatan 
or  Rattan,  Dec.  31,  1838,  F.  O.,  Cen.  Am.,  vol.  38. 
•■  Ibid. 


38    ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

The  British  cabinet  shrewdly  kept  open  the  question  of 
ownership  of  the  islands,  and  watched  developments." 
When  the  Central  American  confederation  had  fallen 
to  pieces,  partly  as  a  result  of  British  influence,"  the 
time  seemed  ripe  for  a  bolder  stand.  In  1838  a  party 
of  Hberated  slaves  from  the  Grand  Cayman  Islands 
came  to  Ruatan  to  settle.  The  Honduran  commandant 
stationed  on  the  island  informed  them  that  before  they 
could  establish  themselves  there  they  must  obtain  per- 
mission from  the  republic  of  Honduras.  Some  of  the 
immigrants  asked  for  permission,  but  others  refused 
to  do  so  and  appealed  to  the  Belize  superintendent. 
Macdonald,  noted  for  his  aggressive  policy,  held  the 
ofifice  at  the  time.  He  soon  landed  on  Ruatan,  hauled 
down  the  Central  American  flag,  and  hoisted  that  of 
Great  Britain.  Scarcely  had  he  departed,  however, 
before  the  commandant  again  ran  up  the  Central 
American  colors.  Macdonald  returned,  seized  the 
commandant  and  his  soldiers  and  carried  them  to 
the  mainland,  threatening  them  with  death  if  they 
attempted  to  return."  The  government  of  Honduras 
protested  and  once  more  unfurled  the  flag  of  Central 
America  on  the  island,*"  but  it  was  hauled  down  by 
orders  of  the  British  government,  and  Chatfield  was 
instructed  to  inform  the  Central  Americans  that  the 
British  government  did  not  deem  it  necessary  to  discuss 
with  them  the  right  of  British  sovereignty  over  Rua- 

'"  Chatfield  to  Palinerston,  Jan.  30,  1836,  F.  0..  Cen.  .\ni.,  vol.  iS,  no. 
2;  Chatfield  to  I'alinerston,  Oct.  8,  1838,  ibid.,  vol.  20,  no.  58. 

'»  Squier  to  Clayton,  Aug.  20,  1849,  Dept.  of  State,  Des.,  Gnat.,  vol.  2. 

"•  Squier,  Notes  on  Central  .-Imeiica,  373. 

•»  I'alnierston  to  Chatfield,  Sept.  21,  1839.  F.  ().,  Cen.  -Sni.,  vol.  aa, 
no.  7;   Squier,  Notes  on  Central  .-iDierica.  374. 


AMERICAN  INTEREST  AWAKENED,  1815-1850      39 

tan.'"  At  this  time  Honduras  was  acting  alone  and 
was  too  weak  to  do  more  than  protest;  therefore  the 
British  remained  in  control.'^ 

In  1 841  the  British  government  went  a  step  further. 
It  informed  the  governor  of  Jamaica  that  should  any 
foreign  power  take  possession  of  Ruatan  he  was  to 
order  the  departure  of  the  intruders,  and  he  was  author- 
ized to  use  forcible  measures  for  their  ejectment,  with- 
out further  instructions,  if  the  order  was  not  obeyed." 

Meanwhile  to  the  Cayman  Island  population  had  been 
added  some  English  settlers,°°  and  Macdonald,  seeing 
his  opportunity,  offered  to  appoint  magistrates  for  them 
if  they  so  desired.**  Some  time  later  the  offer  was 
accepted,  and  subsequently  magistrates  were  regularly 
appointed  by  the  Belize  superintendent.*^ 

On  the  Mosquito  Shore,  as  in  Belize  and  the  Bay 
Islands,  the  same  slow  but  decided  advance  was  made 
towards  British  control.  In  1816  the  heir  of  the  Mos- 
quitos  was  at  his  own  request  crowned  at  Belize,*'  and 
the  custom  was  followed  with  his  successors.'^  In  spite 
of  this,  however,  British  interest  in  the  Mosquitos 
seems  temporarily  to  have  declined,  for  the  practice  of 
giving  them  presents  was  discontinued,  and  was  only 

"^  Palmerston  to   Chatfield,   Sept.   21,    1839,  F.   O.,   Cen.   Am.,  vol.   22, 
no.  7;  Chatfield  to  Palmerston,  Jan.  25,  1840,  ibid.,  vol.  23,  no.  2. 
*'  Squier,  Notes  on  Central  America,  375. 

•"  Palmerston  to  Bulwer,  Mar.   14,  1850,  F.  O.,  Am.,  vol.  509,  no.  25. 
"' Fancourt  to  Elgin,  Jan.  15,  1845,  C.  O.,  Hond.,  vol.  69,  no.  i. 
^'  Squier,  Notes  on  Central  America,  375. 

^■^  Fancourt  to  Elgin,  Jan.   15,  1845,  C.  O.,  Hond.,  vol.  69,  no.  I. 
°' Bard,  Waikna,  345-346;  Stout,  Nicaragua,  168. 
'°  Codd  to  Manchester,  April  3,  1824,  C.  O.,  Hond.,  vol.  35. 


40    ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

revived  in  1830,  after  the  Indians  had  protested  against 
English  neglect." 

In  the  early  thirties,  when  the  Central  American 
government  was  trying  to  secure  a  settlement  with 
England  regarding  the  Belize  boundaries,  an  attempt 
was  also  made  to  induce  the  British  to  relinquish  all 
claims  to  the  Mosquito  Shore,  but  Chatfield  diplo- 
matically evaded  a  discussion  of  the  subject/'  How- 
ever, the  claims  of  the  Central  Americans  to  the  shore 
succeeded  in  reviving  the  interest  of  the  British  govern- 
ment ;  and  as  the  Central  American  confederation  weak- 
ened the  British  interest  increased.  In  1837  the  Colo- 
nial Office  ordered  that  the  custom  of  giving  presents 
be  continued  and  that  the  Indians  be  protected  from 
Central  American  encroachments."  In  the  following 
year  Palmerston  directed  that  the  old  connection  with 
the  Mosquitos  be  maintained,  and,  if  anything,  be 
drawn  closer,  because  circumstances  might  arise  to 
make  the  dependence  of  the  Mosquito  country  politi- 
cally and  commercially  useful  to  England.*' 

"Arthur  to  Bathurst,  Jan.  15,  1821,  ibid.,  vol.  30;  Cockburn  to  the 
Colonial  Secretary  [n.  d.],  ibid.,  vol.  41.  In  view  of  later  events,  it  is 
of  interest  to  note  the  opinion  held  at  this  time  by  the  Belize  super- 
intendent with  regard  to  the  southern  boundary  of  the  Mosquito  territory. 
In  1830  the  Mosquito  king  granted  a  tract  of  land,  apparently  lying 
between  Bluefields  and  the  San  Juan  River,  to  one  McLeLachein  who 
evidently  intended  to  make  a  British  settlement  there.  In  referring  to 
this  circumstance,  Cockburn  wrote  that  he  was  not  aware  of  any 
recognized  right  by  which  the  king  could  make  such  a  grant.  Moreover, 
the  settlement  contemplated  would  be  regarded  with  increased  jealousy 
by  the  Central  .Americans  because  of  its  proximity  to  the  San  Juan  River, 
by  means  of  which  it  was  proposed  to  open  up  a  canal.  Cockburn  to 
Twiss,  Feb.  7,   1830,  ibid. 

'>  Chatfield  to  Palmerston,  July  5,  1834,  F.  C,  Cen.  .\m.,  vol.  14,  no.  j. 

"Stephen  to  Backhouse,  June  15,  1837,  ibid.,  vol.  19. 

"  Strangeways  to  Stephen,  Mar.  28,  1838,  ibid.,  vol.  ai;  Dept.  of  State, 
Inst.,  .\m.  States,  vol.  15,  p.  52. 


AMERICAN  INTEREST  AWAKENED,  1815-1S30      41 

But  no  very  active  measures  were  taken  to  increase 
British  influence  over  that  region  until  the  appoint- 
ment of  the  enterprising  Macdonald  to  the  superin- 
tendency  of  Belize.  Macdonald  quickly  savir  the  use 
which  might  be  made  of  the  Mosquito  protectorate,  and 
in  1840  wrote  to  Russell  urging  the  importance  of 
keeping  the  Central  Americans  from  possessing  the 
mouth  of  the  San  Juan  for  transit  purposes.  To  retain 
the  river  mouth  for  the  Mosquito  king,  he  declared, 
would  promote  British  commercial  prosperity,  and 
strengthen  national  and  political  power.''* 

In  August,  1 84 1,  Macdonald,  accompanied  by  the 
Mosquito  king,  went  in  a  British  vessel  to  San  Juan, 
the  little  town  at  the  mouth  of  the  river.  Here  he 
raised  the  Mosquito  flag,  laid  claim  to  the  port  in  the 
name  of  the  Mosquito  king,  and  announced  the  pro- 
tectorate of  England  over  the  Indians."  The  Central 
Americans  were  ordered  to  leave  the  place  by  the  first 
of  the  following  March.'^  The  Nicaraguan  com- 
mandant of  the  port"  refused  to  recognize  the  sover- 
eign of  the  Mosquitos,  and  was  thereupon  taken  aboard 
the  vessel  and  carried  to  Cape  Gracias  a  Dios,  where 
he  was  put  ashore  and  left  to  get  back  as  best  he  could." 

Macdonald's  expedition  was  evidently  made  without 
instructions  from  his  government,  but,  judging  from 
Chatfield's  reply  to  a  protest  from  Nicaragua,"  it  was 

"  C.  O.,  Hond.,  vol.  57,  no.  45. 

""^Miles'  Register,   LXI,  98;   Latane,  Diplomatic  Relations,    191. 

"  Ntles'  Register,  LXI,  98. 

"  In  1832  the  Nicaraguans  had  moved  to  the  north  bank  of  the  San 
Juan  River,  Pari.  Papers,  1847-1848,  Corns.,  LXV,  "  Correspondence 
respecting  the  Mosquito  Territory  ",  84. 

■"  U.  S.  Docs.,  ser.  no.  579,  doc.  75,  p.  24. 

"  Ibid.,  pp.  24-26. 


42     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

entirely  approved."'  In  this  letter  Chatfield  outlined 
the  history  of  the  British  protectorate  over  the  Mos- 
quitos,  stated  that  the  Alosquio  territory  extended  to 
the  south  bank  of  the  port,  and  declared  that  as  the 
British  government  recognized  the  sovereignty  of  the 
Mosquitos  it  would  not  regard  with  indiflPerence  the 
usurpation  of  their  territory."  Chatfield's  letter  not 
only  had  the  full  approval  of  the  Foreign  Office,  but 
was  clearly  written  in  compliance  with  instructions 
from  the  foreign  secretary."*  In  reply,  the  secretary- 
general  of  Nicaragua  entered  into  further  protests, 
accompanied  by  a  long  argument  to  prove  that  the 
Mosquitos  had  never  been  recognized  as  an  indepen- 
dent nation  by  any  sovereign  power  in  Central  Amer- 
ica.** This  seems  to  have  ended  the  quarrel  for  the 
time,  and,  in  spite  of  British  plans  and  acts,  the  Nica- 
raguan  authorities  remained  at  the  port  of  San  Juan 
unmolested  for  many  years. 

Before  laying  claim  to  San  Juan  in  behalf  of  the 
Mosquito  king,  Macdonald  had  attempted  to  establish 
practical  British  sovereignty  on  the  shore  by  placing 
the  government  in  charge  of  a  commission  to  which  he 
intended  to  delegate  his  authority.  This  body  was  to 
be  composed  chiefly  of  British  subjects  and  was  to  sit 

**  Soon  after  his  appointment  Macdonald  found  among  the  Belize 
archives  documents  showing  the  close  alliance  which  had  formerly  existed 
between  the  Mosquitos  and  the  British  government.  Perceiving  the  use 
to  which  these  documents  could  be  put,  he  sent  them  to  his  government. 
The  result  was  a  distinct  increase  of  interest  in  the  Mosquitos  on  the 
part  of  the  British  cabinet.  Murphy  to  the  Secretary  of  State,  Jan.  20, 
1842,  Dept.  of  State,  Des.,  Cen.  Am.,  vol.  2. 

"■  U.  S.  Docs.,  ser.  no.  579,  doc.  75,  p.  24. 

"Memorandum  on  Mosquito  Shore,  written  Ueo.  15,  184J,  upon  a 
Colonial  Office  letter  of  November  27,  1840,  F.  O.,  Cen.  Am.,  vol.  36. 

"  if.  S.  Docs.,  ser.  no.  579,  doc.  75,  pp.  30-34. 


AMERICAN  INTEREST  AWAKENED,  i8 15-1850      43 

at  Belize."  The  superintendent  evidently  appointed 
the  commissioners  without  instructions,  after  which  he 
outlined  his  plans  for  the  Mosquito  government,  ex- 
pecting that  they  would  meet  with  favor  from  the 
British  cabinet.  Palmerston  was  strongly  inclined  to 
the  scheme  and  wished  it  executed,  but  Russell,  who  at 
that  time  was  colonial  secretary,  opposed  it  on  the 
ground  that  it  would  make  the  shore  in  fact  a  British 
colony."  As  Russell  stood  firm,  the  superintendent  was 
informed  that  there  was  no  objection  to  a  commission 
composed  of  EngHshmen,  provided  that  they  were  con- 
sidered solely  as  Mosquito,  and  not  as  British,  agents.'*" 
Nothing  further  appears  to  have  been  done  towards 
changing  the  government  before  1842,  when  the  death 
of  the  Mosquito  king  created  an  unsettled  state  of 
afifairs.*'  As  a  result  of  this  disorganized  condition, 
frequent  complaints  of  lack  of  protection,  and  of  the 
encroachments  of  the  Central  American  states  on  Mos- 
quito territory,  were  made  by  British  subjects  on  the 
shore.^ 

Finding  that  his  earlier  plans  were  unacceptable, 
Macdonald  wrote  in  1842,  apparently  shortly  after  the 
Mosquito  king's  death,  urging  that  a  British  resident 
be  appointed  for  the  shore.'"  In  the  following  year 
the  Foreign  Office  took  the  matter  seriously  into  con- 
sideration. A  memorandum  written  at  that  time  states 
that  the  question  now  was  how  to  show  interest  in  the 
Mosquito  coast  with  determination  as  to  foreign 
powers,  but  without  adopting  measures  which  might 

**  Memorandum   on    Mosquito    Shore,   written    Dec.    15,    1843,    upon   a 
Colonial  Office  letter  of  Nov.  27,  1840,  F.  O.,  Cen.  Am.,  vol.  36. 
^^  Ibid.  "'Ibid.  "Ibid.  ^^  Ibid. 

*"  Macdonald  to  Metcalf,  April  30,   1842,  C.  0.,  Hond.,  vol.  63. 


44     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

lead  to  unnecessary  quarrels  with  them."  It  was  finally 
decided  to  adopt  Macdonald's  suggestion  and  station 
a  British  resident  on  the  shore.**  The  selection  of  the 
official  seems  to  have  been  left  to  Macdonald,  who,  in 
1844,  appointed  Patrick  Walker,  his  private  secretary," 
to  the  position,  and  established  him  at  Bluefields."  The 
territory  was  renamed  Mosquitia,  and  a  new  flag, 
closely  modelled  after  the  Union  Jack,  was  given  to 
the  Indians." 
\i»  While  the  British  were  thus  establishing  themselves 
more  securely  in  Central  America,  events  in  the  United 
States  had  produced  a  renewal  of  the  earlier  British 
policy  of  blocking  American  advance  to  the  southwest 
by  supporting  Mexico  °° — a  policy  which  had  not  been 
vigorously  pursued  after  Canning's  death.  At  an  early 
date  when  citizens  of  the  United  States  began  moving 
into  Texas,  the  migration  was  not  overlooked  by  the 
British  agent  in  Mexico.  He  saw  the  danger  and  called 
Canning's  attention  to  the  probable  outcome  of  the 
movement ;  but  whether,  in  consequence,  warning  was 
oflfered  to  Mexico  by  the  British  government  is  not 
evident.""    When  Texas  declared  her  independence  and 

"Memorandum  on  Mosquito  Shore,  written  Dec.  15,  1843,  upon  a 
Colonial  Office  letter  of  November  27,  1840,  F.  O.,  Cen.  .'\m.,  vol.  36. 

'^  Ibid.;  Chatfield  to  Aberdeen,  July  i,  1844,  F.  0.,  Cen.  Am.,  vol.  3?, 
no.  24. 

"  Keasbey,  Nicaragua  Canal,  169. 

"^Chatfield  to  Aberdeen,  July  i,  1844,  F.  C,  Cen.  Am.,  vol.  37,  no.  24. 

"*  Crowe,   Gospel  in  Central  America,  213. 

"  Temperley,  "Later  .American  Policy  of  George  Canning",  in  .Un. 
Hist.  Rev.,  XI,  781;  .\dams,  British  Interests  and  .-ictifities  in  Texas, 
15.  239. 

•*  After  reporting  the  movement  to  his  government.  Ward,  the  Uritish 
agent,  remarked:  "  Not  knowing  in  how  far  His  Majesty's  Ciovernment 
may  conceive  the  possession  of  Te.xas  by  the  .\mericans,  to  be  likely  to 
affect  the  interesls  of  (^reat  IMitain,  I  have  not  thought  it  right  to  go 
beyond  such  general  observatinns  upon  the  subject,  in  my  communication 


AMERICAN  INTEREST  AWAKENED,  i8 15-1850      45 

expressed  a  desire  to  enter  the  American  Union,  the 
uneasiness  and  jealousy  naturally  increased,  and  Great 
Britain  promptly  took  measures  to  preserve  the  inde- 
pendence of  this  new  republic,  and  to  maintain  it  as  a 
strong  buffer  state  against  the  extension  of  American 
power/'  This  reinforced  jealousy  of  the  British  un- 
doubtedly was  influential  in  increasing  their  activities 
in  Central  America,  as  w^ell  as  in  determining  their 
attitude  on  the  Oregon  question. 

The  United  States  appears,  however,  to  have  taken 
but  little  notice  for  some  time  of  this  revived  policy  of 
general  aggressiveness  against  American  interests,"* 
and  it  was  not  until  1843  that  the  Washington  authori- 
ties were  really  aroused  regarding  the  situation  in 
Texas.  They  then  realized  that  British  influence 
there  was  very  strong,  and  believed  that  it  aimed, 

with  this  Government,  as  appeared  to  me  calculated  to  make  it  perceive 
the  danger,  to  which  it  is  wilfully  exposing  itself."  Paxson,  "  England 
and  Mexico,  1824-1825  ",  in  Colo.  Univ.  Studies,  III,  118. 

"Adams,  British  Interests  and  Acti-ities  in  Texas,  1S38-1846;  Smith, 
Annexation  of  Texas,  passim. 

"In  1841,  Murphy,  a  special  and  confidential  agent  of  the  United 
States,  was  sent  to  Central  America  with  directions  to  learn  the  cause 
for  the  failure  of  Galindo's  mission,  and  also  to  determine  the  existing 
state  of  the  Belize  boundary  controversy.  To  his  instructions  Webster 
added:  "This  information  you  will  endeavor  to  supply  by  proper 
inquiries,  which,  however,  should  be  cautiously  made  and  so  as  not  to 
let  it  be  supposed  that  this  government  takes  any  more  interest  in  the 
matter  now  than  it  did  at  the  time  of  the  visit  of  Colonel  Galindo  to 
Washington,  or  that  it  is  inclined  to  deviate  from  the  course  which  was 
pursued  upon  that  occasion."  Dept.  of  State,  Inst.,  Am.  States,  vol.  15, 
pp.  48-49.  These  words  suggest  an  intention  to  adopt  a  more  vigorous 
Central  American  policy.  However,  though  Murphy  secured  the  desired 
information,  gave  details  regarding  other  British  encroachments  in 
Central  America,  and  urged  that  a  commercial  treaty  be  made  with 
Nicaragua  to  prevent  the  British  from  gaining  control  of  the  San  Juan, 
no  further  steps  were  taken  by  the  American  government  at  this  time. 
Murphy  to  the  Secretary  of  State,  Jan.  20,  and  Feb.  4,  1842,  Dept.  of 
State,  Des.,  Cen.  Am.,  vol.  2.  The  failure  to  act  may  have  been  due  to 
the  transfer  of  American  attention  to  British  interests  in  Texas. 


46     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

among  other  things,  at  the  aboHtion  of  slavery."  There- 
upon, the  American  government  began  immediately  to 
prepare  for  Texan  annexation/"*  Simultaneously  with 
this  movement  came  the  proclamation  of  the  expansion- 
ist policy  of  the  Democrats/"*  The  election  of  Polk 
followed,  and  in  the  next  year  the  admission  of  Texas 
to  the  Union. 

These  events  were  clearly  disconcerting  to  British 
plans ;  but  the  policy  of  hindering  American  advance 
towards  the  southwest  was  stubbornly  maintained,  and 
was  even  given  greater  impetus  when  war  between  the 
United  States  and  Mexico  became  imminent,  and  with 
it  the  American  acquisition  of  Cahfornia.  Aberdeen, 
then  British  foreign  secretary,  even  thought  of  active 
interference  to  prevent  the  latter  event.  He  gave  up 
his  idea  of  doing  so  only  in  consideration  that  the 
Oregon  question  was  still  capable  of  peaceful  settle- 
ment. Should  the  Oregon  boundary  negotiations  end 
in  war,  aid  was  to  be  given  ]\Iexico.""  As  the  Oregon 
boundary  dispute  was  settled  peaceably,  Mexico  fought 
her  battles  alone — and  lost  California. 

This  triumph  of  American  expansionist  schemes  was 
certain  to  have  a  profound  effect  upon  British  policy  in 
Central  America.  For  centuries  the  importance  of 
Central  America  for  a  transisthmian  route  had  been 
recognized,  and  recently  the  line  via  Nicaragua  had 
been  considered  the  most  feasible.'"  The  significance 
of  such  a  route  at  that  time  becomes  evident  only  when 

"■•'Garrison,  Westward  Extension,  110-114;  Reeves,  American  Dif'lomacy 
under  Tyler  and  Polk,  132-134. 

""Garrison,  K'estward  Extension,  114-115. 

*"*  Rives,  "Mexican  Diplomacy",  in  Am.  Hist.  Rev.,  XVIII,  275. 

"■■•/fcirf.,  286-291. 

><"  Travis,  Mosquito  History,  11;  Snow,  Awerican  Diplomacy,  3jo. 


AMERICAN  INTEREST  AWAKENED,  1815-1850      47 

it  is  remembered  that  before  the  Civil  War  little  faith 
was  entertained  that  a  railroad  could  be  successfully 
built  to  the  Pacific,  or  operated  even  if  it  should  be 
built/'^  Therefore,  upon  gaining  territory  on  the 
Pacific  coast,  the  interest  of  the  United  States  in  Cen- 
tral America  must  increase  tremendously. 

As  England  clearly  saw  the  outcome  of  the  Mexican 
War  before  it  began,  she  lost  little  time  in  preparing 
for  it.  Early  in  1847  Palmerston,  who  had  succeeded 
Aberdeen  in  the  preceding  July,  wrote  to  Chatfield, 
and  Walker,  the  Mosquito  superintendent,  and  to 
O'Leary,  the  British  representative  at  Bogota,^"  asking, 
first,  for  the  most  authentic  information  procurable  as 
to  the  boundary  claimed  by  the  king  of  the  IMosquitos ; 
and,  secondly,  for  their  opinions  as  to  the  boundary 
which  the  British  government  should  insist  upon  as 
"  absolutely  essential  for  the  security  and  well-being 
of  the  Mosquito  state."  ^'^  The  replies  varied  to  some 
extent  regarding  the  limits  claimed  by  the  Mosquito 
king,  though  in  general  all  indicated  that  he  had  pre- 
tended to  dominion  pretty  well  south  to  Chiriqui 
Lagoon,  near  the  Isthmus  of  Panama ;  but  all  agreed 
that  the  boundary  which  the  British  should  insist  upon  l 
to  the  south  was  the  San  Juan  River."' 

A  detailed  report  on  the  Mosquito  Shore,  which  had 
been  called  for  by  the  Committee  of  the  Privy  Council 
for  Trade  and  Plantations,  was  made  by  John  Mc- 

i<^  Travis,  Mosquito  History.    12-13. 

105  New  Granada  as  well  as  Nicaragua  claimed  the  Mosquito  Shore. 

'^oe  Pari.  Papers,  1847-1848,  Corns.,  LXV,  "Correspondence  respecting 
the  Mosquito  Territory  ",   i. 

"'  Ibid.,  2-52.  Had  the  Mosquitos  been  recognized  as  sovereign  and 
independent,  the  claims,  when  compared  with  the  evidence  submitted 
by  Chatfield  and  Walker,  would  have  been  quite  reasonable. 


48     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

Gregor  on  February  i .'"'  The  foreign  secretary  appar- 
ently availed  himself  of  the  information  contained  in 
this  report,  for  on  June  30,  before  receiving  replies  to 
his  inquiries,  he  wrote  to  Chatfield  stating  that  the 
encroachments  committed  by  the  states  of  Honduras 
and  Nicaragua  upon  the  territory  of  the  Mosquitos 
had  given  rise  to  the  question  of  boundaries.  There- 
fore, after  carefully  examining  various  documents 
relative  to  the  subject,  the  British  government  was  of 
the  opinion  that  the  Mosquito  king's  right  should  be 
maintained  as  extending  from  Cape  Honduras  to  the 
mouth  of  the  San  Juan  River /***  Chatfield  was  accord- 
ingly instructed  to  notify  the  Central  American  states 
concerned,  and  to  inform  them  that  the  British  govern- 
ment would  not  view  with  indifference  any  attempt  to 
encroach  upon  the  rights  or  territory  of  the  Mosquito 

king,  who  was  under  the  protection  of  the  British 

/—  110 

Crown. 

The  instruction  was  followed  by  Chatfield,  who,  in 
speaking  of  the  southern  boundary,  took  the  precaution 
to  add  the  words,  "  without  prejudice  to  the  right  of  the 
Mosquito  king  to  any  territory  south  of  the  River  San 
Juan ".  "^  The  two  weak  Central  American  states, 
roused  to  a  fear  for  their  independence,  protested  vigor- 
ously that  they  did  not  recognize  the  Mosquito  king- 
dom, and  declared  their  intention  to  resist  the  attempts 

>•>»  For/.  Papers,  1847,  Corns.,  LXIV,  "Spanish-American  Republics", 
26-61.  The  report  of  McGregor  also  gave  detailed  information  regard- 
ing Belize,  the  I?ay  Islands,  and  Central   America  in  general. 

'*'  These  boundaries  coincide  with  those  given  by  McGregor  as  exist- 
ing in  1777.  Pari.  Papers,  1847,  Corns.,  LXI\',  "  Spanish-.American 
Republics  ",  27. 

^"' Pari.  Papers,  1847-1848,  Corns.,  LX\',  "Correspondence  respecting 
the  Mosquito  Territory  ",   i. 

"'76irf.,   56. 


AMERICAN  INTEREST  AWAKENED,  iS  15-1850      49 

of  the  British  to  commit  aggressions  upon  Central 
American  territory  in  the  name  of  the  Mosquitos."' 
But  unfortunately  they  were  too  helpless  and  distracted 
to  unite  against  the  aggressor. 

In  October,  notice  came  from  the  "  Council  of  State  " 
of  the  Mosquito  king"'  to  the  government  of  Nica- 
ragua, that  the  Nicaraguans  would  be  given  until  Janu- 
ary I,  1848,  to  withdraw  from  the  San  Juan.  After 
that  time,  forcible  means  would  be  employed  to  main- 
tain the  king's  authority."*  On  the  same  date.  Walker, 
in  company  with  the  king,  went  to  San  Juan,  hauled 
down  the  Nicaraguan  flag,  hoisted  that  of  the  Mos- 
quitos,  and  fired  a  royal  salute  to  the  latter."" 

The  Nicaraguan  government  was,  obviously,  too 
weak  to  do  more  than  protest,  which  it  did,  emphatic- 
ally denying  the  existence  of  the  Mosquito  kingdom, 
and  declaring  that  the  Mosquito  Shore,  by  the  treaties 
of  1783  and  1786,  had  been  Spanish  territory,  and  that 
with  independence  from  Spain  the  shore  had  become  a 
part  of  the  Central  American  states."^"  Twice,  also, 
was  appeal  made  to  Washington  by  the  Nicaraguans 
for  aid  against  the  British,"^  but  no  reply  was  returned 
at  the  time  by  the  United  States  government."' 

Before  the  opening  of  the  new  year  the  small  Nica- 
raguan garrison  evacuated  the  mouth  of  the  San  Juan 

"2  Ibid..    66-69. 

'"  This  was  apparently  Walker's  development  of  Macdonald's  idea 
for  government  by  commission,  and  was  made  possible  by  the  increasingly 
aggressive  policy  of  the  British  government,  as  well  as  by  the  fact  that 
Grey,  and  not  Russell,  was  now  colonial  secretary. 

^^*  Pari.  Papers,  1847-1848,  Corns.,  LXV,  "Correspondence  respecting 
the  Mosquito  Territory  ",  58. 

^^Ibid.,  57. 

^^^  Ibid.,  75-76,  93-94. 

"'  U.  S.  Docs.,  ser.  no.  579,  doc.  75,  pp-  ii-i4t  79-8o. 

""  Richardson,  Messages  and  Papers,  V,  34. 

s 


50     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

and  retired  up  the  river  to  Serapaqui.  On  January  i. 
Walker,  again  accompanied  by  the  Mosquito  king,  went 
to  San  Juan  and  hauled  down  the  Nicaraguan  flag 
which  he  found  flying,  and  hoisted  that  of  the  Mos- 
quitos,  saluting  it  as  before.  He  left  a  small  party  at 
the  place  and  gave  the  Nicaraguan  officials  a  short  time 
in  which  to  clear  out  the  customs  house.  Again  the 
Nicaraguans  issued  their  protest,  and  a  few  days  later 
the  force  at  Serapaqui  descended  upon  San  Juan, 
hoisted  the  flag  of  the  repubhc,  seized  the  British  offi- 
cials stationed  at  the  port,  and  carried  them  as  prisoners 
to  Serapaqui.  On  February  12  the  fort  at  the  latter 
place  was  destroyed  by  two  British  war  vessels,  the 
Alarm  and  the  Vixen,  sent  to  punish  the  defiant  act  of 
the  Nicaraguans."' 

Following  the  battle  at  Serapaqui  Captain  Loch  of 
the  Alarm  made  a  treaty  with  the  Nicaraguans.  This 
provided  for  the  surrender  of  the  British  prisoners, 
with  apologies  for  all  violent  acts  committed  at  San 
Juan,  and  also  contained  an  agreement  by  the  Nica- 
raguans not  to  disturb  the  Mosquito  authorities  at  that 
place.  But  by  the  last  article  of  the  treaty  the  Nica- 
raguans tried  to  secure  a  loophole  for  escape.  This 
article  stipulated  that  nothing  in  the  treaty  should  pre- 
vent Nicaragua  from  soliciting,  by  means  of  a  com- 
missioner, a  final  settlement  of  the  difficulties  with 
England.''"'  Walker  had  been  drowned  at  Serapa- 
qui ; '''   therefore  Loch  appointed  an  officer  to  fill  his 

"'PoW.  Papers,  1847-1848,  Corns.,  LXV,  "Correspondence  respecting 
the  Mosquito  Territory",  94-104;  Squier,  Nicaragua,  I,  loi;  Crowe, 
Gospel  in  Central  America,  215. 

^'^  Pari.  Papers,  1847-1848,  Corns.,  LXV,  "Correspondence  respecting 
the  Mosquito  Teritory  ",   121. 

"^Ibid..  104. 


AMERICAN  INTEREST  AWAKENED,  i8 15- 1850      51 

place,  and  also  named  a  collector  of  customs  for  San 
Juan,"*  which  was  shortly  afterwards  renamed  Grey- 
town,  in  honor  of  the  governor  of  Jamaica."' 

In  February,  1848,  Palmerston,  basing  his  action 
upon  the  reports  of  Chatfield  and  Walker,  extended  the 
southern  boundary  of  the  Mosquito  territory  to  the 
Colorado  branch  of  the  San  Juan,  which  was  many 
miles  south  of  the  port.^*  The  purpose  of  this  exten- 
sion was  obviously  to  shut  Nicaragua  from  both  banks 
of  the  river  and  thus  leave  her  no  share  in  any  inter- 
oceanic  canal  arrangements.  In  the  following  month, 
upon  learning  of  the  retaliatory  measures  taken  by  the 
Nicaraguans  against  the  British  at  San  Juan,  the  for- 
eign secretary  showed  his  determination  by  directing 
that  the  Nicaraguan  authorities  be  notified  that  a  Brit- 
ish war  vessel  would  be  ordered  to  visit  San  Juan  from 
time  to  time  to  maintain  the  officials  stationed  there. 
Furthermore,  if  the  Nicaraguans  persisted  in  intruding 
themselves  in  San  Juan,  measures  of  an  unfriendly 
character  would  be  resorted  to  upon  parts  of  their  own 
coast."' 

These  acts  of  Palmerston  gave  Nicaragua  little  rea- 
son to  expect  favorable  results  from  negotiation ;  but 
since  protest  and  appeal  as  well  as  attempt  at  physical 
resistance  had  proved  vain,  negotiation  seemed  the  only 
hope  left.  Accordingly,  Francisco  Castellon  was  ap- 
pointed Nicaraguan  charge  d'affaires  at  London  in  the 

^^^  Ibid.,  123. 

123  Bancroft  to  Buchanan,  Jan.  26,  1849,  Dept.  of  State,  Des.,  Eng., 
vol.  59,  no.  114;  Addington  to  Hawes,  Jan.  12,  1849,  C.  O.,  Hond.,  vol.  78. 

^■*  Part.  Papers,  1847-1848,  Corns.,  LXV,  "Correspondence  respecting 
the  Mosquito  Territory  ",  94. 

^""^  Ibid.,   102. 


52     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

autumn  of  1848,"°  with  instructions  to  try  to  secure 
terms  from  the  British  government.  For  many  months 
Castellon  remained  in  London,  hoping  to  arrive  at  an 
agreement  regarding  Greytown,  but  Palmerston  refused 
to  do  anything  that  would  intimate  that  San  Juan  did 
not  belong  exclusively  to  the  Mosquitos,  and  warned 
the  Nicaraguan  agent  against  counting  on  aid  from 
the  United  States,  as  it  was  "  a  matter  of  total  indiffer- 
ence to  her  Majesty's  government  "  what  the  American 
government  might  say  or  do.  Finally,  in  July,  1849, 
after  all  hopes  of  making  a  direct  settlement  with  the 
British  government  had  disappeared,  Castellon  returned 
to  Central  America.^ 
vX  While  the  British  were  thus  incited  by  American 
expansion  to  renew  their  encroachments  in  Central 
America,  the  people  of  the  United  States  and  their 
government  were  anything  but  indifferent  to  the  situa- 
tion. Once  roused  by  the  cry  of  British  interference 
in  Texas,  American  jealousy  and  suspicion  of  England 
long  survived.  Moreover,  through  the  successful  an- 
nexation of  Texas  and  the  settlement  of  the  vexed 
boundary  questions,  the  nation  had  become  intoxicated 
wnth  the  "  manifest  destiny  "  idea.'"  The  knowledge  of 
European  interference  in  an  attempt  to  preserve  a 
"  balance  of  power  "  in  the  New  World  only  served 
further  to  increase  American  aggressiveness,  which 
was  reflected  in  Polk's  version  of  the  Monroe  doctrine 
set  forth  in  the  annual  message  of  December,  1845.*" 
In  accordance  with  the  policy  then  declared,  the  govern- 

'"•  Castellon  went  by  way  of  Washington  and  made  a  third  appeal  for 
aid,  but  no  reply  appears  to  have  been  given  to  his  communication  during 
Polk's  administration.     U.  S.  Docs.,  ser.  no.  579,  doc.  75,  pp.  91,  92. 

'"  Ibid.,  pp.   173-180. 

'•'"  Dtfm.  Rev.,  XVII,  s-io,  193-204. 

"»  Richardson,  Messages  and  Papers,  IV,  398-399. 


AMERICAN  INTEREST  AWAKENED,  i8 15-1850      53 

ment,  as  far  as  circumstances  permitted,  systematically 
worked  to  frustrate  what  was  believed  to  be  the  design 
of  the  British. 

An  interoceanic  canal  was  part  of  Polk's  general 
expansionist  policy/^  The  British  had  a  grip  on  the 
isthmus  of  Nicaragua  and  were  suspected  of  having 
designs  on  Panama  also."^  In  order  to  insure  a  route 
for  the  United  States,  a  prompt  arrangement  seemed 
necessary  in  1846.  Because  of  the  war  just  opened 
with  ]\Iexico,  it  was  probably  deemed  unwise  to  nego- 
tiate for  the  Nicaragua  route,  and  thus  risk  entangle- 
ment with  the  question  of  Mosquito  claims.  Therefore, 
a  treaty  was  negotiated  with  New  Granada  giving  to 
the  United  States  and  its  citizens  the  right  of  way 
across  the  Isthmus  of  Panama  by  any  available  method 
of  transit.  In  return  for  the  concession  the  United 
States  guaranteed  the  complete  neutrality  of  the  isth- 
mus and  the  right  of  sovereignty  possessed  by  New  v 
Granada  over  it."^ 

For  some  years  the  American  government  had  sus- 
pected Great  Britain  of  designs  upon  CaHfornia.^"  This 
territory  had  attracted  the  Americans  also,  and  Presi- 
dent Polk  especially  coveted  San  Francisco  harbor."* 
Therefore  American  attention  was  attracted  towards 
the  region,  and  the  Mexican  War  had  scarcely  begun 
before  it  was  in  control  of  the  United  States  authori- 
ties. 

*^  Garrison,   Westward  Extension,  287. 

'"  Grahame,  "  The  Canal  Diplomacy  ",  in  N.  Am.  Rev.,  CXCVII,  33. 

"'  Brit,  and  For.  State  Papers,  XL,  968-969. 

**^  Professor  Adams,  British  Interests  and  Activities  in  Texas.  234-264, 
has  shown  that  these  designs  were  entirely  limited  to  British  agents  who 
received  no  encouragement  from  their  government.  The  British  interest 
in  California  just  before  the  Mexican  War  was  due  simply  to  a  desire 
to  save  it  from  falling  into  American  hands. 

"»Polk,  Diary,  I,  71. 


54     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

This  much  accomphshed,  Polk's  administration"  un- 
doubtedly would  have  pursued  a  more  vigorous  policy 
towards  the  British  encroachments  in  Central  America, 
had  it  not  been  for  the  Mexican  War.  But  while  handi- 
capped by  the  struggle  with  Mexico  the  government 
had  no  desire  to  venture  into  a  more  serious  one  with 
Great  Britain."'  However,  before  the  war  was  over 
the  United  States  government  had  determined  to  act. 
A  hint  of  coming  developments  appeared  in  the  presi- 
dential message  of  1847,  through  Polk's  assertion  that 
no  European  power  should,  with  the  consent  of  the 
American  government,  secure  any  foothold  upon  the 
continent.™  Early  in  the  next  year  Elijah  Hise  was 
appointed  charge  d'affaires  in  Guatemala.  As  the  fate 
of  the  treaty  of  peace  with  Mexico  had  not  yet  been 
learned  when  Hise  received  his  instructions,  it  was 
determined  to  proceed  cautiously.  The  general  plan 
was  first  to  reunite  the  Central  American  states  and 
thus  aid  them  to  resist  British  encroachments.*"  The 
purpose  of  the  mission  was  to  determine  the  extent  of 
British  aggressions,  and  to  urge  upon  the  states  the 
necessity  for  union ;  and  Hise  was  instructed  accord- 
ingly.*^ When  his  report  should  be  received  the  gov- 
ernment meant  to  settle  upon  a  more  definite  policy, 
calculated  to  put  an  end  to  British  interference  on  the 
isthmus."' 

135 '•  Letters  of  Bancroft  and  Buchanan  ",  in  Ant.  Hist.  Rev..  \',  98,  99; 
Buchanan,  Works,  VIII,  379. 

**^  Richardson,  Messages  and  Papers.   IV,  539-540. 

"' "  Letters  of  Bancroft  and  Buchanan  ",  in  Atn.  Hist.  Rev.,  V,  98-99; 
Buchanan,  Works,  VIII,  379,  380. 

'«•  Ibid.,  78-84. 

130  "  Letters  of  Bancroft  and  Buchanan  ",  in  .-Int.  Hist.  Rez\,  V,  99. 
.•\t  this  time,  an  American  agent.  Savage,  was  in  Guatemala.  He  had 
announced  the  British  seizure  of  San  Juan,  and  in  reporting  the  inten- 
tions of  the  British,  had  stated  "  all  eyes  arc  turneii  towards  the  United 


AMERICAN  INTEREST  AWAKENED,  i8 13-1850      55 

The  British  government  realized  that  as  soon  as  the 
Mexican  War  was  over  the  United  States  could  be 
expected  to  interfere  in  Central  American  affairs. 
Therefore,  Palmerston  was  on  the  alert.  When,  as 
a  result  of  speeches  of  Senator  Dix,  delivered  early  in 
1848,  the  American  nation  was  being  more  actively 
roused  against  the  British  movements  in  Central  Amer- 
ica,"" the  foreign  secretary  furnished  Crampton,  the 
British  representative  at  Washington,  with  a  history  of 
the  ]\Iosquito  protectorate,'"  and  instructed  him  to  say 
in  reply  to  inquiries  that  his  government  would  be  ready 
to  vindicate  its  proceedings  at  San  Juan  whenever 
called  upon  to  do  so  by  any  party  having  the  right  to 
question  it.'^ 

When  the  proposed  mission  became  known  to 
Palmerston,  he  wrote  to  Chatfield,  stating  that  he 
understood  that  the  principal  object  of  Hise  would  be 
to  urge  a  union  of  the  Central  American  states  in  order 
better  to  resist  any  interference  of  the  British  govern- 
ment in  the  affairs  of  Mosquito.  In  consequence  of 
this,  Chatfield  was  instructed  to  take  such  steps  as 
might  be  necessary  or  useful  to  defeat  the  poHcy  of  the 
United  States  so  far  as  its  object  was  hostile  to  the 
interests  of  Great  Britain.'"  But  Chatfield  was  in  some 
way  misled  regarding  the  object  of  Hise's  visit,  and 
thought  that  he  was  merely  to  arrange  a  commercial 
treaty.'**    Therefore  he  was  but  little  suspicious  of  the 

States  of  America  for  the  solution  of  this  problem  ",  but  he  gave  no 
details  regarding  the  general  situation.  Savage  to  Buchanan,  Jan.  14, 
1S48,  and  Dec.  25,  1847,  Dept.  of  State,  Des.,  Guat.,  vol.  i. 

'*"  Crampton  to  Palmerston,  Feb.  9,  1848,  F.  O.,  Am.,  vol.  484,  no.  19, 
and  April  2,   1848,  ibid.,  vol.  485,  no.  35. 

'^^^  Ibid.,  vol.  483,  no.   13. 

^*'' Ibid.,  no.  20;  vol.  497,  no.  38. 

"^  F.  O.,  Guat.,  vol.  50,  no.  24. 

>«  Chatfield  to  Palmerston,  Jan.   12,  1849,  ibid.,  vol.  57,  no.  6. 


56    ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

American  charge  d'affaires.  Nevertheless  he  reported 
to  Palmerston  his  intention  to  anticipate  any  possible 
designs  of  the  Americans  by  private  correspondence 
calculated  to  show  the  Central  American  states  the  use- 
lessness  of  looking  to  North  America  for  real  sympathy 
at  any  time/*' 

Unfortunately  for  the  plans  of  the  Polk  government, 
Hise  was  delayed  by  sickness  and  other  causes '"  and 
did  not  reach  Central  America  until  late  in  October, 
1848/"  At  the  time  of  his  arrival  the  Central  Ameri- 
can states  were  in  the  utmost  confusion  and  on  the 
verge  of  anarchy,  a  condition  partially  produced  by  the 
intrigues  of  the  British  agents.  Honduras  and  Nica- 
ragua, because  of  the  Mosquito  claims,  hated  and 
feared  England,  as  did  also  Salvador,  and  looked 
towards  the  United  States  for  aid."'  The  Servile 
party,  to  which  the  British  gave  preference,  was  in 
power  in  Costa  Rica  and  in  Guatemala ;  consequently 
the  British  government  was  in  favor  with  those 
states.'"  The  existence  of  a  boundary  dispute  between 
Nicaragua  and  Costa  Rica  ""  also  inclined  the  latter  to 
look  to  Great  Britain  for  protection  against  her 
stronger  neighbor;  and  the  suspicion  of  American 
designs  roused  by  the  Mexican  War  naturally  caused 
Guatemala  to  hold  aloof  from  the  United  States."' 

After  two  months  spent  in  investigation,  Hise  wrote 
his  government  that  he  was  convinced  that  the  British 

"*  Chatfield  to  Palmerston,  Jan.  12,  1849,  F.  O.,  Guat.,  vol.  57,  no.  6. 

""  Buchanan,  Works,  YIII,  380. 

"^Dept.  of  State,  Des.,  .\m.  States,  vol.  15,  p.  52. 

^■"  Chatfield  to  ralnierston,  Jan.  11,  i8|8,  F.  O.,  Guat.,  vol.  51,  no.  2, 
and  Dec.  15,  1848,  ibid.,  vol.  53,  no.  115. 

'"•'  Travis,  Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty,  53. 

""  U.  S.  Docs.,  ser.  no.  579,  doc.  75.  P-  '36. 

1"  Savage  to  Buchanan,  T)tc.  2$,  1847,  Dept.  of  State,  Des.,  Guat.,  vol. 
i;  .Savage  to  Webster,  .April  21,  1851,  ibid.,  vol.  3,  no.  6. 


AMERICAN  INTEREST  AWAKENED,  1815-1850      57 

designed  to  make  themselves  owners  and  occupants  of 
the  points  on  the  coasts  of  Nicaragua  which  would 
become  the  termini  of  any  interoceanic  canal  communi- 
cation by  way  of  the  San  Juan  and  Lake  Nicaragua. 
Therefore,  in  order  to  outwit  British  schemes,  he  asked 
for  power  to  negotiate  transit  treaties.'"'  In  May,  1849,"'^ 
he  again  wrote,  explaining  the  urgency  of  the  situation. 
The  British  agents,  he  said,  were  working  to  produce 
results  the  most  inimical  to  American  interests,  by 
planning  to  secure  control  of  the  whole  interoceanic 
line  of  transit."'  Because  of  the  slowness  of  means  of 
communication,  no  word  was  received  from  Hise  before 
the  end  of  Polk's  administration ;  consequently  no 
reply  or  further  instructions  were  sent  to  him.'"*  In 
view  of  this  fact  and  of  his  belief  that  further  delay 
would  be  fatal  to  American  interests,  it  is  not  to  be 
wondered  at  that  Hise  ventured,  without  instructions, '"_] 
to  negotiate  a  canal  treaty  with  Nicaragua. 

The  treaty,  signed  by  Hise  June  21,  1849,  was  in 
keeping  with  the  Polk  policy,  and  was  a  definite  appli- 
cation of  the  Monroe  doctrine  to  the  situation  in  Cen- 
tral America.  Through  it,  Nicaragua  granted  to  the 
American  government,  or  its  citizens,  in  perpetuity,  the 
right  of  way  for  transit  purposes  across  Nicaragua, 
and  permitted  the  fortification  of  such  a  route.  In 
return,  the  United  States  pledged  herself  to  protect 
Nicaragua  in  all  territory  rightfully  hers."'  By  means 
of  this  treaty,  the  Nicaraguan  commissioner  believed 

^"  Hise  to  Buchanan,  Dec.  20,   1848,  ibid.,  vol.   i. 
^"  Hise  to  Buchanan,  May  25,   1849,  ibid. 

^^*  "  Letters  of  Bancroft  and  Buchanan",  in  Am.  Hist.  Rev.,  V,  99; 
Buchanan,  Works,  VIII,  380. 

^^^  U.  S.  Docs.,  ser.  no.   579,  doc.  75,  pp.   105-106. 
^^^  Ibid.,  pp.   1 10- 1 17. 


58     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

that  Nicaragua  had  gained  a  protector  in  the  United 
States,  and  that  her  case  against  Great  Britain  was 
consequently  secure.'" 

While  Hise  had  been  thus  cut  off  from  his  govern- 
ment, important  changes  were  taking  place  in  the 
United  States.  The  Polk  Democrats  had  given  way  to 
a  Whig  administration  under  Taylor.  The  gold  dis- 
covery in  California,  becoming  known  throughout  the 
country,  had  created  a  popular  demand  for  more  satis- 
factory means  of  transportation  to  the  West  than  that 
afforded  by  ox-team  journey  across  the  plains  or  by 
the  long  voyage  around  Cape  Horn.  This  demand 
attracted  general  attention  to  Nicaragua,  where  the 
British  were  in  control  of  the  eastern  terminus  of  what 
was  considered  the  best  transisthmian  route.  The  suc- 
cessful termination  of  the  Mexican  War  had  excited 
enthusiasm  and  increased  the  self-confidence  of  the 
nation ;  the  conviction  of  "  manifest  destiny  "  still  influ- 
enced a  large  portion  of  the  population.'**  England 
must  not  be  permitted  to  monopolize  a  route  so  valuable 
to  American  prosperity.  Public  opinion  demanded  that 
the  government  take  measures  to  prevent  such  a  pos- 
sibility."' 

At  this  juncture  a  group  of  American  citizens  formed 
a  transportation  company  with  the  object  of  construct- 
ing a  canal.  In  March,  1849,  this  association  made  a 
contract  with  the  Nicaraguan  government  for  the  use 
of  the  San  Juan  route  across  the  isthmus.  When  look- 
ing more  fully  into  the  subject  connected  with  their 

*"  Cliattield  to  ralinerston,  May  17,  1849,  1".  O.,  Gnat.,  vol.  58,  no.  42. 

^f*  Dem.  Rev.,  XXV,  3-1 1. 

'"Travis,  Mosquito  History,  15;  Henderson,  .■Imerican  Diplomatic 
Questions,  iii;  Grahanie,  "The  Canal  Diplomacy",  in  A'.  Am.  Rev., 
CXCVII,  3536. 


AMERICAN  INTEREST  AWAKENED,  1815-1850      59 

contract,  the  members  of  the  company  learned  of  the 
extensive  British  claims  in  the  name  of  the  Mosquito 
king,""  and  were  much  concerned  by  the  discovery. 
Meanwhile  their  movements  had  not  escaped  the  jealous 
watchfulness  of  Chatfield,  who,  through  the  British 
consuls  in  Nicaragua,  promptly  notified  the  Nicaraguan 
government  and  the  company  that  the  whole  of  the  San 
Juan  River  from  its  mouth  to  Machuca  Rapids  be- 
longed to  Mosquito,  and  could  not  be  disposed  of  or 
used  without  the  consent  of  the  British  government/" 
Chatfield  also  reported  the  situation  to  his  govern- 
ment ;  "^  and  in  response  to  instructions  from  the  For- 
eign Office,"^  Barclay,  the  British  consul  at  New  York, 
published  a  warning  notice  to  the  grantees  not  to  begin 
work  on  the  proposed  canal,  inasmuch  as  the  British 
government  was  the  protector  of  the  Mosquitos,  whose 
territory  would  be  bisected  by  it.'°*  Before  this,  how- 
ever, the  American  company  had  reported  conditions 
in  Central  America  to  the  United  States  government 
and  had  asked  protection  for  its  undertaking/" 

The  new  administration  at  Washington  possessed  a 
definite  Central  American  policy,  and  promptly  upon 
accession  proceeded  to  execute  it.  Accordingly,  letters 
were  addressed  by  President  Taylor  .and  by  Clayton, 
his  secretary  of  state,  to  the  Nicaraguan  government, 
replying  to  the  appeals  for  aid  made  to  the  Polk  admin- 
istration.   These  letters  expressed  the  sympathy  of  the 

^^  Keasbey,  Nicaragua  Canal,  193. 

"1  Inclosures  in  Chatfield  to  Palmerston,  May  5,  1849,  F.  O.,  Guat., 
vol.  58,  no.  38. 

^"  ChaLfield  to  Palmerston,  April  14,  and  21,  1849,  ibid.,  vol.  57,  nos. 
33.  35.  and  I\Iay  5,  1849,  ibid.,  vol.  58,  no.  38. 

"'^  Inclosure  in  Palmerston  to  Crampton,  June  28,  1849,  F.  0.,  Am., 
vol.  497,  no.  37. 

"='  Dem.  Rev..  XXV,  406. 

i'>^  U.  S.  Docs.,  ser.  no.  579,  doc.  75,  p.  119. 


6o     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

American  government  and  the  promise  of  its  friendly 
interposition  for  the  purpose  of  adjusting  the  Mosquito 
controversy/** 

At  the  same  time  Hise,  who  had  not  yet  been  heard 
from,"'  was  recalled,'"*  and  Ephraim  George  Squier 
was  appointed  as  his  successor.""  Through  his  instruc- 
tions Squier  was  made  acquainted  with  the  history  of 
British  encroachments  in  Nicaragua,  and  was  directed 
to  inform  the  Nicaraguan  government  that  the  United 
States  would  employ  any  moral  means  in  its  power  "  for 
the  purpose  of  frustrating  the  apparent  designs  of  Great 
Britain  in  countenancing  the  claims  of  sovereignty  over 
the  Mosquito  coast,  and  the  Port  of  San  Juan,  asserted 
by  her  ally  the  alleged  monarch  of  that  region  ". ''° 
The  new  charge  d'affaires  was  empowered  to  make 
treaties  of  commerce  with  the  Central  American  repub- 
lics, and  particularly  one  with  Nicaragua  in  the  interest 
of  the  transportation  company,"^  which  had  become 
absorbed  into  the  American  Atlantic  and  Pacific  Ship- 
Canal  Company  of  New  York/"  This  treaty  was  to 
secure  to  American  citizens  a  right  of  way  across  the 
isthmus  "'  for  a  transit  line  open  to  all  nations,  with 
exclusive  benefits  to  none."*  No  objection  would  be 
made  by  the  United  States  to  the  employment  of  foreign 
capital,  which  might  be  necessary  to  the  success  of  the 
undertaking."*  In  anticipation  of  the  price  which  Nica- 
ragua might  ask  for  such  a  concession,  Clayton  directed 

^"^  U.  S.  Docs.,  ser.  no.  579,  doc.  7s.  P-   '.?2. 

^"^  Ibid.,  pp.  120-121.       ^»»  Ibid.,  p.   117.        "»  2fr»d. 

'"  Dept.  of  State,  Inst.,  Am.  States,  vol.   15,  p.  69. 

'"  U.  S.  Docs.,  ser.  no.  579,  doc.  75,  pp.   120-121. 

""  Keasbey,  Nicaragua  Canal,  197. 

"'  U.  S.  Docs.,  ser.  no.  579,  doc.  7.S.  p.  121. 

"^  76irf.,  p    130.         "»/6irf.,  p.  129. 


AMERICAN  INTEREST  AWAKENED,  1815-1850      61 

that  no  guarantee  of  territorial  independence  should  be 
given  in  compensation  for  the  grant  of  right  of  way."' 

When  Squier  reached  Central  America,  he  found  the 
usual  confusion  in  most  of  the  states.'"  The  three 
republics  which  favored  the  American  government  re- 
garded his  coming  as  an  occasion  for  great  rejoicing.""" 
Their  satisfaction  was  increased  when  Squier  held  out 
high  hopes  of  American  interference  to  drive  out  Brit- 
ish power.'"'  In  consequence  of  Squier's  promises, 
Nicaragua  took  a  defiant  stand  against  the  British, 
strongly  denouncing  the  Mosquito  protectorate  and 
expressing  a  determination  to  uphold  the  Monroe 
doctrine.'*" 

The  terms  of  the  Hise  treaty,  still  unknown  to  the 
United  States,  had  been  revealed  to  Chatfield,  and  had 
evidently  thoroughly  aroused  his  suspicions."'  Con- 
sequently, he  was  on  the  alert  when  Squier  arrived.  At 
once  there  began  between  the  two  a  struggle  for  the 
supremacy  of  their  governments  in  Central  America, 
which  did  not  terminate  until  the  recall  of  Squier  a 
year  later.  Each  important  move  of  Squier  was  met 
by  an  act  from  Chatfield  calculated  to  checkmate  it. 
Squier's  promises  of  American  aid  brought  forth  arti- 
cles of  a  counteracting  nature  by  Chatfield,  published 
in  the  press  of  Costa  Rica  and  Guatemala."'     When 

"'  Ibid.,  p.   121. 

"'  Inclosure  in  Squier  to  Clayton,  July  20,  1849,  Dept.  of  State,  Des., 
Guat.,  vol.  2. 

"'  Chatfield  to  Palmerston,  July  27,  1849,  F.  O.,  Guat.,  vol.  59,  no.  64. 

^"  Squier  to  Clayton,  June  3,  1849,  Dept.  of  State,  Des.,  Guat.,  vol.  2; 
Chatfield  to  Palmerston,  July  27,  1849,  F.  O.,  Guat.,  vol.  59,  no.  64,  and 
Dec.  15,  1849,  ibid.,  vol.  60,  no.  119;  Squier,  Travels  in  Central  America, 
I,  251-256. 

^*"  Chatfield  to  Palmerston,  Oct.  25,  1849,  F.  O.,  Guat.,  vol.  60,  no.  98; 
Inclosures  in  Chatfield  to  Palmerston,  Oct.  29,  1849,  ibid.,  no.  100. 

^^^  Chatfield  to  Palmerston,  May  17,  1849,  ibid.,  vol.  58,  no.  42. 

"'Chatfield  to  Palmerston,  Dec.  15,  1849,  ibid.,  vol.  60,  no.  119. 


62     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

Squier  tried  to  induce  the  three  states  friendly  to  the 
American  government  to  form  a  union,  the  better  to 
resist  British  encroachments/*'  Chatfield,  perceiving  his 
purpose,  proceeded  to  frustrate  it  by  inducing  Hon- 
duras to  form  a  treaty  permanently  detaching  her  from 
the  contemplated  league.'"  When  a  commission  came 
to  ask  Costa  Rica  to  become  a  member  of  the  union ,^'° 
the  British  consul  again  stepped  forward  to  prevent  her 
consent,'""  and  in  order  the  better  to  dominate  Costa 
Rica,  formed  a  new  treaty  with  her,"^  after  which  he 
intimated  to  Nicaragua  that  Costa  Rica  was  under 
British  protection,  and  therefore  her  boundary  rights 
must  be  respected/** 

Notwithstanding  the  opposition  of  British  agents 
and  the  existence  of  a  rival  British  canal  company,"" 
Squier  succeeded  in  inducing  Nicaragua  to  grant  the 
American  company  a  favorable  concession  for  the  con- 
struction of  a  canal  along  the  line  of  the  San  Juan/"* 
Following  this,  the  Nicaraguan  government  granted  the 
company  a  charter  of  incorporation/'' 

These  arrangements  being  made,  Squier  experienced 
little  difficulty  in  forming  a  treaty  for  interoceanic 
communication  based  upon  the  general  terms  outlined 

'*'  Squier  to  Clayton,  Aug.  20,  1849,  Dept.  of  State,  Des.,  Guat.,  vol.  2; 
Chatfield  to  I'almerston,  Nov.  7,  i8.i9,  F.  O.,  Guat.,  vol.  60,  no.   107. 

'*"' ChattidA  *iO-  talmkcraUui^  Dec.  31,  1849,  ibid.,  no.  126;  Squier, 
Travels  in  Central  America,  II,  180-181. 

^*^"  Chatfield   to   Palmerston,   Dec.   24,    1849,    I'-   O.,   Guat.,   vol.   60,  no. 

'^'^  Ibid.;  Chatfield  to  Palmerston,  Dec.  15,  1849,  ibid.,  no.  116. 

'"Chatfield  to  Palmerston,  Nov.  28,  1849,  ibid.,  no.   114. 

"■'  Chatfield  to  tlie  Principal  Secretary  of  the  Government  of  Nicaragua, 
Dec.   I,  1849,  ibid.,  no.  21. 

i*»  Travis,  Clayton-Bulwcr  Treaty,  65. 

'••  Pari.  Pat'ers,  1856,  Corns.,  LX,  "  Correspondence  with  the  United 
States  respecting  Central  America  ",  19-24. 

'"'  Keasbey,  Nicaragua  Canal,  198. 


AMERICAN  INTEREST  AWAKENED,  i8 15-1850      63 

in  Clayton's  instructions.  The  treaty  engaged  the  two 
contracting  parties  to  defend  the  canal  company  in  its 
enterprise,  secured  from  the  American  government  a 
recognition  of  the  rights  of  sovereignty  and  property 
possessed  by  Nicaragua  in  the  canal  route,  and  guaran- 
teed its  neutrality  as  long  as  it  should  be  controlled  by 
American  citizens.  The  rights  and  privileges  given  by 
the  treaty  were  open  to  any  other  nation  willing  to  enter 
into  an  agreement  with  Nicaragua  for  the  protection  of 
the  contemplated  canal."^ 

As  Squier  discovered  soon  after  his  arrival,  Rise's 
suspicions  regarding  the  designs  of  British  agents  upon 
the  termini  of  the  proposed  canal  line  were  well 
founded.  Not  content  with  the  British  claims  to  San 
Juan  on  the  Atlantic,  Chatfield,  as  early  as  January, 
1847,  had  written  to  Palmerston  suggesting  that  Great 
Britain,  in  anticipation  of  the  Americans,  obtain  a  hold 
on  the  "  Port  of  the  Union  "  and  on  Realejo  on  the 
Pacific.  The  Central  American  states  had  long  been  in 
debt  to  the  British  ;  therefore  he  thought  that  an  island 
in  the  bay  might  be  accepted  in  part  payment.^'^  Palmer- 
ston displayed  but  little  interest  in  the  scheme,"^  but 
in  the  following  March  the  British  consul  wrote  again, 
this  time  asking  for  authority  to  obtain  the  cession  to 
Great  Britain  of  the  port  of  San  Carlos  on  Lake  Nica- 
ragua and  three  islands  in  the  Bay  of  Fonseca,  in  return 
for  which  the  British  government  should  assume  the 
payment  of  all  claims  against  the  states  concerned."' 
Palmerston  promptly  replied  that  the  government  did 

^^  Pari.  Papers,    1856,   Corns.,   LX,   "Correspondence  with  the  United 
States   respecting   Central   America",    18-19. 
^''  F.  0.,  Cen.  Am.,  vol.  45,  no.  4. 

"*  Palmerston  to  Ward,  April  16,  1847,  F.  O.,  Cen.  Am.,  vol.  49. 
"'Palmerston  to  Chatfield,  June  17,  1848,  F.  0.,  Guat.,  vol.  50,  no.  15. 


64     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

not  consider  such  a  measure  expedient ;  "*  Chatfield, 
nevertheless,  urged  the  subject  repeatedly,"'  and  finally 
decided  to  secure  Tigre  Island,  which  commanded  the 
Bay  of  Fonseca,  as  guarantee  for  the  payment  of 
British  claims  against  Honduras,  to  which  state  the 
island  belonged.  He  therefore  wrote  to  the  Honduran 
government  pressing  the  payment  of  debts,  and  stating 
that  if  Honduras  did  not  respond  promptly  a  Hen  might 
be  put  upon  Tigre  until  the  claims  should  be  paid.'™  In 
May,  1849,  Palmerston  again  wrote  in  opposition  to 
Chatfield's  plans,  stating  that  the  government  much 
preferred  that  the  claims  be  met  by  proper  payments, 
as  Parliament  would  be  very  little  disposed  to  take  upon 
the  public  the  payment  of  the  claims  in  return  for  the 
islands  in  question.'"*  Chatfield,  however,  still  cher- 
ished the  hope  of  securing  at  least  the  island  of  Tigre 
for  his  government,  which,  he  felt,  did  not  fully  appre- 
ciate the  situation. 

The  hearty  welcome  extended  to  Squier  caused  the 
British  consul  to  believe,  or  at  least  to  pretend  to  be- 
lieve, that  the  three  states  unfriendly  to  England  were 
seeking  the  protection  of  the  American  government  in 
order  to  escape  a  direct  payment  of  British  claims."* 
Therefore,  he  pressed  for  settlement  more  vigorously 

*"  Palmerston  to  Chatfield,  June  17,  1848,  F.  O.,  Guat.,  vol.  50,  no.  15. 

"'Chatfield  to  Talmerston,  Nov.  24,  1848,  F.  0.,  Guat.,  vol.  53,  no.  8; 
Jan.  5,  1849,  ibid.,  vol.  57,  no.  4;  April  14,  1849,  ibid.,  no.  33;  July  24, 
1849,  ibid.,  vol.  59,  no.  63;  July  27,  1849,  ibid.,  no.  67. 

"'  Chatfield  to  the  Principal  Secretary  of  the  Honduran  Government, 
Jan.  26,  1849,  ibid.,  vol.  57,  no.  2.  In  writing  of  the  proposed  lien  on 
Tigre,  Chatfield  said:  "  I  have  p.nrtly  hecn  made  to  make  it  from  a  desire 
to  anticipate  an  attempt  in  any  other  quarter,  to  get  possession  of  a 
spot  so  valuable  in  a  naval  point  of  view  on  this  side  of  the  Continent." 
Chatfield  to  Pundonald,  Feb.  24,  1849,  ibid.,  no.  i. 

'"•Palmerston  to  Chatfield,  May  1,  1849,  ibid.,  vol.  56,  no.  7. 

^"^  Chatfield  to  Palmerston,  Oct.  17,  and  Nov.  14,  1849,  ibid.,  vol.  60, 
nos.  95,  112. 


AMERICAN  INTEREST  A  IF  A  KEN  ED,  iS  15- 1850      65 

than  ever.*"  Upon  learning  of  Chatfield's  designs  on 
Tigre,  Squier  became  fearful  that,  if  executed,  they 
would  embarrass  all  efforts  to  form  a  canal  treaty 
and  construct  a  canal,  for  he  believed  that  the  canal 
must  terminate  on  the  Bay  of  Fonseca/"^  Therefore, 
although  unauthorized  to  do  so,  he  determined  to  form 
a  treaty  with  Honduras  for  the  purchase  of  the  island 
by  the  United  States,  or  for  its  temporary  cession  until 
the  canal  arrangements  should  be  completed.'"*  Accord- 
ingly, at  his  request  a  Honduran  commissioner  came 
to  Guatemala  and  formed  a  treaty  ceding  Tigre  to  the 
American  government  for  a  period  of  eighteen 
months."^  Squier  then  promptly  notified  the  British 
agents  of  the  transaction.""' 

Chatfield  thereupon  hastened  the  execution  of  his 
plans,  and,  on  October  16,  a  week  after  its  cession  to 
the  United  States,  at  his  orders  '"^  Captain  Paynter  of 
the  British  navy  seized  the  island  and  hoisted  the  Brit- 
ish flag.^  Squier  protested  and  demanded  its  evacua- 
tion,^"*  Chatfield  refused  and  called  attention  to  the  hen 
which  he  had  placed  upon  the  Tigre  in  the  preceding 
January.  The  proprietary  rights  thus  established,  he 
declared,  no  subsequent  arrangement  without  cogniz- 
ance of  England  could  undo.^*"" 

^^  Chatfield  to  Palmerston,  Oct.   17,   1849,  ibid.,  no.  95. 

**'  Squier  to  Clayton,  Oct.  10,  1849,  Dept.  of  State,  Des.,  Guat.,  vol.  2. 

^^  Squier  to  Clayton,  .\ug.  20,  1849,  Dept.  of  State,  Des.,  Guat.,  vol.  2. 

^^  Pari.  Papers.  1856,  Corns.,  LX,  "Correspondence  with  the  United 
States  respecting  Central  .\merica  ",  31-32. 

^Ibid.,  33. 

^'''  Inclosures  in  Chatfield  to  Palmerston,  Oct.  17,  1849,  F.  O.,  Guat., 
vol.  60,  no.  93. 

^^  Paynter  to  Hornby,  Oct.  2i,  1849,  ibid.,  vol.  68,  no.  41. 

^^  Pari.  Papers,  1856,  Corns.,  LX,  "Correspondence  with  the  United 
States  respecting  Central  .America  ",   33. 

^  Ibid. 

6 


66     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

Admiral  Hornby,  commander  of  the  British  fleet  in 
the  West  Indies,  was  famihar  with  Palmerston's  view 
of  Chatfield's  plans,""  and,  therefore,  upon  hearing  of 
the  seizure,  he  promptly  ordered  the  restoration  of  the 
island  to  Honduras.'"  Later,  both  Chatfield'"  and 
Squier"'  were  rebuked  by  their  governments  for  the 
parts  which  they  had  played  in  the  affair. 

But  the  seizure  of  Tigre  Island  produced  much 
excitement  in  the  United  States ;  and  suspicion  against 
the  British  government,  which  had  been  somewhat 
allayed  by  negotiations  then  pending,  was  again 
aroused,  and  a  peaceful  settlement  of  the  canal  ques- 
tion endangered.  Clayton,  through  Lawrence,  the 
American  minister  at  London,  demanded  a  disavowal 
of  the  act,^*  which,  after  some  delay,  was  given,**" 
though  not  in  an  altogether  satisfactory  manner. 

^'Hornby  to  Chatfield,  Dec.  12,  1849,  F.  O.,  Cen.  Am.,  vol.  64. 
^'^7b«d.;  Hornby  to  Parker,  Dec.  12,  1849,  ibid.,  vol.  68,  no  100. 
-^'  Palmerston  to  Chatfield,  Jan.    17,   1850,  ihid.,  vol.   63,  no.    i. 
-"  Dept.  of  State,  Inst.,  Am.  States,  vol.   15,  pp.  loo-ioi. 
"*  U.  S.  Docs.,  ser.  no.  579,  doc.  75,  pp.  313-315. 

^^^  Pari.  Papers,    1856,   Corns.,   LX,  "Correspondence  with  the  United 
States  respecting  Central  America  ",  34-35. 


CHAPTER  III. 
The  Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty,  April  19,  1850. 

While  the  British  and  American  agents  were  manipu- 
lating the  weak  Central  American  states  in  the  interest 
of  the  country  each  represented,  a  movement,  initiated 
at  Washington,  had  begun  towards  effecting,  through 
negotiation,  a  peaceful  settlement  of  the  matter  in  dis- 
pute. But  the  problem  was  an  unusually  hard  one 
because  of  the  peculiar  nature  of  the  situation  itself ; 
and  the  difficulty  was  made  greater  by  the  suspicion 
and  jealousy  with  which  each  government  had  long 
viewed  the  other ;  moreover,  this  mutual  distrust  was 
further  stimulated  by  the  rash  acts  of  the  agents  in 
Central  America,  and  the  negotiations  were  embar- 
rassed accordingly. 

George  Bancroft  was  American  minister  at  London 
when  San  Juan  was  seized  by  the  British,  but  for  many 
months  he  received  no  instructions  upon  the  subject, 
because  his  government  had  decided  to  investigate  the 
situation  before  determining  upon  a  course  of  action. 
The  investigation  was  to  be  made  by  Hise,  whose 
report,  as  has  already  been  stated,  was  not  received 
before  Polk's  administration  ended.  But  Bancroft  in- 
formed the  American  government  of  whatever  came  to 
his  notice  with  reference  to  the  dispute  between  Eng- 
land and  Nicaragua.  When  Castellon,  accompanied  by 
Marcoleta,  the  Nicaraguan  charge  d'affaires  in  Bel- 
gium, arrived  in  England  for  the  purpose  of  trying 

67 


68     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

to  settle  the  Greytown  dispute,  Bancroft  apprised 
Buchanan  of  the  fact  and  expressed  the  belief  that 
Palmerston  would  not  recede/  Later  he  reported  the 
unsatisfactory  reply  which  had  been  given  Castellon, 
remarking  that  Aberdeen  agreed  with  Palmerston  in 
the  stand  which  the  latter  had  taken.' 

Bancroft's  last-mentioned  report  reached  Washing- 
ton very  shortly  before  the  inauguration  of  President 
Taylor  and  probably  hastened  the  action  of  the  new 
administration,  which,  while  it  had  no  schemes  for  terri- 
torial aggrandizement,  was  interested  in  dislodging  the 
British  from  their  position  in  Central  America,  and 
very  desirous  of  securing  a  neutral  transisthmian  route. 
On  April  30,  1849,  Clayton,  the  new  secretary  of  state, 
directed  Bancroft  to  notify  Castellon  that  the  Presi- 
dent had  determined  to  grant  Nicaragua's  request  by 
trying  to  induce  the  British  government  to  abandon  its 
pretensions  to  Nicaraguan  territory.  Bancroft  was 
also  directed  to  advise  the  Nicaraguan  minister  to 
"  continue  firm  in  asserting  the  rights  of  his  govern- 
ment and  not  to  do  any  act  which  might  either  weaken 
or  alienate  these  rights  ".' 

Two  days  later  Clayton  again  wrote  to  Bancroft 
stating  that  for  some  time  the  President  had  anxiously 
viewed  the  acts  of  the  British  in  Central  America,  but 
had  not  asked  for  an  explanation,  in  the  hope  that  the 
measures  of  the  British  government  might  still  prove 
consistent  with  the  treaties  made  between  that  govern- 
ment and  Spain;  or,  if  otherwise,  that  the  differences 
between  Great  Britain  and  the  Central  American 
authorities  might  be  settled  in  a  manner  satisfactory 

•  U.  S.  Docs.,  ser.  no.  579,  doc.  75,  p.  222. 

*  llnd.,  p.  224. 

'  Dcpt.  of  State,  Inst.,  Gt.  Brit.,  vol.   15,  pp.  385-386. 


CLAYTON-BULWER    TREATY  69 

to  all  parties.  That  hope,  however,  had  apparently 
been  vain.  Therefore,  since  Nicaragua  had  requested 
the  interposition  of  the  United  States  with  reference 
to  the  seizure  of  San  Juan,  the  American  government 
had  investigated  the  Mosquito  claims  asserted  by  the 
British  and  had  decided  these  claims  to  be  without  rea- 
sonable foundation,  consequently  the  President  had 
decided  to  present  the  American  views  upon  the  ques- 
tion to  the  friendly  consideration  of  Great  Britain,* 

But  before  entering  into  any  written  correspondence 
upon  the  subject,  it  seemed  best  that  Bancroft  sound 
Palmerston  in  conversation  as  to  the  views  and  inten- 
tions of  the  British  government  regarding  the  Mos- 
quito coast,  and  ascertain  whether  that  government 
intended  to  set  aside  for  its  own  use  any  portion  of  the 
territory ;  if  so,  for  what  reason,  and  on  what  prin- 
ciple. Clayton  also  suggested  that  Bancroft  find  out  if 
the  British  government  claimed  a  right  as  ally  and  pro- 
tector of  the  Mosquito  king  to  "  control  or  obstruct  the 
commerce  of  the  river  San  Juan  de  Nicaragua,  or  to 
keep  forts  or  establishments  of  any  kind  on  its  banks  ". 
Further,  Bancroft  was  instructed  to  intimate  to  Palmer- 
ston the  inexpediency  of  any  great  commercial  power  1 
claiming  a  right  to  the  river,  in  case  it  should  become; 
a  world  highway.  He  was  to  inform  Palmerston  in 
the  most  friendly  manner  that  while  the  United  States 
would  look  upon  the  exclusive  possession  or  command 
of  such  a  river  by  themselves  as  a  great  evil,  which 
would  draw  upon  the  nation  the  jealousy  and  ultimately 
the  hostility  of  the  rest  of  the  commercial  world,  yet 
they  ought  not  to  consent  to  its  obstruction  by  any  other 
power.    If,  after  the  subject  had  been  thus  presented, 

"^  L'.  S.  Docs.,  ser.  no.  579,  doc.  75,  pp.  230-231. 


70     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

Palmerston  was  still  unwilling  to  abandon  the  British 
and  Mosquito  claim,  or  retire  from  the  river  and  the 
command  of  its  harbor,  Bancroft  was  to  express  to  him 
the  views  of  the  President  regarding  the  Mosquito 
claim,  assuring  him  that  the  United  States  was  not  actu- 
ated by  ambitious  motives  or  by  any  feeling  in  the  least 
unfriendly  to  Great  Britain.  If  this  failed  to  move 
Palmerston,  then  Bancroft  was  to  present  a  formal 
written  protest  to  the  British  government.  Bancroft 
was  also  directed  to  obtain  from  the  Costa  Rican  minis- 
ter an  assurance  that  he  would  not  commit  the  rights 
of  his  state  by  any  convention  with  Great  Britain.  A 
cession  to  Great  Britain  of  the  territory  south  of  the 
San  Juan  River,  which  was  claimed  by  Costa  Rica  as 
well  as  by  Nicaragua,  might  be  a  serious  embarrass- 
ment to  the  United  States.  No  British  forts  or  pos- 
sessions of  any  kind  should  exist  on  either  bank  of  the 
river.  Therefore,  Clayton  stated,  it  was  desirable  to 
warn  Costa  Rica  against  ceding  her  territory  to  Great 
Britain,  for  the  safety  of  every  American  state  would 
require  that  it  yield  to  no  further  foreign  aggression." 
Bancroft  had  no  opportunity  to  present  the  subject 
to  Palmerston  for  some  time,  but  he  had  an  interview 
with  Molina,  the  Costa  Rican  minister,  who  assured 
him  that  the  relation  existing  between  his  country  and 
Great  Britain  was  one  of  friendship,  and  nothing  more. 
However,  Bancroft  suspected  from  Molina's  manner 
that,  in  case  war  occurred  with  Nicaragua  over  the 
boundary  question,  Costa  Rica  meant  to  ask  protection 
of  England."  Therefore,  in  reporting  the  interview  to 
Clayton,  Bancroft  suggested  that  the  American  agent 
in  Central  America  try  to  get  the  two  states  to  reach  an 

*  U.  S.  Docs.,  ser.  no.  579,  doc.  75,  p.  232. 
"  Ibid.,  p.  233. 


CLAYTON -BULWER    TREATY  71 

agreement  over  their  boundaries ;  meanwhile,  he  him- 
self would  endeavor  to  induce  the  Costa  Rican  minister 
to  await  the  outcome  of  such  an  effort,  before  appealing 
to  England/ 

But  Bancroft  was  decidedly  slow  in  grasping  the 
intentions  of  Costa  Rica.  This  was  evidently  due  to  his 
inclination  to  credit  Molina  with  more  frankness  and 
friendliness  towards  the  United  States  than  the  latter 
really  felt.'  A  note  in  the  Public  Record  Office  in 
London  shows  that  in  December,  1848,  five  months  pre- 
vious to  Bancroft's  interview  with  him,  Molina  had 
distinctly  asked  that  the  British  government  take  Costa 
Rica  under  its  protection,  as  that  state  feared  trouble 
with  New  Granada  and  Nicaragua  over  boundary  ques- 
tions.' The  terms  offered  by  the  Costa  Ricans,  in  return 
for  the  protecting  power  of  the  British,  practically 
amounted  to  a  surrender  of  their  country  to  the  latter." 
Thus  it  is  evident  that  Clayton's  fears  of  Costa  Rican 
plans  for  British  protection  were  far  from  groundless. 
Palmerston,  however,  refused  the  offer,  though  just 
at  what  time  is  not  clear."  Buchanan,  writing  in  April, 
1850,  expressed  the  beHef  that  but  for  the  determination 
to  resist  European  colonization  on  the  North  American 
continent,  shown  by  Polk's  administration,  the  offer 
would  have  been  accepted."  Yet  this  is  by  no  means 
certain.  To  be  sure.  Great  Britain,  even  at  this  early 
date,  did  not  think  it  wise  to  run  counter  to  the  Monroe' 
doctrine,  but  there  were  stronger  reasons  for  not  con 

'  Ibid.,  p.  233.         *  Ibid.,  p.  223. 

*  Moliua  to  Palmerston,  Dec.  23,  1848,  F.  O.,  Costa  Rica,  vol.   i. 

"  Ibid. 

"■  Molina  to  Palmerston,  Mar.  2^,  1850,  ibid.,  vol.  3.  This  letter  of 
Molina  simply  refers  to  the  refusal  as  having  been  made  "  on  considera- 
tions of  too  great  a  weight  to  be  controverted." 

"  Biichanan,  Works,  VIII,  379. 


72     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

sidering  Molina's  proposal.  At  this  time  the  British 
government  had  come  to  feel  strongly  that  the  country 
was  overburdened  with  colonies,  and  it  was  even  be- 
lieved that  Canada  must  soon  become  independent." 
By  the  seizure  of  San  Juan  and  the  extension  of  the 
I  Mosquito  boundary  to  the  Colorado,  England  had 
'gained  all  that  she  desired  at  the  time,  in  the  vicinity 
vof  the  proposed  canal ;  therefore,  all  regard  for  Ameri- 
jcan  wishes  aside,  there  could  be  no  object  in  burdening 
iierself  with  a  Costa  Rican  protectorate. 

Meanwhile  the  outlook  for  Nicaragua  had  grown 
more  discouraging.  The  British  government  was 
plainly  determined  not  to  restore  San  Juan."  Palmer- 
ston's  plan  to  settle  all  of  the  questions  in  dispute  by 
an  agreement  between  IMosquito,  Costa  Rica,  and  Nica- 
ragua would  not  be  considered  by  the  Nicaraguans, 
who  did  not  recognize  the  Mosquito  kingdom."  There- 
fore, in  despair,  Nicaragua  again  turned  to  the  United 
States.  On  July  12,  Castellon  addressed  a  note  to  Ban- 
croft asking  whether  Honduras,  Salvador,  and  Nica- 
ragua, or  the  last-named  only,  would  be  admitted  to  the 
American  Union.  In  case  the  American  government 
were  willing,  upon  what  terms  could  the  admission  take 
place,  and  what  steps  were  necessary  to  effect  it?  If 
the  United  States  were  opposed  to  annexation,  could 
the  Nicaraguans  count,  at  least,  on  American  aid  in 
defending  the  integrity  of  their  territory?  If  so,  upon 
what  terms  would  the  aid  be  given  ?  '* 

Bancroft,  who  was  entirely  without  instructions  upon 
this  subject,  cautiously  replied  that  the  United  States 
had  no  selfish  purpose  in  its  policy  towards  Central 

"  U.  S.  Docs.,  ser.  no.  579,  doc.  75,  p.  223. 

^*  Ibid.,  p.  235.  ''*  Ibitl..  p.  2j6.  "Ibid.,  pp.  301-302. 


CLAYTON-BUUVER    TREATY  7Z 

America ;  it  desired  only  the  welfare  of  the  Central 
American  states.  The  American  government,  he  said, 
had  hoped  to  see  San  Juan  returned  to  Nicaragua,  but 
intervention  for  that  purpose  had  been  delayed  by  the 
dissensions  within  Central  America  itself.  In  order 
that  a  more  sympathetic  regard  from  the  outside  might 
be  secured,  he  advised  that  the  boundary  dispute  be 
settled  peaceably  with  Costa  Rica,  and  that  the  latter 
be  permitted  to  carry  on  commerce  through  the  port  of 
San  Juan,  duty  free." 

After  the  receipt  of  this  reply,  Castellon  once  more 
turned  to  Palmerston  and  proposed  arbitration.''' 
"  Should  this  be  refused  ",  Bancroft  wrote  Clayton, 
"  Nicaragua  must  submit,  unless  she  can  rely  on  the 
prompt  exertion  of  the  influence  of  the  United 
States."  ^*  But  Palmerston  would  not  arbitrate ;  "  and, 
indeed,  acquiescence  in  a  plan  to  refer  her  claims  to 
Mosquito  to  an  international  court  was  hardly  to  be 
expected  of  Great  Britain. 

Clayton's  instructions  on  Central  American .  afifairs 
had  reached  Bancroft  in  May,  but  it  was  not  until  July 
that  he  succeeded  in  securing  an  interview  on  them  with 
Palmerston,  and  even  then  the  latter  was  called  away 
before  the  interview  was  concluded."  Bancroft  be- 
lieved, and  reported  to  Clayton,  that  Palmerston  was 
purposely  delaying  in  order  to  shut  the  United  States 
out  of  the  Central  American  discussion  and  thereby 
bring  the  Central  American  states  to  an  acquiescence  in 
British  arrangeme  'ts."     The  British  correspondence 

"  Ibid.,  pp.  303-304.  •*'  Ibid.,  236.  ^'  Ibid. 

"  Inclosure  in  Lawrence  to   Clayton,   April    19,    1850,   Dept.   of   State, 
Des.,  Eng.,  vol.  60,  no.  45. 
^  U.  S.  Docs.,  ser.  no.  579,  dec.  75,  p.  235. 
^  Ibid. 


74     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

indicates  the  correctness  of  Bancroft's  surmise ;  the 
plan  was  to  frighten  Nicaragua  into  yielding,  and  thus 
avoid  any  cause  for  American  interference. 

At  the  interview  Bancroft  asked  whether  the  British 
government  intended  to  appropriate  to  itself  the  town 
of  San  Juan  or  any  part  of  the  "  so  called  Mosquito 
territory  ",  to  which  Palmerston  replied,  "  No ;  you 
know  very  well  we  have  already  colonies  enough." 
When  asked  in  whose  hands  San  Juan  then  was,  the 
Foreign  Secretary  replied,  "  For  the  present,  in  those  of 
English  commissioners."  He  acknowledged  that  this 
was  an  occupation  by  England,  but  stated  that  the 
occupation  was  only  temporary.  Thereupon  Bancroft 
expressed  the  opinion  of  his  government  that  there  was 
no  such  body  politic  as  the  kingdom  of  the  IMosquitos ; 
that  if  there  were  any,  its  jurisdiction  did  not  reach  to 
San  Juan ;  and  that,  even  if  it  did,  no  right  of  exercis- 
ing a  protectorate  belonged  to  Great  Britain.  In  his 
response  to  this,  Bancroft  reported  to  his  government, 
Palmerston  "  did  not  in  the  least  disguise  his  strong 
disinclination  to  restore  the  port,  insisting,  however, 
that  any  purposes  the  United  States  might  have  in 
reference  to  connecting  the  two  oceans  by  a  commercial 
highway,  would  be  better  promoted  by  the  policy  which 
he  is  pursuing  than  in  any  other  way.  And  in  refer- 
ence to  the  whole  subject,  his  words  were,  '  You  and  we 
can  have  but  one  interest '."  " 

Bancroft  was  not  reassured  by  Palmerston's  conclud- 
ing remarks,  because  of  the  attitude  towards  the  restor- 
ation of  San  Juan,  displayed  in  this  interview,  as  well 
as  by  the  reports  of  Castellon  and  Marcoleta.  More- 
over, Palmerston  did  not  invite  a  renewal  of  the  inter- 

*'  U.  S.  Docs.,  ser.  no.  579,  doc.  75,  p.  235. 


CLAYTON-BULWER   TREATY  75 

rupted  discussion,  and  when  Bancroft  learned  that  the 
Foreign  Secretary  had  given  a  long  interview  to  Cas- 
tellon  and  Marcoleta,  he  decided  that  it  was  time  to 
present  the  protest,  as  directed  by  Clayton."  But  he 
had  not  quite  finished  writing  the  paper  when  notice  of 
his  recall  came,  and  in  view  of  this  he  thought  it  best 
not  to  present  the  protest  to  the  British  government." 
Before  Bancroft's  report  of  his  interview  reached 
Washington  the  American  government  had  learned  that 
a  contract  had  been  secured  from  Nicaragua  by  the 
Atlantic  and  Pacific  Ship-Canal  Company.  As  he  knew 
that  the  completion  of  this  contract  w^as  to  be  followed 
by  a  canal  treat}%  drawn  up  between  Squier  and  the 
Nicaragua  government,  Clayton  became  uneasy  over 
Bancroft's  delay.  Therefore,  on  August  16,  he  wrote 
to  Rives,  the  newly-appointed  minister  to  France,  re- 
garding the  situation,  and  pointed  out  how  important 
it  was  that  Great  Britain  become  acquainted  with  the 
views  of  the  United  States  government  upon  the  Mos- 
quito question.  "  We  are  deeply  anxious  ",  he  wrote, 
"  to  avoid  any  collision  with  the  British  government  in 
relation  to  this  matter;  but  that  collision  will  become 
inevitable  if  great  prudence  be  not  exercised  on  both 
sides."  With  reference  to  the  arrangement  between 
Nicaragua  and  the  canal  company,  he  said :  "  We  view 
the  title  of  the  state  of  Nicaragua,  which  entered  into 
this  contract,  as  irrefragable,  and  are  about  to  make  a 
treaty  with  her  on  the  subject.  WJien,  Great  Britain 
shall  ascertain  the  real  objects  that  we  have  in  view, 
sTie  cannot,  I  think,  fail  to  see  the  propriety  of  aiding 
instead  of  obstructing  us  in  securing,  for  all  commer- 
cial nations  on  the  same  terms,  the  right  of  passage  by 

"  Ibid.,  pp.  235-236.  ^  Ibid.,  p.  234. 


76     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

the  Nicaragua  route  from  ocean  to  ocean,  if  that  route 
should  prove  to  be  practicable."  Consequently,  Rives 
was  instructed  to  pass  through  London  on  his  way  to 
Paris  and  perform  the  duty  enjoined  upon  Bancroft,  if, 
upon  his  arrival  in  London,  it  had  not  yet  been  per- 
formed. If  Palmerston  showed  himself  determined 
to  maintain  the  Mosquito  title,  Rives  was  not  to  pre- 
sent the  protest,  but  to  leave  that  to  Lawrence,  Ban- 
croft's successor.^* 

Palmerston  was  absent  from  London  when  Rives 
arrived,^'  but  he  soon  returned,  and  on  September  24, 
Rives  had  an  interview  with  him.  Palmerston  received 
the  American  minister  cordially,  saying  that  he  had 
returned  to  London  solely  for  the  purpose  of  seeing  and 
conversing  with  him.^  Rives  stated  the  object  of  his 
errand  as  instructed,  explaining  the  views  of  the  Ameri- 
can government  and  its  intention  to  support  the  canal 
company  in  the  rights  granted  it  by  Nicaragua.  He 
then  pointed  out  to  Palmerston  the  peculiar  interest 
which  the  United  States  must  have  in  the  canal  route 
because  of  her  possessions  on  the  Pacific  coast,  assuring 
him,  however,  that  the  United  States  "  sought  no 
exclusive  privilege  or  preferential  right  of  any  kind  in 
regard  to  the  proposed  communication  "  but  wished  to 
see  it  "  dedicated  to  the  common  use  of  all  nations,  on 
a  footing  of  perfect  equality  for  all."  Yet,  while  pos- 
sessing no  selfish  designs  on  the  transisthmian  route, 
the  American  nation  "  could  never  consent  to  see  so 
important  a  communication  fall  under  the  exclusive 
control  of  any  other  great  commercial  power."  Mos- 
quito possession  at  the  mouth  of  the  San  Juan  could  be 

-°  U.  S.  Docs.,  ser.  no.  660,  doc.  27,  p.   13. 
"/£)/</..  p.   15.  ^^  Ibid.,  p.  18. 


CLAYTON-BUUVER    TREATY  77 

considered  in  no  other  light  than  British  possession,  and 
must  necessarily  cause  dissatisfaction  and  distrust  on 
the  part  of  other  commercial  powers.  In  view  of  these 
facts,  Rives  suggested  to  Palmerston  that  the  govern- 
ments which  they  represented  come  to  a  "  frank  and 
manly  understanding  with  each  other,  and  unite  their 
influence  for  the  accomplishment  of  an  object  of  the 
highest  importance  to  both  of  them  as  well  as  the  rest 
of  the  world,  instead  of  hazarding  the  final  loss  of  so 
great  an  object  by  jarring  and  divided  councils."  " 

Palmerston  replied  that  he  was  very  glad  to  have  full 
and  free  conversation  upon  the  subject.  He  had  con- 
versed to  some  extent  with  Bancroft  regarding  it,  he 
said,  but  as  Bancroft  was  soon  to  leave,  it  had  not 
seemed  necessary  to  enter  into  much  detail.  He  then 
reviewed  the  controversy  W'ith  Nicaragua,  stating  that 
from  a  very  early  time  the  Mosquito  Indians  had  been 
treated  by  the  British  as  forming  a  sovereign  state. 
For  more  than  a  century,  the  British  government  had 
given  them  tokens  of  recognition  and  protection.  The 
Nicaraguans,  according  to  the  Foreign  Secretary,  had 
taken  forcible  possession  of  the  port  of  San  Juan  to 
which  they  had  no  right.  The  British,  as  protectors  of 
the  Mosquitos,  had  driven  them  out,  but  the  Nicara- 
guans, while  not  in  possession,  had  fraudulently  granted 
a  right  of  way  to  American  citizens  in  order  to  draw 
the  United  States  into  their  quarrel.  In  this  connection 
Palmerston  assured  Rives,  however,  that  there  was  not 
the  slightest  foundation  for  the  suspicion,  which  existed 
in  the  United  States,  that  the  British  government 
wished  to  plant  a  new  colony  on  the  San  Juan,  for  they 
already  had  more  colonies  than  they  could  manage ; 

^  Ibid.,  pp.  18-19. 


78     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

"  that,  as  to  any  idea  of  their  holditig  exclusive  posses- 
sion of  the  mouth  of  the  San  Juan  as  the  Key  of  the  con- 
templated communication  between  the  Atlantic  and  the 
Pacific,  nothing  could  be  further  from  their  minds''  *" 

Later  Palmerston  spoke  of  the  dissension  and  strife 
which  distracted  the  Central  American  states  and  pre- 
vented the  development  of  their  natural  resources.  In 
the  interest  of  humanity  and  of  the  general  commerce 
of  the  world,  he  declared,  it  was  desirable  to  promote 
the  civilization  and  improvement  of  those  countries.** 

When  the  conversation  again  reverted  to  the  Mos- 
quitos.  Rives  called  attention  to  the  fact  that  "  the 
ultimate  property  or  high  domain  of  Indian  territory 
was  always  considered  as  vested  in  the  nations  coloniz- 
ing the  country  by  the  mere  fact  of  discovery  or  settle- 
ment anywhere  within  the  limits  declared  to  be  assumed 
by  them  ",  and  pointed  out  that  this  principle  had  been 
acted  upon  by  Great  Britain  herself  in  various  inter- 
national pacts.  The  Foreign  Secretary  fully  admitted 
the  general  doctrine  stated  by  Rives,  and  said  that  this 
was  the  principle  on  which  the  British  relations  with 
the  Indian  tribes  in  Canada  were  conducted.  But  he 
insisted  that  the  case  of  the  Mosquitos  was  "  sui  generis 
and  stood  upon  its  own  peculiar  circumstances  ".  How- 
ever, he  declared  that  the  question  of  Mosquito  title 
need  not  prevent  the  consummation  of  the  plan  for 
interoceanic  communication.*^ 

Throughout  the  interview  Palmerston's  conversation 
was  marked  by  "  a  tone  of  perfect  frankness  and  the 
most  conciliatory  and  friendly  spirit  towards  the  United 
States  ",  which  led  Rives  to  feel  that  the  way  had  been 

**■  U.    S.   Docs.,   ser.    no.    660,   doc.    27,   p.    20.      The   italics  appear   in 
Rives's  report  to  Clayton. 
»'  Ibid.  "  Ibid.,  p.  23. 


CLAYTON-BU LIVER    TREATY  79 

opened  for  a  better  understanding  and  final  co-opera- 
tion."   In  conclusion,  Rives  suggested,  that  "  if  Great 
Britain  would  do  what  she  had  the  unquestionable 
power  to  effect  with  the  Mosquitos,  and  exert  her  influ- 
ence with  Costa  Rica,  while  the  United  States  em- 
ployed their  good  offices  with  Nicaragua,  every  politi- 
cal impediment  to  the  execution  of  the  great  work  they 
both  desired  to  see  accomplished  would  be  speedily 
removed."      This  done,  the  benefits  of  the  highway  j 
could  be  secured  to  all  by  an  international  guaranteed 
Palmerston  received  the  suggestion  very  favorably  and  | 
left  the  American  minister  with  the  impression  that  he  \ 
was  desirous  of  co-operating  with  the  United  States  in  j 
promoting  the  accomplishment  of  the  object  in  which  / 
both  nations  were  interested,  the  construction  of  an/ 
interoceanic  highway."* 

When  Lawrence  arrived  two  or  three  weeks  later  he 
had  interviews  with  Palmerston '"  and  Russell,^'  both  of 
whom  repeated  substantially  what  had  been  said  to 
Rives.  In  consequence,  Lawrence,  like  Rives,  was  led 
to  believe  that  the  British  government  would  join  with 
the  United  States  in  the  guarantee  of  a  transisthmian 
highway."^ 

A  comparison  of  the  attitude  displayed  by  Palmer- 
ston towards  Bancroft,  with  his  manner  of  meeting  and 
answering  Rives  and  Lawrence,  plainly  reveals  a  shift- 
ing of  British  policy.  The  fact  of  such  a  change  makes 
desirable  at  this  point  a  more  definite  consideration  of 
British  motives  as  well  as  an  investigation  into  the 
causes  which  made  the  English  government  show  j 
greater  willingness  at  this  time  to  discuss  the  Central  I 

^^  Ibid.,  p.  21.  ^*  Ibid.,  p.  23.         ^^  Ibid.,  p.  23-24. 

=«  Ibid.,  p.  24.         «  Ibid. 


8o    ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

American  question,  and  particularly  the  strictly  canal  \ 
phase  of  it,  with  the  American  government. 
^--    In  the  first  place,  it  should  be  said  that  the  aggressive 
f     movement  of  the  United  States  towards  the  southwest, 
1     accompanied  by  the  talk  of  "  manifest  destiny  ",  had 
I    given  the  British  good  reason  to  suspect  the  Americans 
of  designs  upon  the  territory  of  the  isthmus,  and  to  fear 
that  they  might  attempt  to  monopolize  the  Nicaragua 
route.^     Should  this  fear  be  realized,  the  control  of 
commerce  in  the  Pacific  would  pass  from  English  to 
American  hands.    To  prevent  such  a  monopoly  of  the 
interoceanic  highway  and  to  secure  a  share  in  any 
arrangement  with  regard  to  it,  Palmerston  directed  the 
seizure  of  San  Juan.    That  this  was  the  Foreign  Secre- 
tary's main  and  perhaps  only  motive  is  evident  from  a 
\  study  of  his  conduct  previous  and  subsequent  to  the 
seizure.    Moreover,  Rives  after  his  interview  expressed 
the  belief  that  Palmerston's  aim  had  been  to  prevent 
exclusive  control  of  the  interoceanic  route  by  the  Amer- 
icans, and  not  to  monopolize  it  for  the  British."      A 
Times  editorial  of  a  later  date  took  the  same  view.*" 
Indeed,  the  British  government  must  have  clearly  real- 
ized that  the  American  people  would  not  peacefully 
permit  the  establishment  of  such  a  foreign  monopoly. 

After  San  Juan  had  come  under  Anglo-Mosquito 
control,  there  was  a  double  British  reason  for  avoiding 
all  discussion  with  the  United  States  government. 
Complicated  with  the  old  fear  of  American  designs  on 
the   route,   was   the  knowledge  that   since   American 

'"  Chatfield  to  Palmerston,  Mar.  8,  1848,  F.  O.,  Guat.,  vol.  51,  no.  30; 
Sept.  15,  1849,  ibid.,  vol.  59,  no.  87;  Manning  to  Green,  Oct.  4.  1849, 
C.  O.,  Hond.  vol.  77. 

'»  U.  S.  Docs.,  ser.  no.  660,  doc.  27,  p.  21. 

*"  London  Times,  June  13,  1850. 


CLAYTON-BULWER   TREATY  8i 

interests  had  focussed  attention  upon  the  region  the 
Monroe  doctrine  might  be  applied  to  the  situation  in  an 
attempt  to  drive  out  the  intruders.  This  explains  the 
attitude  towards  Bancroft  as  well  as  the  attempt  to 
force  Nicaragua  to  acquiesce  in  British-made  bound- 
aries for  the  Mosquitos. 

But  despatches  containing  the  purport  of  the  Hise 
treaty  *^  and  outlining  the  terms  of  the  canal  contract 
of  the  New  York  company,"  as  well  as  reports  of 
Squier's  reception  in  Central  America  and  the  policy 
followed  by  him,*'  must  have  reached  Palmerston  a  little 
before  Rives's  arrival.  These  would  all  be  strongly 
influential  towards  convincing  the  British  government 
that  the  United  States  must  be  reckoned  with  eventu- 
ally in  connection  with  Central  America,  and  that  fur- 
ther evasion  would  be  useless,  if  not  distinctly  unwise. 
To  lend  emphasis  to  this  view  there  was  the  fact  that 
Castellon  had  departed  without  an  agreement  regard- 
ing Mosquito  boundaries,  and,  in  consequence,  the 
Nicaraguans  would  undoubtedly  again  turn  to  the 
Americans,  whose  feelings  had  been  strongly  enlisted 
on  their  side.  In  the  opinion  of  the  Times,  Nicaragua 
had  gained  a  position  that  it  was  "  most  unwise  to  treat 
with  violence  and  contumely  ".  "  Therefore,  that  news- 
paper advised  a  pacific  and  conciliatory  policy."  How- 
ever, this  policy  was  not  to  be  directed  towards  the 
weak  state  of  Nicaragua,  but  towards  the  power  be- 
lieved to  be  behind  that  state — the  American  govern- 

**  Chatfield  to  Palmerston,  May  17,  1849,  F.  O.,  Guat.,  vol.  58,  no.  42. 

*^  Chatfield  to  Palmerston,  April  21,  1849,  ibid.,  vol.  57,  no.  35;  May  5, 
1849,  ibid.,  vol.  58,  no.  38;  Crampton  to  Palmerston,  June  25,  1849, 
F.  O.,  Am.  vol.  409,  no.  61. 

^  Chatfield  to  Palmerston,  July  27,  1849,  F.  O.,  Guat.,  vol.  59,  no.  64. 

**  London  Times,  Nov.  i,  1849. 

«  Ibid. 

7 


82     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

ment  and  the  American  people.  These  various  con- 
siderations which  have  been  mentioned  seem  to  furnish 
ample  explanation  of  the  British  change  in  attitude. 

After  Rives's  frank  and  friendly  statement  of  the 
American  canal  policy,  practically  all  remaining  sus- 
picion of  American  intentions  concerning  Central 
America  seems  to  have  vanished.  With  its  disappear- 
ance came  a  change  of  attitude  towards  Central  Amer- 
ica itself.  Since  the  aim  of  the  United  States  was 
really  the  establishment  of  a  great  commercial  highway 
for  the  benefit  of  all  nations,  weakness  and  disorganiza- 
tion in  Central  America  was  no  longer  an  advantage 
but  a  handicap  to  British  interests  ;  hence  Palmerston's 
expression  of  a  desire  for  the  quieting  of  dissension  in 
those  countries,  and  the  promotion  of  civilization. 

One  further  matter  requires  attention  in  this  con- 
nection. By  the  seizure  of  San  Juan  the  British  gov- 
ernment had,  for  the  time,  insured  the  Nicaragua  route 
against  foreign  monopoly ;  but  in  order  to  give  some 
shadow  of  legality  to  the  act,  it  had  committed  itself 
to  an  assertion  of  the  Mosquito  title  to  the  port,  as  well 
as  revived  the  British  protectorate  over  the  Indians  and 
renewed  the  claim  of  full  sovereignty  and  independence 
for  them.  This  unfortunate  proclamation  of  Mosquito 
sovereignty  placed  Great  Britain  in  a  position  from 
which  she  could  not  easily  withdraw.  This  attitude,  in 
reality  outworn,  but  forced  on  England  as  consistent 
with  her  past  stand,  consequently  became  the  source  of 
virtually  all  future  trouble  between  the  British  and 
Americans  over  Central  America,^ ~ft>f''rf"pro\'^  an 
obstacle  in  all  negotiations  and  made  difficult  a  free 
discussion  of  the  matters  taken  up,  with  the  result  that 
misunderstandings  arose  which  complicated  the  Cen- 


CLAYTON-BULWER    TREATY  83 

tral  American  question  and  delayed  its  final  settlement 
for  more  than  half  a  century. 

Lawrence's  full  instructions  did  not  reach  him  until 
some  time  following  his  arrival  in  London.'"  After  a 
long  discussion  showing  the  fallacy  of  the  Mosquito 
claim/^  they  directed  Lawrence  to  suggest  to  Palmer- 
ston  that  the  two  governments  form  a  treaty  guarantee- 
ing the  independence  of  Nicaragua,  Honduras,  and 
Costa  Rica,  with  provisions  for  extinguishing  the  title 
of  the  Mosquitos  to  any  lands  assigned  to  them  in 
carrying  out  the  terrns  of  the  treaty,  should  the  pro- 
posed interoceanic  canal  pass  through  those  lands."  A 
copy  of  the  part  of  the  Squier  treaty  pertaining  to  the 
canal  was  inclosed  by  Clayton  with  instructions  to 
Lawrence  to  call  Palmerston's  attention  to  the  terms  of 
this  and  express  to  him  the  desire  of  the  United  States 
that  the  British  government  enter  into  a  similar  treaty 
with  Nicaragua.*'  The  whole  negotiation  with  Great 
Britain  should  be  placed  on  the  "  broad  basis  of  a  great 
highway  for  the  benefit  of  mankind,  to  be  dedicated 
especially  by  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States,  to 
the  equal  benefit  and  advantage  of  all  the  nations  of 
the  world  that  would  join  them  in  entering  into  the 
proper  treaty  stipulations  with  Nicaragua." ""  Should 
Great  Britain  desire  any  further  guarantees  of  Ameri- 
can good  faith  than  those  already  given,  Clayton  added, 
the  American  government  would  gladly  enter  into  a 
treaty  with  her  binding  both  nations  "  never  to  colo- 
nize, annex,  settle,  or  fortify  any  part  of  the  ancient 

**  The  instructions  were  dated  October  20,  and  were  written  after  the 
receipt  of  Bancroft's  and  Rives's  reports  of  their  interviews.  U.  S.  Docs., 
ser.  no.  660,  doc.  27,  p.  24. 

*''  Ibid.,  pp.  24-29.         ■*'  Jbid.,  pp.  29-30.         ^'  Ihid.,  p.  30.  ™  Ihid. 


84     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

territory  of  Guatemala,  embracing  Nicaragua,  Costa 
Rica,  Honduras,  and,  indeed,  the  whole  Mosquito 
coast."  " 

In  case  the  British  rejected  these  overtures  and 
refused  to  cooperate,  Lawrence  should  present  the 
terms  of  Hise's  treaty  which  had  recently  been  received, 
informing  Palmerston  that  the  treaty  was  made  with- 
out authority  from  the  United  States,  and  assuring  him 
that  no  step  would  be  taken  towards  ratifying  it,  if,  by 
an  arrangement  with  England,  American  interests  could 
be  placed  upon  a  "  just  and  satisfactory  foundation  ". 
Should  the  efforts  to  this  end  fail,  however,  the  Presi- 
dent would  not  hesitate  to  present  it,  or  some  other 
treaty  which  might  be  concluded  by  Squier,  to  the  Sen- 
ate for  ratification,  in  which  action  he  would  be  sup- 
ported by  the  American  people."" 

Should  the  British  government  refuse  all  proposi- 
tions made  by  Lawrence,  the  latter  was  directed  to 
enter  the  protest  which  Bancroft  was  to  have  presented, 
and  immediately  notify  his  government  of  the  fact." 
If,  on  the  other  hand,  Palmerston  showed  a  willingness 
to  co-operate,  but  should  be  still  tenacious  about  the  pro- 
tection of  the  Indians,  Lawrence  was  to  suggest  that 
the  Nicaraguan  government  pay  them  an  annuity  in 
order  to  extinguish  their  title.  Lawrence  should  strive 
to  produce  a  withdrawal  from  all  pretensions  to  the 
whole  Mosquito  coast."  "  I  shall  await  the  result  of 
your  negotiation  with  no  little  anxiety  ",  Clayton  con- 
cluded. "  Bring  it  to  a  speedy  close  one  way  or  the 
other.     We  are  ready  for  either  alternative.     If  we 

"  U.  S.  Docs.,  ser.  no.  660,  doc.  27,  p.  31. 
M  Ihid.  »»  Ihid.,  p.  33-  »•  Ibid.,  p.  34- 


CLAYTON-BULIVER    TREATY  85 

must  have  a  collision  with  Great  Britain  about  this 
matter,  the  sooner  we  understand  it  the  better  for  us. 
The  President  is  firm  in  his  purpose  and  will  never 
consent  that  Great  Britain  shall,  under  any  pretext, 
enjoy  any  exclusive  possession  within  the  territory  of 
Nicaragua.  If  we  adopt  the  treaty  negotiated  by  Mr. 
Hise  and  Great  Britain  should  persevere  in  her  asser- 
tion of  the  Mosquito  title,  I  know  not  how  we  can  avoid 
a  collision  consistently  with  our  national  honor."  " 

After  the  receipt  of  his  instructions,  Lawrence 
promptly  secured  an  interview  with  Palmerston,  and 
opened  the  subject  in  a  general  way,  but  avoided  a 
discussion  of  the  rights  of  the  Mosquitos,  explaining 
to  the  Foreign  Secretary  that  he  hoped  it  would  not 
become  necessary  to  do  so."""  After  his  interview  he 
addressed  a  note  to  Palmerston,  asking  whether  Great 
Britain  intended  to  occupy  or  colonize  Nicaragua,  Costa 
Rica,  the  Mosquito  coast,  or  any  part  of  Central  Amer- 
ica, and  also  whether  the  British  government  would 
join  with  the  United  States  in  guaranteeing  the 
neutrality  of  a  "  ship-canal,  railway  or  other  com- 
munication to  be  open  to  the  world  and  common  to  all 
nations."  " 

Lawrence's  object  in  avoiding  agitation  of  the  Mos- 
quito title  and  in  narrowing  the  discussion  to  the  two 
questions  was  to  make  more  possible  a  prompt  reply, 
and  thus  relieve  the  popular  mind  in  America.  More- 
over, he  believed  that  if  the  points  covered  by  his 
inquiries  could  be  settled,  an  amicable  arrangement  of 
the  Mosquito  question  would  follow.^* 

Palmerston's  reply,  written  on  November  13,  stated 
that  the  British  government  did  not  intend  to  "  occupy 

■' Ibid.  ^  Ibid.,  pp.    4.3-44.         ^''  Ibid.,  p.  45.  ^  Ibid.,  p.  44. 


86     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

or  colonize  Nicaragua,  Costa  Rica,  the  Mosquito  coast, 
or  any  part  of  Central  America."  In  regard  to  Law- 
rence's second  inquiry,  the  Foreign  Secretary  wrote 
that  the  British  government  would  feel  great  pleasure 
in  combining  with  the  United  States  to  effect  the  estab- 
lishment of  such  an  interoceanic  highway  as  was  sug- 
gested and  would  fully  undertake  to  obtain  the  consent 
of  Mosquito  to  such  arrangements  as  would  render  the 
port  of  Grey  town  applicable  for  the  purpose/^ 

In  a  private  letter  to  Lawrence  of  the  same  date 
Palmerston  protested  against  the  terms  of  the  Squier 
treaty.  He  had  as  yet  received  no  copy  of  that  docu- 
ment, he  said,  but  if  he  had  been  correctly  informed 
with  reference  to  it,  one  object  of  the  treaty  was  to 
engage  the  United  States  to  endeavor  to  compel  the 
British  government  to  return  Greytown  to  Nicaragua. 
Such  an  engagement  would  involve  the  United  States 
in  an  unprovoked  aggression  towards  Great  Britain." 

Lawrence  replied  by  pointing  out  that  no  maritime 
nation  ought  to  desire  or  to  be  permitted  to  have  exclu- 
sive foothold  on  the  isthmus.  On  the  contrary,  the 
aims  of  such  a  nation  should  be  confined  to  guaran- 
tees of  neutrality.  He  hoped,  therefore,  that  the  Mos- 
quitos  might  be  properly  provided  for,  that  other 
causes  of  difference  might  be  satisfactorily  arranged, 
and  the  two  governments  thus  be  spared  a  discussion 
which  could  only  defer  matters,  and  perhaps  lead  to 
serious  results.  The  Squier  treaty,  while  it  rested  upon 
the  validity  of  Nicaragua's  claim  of  sovereignty  from 
ocean  to  ocean,  sought  to  secure  nothing  exclusively  to 

'•  U.  S.  Docs.,  ser.  no.  660,  doc.  27,  p.  46. 

*^  Pari.   Papers,    1856,   Corns.,   LX,   "Correspondence   with  the   United 
States  respecting  Central  America  ",  8. 


CLAYTON-BULWER   TREATY  87 

the  United  States,  and  contemplated  an  invitation  to 
the  world  to  join  in  its  provisions.  "  I  have  reason  to 
believe  ",  Lawrence  concluded,  "  that  the  United  States 
are  as  firm  as  they  are  sincere  on  this  point."  °* 

It  was  now  clear  that  the  negotiations  would  not 
proceed  as  smoothly  as  was  at  first  hoped.  Clayton  saw 
an  obstacle  in  the  Foreign  Secretary's  promise  to  obtain 
the  consent  of  Mosquito  to  arrangements  regarding 
Greytown ;  consequently  he  declared  that  British  with- 
drawal from  the  port  was  essential  to  the  success  of 
the  enterprise.*^  Lawrence  was  accordingly  instructed 
to  press  the  matter  so  as  to  leave  no  doubt  in  Palmer- 
ston's  mind  of  the  American  convictions  regarding  it." 

Lawrence  also  quickly  saw  the  difficulty  and  soon 
became  convinced  that  discussion  of  the  Mosquito  ques- 
tion could  not  be  avoided.  On  December  14  he  wrote 
to  Palmerston  that  unless  the  views  of  the  two  govern- 
ments upon  the  subject  could  be  harmonized  the  desired 
cooperation  would  be  prevented;  and  he  asked  defi- 
nitely whether  the  British  government  was  willing  to 
transfer  the  Mosquito  protectorate  to  other  hands 
under  provisions  for  the  humane  treatment  of  the 
Indians,  and  to  let  such  parts  of  the  territory,  said  to 
be  occupied  by  them,  as  might  be  necessary,  be  dedi- 
cated to  the  transit  route.**  On  the  same  date  Lawrence 
wrote  to  Clayton  expressing  a  determination  to  insist 
upon  the  abandonment  of  the  Mosquito  protectorate, 
even  if  Lord  Palmerston  gave  up  everything  else.°° 

No  reply  was  made  to  Lawrence's  last-mentioned 
note  to  Palmerston,  and  with  this  note  negotiations  on 

"  Ihid.,  24-2$. 

^  U.  S.  Docs.,  ser.  no.  660,  doc.  27,  pp.  51-52. 

^^Tbid.         "/bid.,  pp.  54-58.        "/bid.,  pp.  53-54. 


88     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

the  British  side  of  the  Atlantic  terminated.  The  reason 
for  this  cessation  was  perhaps  Lawrence's  insistence 
upon  discussing  the  Mosquito  question  with  the  pur- 
pose of  forcing  the  British  to  retreat  from  the  stand 
they  had  taken. 

Some  time  in  the  autumn  of  1849,  probably  when 
Lawrence  began  to  direct  his  attention  to  the  Mosquito 
title,  the  British  government  seems  to  have  carefully 
investigated  the  history  of  the  question.  As  a  result 
it  evidently  concluded  that  the  rights  previously  con- 
tended for  were  not  easily  reconcilable  with  the  terms 
of  the  treaties  with  Spain."*  Moreover,  it  discovered 
that  the  mouth  of  the  San  Juan  was  fortified  by  the 
Spaniards  long  before  the  establishment  of  the  Mos- 
j  quito  protectorate.*"  The  results  of  this  investigation, 
and  the  fact  that  Nicaragua  had  won  the  sympathy  of 
the  United  States,  evidently  caused  the  cabinet  to 
abandon  any  intention  it  might  have  had  to  assume  a 
defiant  stand  on  the  question,**  which,  with  the  existing 
temper  of  the  American  people,  would  have  made  war 
very  probable. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  English  government  did  not 
intend  to  give  up  the  claims  hitherto  maintained  for  the 
Mosquitos  if  it  could  possibly  avoid  doing  so.  Besides, 
the  British  protectorate  was  not  easily  disposed  of. 
Yet,  from  the  present  evidence  it  seems  pretty  certain 
that  had  Great  Britain  been  squarely  confronted  with 
an  American  war  as  the  only  other  alternative,  a 
method  of  relinquishing  Mosquito  claims  without  too 
great  damage  to  British  pride  would  have  been  found. 

"•London   Times,  June   13,   1850. 
"  Ibid.         M  Ibid. 


CLAYTON-BULWER   TREATY  89 

As  it  was,  the  British  government  determined  to 
proceed  cautiously  and,  if  possible,  to  remove  all  cause 
of  jealousy  regarding  the  canal  route,  while  still  main- 
taining the  protectorate.  Evidently  with  this  in  view 
the  cabinet  concluded  to  attempt  negotiations  in  Wash- 
ington. There  were  reasons  for  believing  that  better 
terms  might  be  made  with  Clayton  than  with  Law- 
rence. The  former  had  shown  nervousness  when  speak- 
ing to  Crampton  just  after  the  receipt  of  the  Hise  treaty 
and  had  expressed  great  anxiety  that  the  British  gov- 
ernment should  not  think  that  the  treaty  was  in  accord- 
ance with  the  wishes  of  the  American  government." 
Besides,  both  Whig  and  Democratic  press  in  America 
were  violently  attacking  the  British  claims  and  calling 
upon  the  administration  for  action  on  the  matter.'* 
This  situation  also  might  have  been  expected  to  incline 
Clayton,  embarrassed  by  a  refractory  Democratic  Sen- 
ate, to  an  early  compromise  settlement.  Be  these 
speculations  as  they  may,  the  fact  remains  that  some 
time  previous  to  November  14  "  Sir  Henry  Bulwer  was 
appointed  British  agent  to  Washington,  presumably 
for  the  purpose  of  determining  what  chance  there  was 
of  making  a  favorable  arrangement  with  Clayton." 
But  hope  of  reaching  terms  with  Lawrence  was  not 
entirely  given  up ; "  the  aim  was  to  satisfy  the  United 
States  without  forsaking  the  protectorate,  and  if  Law- 

^'  U.  S.  Docs.,  ser.  no.  1991,  doc.  194,  pp.  55-56. 

'"Crampton  to  Palmerston,  Nov.  4,  1849,  F.  O.,  Am.,  vol.  501,  no.  95. 

'^  Bulwer  sailed  for  America  on  November  14,  the  day  after  Palmerston 
wrote  to  Lawrence  complaining  of  the  terms  of  the  Squier  treaty. 
U.  S.  Docs.,  ser.  no.  660,  doc.  27,  p.  45. 

"  The  British  Public  Record  Office  is  singularly  lacking  in  any  corre- 
spondence giving  reasons  for  taking  up  the  discussion  of  the  question 
at  Washington. 

'^  Pari.  Papers,  1856,  Corns.,  LX,  "  Correspondence  with  the  United 
States  respecting  Central  America  ",  35. 


90     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

rence  showed  any  sign  of  yielding,  there  was  no  reason 
why  negotiations  with  him  should  not  be  resumed.'' 

Bulwer  received  no  detailed  instructions  before  his 
departure,  but  in  his  last  conversation  with  the  Foreign 
Secretary,  Palmerston  pointed  out  that  an  unforeseen 
difificulty  had  arisen  about  an  unimportant  matter,  and 
that  while  the  question  itself  would  have  to  be  solved 
in  a  manner  that  comported  with  British  honor,  the 
matter  out  of  which  the  difificulty  had  grown  would 
admit  of  adjustment.'"  This  view  of  the  situation  indi- 
cates that  the  British  government  was  prepared  to 
arrange  its  relations  with  Central  America  to  suit 
whatever  were  the  ultimate  demands  of  the  United 
States,  should  these  demands  be  in  any  way  reasonable. 

Bulwer  reached  Washington  some  time  in  Decem- 
ber, but  for  some  weeks  no  attempt  at  negotiation  was 
made.  Indeed,  for  a  short  time  it  appeared  that  there 
would  be  no  further  effort  to  settle  the  question  with 
England.  This  was  when  the  British  seizure  of  Tigre 
Island  became  known  at  Washington,  and  excitement 
ran  high  as  a  result.''  Just  at  this  crisis  Carcache,  a 
representative  of  the  Nicaraguan  government,  arrived 
to  solicit  ratification  of  the  Squier  treaty."  Clayton, 
partaking  of  the  general  increase  in  suspicion  of  British 
aims  in  Central  America,  promptly  stated,  on  January 
5,  in  response  to  a  note  from  Carcache,  that  the  Presi- 

"  Lawrence  did  not  receive  word  until  April,  1850,  that  the  negotia- 
tions had  been  entirely  transferred  to  Washingrton.  Appleton,  "  Memoir 
of  Hon.  Abbott  Lawrence  ",  in  Mass.  Hist.  See,  Proc,  III  (1855- 
1858),  76. 

'•'•  Bulwer  to  Palmerston,  .\pril  28,  1850,  "  Private  ",  1".  C,  Am., 
vol.   512. 

'"  Pari.  Papers,  1856,  Corns.,  LX,  "  Correspondence  with  the  United 
States  respecting  Central  America  ",  28-29. 

"  U.  S.  Docs.,  ser.  no.  579,  doc.  75,  pp.  3i2-3'3- 


CLAYTON-BULWER   TREATY  91 

dent  would  submit  the  Squier  treaty  to  the  Senate  and 
would  cheerfully  ratify  it  if  it  received  the  approval 
of  that  body."  Bulwer,  however,  seems  to  have  come 
to  the  rescue,  and  succeeded  in  allaying  the  suspicions 
of  the  American  government  to  such  a  degree  as  to 
alter  its  intentions  regarding  the  Squier  treaty.  Con- 
sequently, when,  a  little  later,  a  call  came  from  the 
Senate  for  the  Squier  correspondence  and  treaties," 
it  was  met  with  a  refusal  from  President  Taylor.'" 

After  his  arrival  in  Washington,  Bulwer  carefully 
studied  the  situation  and  saw  that  the  chief  interest  of 
the  American  people  regarding  Central  America  lay 
in  the  need  for  an  interoceanic  route,  and  that  the 
broader  question  of  Mosquito  claims  had  for  the  time  a 
secondary  place.  He  therefore  concluded  that,  in 
trying  to  reach  an  agreement,  it  would  be  best  to  avoid 
all  consideration  of  the  latter  question  and  to  concen- 
trate upon  the  former."  This  he  seemed  to  believe 
would  make  possible  a  disposal  of  the  difficulty  with- 
out serious  sacrifice  of  British  pride.  The  situation  of 
the  American  government  at  the  time  favored  the  idea. 
When  Clayton,  his  nervousness  increased  by  the  dis- 
content of  the  country  and  the  demand  of  both  houses 
of  Congress  for  the  Squier  correspondence,*^  went  to 
him  and  declared  that  he  "  must  either  deliver  up  the 
whole  subject  to  popular  discussion  and  determination, 
or  come  to  some  immediate  settlement  upon  it  ",*'  Bul- 

"  Ibid.,  p.  313. 

''^  Cong.  Globe,  31  Cong.,  i  sess.,  pt.  i,  p.  159. 
^  Richardson,  Messages  and  Papers,  V,  31-32. 

^  Pari.   Papers,   1856,   Corns.,   LX,   "Correspondence  with  the  United 
States  respecting  Central  America  ",  29-30. 
^  Ibid.,  35. 
*'  U.  S.  Docs.,  ser.  no  1991,  doc.  194,  p.  61. 


92     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

wer  saw  his  chance.  He  determined  to  enter  into  a 
negotiation  for  the  purpose  of  forming  a  treaty, 
although  he  was  without  treaty-making  power  and  even 
without  definite  instructions  from  his  government. 
Clayton's  semi-appeal  to  him  gave  him  an  advantage 
which  he  was  quick  to  seize.  By  playing  upon  the 
nervousness  of  the  Secretary  of  State  he  induced  him 
to  avoid  the  subject  of  Mosquito  claims  in  the  discus- 
sion which  followed,  and  to  put  practically  the  whole 
emphasis  on  securing  guarantees  of  neutrality  for  the 
isthmian  canal."* 

(^^"xqX,  while  driven  from  the  bolder  stand  of  a  few 
months  before,  Clayton  by  no  means  gave  up  hopes  of 
making  the  British  relinquish  the  Indian  protectorate. 
As  a  frank  promise  to  withdraw  seemed  out  of  the 

'  question,  he  determined  to  gain  his  end  by  a  less  direct 
route ;  this  was  by  securing  such  a  wording  of  the 
treaty  as  would  amount  to  a  British  agreement  to  aban- 
don all  control  in  Central  America.  Bulwer,  on  the 
other  hand,  strove  to  preserve  the  protectorate,  while 
giving  up  all  special  advantage  which  might  interfere 
with  the  security  of  the  interoceanic  highway.  Even  a 
casual  study  of  the  Clay ton-Bul wer  treaty  makes  it 
evident  that  a  severe  struggle  took  place  between  the 
negotiators,  a  struggle  as  the  Times  put  it,  "  for  gen- 
eralship in  the  use  of  terms  " ; "  and  such  a  study  also 
shows  that  both  contestants  were  forced  to  recede  from 
some  of  the  ground  which  they  had  hoped  to  hold. 
In  short,  it  makes  it  clear  that  the  treaty  was  not  a 
victory,  but  a  compromise. 

**  Pari.  Papers,    1856,   Corns.,   LX,  "  Correspondence   with   the   United 
States  respecting  Central   America  ",   35-38. 
"  London  Times,  Jan.  19,  1856. 


CLAYTON-BU LIVER    TREATY  93 

The  project  of  a  convention  was  quickly  completed 
and  on  February  3  this  was  sent  to  Palmerston  for  his 
approval,  together  with  a  letter  explaining  the  circum- 
stances producing  it/*  But  as  negotiations  had  pro- 
gressed, discontent  in  the  United  States  had  increased. 
A  disavowal  of  the  seizure  of  Tigre  had  not  yet  reached 
Washington,  and  just  a  week  after  the  project  was 
sent  off,  reports  again  came  from  Central  America  "  of 
other  violent  acts  committed  by  Chatfield  and  the  Brit- 
ish naval  officers,  in  their  efforts  to  collect  claims 
against  the  republics.**  Probably  roused  by  the  fresh 
suspicions  resulting  from  these  reports,'"  certain  mem- 
bers of  the  American  cabinet  who  knew  the  character 
of  the  recent  agreement  went  to  Clayton  and  desired 
that  alterations  be  made  in  the  project  in  order  to  pre- 
vent further  disputes.  Some  arrangement,  they  stated, 
should  be  made  for  the  relinquishment  of  Mosquito 
claims  to  territory  along  the  San  Juan.  As  it  was,  they 
felt  that  many  would  contend  that  the  British  meant 
to  do  under  another  name  that  which  they  agreed  not  to 
do  under  their  own.*" 

Clayton,  thereupon,  explained  the  situation  to  Bul- 
wer,  and  on  February  18  the  latter  wrote  to  Palmerston 
explaining  the  change  of  feeling  which  had  taken  place. 
It  was  his  belief,  he  stated,  that  if  Clayton  had  not 
already  signed  the  project  he  would  not  do  so  now. 
However,  having  done  so,  he  was  bound  inevitably  to 
a  conciliatory  line  of  policy,  if  the  project  should  be 

^  Pari.  Papers,  1856,  Corns.,  LX,  "Correspondence  with  the  United 
States  respecting  Central  America  ",  35-40. 

"  Bulwer  to  Palmerston,  Feb.    18,   1850,  F.  O.,  Am.,  vol.   511,  no.  31. 
**  Crowe,  Gospel  in  Central  America,  217-220. 

"  Bulwer  to  Palmerston,  Feb.  18,  1850,  F.  O.,  Am.,  vol.  511,  no.  31. 
»»  Ibid. 


94     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

approved  by  the  British  government,  and  would  omit 
nothing  to  make  that  policy  succeed.  Though  Clayton's 
colleagues  were  not  so  interested,  Bulwer  believed  they 
would  be  loath  to  reject  the  treaty.  But  he  added,  "  I 
ought  not  to  disguise  from  your  Lordship  that  this 
question  is  becoming,  the  longer  it  remains  in  abeyance 
the  more  intricate  and  perplexing,  and  that  it  contains 
within  it  if  not  the  seeds  of  actual  war,  the  seeds  of 
such  hostile  and  angry  excitement  as  render  war 
always  possible,  and  very  often  produce  many  of  the 
evils  of  war  even  when  war  itself  is  not  produced." 
He  therefore  suggested  that  Palmerston  add  to  the 
project,  if  approved  by  him,  an  explanation  or  clause 
that  would  quiet  to  some  extent  the  suspicions  of 
British  intentions.  In  conclusion,  he  wrote :  "  I  am 
bound  to  add  my  opinion  that  if  nothing  is  done,  and 
even  that  if  nothing  is  done  speedily,  to  set  this  busi- 
ness at  rest,  and  bring  it  to  an  amicable  conclusion,  the 
tone  of  opinion  on  this  side  of  the  Atlantic  will  raise  it 
ere  long  into  very  serious  importance."  ** 

While  negotiations  remained  in  this  uncertain  state 
the  situation  grew  more  tense.  Rumors  again  reached 
the  American  government  that  British  protection  was 
to  be  extended  to  Costa  Rica  ;  "  and  before  fear  of  this 
could  be  allayed  by  word  from  Palmerston,"  there 
arrived  from  Lawrence  the  announcement  regarding 
the  evacuation  of  Tigre  Island  and  a  disavowal  of  its 
seizure,  qualified  by  the  declaration :    "  Her  Majesty's 

"Bulwer  to  Palmerston,  Feb.  18,  1850,  F.  O.  Am.,  vol.  511,  no.  31. 
Part  of  this  despatch  is  given  in  Pari.  Papers,  1856,  Corns.,  LX,  "  Corre- 
spondence w^ith  the   United   States  respecting  Central   .\merica  ",   40-43. 

"Pari.  Papers,  1856,  Corns.,  LX,  "Correspondence  with  the  United 
States  respecting  Central  America  ",  46. 

"  Ibid.,  46-47- 


CLAYTON-BULWER    TREATY  95 

Government  must  not  on  that  account  be  considered  as 
giving  up  in  any  degree  the  claims  which  it  has  made 
on  the  Government  of  Honduras,  and  must  hold  itself 
free  to  use  whatever  means  the  Law  of  Nations  may 
allow  for  obtaining  the  redress  which  it  demands  if  that 
redress  should  continue  to  be  withheld."  ^ 

Such  a  statement,  closely  following  reports  of 
blockades  and  seizures  in  Central  America,  seemed  to 
the  American  government  utterly  inconsistent  with 
Palmerston's  declaration  that  the  British  government 
had  no  intention  of  occupying  or  colonizing  the  re- 
gion ; "  consequently  it  roused  all  the  old  suspicion  of 
British  good  faith,*^  and  caused  the  American  govern- 
ment almost  to  despair  of  reaching  an  agreement."  As 
a  result,  the  administration  decided  to  pursue  its  own 
course,  with  the  intention  of  continuing  it  should  Great 
Britain  prove  herself  determined  not  to  act  honorably. 
Accordingly,  the  American  government  seems  to  have 
worked  in  anticipation  of  a  later  struggle,  diplomatic 
or  military,  with  the  British.  In  1847  Christopher 
Hempstead  had  been  appointed  United  States  consul  at 
Belize,"*  securing  his  exequatur  from  Great  Britain.'' 
On  March  i,  1850,  Clayton  sent  him  a  letter  of  recall, 
explaining  that  as  the  appointment  might  have  been 
made  "  without  full  consideration  of  the  territorial 
rights  of  Great  Britain  in  that  quarter  ",  it  was  deemed 
advisable  under  existing  circumstances  to  discontinue 
the  consulate.^"*  Although,  before  negotiations  had 
begun,  Bulwer,  at  least,  had  understood  that  the  Squier 
treaty  would  not  be  presented  to  the  Senate  before  the 

"  Ibid.,  34-35.         »»  7b»i.,  48-49-         ^Ibid.        "^  Ibid.,  $3. 

"  V.  S.  Docs.,  ser.  no.  579,  doc.  75,  pp.  310-311. 

"'  Ibid.,  p.  311. 

^'^  Ibid.,  ser.  no.  660,  doc.  12,  p.  2. 


96     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

treaty  which  it  was  hoped  would  result  from  the  nego- 
tiations, or  except  in  connection  with  it/*"  on  March  19 
it  was  nevertheless  transmitted  "  for  the  advice  of  the 
Senate  in  regard  to  its  ratification  "/" 

A  few  days  after  this,  Bulwer  received  his  govern- 
ment's approval  of  the  treaty  project,  and  was  em- 
powered to  sign  it.  In  order  to  remove  the  suspicions 
of  the  Americans,  Palmerston  directed  that  at  the  time 
of  signing  Bulwer  give  to  Clayton  a  note  stating  that 
the  British  government  had  no  intention  of  making  use 
of  the  protection  which  it  afforded  to  the  Mosquitos, 
for  the  purpose  of  doing  under  cover  of  that  protection 
any  of  the  things  the  intention  to  do  which  was  dis- 
claimed in  the  letter  to  Lawrence"'  of  November  13, 
1849/"*  This  greatly  eased  the  situation.  Aloreover, 
a  little  later  a  letter  was  received  from  Palmerston  dis- 
avowing any  intention  on  the  part  of  the  British  gov- 
ernment of  establishing  a  protectorate  over  Costa 
Rica.'""  Consequently,  the  negotiations  proceeded,  and 
after  a  few  minor  changes  in  the  body  of  the  treaty 
Clayton  agreed  to  sign  it.  He  added,  however,  that 
upon  receiving  the  statement  which  the  Foreign  Secre- 
tary had  directed  Bulwer  to  make,  he  should  be  obliged 
to  present  a  counter-declaration  on  the  part  of  the 
United  States  government  to  the  effect  that  it  in  no 
wise  recognized  the  Mosquito  title  or  sovereignty.^"* 
Thereupon,  Bulwer,  desiring  to  omit  such  an  allusion 

^'^^  Pari.  Papers,  1856,  Coins..  LX,  "  CorresponJence  with  the  United 
States  respecting  Central  .\nierica  ",  52-53. 

""  Richartlson,  Messages  and  Papers,  V,  33-34. 

'"3  See  above,  pp.  85-86. 

^'^  Pari.  Papers,  1856,  Corns.,  LX,  "Correspondence  with  the  United 
States  respecting  Central   .\merica  ",  45-46. 

^"^  Ibid..  46-47. 

^*' lUilwer  to  ralmerston,  April  28,   1850,  F.  O.,  Am.,  vol.  512,  no.  67. 


CLAYTON-BULWER    TREATY  97 

to  a  difference  between  the  two  governments  and  feel- 
ing it  desirable  to  bind  the  United  States  also  as  to 
American  protection  over  any  part  of  Central  America, 
decided  to  omit  the  statement  suggested  by  Palmer- 
ston,  and  instead  to  embody  in  the  treaty  the  substance 
of  the  statement,  but  without  direct  mention  of  the 
Mosquito  protectorate."'  This  being  arranged,  the 
convention  was  signed  by  the  two  negotiators  on  April 
19,  1850/"' 

Since  the  fame  and  notoriety  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer 
treaty  resulted  almost  entirely  from  the  peculiar  word- 
ing of  the  first  article,  that  article  is  here  quoted  in  full : 

The  Governments  of  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States 
hereby  declare  that  neither  the  one  nor  the  other  will  ever 
obtain  or  maintain  for  itself  any  exclusive  control  over  the 
said  Ship-Canal ;  agreeing  that  neither  will  ever  erect  or 
maintain  any  fortifications  commanding  the  same,  or  in  the 
vicinity  thereof,  or  occupy,  or  fortify,  or  colonize,  or  assume  or 
exercise  any  dominion  over  Nicaragua,  Costa  Rica,  the  Mos- 
quito Coast,  or  any  part  of  Central  America ;  nor  will  either 
make  use  of  any  protection  which  either  affords  or  any  may 
afford,  or  any  alliance  which  either  has  or  may  have,  to  or 
with  any  State  or  people,  for  the  purpose  of  erecting  or  main- 
taining any  such  fortifications  or  of  occupying,  fortifying  or 
colonizing  Nicaragua,  Costa  Rica,  the  Mosquito  Coast,  or  any 
part  of  Central  America,  or  of  assuming  or  exercising  domin- 
ion over  the  same.  Nor  will  Great  Britain  or  the  United  States 
take  advantage  of  any  intimacy,  or  use  any  alliance,  connec- 
tion, or  influence  that  either  may  possess  with  any  State  or 
Government  through  whose  territory  the  said  canal  may  pass, 
for  the  purpose  of  acquiring  or  holding,  directly  or  indirectly, 
for  the  subjects  or  citizens  of  the  one,  any  rights  or  advantages 
in  regard  to  commerce  or  navigation  through  the  said  canal, 

"'  Ibid.  Part  of  this  despatch  is  given  in  Pari,  Papers,  1856,  Corns. 
LX,  "  Correspondence  with  the  United  States  respecting  Central  Amer- 
ica ",   55-56. 

">*  Ibid.,  52. 

8 


98     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

which  shall  not  be  offered,  on  the  same  terms,  to  the  subjects 
or  citizens  of  the  other.^"** 

By  the  fourth  article  the  two  governments  engaged  to 
use  their  good  offices  to  "  procure  the  estabhshment  of 
two  free  ports,  one  at  each  end  of  the  said  canal ",  and 
the  eighth  stated  that  the  two  contracting  parties  desir- 
ing not  only  "  to  accomplish  a  particular  object,  but  also 
to  establish  a  general  principle  ",  agreed  to  extend  their 
protection,  by  treaty,  to  any  other  practicable  communi- 
cations, whether  by  canal  or  railway,  across  the  isthmus 
connecting  North  and  South  America.  The  remainder 
of  the  treaty  referred  to  the  more  obvious  provisions 
necessary  for  securing  the  construction  and  neutraliza- 
tion of  the  canal/" 

Before  signing  the  agreement,  Clayton,  fearing  oppo- 
sition from  the  Democratic  majority  of  the  Senate, 
with  the  aid  of  King,  the  chairman  of  the  Committee  on 
Foreign  Relations,  obtained  the  approval  of  the  leading 
members  to  the  measure/"  Therefore,  he  submitted 
it  with  a  fair  hope  of  securing  ratification.  Neverthe- 
less, the  treaty  had  a  stormy  time  in  the  Senate,  the 
members  of  which  were  distinctly  divided  on  the  ques- 
tion of  what  should  be  accomplished  by  the  arrange- 
ment. Some  were  primarily  interested  in  securing  the 
guarantee  for  the  proposed  canal ;  others  were  bent 
upon  driving  the  British  completely  out  of  Central 
America."*  Stephen  A.  Douglas  was  leader  of  the 
latter  faction,  and  was  bitterly  opposed  to  the  treaty."* 

^"^  Pari.  Papers,  1856,  Corns.,  LX,  "Correspondence  with  the  United 
States  respecting  Central  America  ",   50. 

"0  Ibid.,  so-52. 

»"  Buchanan,  JVoiks.  VIII,  382;  Cong.  Record.  XXII,  2981. 

'■'^  Cong.  Globe,  32  Cong.,  2  sess.,  237-238;  34  Cong.,  i  sess.,  pt.  2,  p. 
1072. 

^^^  Ibid.,  34  Cong.,  i  sess.,  pt.  2,  p.   1072;  Cong.  Record,  XXII,  2971. 


CLAYTON -BULWER    TREATY  99 

It  took  the  best  efforts  of  Clayton  and  King  to  persuade 
the  opposition  that  the  agreement  was  a  practical  appli- 
cation of  the  Monroe  doctrine,  and  required  the  aban- 
donment of  the  Mosquito  protectorate."* 

In  the  discussion  of  the  treaty  the  uncertain  wording 
of  the  first  article  was  criticised,  but  King  explained 
that  the  obscurity  was  due  to  a  wish  on  the  part  of 
Bulwer  to  protect  his  nation's  pride,  and  the  desire  of 
Clayton  to  indulge  him  in  this.  England,  it  was  ex- 
plained, felt  that  she  was  being  forced  into  a  sort  of 
backward  step,  and  it  was  expected  that  the  Americans 
would  not  insist  upon  any  expression  that  might  wound 
her  sensibilities.""  These  explanations,  evidently  given 
with  perfect  sincerity  by  King"' — though  up  to  this 
time  neither  Bulwer  nor  Palmerston  had  acknowledged 
a  retreat  on  the  part  of  their  government — so  con- 
vinced some  of  the  senators  that  they  wished  to  retain 
in  the  Squier  treaty  the  clause  recognizing  the  right  of 
Nicaragua  over  the  proposed  canal  route.  They  argued 
that  this  recognition  was  now  of  no  real  importance, 

"<  Buchanan,  Works,  VIII,  381-382. 

"'  Cong.  Globe,  32  Cong.,  2  sess.,  253.  In  a  letter  to  Squier  describing 
the  new  treaty,  Clayton  added,  "  But  let  there  be  no  exultation  on  our 
side  at  the  expense  of  British  pride  or  sensibility  ",  and  cautioned  Squier 
to  deal  kindly  with  both  British  subjects  and  British  agents.  Dept.  of 
State,  Inst.,  Am.  States,  vol.  is,  P-  108. 

"*  On  May  8,  1850,  King  wrote  to  Buchanan  in  reference  to  the 
Clayton-Bulwer  treaty:  "  I  saw  no  objection  to  entering  into  a  Treaty 
stipulation  not  to  occupy  or  colonise  any  portion  of  Central  America, 
when  by  so  doing  we  are  practically  enforcing  the  Monroe  doctrine,  by 
requiring  of  England  the  abandonment  of  her  claim  to  the  protectorate 
of  the  King  of  the  Mosquitos  .  .  .  The  Treaty  as  I  conceive  accomplishes 
all  that  we  ought  to  desire,  while  it  strengthens  the  position  we  have 
heretofore  taken,  and  avowed  before  the  world.  I  may  be  mistaken  in 
the  views  I  have  expressed;  but  if  so,  four-fifths  of  the  Democratic 
Senators  whom  I  consulted  before  the  signature  of  the  Treaty,  were 
equally  in  error."     Buchanan,  Works,  VIII,  382. 


loo     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

and  that  it  would  be  satisfactory  to  Nicaragua  and,  in 
view  of  the  terms  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty,  could 
not  be  obnoxious  to  Great  Britain/"  Bulwer,  however, 
pointed  out  to  Clayton  that  this  policy  would  destroy 
the  harmony  so  necessary  to  the  construction  of  the 
canal."'  Clayton  agreed  with  him ;  and  the  Senate  as 
a  whole  showed  the  same  desire  for  friendly  action.*^" 
As  a  result  of  the  efforts  of  Clayton  and  King,  aided 
by  Bulwer,'"^  considerable  temporary  favor  was  created 
for  the  treaty  in  the  Senate,  and  it  was  ratified  without 
modification  by  a  vote  of  forty-two  to  eleven.'^  In  view 
of  the  temper  of  the  Senate  a  few  weeks  before,  the 
fact  that  the  treaty  passed  by  such  a  large  majority, 
or  even  that  it  passed  at  all,  seems  ample  proof  that  the 
Senate  as  a  whole  believed  the  arrangement  to  be  in 
harmony  with  the  Monroe  doctrine  and  felt  that  it 
would  force  the  British  out  of  Central  America. 

Shortly  before  the  treaty  was  sent  to  the  Senate,  an 
instruction  of  far-reaching  significance  was  received 
by  Bulwer  from  his  government.  It  had  been  reported, 
Palmerston  wrote,  that  some  Americans  were  about  to 
establish  themselves  in  the  island  of  Ruatan.  The 
islands  of  Ruatan  and  Bonacca  were  not  only  English 
de  jure  but  were  actually  occupied  by  British  settlers 

'"Bulwer  to  Palmerston,  May  6,  1850,  "Private  and  confidential", 
F.   O.,   Am.,  vol.   512- 

^'^  When  the  treaty  was  signed  on  .'Xpril  19,  Clayton  had  assured 
Bulwer  that  should  the  Senate  ratify  it,  care  would  be  taken  that  any 
other  treaty  also  confirmed  by  the  Senate  should  conform  with  it. 
Pari.  Papers,  1856,  Corns.,  LX,  "  Correspondence  with  the  United  States 
respecting  Central   America  ",   52-54. 

'"  Bulwer  to  Palmerston,  May,  6,  1850,  "  Private  and  confidential  ", 
F.  O.,  Am.,  vol.  512. 

1^'  Bulwer  to  Palmerston,  .'\ug.  6,  1850,  "  Secret  and  confidential  ", 
vol.  514,  no.   157. 

*"  ConfiT.  Globe,  32  Cong.,  2  and  3  sess.,  .\ppendix,  267. 


CLAYTON-BULIVER    TREATY  loi 

who  were  governed  by  a  British  magistrate  appointed 
by  the  BeHze  superintendent.  Moreover,  in  1841  the 
governor  of  Jamaica  had  been  instructed  that  if  any 
other  power  should  take  possession  of  Ruatan  he  was 
to  demand  the  removal  of  the  intruder,  and,  should  the 
demand  be  disregarded,  he  was  authorized  to  resort  to 
forcible  means  for  compelling  withdrawal  without  fur- 
ther instructions."^ 

In  a  note  to  Clayton,  dated  April  15,  Bulwer  made 
known  this  view  of  his  government,  adding,  "  should 
any  persons  attempt  to  locate  themselves  therein  and 
resist  his  [the  governor  of  Jamaica's]  request  for  their 
withdrawal,  I  deem  it  advisable  to  report  to  you  at 
once  the  intelligence  which  H.  M.  Govt,  has  received 
knowing  that  you  will  take  all  the  steps  in  your  power 
to  prevent  the  aggression  of  wh.  H.  M.'s  Govt,  has 
been  informed."  ^^ 

Clayton  was  much  disconcerted  by  this  communica- 
tion which  seemed  to  threaten  disaster  to  the  treaty 
just  negotiated  with  Bulwer.  For  several  days  he 
delayed  action,  during  which  time  the  treaty  was  signed 
and  sent  to  the  Senate,  but  when  it  was  under  discus- 
sion by  that  body  he  called  upon  the  British  minister 
and  asked  that  he  cancel  his  note.  An  official  message 
like  the  note,  he  explained,  if  permitted  to  stand,  must 
be  sent  to  Congress,  and  should  this  be  done,  some  of 
the  members  would  very  possibly  imagine  that  Great 
Britain  was  at  that  moment  laying  claim  to  new  terri- 
tories in  America — a  belief  which,  however  erroneous, 
would  affect  the  passing  of  the  treaty  now  under  their 

1-'  Palmerston  to  Bulv.er,  Mar.  14,  1850,  F.  O.,  Am.,  vol.  509,  no.  25. 
See  above,  p.  39. 

"^  Inclosure  in  Bulwer  to  Palmerston,  April  16,  1850,  F.  O.,  Am., 
vol.  512,  no.  63. 


I02     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

consideration.  The  reports  of  American  designs  upon 
Ruatan,  Clayton  stated,  he  believed  were  entirely 
incorrect."^ 

In  consequence  of  Clayton's  representations,  Bulwer 
agreed  to  cancel  his  note  of  April  15,"*  and  to  accept 
from  Clayton  as  satisfactory  a  private  note  to  the  effect 
that  the  American  government  had  never  desired  to 
occupy,  fortify,  or  settle  any  of  the  Bay  Islands,  that 
he,  Clayton,  had  no  knowledge,  information,  or  belief 
that  Americans  desired  to  establish  themselves  there 
and  that  no  attempt  of  American  citizens  to  do  so  would 
receive  countenance  from  their  government.'^ 

This  indirection  on  the  part  of  the  American  secre- 
tary of  state,  though  it  probably  saved  the  treaty, 
played  an  important  part  in  complicating  English- 
American  isthmian  relations,  as  will  appear  later. 

The  treaty  as  altered  by  Bulwer  met  the  approval  of 
Palmerston,  who  stated  that  the  government  would 
ratify  it."^'  But  a  suspicion  that  it  was  intended  by  the 
Americans  to  apply  to  Belize  and  the  Bay  Islands  seems 
to  have  risen  in  Palmerston's  mind — evidently  in  con- 
sequence of  Clayton's  attitude  towards  Bulwer's  note 
of  April  15 — and  made  him  anxious  to  guard  against 
such  a  contingency.  The  sole  object  of  the  British  in 
wishing  to  retain  the  Mosquito  protectorate  was  to 
save  the  dignity  of  the  government  and  perhaps  to  do 
their  duty  by  the  Indians  ;  but  with  Belize  it  was  differ- 
ent ;  the  population  there  was  almost  wholly  composed 

>-•'  Bulwer  to  Palmerston,  .'\pril  27,  1850,  "  I'rivate  and  confidential  ", 
F.  0.,  Am.,  vol.  5I2. 

"s  Ibid. 

^Clayton  to  Bulwer,  April  24,  1850,  "Private",  ibid. 

>"  Pari.  Papers,  1856,  Corns..  LX,  "  Correspondence  with  the  United 
States  respecting  Central  .\merica  ",  58. 


CLAYTON-BULWER   TREATY  103 

of  British  subjects,  the  territory  was  desirable,  and  the 
full  title  to  it  was  almost  their  own.  The  attempts 
to  place  it  entirely  under  British  sovereignty  have  been 
described.  The  Bay  Islands  also  were  prized  by  the 
British  because  of  the  fine  harbors  of  Ruatan.  Conse- 
quently, Palmerston  was  roused  to  precautionary  meas- 
ures. He  instructed  Bulwer  to  deliver  to  Clayton,  at 
the  time  of  exchanging  ratifications,  a  declaration  that 
"  Her  Majesty's  Government  do  not  understand  the 
engagements  of  that  Convention  as  applying  to  Her 
Majesty's  settlement  at  Honduras,  or  to  its  dependen- 
cies."*'^ Should  the  United  States  government  object 
to  receiving  and  assenting  to  this  declaration,  Bulwer 
was  not  to  proceed  to  the  exchange  of  ratifications 
without  further  instructions."^ 

Palmerston's  declaration  was  regarded  with  much 
dissatisfaction  by  Clayton,  to  whom  the  treaty  was 
already  much  less  than  he  had  hoped  for  and  desired."" 
Consequently,  for  a  time  it  was  resolved  to  abandon  the 
arrangement  entirely."*  Besides,  the  doubt  regarding 
the  efficacy  of  the  treaty,  for  a  time  overcome  in  the 
Senate,  had  returned  very  strongly  immediately  after 
the  vote  was  taken,""  and  King  declared  that  if  the 
document  should  be  resubmitted  for  reconsideration  in 
connection  with  Palmerston's  statement,  it  would  not 
receive  a  single  vote.""*  But  King  seems  to  have  con- 
vinced Clayton  that  the  Senate  did  not  regard  the  treaty 
as  applying  to  Belize."^* 

^^  Ibid.,  59-60.  ^  Ibid.,  60. 

''*  U.  S.  Docs.,  ser.  no.  694,  doc.  13,  p.  16. 
la  Ibid. 

^^^  Bulwer   to    Palmerston,   Aug.    6,    1850,   "  Secret   and    confidential  ", 
F.  C,  Am.,  vol.  S14,  no.   157. 
'^^  Cong.   Globe,  32  Cong.,  2  sess.,  2^7. 
i-'^  Ibid.,  230. 


104     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

King  suspected,  however,  that  the  object  of  the 
declaration  was  to  obtain  from  the  American  govern- 
ment an  acknowledgment  of  British  title  to  the  Belize 
territory,'"  and  he  was  determined  that  no  such  admis- 
sion should  be  made.  Clayton  also  suspected  the  British 
of  this  design ;  but,  in  view  of  his  evasive  arrangement 
with  Bulwer  to  prevent  British  pretensions  to  the  Bay 
Islands  from  defeating  ratification  of  the  treaty  by  the 
Senate,  he  was  especially  concerned  over  the  elastic 
possibilities  of  the  term  "  dependencies  ",  and  believed 
that  by  this  wording  the  British  government  aimed  to 
insure  its  claims  to  the  Bay  Islands."" 

After  considerable  discussion  the  American  govern- 
ment decided  to  proceed  with  the  ratification,  but  to 
present  a  counter-declaration,  calculated  to  annul  any 
effect  intended  to  be  produced  by  the  statement  of  the 
British  government.'"  This  counter-declaration  was 
carefully  drawn  up  by  Clayton,  who  consulted  John- 
son, the  United  States  attorney-general,  with  regard  to 
its  phraseology.'' 

''^  Cong.  Globe,  33  Cong.,  i  sess.,  Appendix,  96. 

is«  Bulwer  to  Palmerston,  Aug.  6,  1850,  "  Secret  and  confidential  ", 
F.  O.,  Am.,  vol.  514.  According  to  Bulwer,  in  a  conversation  during 
the  period  of  negotiation  Clayton  had  acknowledged  Belize  "  with  its 
dependencies,  including  two  islands  called  Ruatan  and  Bonaca  ",  to  be 
excluded  from  the  terms  of  the  treaty.  Extract  of  memorandum  inclosed 
by  Bulwer  in  a  private  note  to  Webster,  Aug.  17,  1850,  Dept.  of  State, 
Notes  to  Dept.,  Gt.  Brit.,  vol.  27.  This  statement  appears  inconsistent 
with  some  of  Clayton's  other  statements  and  actions,  but  a  knowledge  of 
his  equivocal  conduct  regarding  the  islands  when  the  treaty  was  before 
the  Senate  makes  it  seem  not  unlikely  that  Bulwer  reported  the  conver- 
sation correctly.  Clayton  possessed  a  wavering  and  contradictory  dis- 
position, qualities  which  were  fully  recognized  by  Bulwer.  Bulwer  to 
Palmerston,  Mar.  2,  1850,  "  Private  and  confidential  ",  F.  C,  Am.,  vol. 
512,  no.  43;  "Letters  of  Bancroft  and  Buchanan",  in  Am.  Hist.  Rev., 
V,  98.  Cf.  Crampton  to  Clarendon,  Mar.  31,  1856,  F.  O.,  Am.,  vol. 
642,  no.  77;  May   19,   1856,  ibid.,  vol.  643,  no.   128;   May  27,   1856,  ibid. 

"'  U.  S.  Docs.,  ser.  no.  694,  doc.  13,  pp.  16-17. 

'''Ibid.,  p.   16. 


CLAYTON-BULWER    TREATY  105 

On  July  4,  the  day  upon  which  the  ratifications  were 
exchanged,  Clayton  wrote  to  King  with  reference  to 
the  proposed  counter-statement  and  asked  for  his  per- 
mission to  state  that  the  true  meaning  of  the  treaty 
had  been  explained  by  him,  King,  to  the  Senate  before 
the  vote  was  taken."'  To  this  King  replied  that  the 
Senate  "  perfectly  understood  that  the  treaty  did  not 
include  British  Honduras  "/*" 

Consequently,  before  the  ratifications  were  ex- 
changed that  night  Clayton  handed  to  Bulwer  a  docu- 
ment which  declared  that  the  treaty  was  not  understood 
by  the  British  or  American  governments  or  by  the 
negotiators — 

to  include  the  British  settlement  in  Honduras  (commonly 
called  British  Honduras,  as  distinct  from  the  State  of  Hon- 
duras) nor  the  small  islands  in  the  neighborhood  which  may  be 
known  as  its  dependencies.  To  this  settlement,  and  these 
islands,  the  treaty  we  negotiated  was  not  intended  by  either 
of  us  to  apply.  The  title  to  them  it  is  now  and  has  been  my 
intention,  throughout  the  negotiation,  to  leave,  as  the  treaty 
leaves  it,  without  denying,  affirming,  or  in  any  way  meddling 
with  the  same,  just  as  it  stood  previously.  The  chairman  of 
the  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations  of  the  Senate,  the  Hon. 
William  R.  King,  informs  me  that  "  the  Senate  perfectly  under- 
stood that  the  treaty  did  not  include  British  Honduras".  It 
was  understood  to  apply  to,  and  does  include  all  the  Central 
American  States  of  Guatemala,  Honduras,  San  Salvador, 
Nicaragua,  and  Costa  Rica  with  their  just  limits  and  proper 
dependencies.*'" 

To  this  Bulwer  replied  in  substance,  that  he  under- 
stood Clayton's  answer  to  the  declaration  of  the  British 
government  as  meaning  that  he,  Clayton,  fully  recog- 

"*  Cong.  Globe,  32  Cong.,  2  sess.,  250. 

^*'  Ibid. 

"*  U.  S.  Docs.,  ser.  no.  660,  doc.   12,  pp.  2-3. 


io6     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

nized  that  it  was  not  the  intention  of  the  treaty  to 
include  the  British  settlement  at  Honduras,  whatever 
might  be  included  under  the  term,  nor  its  dependencies, 
whatever  they  might  be ;  and  that  British  title  to  the 
settlement  would  not  in  any  way  be  altered  in  conse- 
quence of  the  treaty/*^  Exchange  of  ratifications  fol- 
lowed."' 

Thus  the  treaty  was  concluded  without  the  consent 
of  the  Senate  to  the  declaration,  and,  in  consequence, 
that  declaration  was  obviously  not  an  alteration  of  the 
treaty  but  was  merely  understood  by  the  two  negotia- 
tors as  a  "  just  specification  of  its  meaning  and  inten- 
tions ".'"  However,  the  President  and  his  cabinet,**" 
as  well  as  individual  senators  who  were  consulted,  knew 
of  the  existence  of  the  declaration  before  the  treaty 
was  ratified.  Furthermore,  the  interpretation  of  the 
treaty  held  by  the  government  must  have  become  pretty 
well  known  to  the  Senate  as  a  whole  within  a  few  days 
after  it  was  concluded,  for,  on  July  8,  the  National 
Intelligencer  stated  that  the  treaty  neither  recognized 
nor  altered  in  any  way  the  British  title  to  Belize ; '"  and 
the  message  of  the  President,  of  the  fourteenth  of  the 
same  month,  transferring  the  treaty  to  the  House  of 
Representatives,  contained  more  detailed  expressions 
to  the  same  efifect."' 

Although  no  discussion  appears  to  have  arisen  at 
the  time,  in  consequence  of  these  post-ratification 
announcements,  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  from  the 

"^  Pari.  Papers,    1856,   Corns.,   LX,  "  CorresponJeiK-e  with   the   United 
States  respecting  Central  America  ",  63-64. 
"'  U.  S.  Docs.,  ser.  no.  660,  doc.  12,  p.  4. 

"*  Rulwer  to  ralnierston,  Aug.  6,  1850,  F.  C,  Am.,  vol.  514,  no.    157. 
'•"  Cong.  Globe,  32  Cong.,  2  sess.,  248. 
I'*'  Ibid..  249.  "'  Ibid. 


CLAYTON-BUUVER    TREATY  107 

first  was  unpopular  in  America.  Its  phraseology  was 
vague  and  it  did  not  directly  abolish  the  Mosquito 
protectorate ;  hence  it  failed  to  convey  the  full  assur- 
ance desired  by  the  nation  that  British  influence  in 
Central  America  was  absolutely  obliterated.  However, 
the  American  government  beheved  that  the  pecuHar 
wording  of  the  first  article  had  rendered  the  protector- 
ate null ;  it  felt  that  the  agreement  not  to  occupy, 
colonize,  fortify,  or  exercise  dominion  was  equivalent 
to  an  agreement  to  withdraw,  for  without  the  ability  to 
do  these  things  protection  was  impossible.  To  be  sure, 
a  nominal  protectorate  could  exist  under  the  treaty,  but 
it  was  hoped  that  as  the  protectorate  was  utterly  shorn 
of  its  power,  the  British  government  would  entirely 
abandon  it.  This  general  view  of  the  treaty  was  re- 
flected in  a  letter  written  by  Clayton  to  Squier  Avhen  the 
treaty  was  before  the  Senate.    He  wrote : 

I  trust  that  means  will  speedily  be  adopted  by  Great  Britain 
to  extinguish  the  Indian  title  with  the  help  of  the  Nicaraguans 
or  the  Company  "*  within  what  we  consider  to  be  the  limits  of 
Nicaragua  .  .  .  Having  always  regarded  an  Indian  title  as 
a  mere  right  of  occupancy,  we  can  never  agree  that  such  a  title 
should  be  treated  otherwise  than  as  a  thing  to  be  extinguished 
at  the  will  of  the  discoverer  of  the  country.  Upon  the  ratify- 
ing of  the  treaty,  Great  Britain  will  no  longer  have  any  interest 
to  deny  this  principle  which  she  had  recognized  in  every  other 
case  in  common  with  us.  Her  protectorate  will  be  reduced  to 
a  shadow,  " Stat  nominis  umbra,'  for  she  can  neither  occupy, 
fortify,  colonize  or  exercise  dominion  or  control  in  any  part  of 
the  Alosquito  coast  or  Central  America.  To  attempt  to  do 
either  of  those  things  after  the  exchange  of  ratifications,  would 
inevitably  produce  a  rupture  with  the  United  States."' 

^■•^  The  canal  company. 

"9  Dept.  of  State,  Inst.,  Am.  States,  vol.  15,  pp.  io;-io6. 


io8     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

Reverdy  Johnson,  the  attorney-general,  interpreted 
the  agreement  in  the  same  manner.  On  December  30, 
1853,  he  wrote  in  a  letter  to  Clayton : 

As  one  of  the  advisers  of  the  President,  I  unhesitatingly  gave 
him  my  opinion,  that  the  treaty  did  effectually,  to  all  intents 
and  purposes,  disarm  the  British  protectorate  in  Central  Amer- 
ica and  the  Mosquito  coast,  although  it  did  not  abolish  the 
protectorate  in  terms,  nor  was  it  thought  advisable  to  do  so 
"in  ipsissimis  verbis".  All  that  was  desired  by  us  was  to  ex- 
tinguish British  dominion  over  that  country,  whether  held 
directly  or  indirectly — whether  claimed  by  Great  Britain  in  her 
own  right,  or  in  the  right  of  the  Indians.^" 

The  correspondence  upon  the  subject  makes  it  clear 
that  at  the  time  of  negotiation  the  British  government 
agreed  pretty  closely  with  the  United  States  as  to  the 
influence  of  the  treaty  upon  the  Mosquito  protector- 
aie  "^ — an  influence,  however,  which,  strange  to  say, 
Bulwer,  the  British  negotiator  of  the  treaty,  did  not 
recognize  as  existing."''    Though  there  was  no  feeling 

*">  U.  S.  Docs.,  ser.  no.  694,  doc.  13,  p.  15.  Though  Johnson's  letter 
was  written  more  than  three  years  after  the  ratification  of  the  treaty,  and 
during  a  controversy  between  the  British  and  American  governments  over 
its  interpretation,  there  is  no  reason  to  believe  that  the  opinion  of  the 
Attorney-General  here  expressed  differed  in  any  degree  from  that  held 
by  him  when  the  treaty  was  concluded. 

^^^  This  will  be  brought  out  in  the  following  chapters. 

'"  On  April  28,  1850,  after  the  treaty  was  signed,  Bulwer  wrote  to 
Palmerston:  "I  need  not  say  that  should  your  Lordship  wish  to  make 
any  further  statement  as  to  the  views  of  Her  Majesty's  Government 
with  regard  to  the  protectorate  of  Mosquito,  that  statement  can  still  be 
made;  nothing  in  the  present  Convention  is  affirmed  thereupon,  but 
nothing  is  abandoned."  Pari.  Papers,  1856,  Corns.,  LX,  "  Correspondence 
with  the  United  States  respecting  Central  America  ",  56. 

In  a  memorandum  of  the  negotiations  kept  for  his  own  use  Bulwer 
wrote:  "The  treaty,  indeed,  was  intended  to  apply  to  future  and  not 
to  present  possessions  in  Central  America;  so  that  without  any  question 
as  to  what  Central  .America  is,  IT.  M.'s  settlement  in  Honduras  and  its 
dependencies  are  not  included  in  the  said  treaty."  Extract  of  Mem- 
orandum inclosed  by  Bulwer  in  a  private  note  to  Webster,  .Aug.  17,  1850, 
Dept.  of  State,  Notes  to  Dept.,  Gt.  Brit.,  vol.  27. 


CLAYTON-BULJVER    TREATY  log 

that  the  protectorate  over  the  Mosquitos  had  been  aban- 
doned, it  was  fully  realized  that  the  relations  with  the 
Indians  had  been  decidedly  weakened/"  Through  the 
persistence  of  Clayton  the  substance  of  the  protectorate 
had  been  taken  away,  though  the  form,  with  the  pride 
of  the  British,  had  been  preserved  by  Bulwer's  shrewd 
diplomacy. 

Just  what  either  government  thought  would  be  the 
effect  of  the  treaty  upon  British  occupation  of  Belize 
and  the  Bay  Islands,  it  is  impossible  to  say,  for  no 
expression  of  opinion  upon  this  point  seems  to  have 
been  recorded  at  this  time.  It  seems  fair  to  presume, 
however,  that,  after  the  British  declaration  regarding 
Belize  had  been  exchanged  for  the  American  counter- 
declaration,  both  governments  were  uncertain  as  to 
what  had  actually  been  lost  or  won  by  the  transaction ; 
but  that  both  were  determined  to  get  the  most  possible 
out  of  the  arrangement  in  the  execution  of  their 
respective  policies.  The  effect  of  this  procedure  will 
appear  later. 

"'  Ehiring  the  negotiation  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty,  Chatfield  en- 
deavored to  form  a  treaty  with  Honduras  regarding  the  Mosquito 
boundary  at  the  north.  The  first  draft  of  the  agreement  bore  the 
Queen's  name  as  one  of  the  parties  to  the  agreement.  Inclosure  in 
Palmerston  to  Chatfield,  Mar.  30,  1S50,  F.  O.,  Cen.  Am.,  vol.  63,  no.  11. 
Later,  in  June,  this  was  changed  by  order  of  the  British  government,  and 
the  name  of  the  Mosquito  king  was  substituted,  on  the  ground  that  the 
other  form  was  not  consistent  with  the  language  of  the  treaty  with  the 
United  States,  which  engaged  both  parties  not  to  "  assume  or  exercise 
any  dominion  over  Mosquito  coast  ",  etc.  Palmerston  to  Chatfield,  June 
20,  1850,  and  inclosure,  ibid.,  no.  21,  and  Foreign  Office  notes  of  June 
6  and  7,  1850,  ibid.,  vol.  63. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

Attempts  at  Readjustment  Under  the  New 
Treaty,  1850-1852. 

The  negotiation  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  was 
brought  to  a  successful  conclusion  by  careful  concen- 
tration upon  the  points  of  agreement  between  the  two 
contracting  parties,  and  studied  avoidance  of  the  larger 
Central  American  question,  regarding  which  differ- 
ences were  well  known  to  exist.  To  carry  out  the  spirit 
of  the  treaty  in  its  application  to  the  Mosquitos  was  far 
more  difficult,  but  it  was  a  task  which  the  British  gov- 
ernment honestly  planned  to  attempt,  even  before  rati- 
fications were  exchanged. 

When  the  treaty  was  under  consideration  of  the 
Senate,  Bulwer  wrote  to  Palmerston : 

You  will  best  judge  if  anything,  and  if  anything  what,  is  to 
be  done  as  to  the  remaining  difference  between  Nicaragua  and 
Mosquito,  on  which  the  Government  of  Her  Majesty  and 
that  of  the  United  States  still  entertain  opposite  opinions, 
although  these  opinions  are,  by  our  Treaty,  restrained  or  with- 
drawn from  the  necessity  of  being  carried  out  into  any  act 
of  hostility.* 

Though  the  British  government,  he  added,  no  longer 
had  any  interest  in  maintaining  the  Mosquitos  where 
they  were  or  in  protecting  them  in  that  particular  local- 
ity, still  they  could  not  give  up  the  protectorate  or 

'  I'arl.  Papers,  1856,  Corns.,  LX,  "  Correspondence  with  the  United 
•States  respecting  Central  America  ",  56. 


ATTEMPTS  AT  READJUSTMENT,  1830-1852      in 

change  the  condition  of  things  on  which  it  existed  if 
pressed  to  do  so  in  a  disagreeable  way  ;  yet  the  question 
might  be  finally  settled  with  a  friendly  power  on  general 
and  friendly  grounds.  If  the  pending  treaty  with  the 
United  States,  and  that  between  the  latter  and  Nica- 
ragua could  be  completed  without  any  assertion  of  the 
right  of  Nicaragua  over  the  Mosquito  territory,  a 
friendly  arrangement  might  be  made  with  the  United 
States  for  the  withdrawal  of  the  Mosquitos  from  the 
vicinity  of  the  canal.  The  Mosquito  title  might  be 
purchased  and  the  Indians  reorganized  in  a  particular 
district.' 

In  reply  to  these  suggestions,  Palmerston  wrote : 

Her  Majesty's  government  feel  that  the  present  state  of 
things  in  regard  to  the  Mosquito  Territory,  and  especially  with 
regard  to  the  Port  of  Grey  Town,  is  in  many  respects  incon- 
venient, and  not  entirely  in  conformity  with  the  true  spirit  and 
meaning  of  the  Convention  just  concluded  between  Great 
Britain  and  the  United  States.  The  British  government  is 
bound  in  honor  to  protect  the  Mosquitos,  but  her  Majesty's 
government  are  of  the  opinion  that  the  protection  of  Great 
Britain  might  be  afforded  to  that  nation  as  effectually  in  a 
different  way,  and  without  any  direct  interference  of  any  agent 
of  the  British  Government  in  the  internal  affairs  of  that 
country. 

In  accordance  with  this  idea,  he  explained,  the  boun- 
daries of  the  Mosquito  territor)^  might  be  adjusted  by 
Great  Britain  in  co-operation  with  the  United  States. 
In  order  to  meet  the  terms  of  the  treaty,  and  yet  to 
secure  for  Greytown  a  well-organized  government,  the 
boundary  dispute  between  Mosquito  and  Costa  Rica 
might  be  so  arranged  as  to  give  the  port,  with  a  suffi- 

^ibid.,  56-57. 


112     AXGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

cient  district  to  the  north  of  it,  to  the  latter.'  In  return 
for  the  cession,  Palmerston  wrote,  the  Mosquitos 
should  be  given  some  suitable  and  adequate  compensa- 
tion/ In  combination  with  these  arrangements,  he 
thought  that  the  general  differences  between  Costa  Rica 
and  Nicaragua  might  be  settled  by  the  good  offices  of 
the  British  and  American  governments.'  The  basis  of 
such  arrangement  might  be  the  decision  in  favor  of 
Nicaragua  of  some  of  the  disputed  questions  of  boun- 
dary on  the  western  side  of  the  isthmus.' 

Bulwer  knew  that  the  American  government  was 
interested  in  securing  a  favorable  canal  treaty  from 
Nicaragua,  and  therefore  would  not  be  likely  to  make 
any  disagreeable  suggestions  to  her  while  the  Squier 
treaty  was  in  abeyance.  Consequently,  he  approached 
Clayton  cautiously,  remarking  that  if  the  American 
government  would  agree  to  the  transfer  of  Greytown  to 
Costa  Rica  in  return  for  some  cession  of  other  disputed 
territory  he  would  suggest  such  an  arrangement  to 
Palmerston.'  However,  as  he  suspected  would  be  the 
case,  Clayton  was  opposed  to  such  a  disposal  of  the 
question.'  Bulwer  therefore  became  convinced  that 
the  most  urgent  need  at  that  time  was  to  prevent  the 
United  States  from  recognizing  by  treaty  the  rights  of 

'  F.  O.,  Am.,  vol.  509,  no.  58.  Though  Costa  Rica  did  possess  a  more 
stable  government  than  Nicaragua,  the  fact  that  Great  Britain  was  a 
friend  of  the  former,  while  bad  feeling  existed  between  herself  and  the 
latter,  which  looked  towards  the  United  States  for  protection,  undoubtedly 
also  influenced  Palmerston  in  considering  the  disposal  of  Greytown. 

•  Pari.  Papers,  1856,  Corns.,  I.X,  "Correspondence  with  the  United 
States  respecting  Central  .America  ",  58-59. 

•  F.  0.,  Am.,  vol.  509,  no.  59. 
«  Ibid. 

'  lUilwer  to  Palmerston,  July  i,  1850,  "  Private  and  confidential  ", 
F.  O.,  .Xm.,  vol.  513. 

•  Ibid. 


ATTEMPTS  AT  READJUSTMENT,  1850-1852      113 

Nicaragua  over  the  San  Juan,  and  worked  with  that 
end  in  view.' 

With  the  accession  of  President  Fillmore,  Daniel 
Webster  became  secretary  of  state,  and  as  the  Clayton- 
Bulwer  treaty  was  by  this  time  ratified,  discussions 
more  to  the  point  regarding  the  disposal  of  affairs  in 
Central  America  seemed  possible.  Shortly  after  the 
ratification,  Molina,  the  Costa  Rican  representative, 
informed  Palmerston  that  his  government  was  willing 
to  submit  the  boundary  dispute  with  Nicaragua  to  the 
joint  mediation  or  arbitration  of  the  United  States  and 
Great  Britain,"  and  would  be  bound  by  the  decision  of 
those  governments."  Thereupon  Palmerston  communi- 
cated Molina's  message  to  Bulwer  with  instructions  to 
submit  the  proposal  to  the  United  States  government." 
The  matter  was  made  known  to  Webster  by  Bulwer," 
who  at  the  same  time  suggested  the  desirability  of 
speedily  settling  by  joint  mediation  all  of  the  territorial 
differences  between  Mosquito,  Costa  Rica,  and  Nica- 
ragua." 

Webster  replied  that  it  would  be  necessary  to  know 
what  the  Nicaraguans  would  consent  to  before  the 
United  States  government,  which  was  in  some  degree 
compromised  with  respect  to  their  claims  by  the  ex- 
pression of  its  opinions,  could  decide  what  would  be 
the  best  course.  He  added,  however,  that  he  entirely 
agreed  in  the  spirit  of  the  plan  suggested  by  Palmer- 
ston, and  stated  that  he  would  recommend  the  Senate 
to  do  nothing  for  the  time  being  with  regard  to  the 

» Ibid. 

■**  This  was  in  reply  to  an  offer  made  by  Palmerston.  Pari.  Papers, 
1856,  Corns.,  LX,  "  Correspondence  with  the  United  States  respecting 
Central  America  ",  65. 

"  Ibid.,  65-66.         ^  Ibid..  67.        "  Ibid.,  68.  ^*  Ibid.,  67. 

9 


114    ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

Squier  treaty,"  to  which  Bulwer  had  called  attention 
because  it  contained  certain  points  objectionable  to  the 
British  government." 

But  the  situation  in  Central  America  was  such  as  to 
make  a  prompt  settlement  very  difficult,  if  not  impos- 
sible. Political  conditions  in  Nicaragua  had  grown 
worse  and  the  government  had  been  brought  very  much 
under  the  influence  of  the  canal  company,"  an  agent 
of  which  was  reported  as  trying  to  induce  the  Nica- 
raguans  to  recapture  San  Juan."  This  town  "  was  at 
the  time  nominally  under  Mosquito  sovereignty,  but 
really  governed  by  the  British  consul,  who  was  virtually 
dictator  "^  and,  as  representative  of  the  arch-enemy,  was 
cordially  hated  by  the  Nicaraguans.  To  avert  danger 
of  an  attack,  British  war  ships  were  ordered  to  visit  the 
port,"  and  after  a  time  one  or  two  vessels  were  kept 
constantly  in  the  harbor."  The  boundary  dispute  be- 
tween Costa  Rica  and  Nicaragua  had  also  grown  more 
bitter,  and  war  between  the  two  threatened  to  increase 
the  confusion." 

More  serious  still  was  the  fact  that  communication 
with  the  British  and  American  agents  in  Central  Amer- 

^'^ Pari.  Papers,  1856,  Corns.,  LX,  "Correspondence  with  the  United 
States  respecting  Central  America  ",  68-69. 

"  Ibid.,  70-72. 

"Bulwer  to  Palmerston,  Sept.  29,  1850,  "Private  and  confidential", 
F.  C,  Am.,  vol.  S'S,  no.  189. 

^^  Pari.  Papers,  1856  Corns.  LX,  "Correspondence  with  the  United 
States  respecting  Central  America  ",  90. 

"  In  the  autumn  of  1850  the  place  contained  fifty  or  sixty  houses 
with  a  population  of  about  three  hundred.     Squier,  Nicaragua,  I,  73-73. 

*•  Froebel,  Seven  Years'  Travel  in  Central  America,  14;  Squier, 
Nicaragua,  I,  79. 

^  Pari.  Papers,  1856,  Corns.,  LX,  "Correspondence  with  the  United 
States  respecting  Central  America",  90-91. 

"  Squier,  Nicaragua,  I,  79. 

**  Pari.  Papers,  1856,  Corns.,  LX,  "Correspondence  with  the  United 
States  respecting  Central  America  ",  95. 


ATTEMPTS  AT  READJUSTMENT,  1850-18 52      115 

ica  was  so  difficult  that  it  was  almost  impossible  for 
their  governments  to  keep  in  touch  with  or  control 
them.  The  actions  of  Chatfield  and  Squier  in  particu- 
lar, both  of  whom  were  lacking  in  tact  and  judgment 
and  were  exceedingly  jealous  of  each  other's  intentions, 
often  threatened  to  cause  trouble  for  the  countries 
which  they  represented.  Apparently  unaware  of  the 
opinion  held  at  Washington  regarding  his  treaty  for 
the  cession  of  Tigre,  Squier  seized  the  island  shortly 
after  its  evacuation  by  the  British,''*  and  for  many 
months  the  American  flag  floated  over  it,  regardless  of 
the  fact  that  the  Honduras  legislature  had  disavowed 
the  treaty  of  cession.^  Chatfield,  on  the  other  hand, 
seemed  finally  to  lose  all  interest  in  making  Tigre  Brit- 
ish territory,  but  busied  himself  with  various  other 
violent  acts  calculated  to  force  the  Central  American 
states  to  pay  their  long-standing  debts.  His  efforts 
with  Nicaragua  and  Costa  Rica  availed  little,  however, 
for  both  states  united  in  refusing  payment  until  the 
British  acknowledged  their  rights  to  Mosquito  Shore.^ 
Furthermore,  scarcely  had  the  terms  of  the  Clayton- 
Bulwer  treaty  become  known  before  the  two  agents 
began  to  rouse  irritation  by  their  extreme  and  contra- 
dictory interpretations  of  that  instrument,  as  to  the 
peculiar  advantages  conferred  by  it  upon  their  respect- 
ive governments."    As  a  result  of  his  unsatisfactory 

"  Ihid.,  61.  23  iiid,^  94-95. 

2«Hall  to  Macdonald,  Dec.  8,  1841,  F.  O.,  Cen.  Am.,  vol.  25;  Chatfield 
to  Palmerston,  Nov.  6,  1850,  ibid.,  vol.  66,  no.  104.  Spain,  by  a  treaty 
with  Nicaragua,  made  July  25,  1850,  acknowledged  the  exclusive  claims 
of  the  latter  to  the  sovereignty  of  Mosquito  coast.  Chatfield  to 
Palmerston,  Oct.  9,  1850,  ibid.,  vol.  65,  no.  87. 

"  Inclosure  in  Chatfield  to  Palmerston,  July  i,  1850,  ibid.,  vol.  64; 
Chatfield  to  Palmerston,  Aug.  20,  1850,  ibid.,  vol.  65,  no.  58;  Bulwer  to 
Palmerston,  Mar.  10,  1851,  F.  O.,  Am.,  vol.  528,  no.  49. 


ii6     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

conduct,  Squier  was  recalled  in  the  autumn  of  1850* 
and  was  succeeded  by  Kerr,"  who  was  of  a  less  pugna- 
cious disposition.'"  This  change  relieved  matters  but 
little,  however,  for  Chatfield  remained  and  kept  up  the 
condition  of  semi-warfare  in  Central  America,"  and 
consequently  created  ill-feeling  in  the  United  States 
against  England.  But  he  too  was  removed,  in  January, 
1852,"^  presumably  in  consequence  of  repeated  com- 
plaints by  the  American  government,"  and  after  his 
departure  more  pacific  relations  prevailed  between 
British  and  American  representatives  on  the  isthmus. 

Notwithstanding  these  various  obstacles,  Bulwer 
tried  to  keep  the  question  of  a  Central  American  settle- 
ment to  the  front,  for  he  felt  that  better  and  fairer 
terms,  from  a  British  viewpoint,  could  be  obtained  from 
Webster  than  from  any  other  secretary  of  state.**  But 
in  consequence  of  Webster's  determination  to  consider 
Nicaragua's  wishes  in  the  matter,  no  progress  was 
made  for  several  months.  The  Nicaraguan  govern- 
ment had  promised  to  send  a  representative  to  Wash- 
ington, but  none  had  arrived.**  Should  none  be  sent, 
Webster  assured  Bulwer,  it  was  the  intention  of  the 
American  government  to  establish  diplomatic  relations 

^Bulwer  to  Palmerston,  Oct.  7,  1850,  ibid.,  vol.  515,  no.  208. 

-°  U.  S.  Docs.,  ser.  no.  819,  doc.  25,  pp.  47-48. 

*•  Chatfield  to  Palmerston,  Oct.  25,  1851,  F.  O.,  Cen.  Am.,  vol.  72, 
no.  126. 

*^  Bulwer  to  Palmerston,  Jan.  28,  1851,  F.  C,  Am.,  vol.  527,  no.  20; 
Bulwer  to  Palmerston,  Mar.  10,  1851,  ibid.,  vol.  528,  no.  49. 

"Granville  to  Chatfield,  Jan.  15,  1852,  F.  O.,  Cen.  Am.,  vol.  76,  no.  2; 
Bulwer  to  Palmerston,  June  22,  1851,  F.  O.,  Am.,  vol.  529,  no.  iia. 

^  Bulwer  to  Palmerston,  Jan.  28,  1851,  ibid.,  vol.  527,  no.  ao;  Mar. 
10,  1851,  ibid.,  vol.  528,  no.  49. 

"White  to  Palmerston,  Nov.  12,  1851,  ibid.,  vol.  537;  Bulwer  to 
Palmerston,  May  19,  185 1,  ibid.,  vol.  528,  no.  98. 

^  Pari.  Papers,  i8.i;6,  Corns.,  LX,  "Correspondence  with  the  United 
States  respecting  Central  America  ",  95. 


ATTEMPTS  AT  READJUSTMENT,  1850-1852      117 

with  Nicaragua  by  appointing  an  agent  to  that  govern- 
ment at  once.'* 

While  the  American  government  waited  to  hear  from 
Nicaragua,  Bulwer  resumed  the  discussion  of  terms  of 
settlement,  and  finally  persuaded  Webster  to  agree  not 
to  recognize  the  exclusive  right  of  Nicaragua  over  the 
San  Juan  River  or  to  make  more  than  a  commercial 
treaty  with  that  government ;  but  Webster  would  not 
consent  to  the  cession  of  Greytown  to  Costa  Rica." 
Bulwer  therefore  suggested  to  Palmerston  that  the 
town  be  given  to  Nicaragua,  in  return  for  compensation 
to  the  Mosquitos  and  to  Costa  Rica ;  '^  and  Palmerston 
agreed  to  this  plan,  provided  insurmountable  difficulties 
prevented  the  transfer  of  the  port  to  Costa  Rica.'" 

Finally  Marcoleta  arrived  as  representative  of  the 
Nicaraguan  government  and  expressed  a  desire  to  form 
commercial  treaties  with  Great  Britain  and  with  the 
United  States.""  Shortly  afterwards  he  began  negotia- 
tions for  the  latter  purpose  with  Webster."  Mean- 
while the  discussion  of  the  disputed  points  in  connec- 
tion with  Mosquito  was  vigorously  pursued  by  Webster 
and  Bulwer,  and  the  latter  began  to  hope  for  a  speedy 
termination  of  the  whole  question.*^  However,  when 
the  two  negotiators  had  almost  reached  an  agreement 
regarding  Greytown,*^  Marcoleta  displayed  a  sudden 
change  of  mind,"  and  declared  himself  unwilling  to 
sign  any  commercial  treaty  with  England,  or  even  with 

»•  Ihid.  "  m^^  96-97.  3s  ji,i^  39  /j,j-(i^  gg 

«  Ibid.         ■"  Ibid.  *'  Ibid.         '="  Ibid.,  98-99- 

**  The  change  in  Marcoleta  was  evidently  due  to  criticism  from  his 
government  because  of  a  willingness  to  make  concessions,  which  he  had 
at  first  shown,  and  to  a  correspondence  which  he  had  recently  carried 
on  with  Senator  Douglas,  who  was  an  enemy  of  any  compromise  with 
England.  Bulwer  to  Palmerston,  July  28,  185 1,  F.  O.,  Am.,  vol.  329, 
no.  132. 


ii8     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

the  United  States  unless  something  respecting  Grey- 
town  and  the  Mosquito  territory  was  at  the  same  time 
settled." 

This  stand  of  the  Nicaraguan  agent  produced  a 
change  in  Webster,  who,  while  still  expressing  adher- 
ence to  his  former  opinions,  seemed  reluctant  to  act 
upon  them/*  Bulwer,  desirous  of  securing  some  defi- 
nite result,  drew  up  a  statement  of  the  opinions  ex- 
pressed by  himself  and  Webster,  which  the  latter  after 
some  reflection  finally  refused  to  sign."  Then  Bulwer 
proposed  a  meeting  of  Marcoleta,  Molina  (the  Costa 
Rican  minister),  Webster,  and  himself  for  the  purpose 
of  trying  to  reach  satisfactory  terms.  The  meeting 
was  held  July  1 1,  but  it  resulted  in  nothing,  as  the  Nica- 
raguan minister  refused  to  accept  any  arrangement 
suggested  by  Bulwer,  and  offered  instead  proposals 
from  his  own  government,^  which  Bulwer  in  turn 
refused  to  consider.'"  This  change  in  affairs  again 
brought  negotiations  to  a  standstill,  for  Marcoleta  had 
no  powers  to  go  beyond  the  proposals  he  had  made."" 
Some  time  before,  Crampton  had  arrived  at  Washing- 
ton for  the  purpose  of  relieving  Bulwer,  but  at  Web- 
ster's request  the  latter  had  consented  to  remain  longer 

*' Pari.  Papers,  1856,  Corns.,  LX,  "Correspondence  with  the  United 
States  respecting  Central  America  ",  99. 

«  Ibid. 

*''  Ibid.  Webster's  reluctance  was  certainly  produced  to  some  extent 
by  the  change  in  Marcoleta;  but  public  criticism  of  his  foreign  policy 
may  also  have  caused  him  to  hesitate.  Bulwer  to  Palmerston,  April  7, 
185 1,  F.  O.,  Am.,  vol.  528,  no.  69. 

**  Pari.  Papers,  1856,  Corns.,  "Correspondence  with  the  United  States 
respecting  Central  America  ",  99.  Marcoleta's  proposals  diflfered  from 
those  of  Bulwer  in  that  they  provided  for  no  compensation  to  the 
Mosquitos  in  return  for  Greytown,  which,  by  both  projects  was  to  go 
to  Nicaragua;  and  the  boundary  dispute  between  the  latter  and  Costa 
Rica  was  to  be  settled  by  arbitration.     Ibid.,   100. 

**  Ibid.,  98.  '"Ibid..  100. 


ATTEMPTS  AT  READJUSTMENT,  1850-18 52      119 

in  order  to  try  to  settle  the  Mosquito  difficulty."  Now, 
as  no  progress  could  be  made  until  the  Nicaraguan 
government  was  again  heard  from,  Bulwer  returned 
home  in  August,  1851." 

During  the  period  of  delay  an  event  occurred  which 
created  considerable  feeling  against  England  in  the 
United  States,  and  seriously  threatened  the  friendly 
relations  which  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  had  tempo- 
rarily established.  On  November  21,  1851,  the  Pro- 
metheus, a  vessel  belonging  to  the  Atlantic  and  Pacific 
Ship-Canal  Company,  was  in  Greytown  harbor,  about 
to  leave  for  New  York."  For  some  time  harbor  dues  " 
had  been  levied  by  the  municipal- authorities  upon  all 
vessels  entering  the  port  except  the  English  steamers 
which  carried  the  mail.  All  had  fulfilled  the  require- 
ment except  the  Prometheus,  which  had  made  several 
trips,  each  time  steadily  refusing  to  meet  the  demands 
of  the  port  officials,  on  the  ground  that  the  company 
did  not  recognize  the  Mosquito  authorities  ."^  On  the 
occasion  in  question,  after  the  usual  bill  of  charges,  plus 

*i  Bulwer  to  Palmerston,  May  25,  185 1,  F.  O.,  Am.,  vol.  528,  no.  100. 

'^Dic.  Nat.  Biog.,  XIII,  6. 

^  Pari.  Papers,  1856,  Corns.,  LX,  "Correspondence  with  the  United 
States  respecting  Central  America",  iii. 

"  This  was  a  port  charge  levied  solely  by  the  local  officials  in  order 
to  meet  expenses  connected  with  the  harbor.  U.  S.  Docs.,  ser.  no.  618, 
doc.  30,  p.  5.  In  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer 
treaty,  Palmerston,  in  the  autumn  of  1850,  had  instructed  the  Mosquito 
authorities  to  make  Greytown  a  free  port.  Palmerston  to  Buhver, 
Nov.  15,  1850,  F.  O.,  Am.,  vol.  510,  no.  150.  These  instructions  had  been 
obeyed,  and  since  January  1,  1851,  no  duties  had  been  levied  by  the 
representatives  of  the  Mosquito  government  upon  vessels  or  goods. 
U.  S.  Docs.,  ser.  no.  618,  doc.  30,  p.  5. 

"  It  should  be  remembered  that  the  canal  company  had  obtained  its 
charter  and  contract  from  the  Nicaraguan  government.  The  contract  had 
granted  the  company  the  use  of  the  river  and  harbor  "  free  of  all  duties 
or  charges  of  any  kind  whatsoever  ".  Par!.  Papers,  1856,  Corns.,  LX, 
"  Correspondence  with  the  United  States  respecting  Central  America  ", 


120     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

arrears,  had  been  presented  and  payment  refused,  a 
warrant  was  issued  for  the  arrest  of  Churchill,  the  cap- 
tain of  the  vessel,  for  the  debt.  Local  officials  went 
aboard  and  served  the  warrant,  but  Churchill  still 
resisted.  The  officials,  after  giving  notice  that  the 
vessel  would  not  be  permitted  to  leave  until  the  debt 
was  paid,  went  ashore.  The  captain,  however,  ignored 
the  threat  and  in  a  few  minutes  his  vessel  was  dropping 
down  the  harbor. "*  The  British  brig-of-war  Express 
happened  to  be  in  the  port  at  the  time  and  its  captain, 
Fead,  had  been  requested  by  Green,  the  British  consul, 
to  detain  the  Proiuetheus  in  case  the  dues  were  not 
paid."  Accordingly  the  Express  immediately  followed 
the  departing  vessel  and  at  Green's  orders  two  shots 
were  fired  across  her  bows.  The  Prometheus  then 
returned  to  her  place  of  anchorage,  and  the  president 
of  the  canal  company,  Cornelius  Vanderbilt,  who  hap- 
pened to  be  aboard,  went  ashore  and  paid  the  debt. 
The  vessel  was  then  permitted  to  proceed  on  her 
voyage."' 

On  December  i,  the  board  of  directors  of  the  canal 
company  met  and  drew  up  resolutions  regarding  the 
affair,  in  which  they  claimed  the  interference  and  pro- 
tection of  the  United  States  government.*'  White,  the 
counsel  for  the  company,  sent  resolutions,  accompanied 
by  a  letter  calling  attention  to  Green's  share  in  detain- 
ing the  vessel,  to  the  United  States  government." 
Promptly  upon  receiving  intelligence  of  the  matter, 
the   Navy   Department   ordered   Commodore   Parker, 

"Pari.   Papers,    1856,   Corns.,    LX,   "Correspondence   with   the   United 
States  respecting  Central  .-Xmerica  ",  iii. 
"  Ihid.,  113. 

'^  Ibid.,  hi;  U.  S.  Docs.,  ser.  no.  614.  doc.  6.  pp.  2-1. 
"  Ibid.,  p.  3.  *•  Ibid.,  p.  2. 


ATTEMPTS  AT  READJUSTMENT,  1S50-1852      121 

commander  of  the  home  squadron,  to  leave  as  soon  as 
possible  for  San  Juan  in  order  to  protect  American 
interests  there."  Parker  was  instructed  to  assure  the 
authorities  of  the  port,  however,  that  the  American 
government  would  not  justify  the  non-payment  of  any 
lawful  and  proper  port  dues  on  the  part  of  merchant 
vessels."'^  On  the  same  date  Webster  sent  a  despatch 
to  Lawrence  calling  his  attention  to  the  action  of  the 
British  officials  at  San  Juan  and  directing  him  to  inquire 
of  Palmer ston  whether  the  captain  of  the  Express  had 
acted  under  orders  from  his  government,  and  whether 
his  course  was  approved.  Should  Palmerston's  reply 
be  in  the  affirmative,  Lawrence  was  to  state  that  the 
President  would  consider  the  proceeding  a  violation  of 
the  treaty  of  April  19,  1850." 

The  resignation  of  Palmerston  just  when  Lawrence 
presented  his  communication  prevented  a  prompt  reply 
from  the  British  government,'^*  but  on  December  30, 
immediately  after  his  installation  in  the  Foreign  Office, 
Granville  wrote  to  Lawrence  stating  that  Fead's  act 
was  not  in  consequence  of  any  orders  from  his  govern- 
ment, and  that  as  soon  as  word  should  be  received  from 
Greytown  a  further  statement  would  be  made.  In  the 
meanwhile  Lawrence  might  rest  assured  that  it  was 
"  far  from  the  intention  of  her  Majesty's  government 
to  authorize  any  proceeding  at  variance  with  the  stipu- 
lations of  the  treaty  of  Washington  of  the  19th  of 
April,  1850."  °°  Upon  receipt  of  this  note  Lawrence 
expressed  his  regret  that  the  British  government  had 
not  yet  received  the  official  intelligence  which  would 
enable  it  to  disavow  the  act  of  the  Express.^    To  this 

^^  Ibid.,  p.  4.         '^^  Ibid.         '^  Ibid.,  ser.   no.  6i8,  doc.   30,  pp.    1-2. 
M  Ibid.,  p.  4.        «  Ibid.,  pp.   5-6.         "«  Ibid.,  p.  6. 


122     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

Granville  replied  that  should  the  circumstances  of  the 
affair  be  shown  to  be  such  as  were  described  by  the 
American  minister,  the  British  government  would  at 
once  disavow  it." 

During  this  period  of  suspense  the  affair  was  taken 
up  in  an  angry  manner  in  the  United  States  by  the  Dem- 
ocratic party  and  the  press,  and  matters  were  becoming 
serious  "*  when  Crampton  received  a  letter  from  Vice- 
Admiral  Seymour  of  the  British  navy,  which  reheved 
the  situation.  Seymour  stated  that  his  instructions  to 
the  commander  of  the  Jamaica  division  of  the  navy  did 
not  sanction  such  an  act  as  Fead  had  committed,  and 
that  therefore  he  had  sent  word  to  Fead  to  desist  from 
enforcing  the  payment  of  dues  at  Grey  town  until  fur- 
ther orders.  Seymour  also  stated  that  Green,  too,  had 
apparently  acted  without  instructions.'"  Crampton 
greatly  relieved  Webster's  anxiety  by  reading  portions 
of  this  timely  letter  to  him,  and  he,  Webster,  asked 
Crampton  to  inform  Seymour  that  the  United  States 
government  highly  appreciated  the  friendly  and  con- 
siderate spirit  in  which  he  had  acted." 

On  December  20,  Seymour  had  written  to  the  Admir- 
alty of  the  affair  and  explained  the  instructions  which 
he  had  given  regarding  Greytown."^  Through  this 
letter  Granville  received  his  first  official  information 
regarding  the  matter."  On  January  10,  1852,  immedi- 
ately upon  the  receipt  of  it,  he  wrote  to  Lawrence 
making  known  the  attitude  taken  by  the  Vice-Admiral, 
and  stating  that  the  British  government  entirely  ap- 

"  U.  S.  Docs.,  ser.  no.  6i8,  doc.  30,  pp.  6-7. 

**  Pari.   Papers,    1856,   Corns.,   LX,   "Correspondence   with   the   United 
States  respecting  Central  .\merica  ",  122. 
**lbxd.,  121.         ■">  Ibid.,   \22.         ^Ibid.,   121. 
"  U.  S.  Docs.,  ser.   no.   618,  doc.  30,  pp.   7-8. 


ATTEMPTS  AT  READJUSTMENT,  1850-1852      123 

proved  of  the  latter 's  conduct,  and  disavowed  the  acts 
of  Green  and  Fead." 

Lawrence  expressed  his  gratification  at  the  prompt- 
ness with  which  the  disavowal  had  followed  the  receipt 
of  Seymour's  report  and  stated  that  he  had  no  doubt 
but  that  the  apology  would  be  received  by  his  govern- 
ment in  the  same  spirit  which  had  dictated  it  on  the  part 
of  Great  Britain."  Lawrence's  earlier  report  of  the 
attitude  taken  by  Granville  had  been  received  by  Web- 
ster with  much  satisfaction/"  and  after  notice  of  the 
disavowal  and  apology  had  reached  him  he  expressed 
his  belief  that  the  British  government  had  "  behaved 
with  great  honor  and  justice  in  the  affair  of  the  Prome- 
theus".'^ Thus  the  matter  ended  peaceably,  and  with 
friendly  feelings  between  the  two  governments. 

But  the  excitement  growing  out  of  the  affair  showed 
the  constant  danger  in  delaying  a  settlement  regarding 
the  Mosquito  question  and  created  greater  anxiety  on 
both  sides  for  a  resumption  of  negotiations.''  Webster 
now,  apparently  for  the  first  time,  showed  a  real  inter- 
est in  effecting  an  adjustment.  While  writing  to  Law- 
rence shortly  before  the  news  of  the  disavowal  was 
received,  he  expressed  his  fears  for  the  future  should 
the  arrangement  of  matters  in  dispute  with  England 
much  longer  be  postponed.'*  Moreover,  Palmerston's 
withdrawal  from  the  government  was  considered  as 
particularly  favorable  to  American  interests,  and  hence 
to  an  adjustment."    It  was  now  believed  that  England 

"/&td.  ■'*Ibid.,  pp.  8-9. 

"  Webster,  Writings  and  Speeches,  XVI,  635. 
'•  Curtis,  Daniel  Webster,  II,  596. 

"  Pari.  Papers,  1856,  Corns.,  "  Correspondence  with  the  United  States 
respecting  Central  America",   117,   123-124. 

78  Webster,  Writings  and  Speeches,  XVI,  634-635. 
■"Ibid..  XVIII,  504,  Sio. 


124     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

had  a  strong  desire  to  settle  all  pending  questions  '"  and 
that  she  would  never  be  in  a  better  humor  for  the 
purpose.**  A  strong  effort  was  made  to  have  Bulwer 
return  to  the  country  for  the  purpose  of  resuming  the 
negotiations/'  but  circumstances  prevented,"  so  that 
duty  fell  to  Crampton. 

Matters,  however,  were  in  such  confusion  in  Nica- 
ragua that  it  seemed  impossible  to  make  the  diplomatic 
connections  necessary  for  consulting  her  with  reference 
to  terms.  It  was  just  at  this  time  that  the  three  states 
of  Honduras,  Nicaragua,  and  Salvador  were  making  an 
effort  to  federate,  but  affairs  were  so  unstable  as  to 
force  Marcoleta  to  acknowledge  that  there  was  no 
government  which  he  could  properly  represent,  or  which 
could  properly  give  him  instructions ; "  and  Kerr,  the 
American  minister,  who  had  been  in  Nicaragua  for 
several  months,  reported  that  he  had  not  yet  been  able 
to  find  any  authority  to  which  he  could  present  his 
credentials."* 

But  upon  reflection  the  American  government  had 
decided  that  until  the  boundary  dispute  between  Nica- 
ragua and  Costa  Rica  was  settled,  and  until  it  was 
determined  just  where  the  proposed  canal  should  run, 
no  guarantee  of  sovereignty  over  the  canal  line  could 
be  given  to  Nicaragua;  for  such  a  guarantee,  should 
the  route  run  on  the  south  side  of  the  river — which  was 
claimed  by  Costa  Rica — would  only  complicate  diffi- 

*"  Curtis,  Daniel  Webster,  II,  59 j. 
"Webster,    Writings  and  Speeches.   Will,   525. 
'^  Curtis,  Daniel  Webster,  II,  593. 
"  Ibid.,  593-596. 

■"Webster,   Writings  and  Speeches,   X\'I,   636;    U.   S.   Docs.,   ser.   no. 
819,  doc.  25,  p.  55. 
«  Ibid. 


ATTEMPTS  AT  READJUSTMENT,  1850-18 52      125 

culties.'*  Hence,  as  a  canal  treaty  with  Nicaragua  must 
be  an  arrangement  of  the  indefinite  future,  the  friend- 
ship of  that  nation  was  not  now  so  eagerly  sought. 
This  fact,  as  well  as  the  urgency  for  the  settlement  of 
the  Mosquito  question  and  the  hopelessness  of  early 
restoration  of  diplomatic  relations  with  Nicaragua, 
made  Webster  willing  to  consider  terms,  independently 
of  that  state.  The  idea  now  was  to  reach  an  agreement 
satisfactory  to  the  British  and  American  governments, 
which  could  become  the  basis  for  a  quadripartite 
treaty." 

After  Webster  had  expressed  a  desire  to  come  to  an 
understanding  over  the  question,**  Granville,  on  January 
23,  1852,  instructed  Crampton  to  enter  into  a  discussion 
with  him,  and  outlined  various  plans  of  settlement  to 
be  proposed  to  the  American  secretary  of  state.  It 
was  the  desire  of  the  British  government,  Granville 
wrote,  that  the  whole  Mosquito  question  should  be  set- 
tled, and  especially  that  it  should  be  settled  in  such  a 
manner  as  to  secure  the  cordial  assent  and  good  will  of 
the  United  States.  The  only  stipulation  upon  which  the 
government  insisted  was  that  the  settlement  be  con- 
sistent with  British  honor.** 

But  the  change  which  almost  immediately  again  took 
place  in  the  Foreign  Office,  as  well  as  the  preoccupation 
of  Webster  with  other  matters,*"  prevented  any  definite 
progress  from  being  made  before  events  at  Greytown 
once  more  attracted  attention  to  that  place. 

*"  U.  S.  Docs.,  sen  no.  819,  doc.  25,  pp.  47-48. 
"  Webster,  Writings  and  Speeches,  XIV,  480. 

^  Pari.   Papers,    1856,   Corns.,    LX   "Correspondence   with   the   United 
States  respecting  Central  America",   117. 
^^  Ibid.,  124-126. 
^  Ibid.,  131,  143,  144,  146. 


126     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

The  difficulty  this  time  rose  from  the  instructions 
given  Commodore  Parker  before  his  departure  for 
Greytown.  These  had  stated  that  the  United  States 
acknowledged  no  right  in  the  government  or  vessels  of 
Great  Britain  to  exercise  any  police  or  supervision  over 
American  merchant  vessels  in  Nicaragua  or  elsewhere, 
out  of  British  dominions ;  on  the  contrary,  the  first 
article  of  the  convention  between  the  United  States  and 
Great  Britain  relative  to  Nicaragua,  signed  April  19, 
1850,  excluded  each  of  the  contracting  parties  from 
assuming  or  exercising  any  dominion  over  Nicaragua, 
Costa  Rica,  the  Mosquito  coast,  or  any  part  of  Central 
America.** 

This  view  of  the  matter  was  presented  by  Parker  to 
Captain  Fead,  who  in  turn  reported  it  to  his  govern- 
ment. Upon  receipt  of  Fead's  letter,  Granville  wrote 
in  an  injured  tone  to  Crampton  with  regard  to  Parker's 
language : 

Her  Majesty's  Government  cannot  admit  such  an  interpreta- 
tion of  the  Convention  of  the  19th  of  April,  by  which,  as  under- 
stood by  Her  Majesty's  Government,  Great  Britain  is  not 
precluded  from  protecting  the  Mosquitos  but  is  only  restricted 
from  occupying,  fortifying,  or  colonizing,  or  of  assuming  or 
exercising  any  dominion  over  the  Mosquito  Coast  or  any  part 
of  Central  America;  and  Her  Majesty's  Government  will  there- 
fore resist  any  attempt  on  the  part  of  Nicaragua  or  any  other 
Power  to  take  possession  of  Greytown,  or  of  any  portion  of  the 
Mosquito  territory,  until  some  arrangement  is  concluded 
between  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States." 

With  his  letter  Granville  inclosed  a  report  from  Sey- 
mour, showing  matters  to  be  in  a  critical  condition  at 
Greytown.    The  language  of  some  of  Parker's  officers 

"  U.  S.  Docs.,  ser.  no.  614,  doc.  6,  p.  4. 

"'  Pari.  Papers,  1856,  Corns.,  LX,  "  Correspondence  with  the  United 
States  respecting  Central  America  ",  127. 


ATTEMPTS  AT  READJUSTMENT,  1850-1852      127 

was  of  so  unfriendly  a  nature  as  to  cause  the  British 
officers  at  the  place  to  fear  that  they  would  further  a 
threatened  attack  on  the  port  by  the  Nicaraguans.  In 
consequence  of  these  demonstrations,  Seymour  had 
ordered  an  additional  vessel  to  Greytown.'' 

With  reference  to  this  situation,  Granville  stated  that 
in  order  to  maintain  a  good  understanding  between  the 
two  countries  it  was  desirable  that,  until  a  final  settle- 
ment could  be  reached,  a  provisional  agreement  be 
made,  by  which,  without  entering  into  any  question  of 
right  of  possession,  both  parties  should  recognize  the 
existing  government  of  Greytown  as  a  merely  de  facto 
body,  existing  there  for  the  benefit  of  commerce  and 
the  maintenance  of  order ;  and  that  in  accordance  with 
this  agreement  British  subjects  and  American  citizens 
at  Greytown  be  enjoined  to  respect  the  local  laws  and 
pay  the  local  port  dues,  and  the  commanders  of  British 
and  American  vessels  stationed  or  arriving  at  the  port 
be  instructed  to  enforce  respect  to  these  laws  and  regu- 
lations." 

The  view  given  by  Granville  as  to  the  bearing  of  the 
Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  upon  the  Mosquito  protectorate 
is  of  interest  because  it  is  the  first  expression  of  opinion 
upon  the  subject  exchanged  between  the  two  govern- 
ments and  is  a  slight  hint  of  the  long  and  bitter  discus- 
sions over  the  interpretation  of  the  treaty  which  were 
to  come  with  more  aggressive  administrations  in  Eng- 
land and  the  United  States.  But  at  this  time  no  discus- 
sion resulted,  for  when  Crampton  called  Webster's 
attention  to  the  matter,  the  Secretary  of  State  replied 
that  he  by  no  means  held  the  doctrine,  which,  from  the 
terms  of  the  Foreign  Secretary's  letter,  the  British 

o^Ibid.,  128.  ^Ibid.,  127-128. 


128     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

government  seemed  to  infer  was  that  held  by  the  Amer- 
ican government.  On  the  contrary,  he  said,  he  was 
"  well  aware  that  each  Government  still  held  its  own 
opinion  as  to  the  rights  of  Nicaragua  and  Mosquito  to 
Grey  town  "  and  that  it  was  for  the  purpose  of  remov-, 
ing  and  reconciling  these  recognized  differences  ofi 
opinion  that  he  was  engaged  in  negotiations  upon  the 
subject  with  the  British  minister.*"  Furthermore,  Web- 
ster received  with  favor  Granville's  proposal  to  recog- 
nize the  de  facto  government  at  Greytown.*"  Therefore, 
in  accordance  with  a  suggestion  from  Webster,  identi- 
cal instructions,  with  full  power  to  come  to  an  agree- 
ment and  execute  the  details  of  the  arrangement,  were 
sent  to  Parker  and  Seymour  by  their  respective  govern- 
ments.*' 

But  before  the  instructions  for  this  mutual  arrange- 
ment were  given,  another  event  took  place  at  the  storm- 
center,  which  threatened  further  to  embarrass  the 
situation.  On  February  28  there  met  in  San  Juan  a 
body  of  men  largely  composed  of  Americans — resident 
merchants  *'  and  adventurers,  pausing  on  their  way  to 
California.**  This  assemblage  passed  resolutions  ex- 
pressing a  desire  for  a  more  satisfactory  government 
than  that  existing  under  the  Anglo-Mosquito  authori- 
ties, and  indicating  the  determination  to  establish  a  new 
government  based  upon  power  to  be  obtained  from 
Nicaragua,  which  was  declared  to  be  the  rightful  owner 
of  the  territory.  In  accordance  with  the  resolutions,  a 
committee  of  fifteen  was  appointed  with  instructions  to 

"'^  Pari.   Papers,    1856,   Corns.,   LX,   "Correspondence   with   the    United 
States  respecting  Central  America  ",  134.  ] 

"^  Ibid.  '^  Ibid.,  134-137.  '^  Ibid.,   110-112,   139. 

•°  Ibid.,  137,  151. 


ATTEMPTS  AT  READJUSTMENT,  1850-1852      129 

proceed  to  Nicaragua  and  secure  a  charter  of  incor- 
poration/"" 

Crampton,  upon  learning  of  these  proceedings,  imme- 
diately realized  that  the  plans  of  the  Americans  could 
not  be  carried  into  effect  without  the  violent  expulsion 
of  the  existing  authorities  at  Greytown — an  event 
likely  to  cause  misunderstandings  or  collisions  between 
the  British  and  American  naval  officers  at  the  port,  and. 
consequently,  bad  feeling  between  their  governments/" 
Therefore,  he  promptly  communicated  with  Webster, 
and  the  two  agreed  upon  a  set  of  instructions  which 
was  sent  to  the  British  and  American  naval  officers  sta- 
tioned at  Greytown."^  These  instructions  were  similar 
to  those  recently  furnished  to  Parker  and  Seymour,^"' 
who  were  at  the  time  so  far  apart  that  it  would  be  long 
before  they  could  meet  and  come  to  an  agreement."" 
This  prompt  action  and  the  good  judgment  of  the  act- 
ing British  consul  at  Greytown  ""  apparently  convinced 
the  disaffected  Americans  that  they  could  not  count  on 
any  support  from  their  government,  and  caused  their 
plans  to  come  to  nothing.*"* 

But  the  increase  of  immigration  to  the  California 
gold  fields  and  the  popularity  of  the  Nicaragua  route 
had  in  four  years'  time  quite  changed  the  character  of 
the  population  of  Greytown,  as  well  as  greatly  added 
to  its  numbers.*"'  The  American  residents,  who  were 
the  most  numerous,"'  complained  of  British  influence 
and  attributed  the  difficulties  which  constantly  rose  in 
the  town,  not  to  Mosquito,  but  to  British  interference."' 
Therefore,  Green,  who  acted  as  British  consul  and  agent 
for  the  Mosquito  king,  and  was  in  the  latter  capacity 

^0^  Ibid.,  138-139.        ^'"■Ihid..  137.        ^"^  Ibid.         ^^Ibid.,  140-142. 
i«*/6trf.,  137.       i»5/W(i.,  150-152.       i»«7fc«d.,   151-152.        >»'/6td.,  169. 
^'>'Ibid.,  168.        '"»  Ibid.,   168-169. 

10 


130     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

chairman  of  the  town  council/"  decided  to  remove  the 
cause  of  friction  by  withdrawing  from  all  direct  inter- 
ference with  the  management  of  the  local  govern- 
ment/" He  was  very  probably  also  moved  to  this 
resolve  by  fear  of  another  attempt  such  as  that  made 
in  February  to  overthrow  Mosquito  sovereignty  at 
Greytown  and  establish  that  of  Nicaragua.  Conse- 
quently, on  April  i,  he  called  a  meeting  of  the  inhabi- 
tants and  transferred  to  them  the  power  of  self-govern- 
ment."^ The  result  was  the  establishment  of  a  free 
town  corresponding  in  a  small  way  to  the  German  cities 
of  Hamburg  or  Bremen."'  A  new  constitution  was 
formed,  and  under  it  new  officers  were  elected."*  The 
inhabitants,  who  preferred  a  government  of  their  own 
to  being  under  the  dominion  of  Nicaragua,  now  unani- 
mously expressed  a  dislike  for  that  state  and  declared 
their  intention  of  forcibly  resisting  any  attempt  of  the 
Nicaraguans  to  occupy  the  place."°  However,  they  had 
no  objection  to  the  nominal  supremacy  of  the  Mosquito 
king,  and  permitted  his  flag  to  fly  over  the  town."' 
While  the  accidental  discovery  of  gold  in  the  Cali- 
fornia Sierras  was  thus  causing  the  cessation  of  active 
British  interference  at  Greytown,  negotiations  for  the 
final  disposal  of  the  Mosquito  question  had  made  some 
headway.  At  Webster's  request,  Crampton  had  out- 
lined a  plan  for  the  settlement  of  the  dispute,  to  which 
the  British  government  would  agree.  This  provided 
for  the  cession  of  Greytown  and  a  district  to  the  north 
of  it  to  Nicaragua,  in  return  for  a  sum  of  money  to  be 
paid  to  the  Mosquitos ;    for  the  establishment  of  a 

^'^ Pari.  Papers,    1856,  Corns.,   LX,  "Correspondence  with  the   United 
States  respecting  Central  America  ",  168-169. 
"*/6»rf.  ^  Tbid..  169.  "*  Ibid..  168,  169. 

^*Ibid.,  169-173.       ^"Ibid..  169-170.       "''Ibid.,  168,  188. 


ATTEMPTS  AT  READJUSTMENT,  1850-1852      131 

definite  boundary  for  the  remainder  of  the  Mosquito 
territory  wherein  the  rights  of  the  Indians  were  to  be 
respected ;  and  for  the  settlement  of  the  boundary  dis- 
pute by  giving  to  Costa  Rica  the  district  of  Guanacaste 
and  all  territory  south  of  the  San  Juan,  together  with  a 
limited  right  of  navigation  of  the  river."'  After  a  con- 
ference upon  the  matter,  Webster  failed  to  approve 
of  the  arrangement,  and  seemed  inclined  to  the  cession 
of  Greytown  to  Nicaragua  without  an  equivalent,  as 
Nicaragua  was  without  funds ;  and  he  proposed  the 
recommendation  of  union  between  the  Nicaraguans  and 
Mosquitos,  the  latter  becoming  Nicaraguan  citizens. 
Crampton  on  his  part  objected  to  this  plan  as  inadvis- 
able and  inconsistent  with  the  position  which  the  British 
had  always  held  in  regard  to  Mosquito,  a  position  from 
which,  he  said,  Webster  must  feel  they  could  not  honor- 
ably recede."*  Finally  Webster  again  told  him  to  draw 
up  the  articles  in  a  manner  acceptable  to  the  British 
government,  and  to  add  such  improvements  and  condi- 
tions as  should  occur  to  him."'  Crampton  did  this,^ 
modifying  his  project  in  the  hope  of  meeting  the  most 
serious  objections  of  the  United  States.*^  This  project 
he  sent  to  his  government,  which,  after  making  some 
slight  modifications,  returned  the  articles  with  its  ap- 
proval.^ The  document  then  became  the  basis  of  a 
plan  of  settlement. 

There  is  no  evidence  that  in  the  negotiations  which 
followed  Webster  made  any  attempt  to  force  the  Brit- 
ish out  of  Central  America.  The  Fillmore  administra- 
tion restricted  its  interest  in  that  region  almost  wholly 

^■^  Ibid.,  142-143.        ^^Ibid.,  143.        ^^  Ibid.,  144. 
"»7fc»d.,    144-146.       ^  Ibid.,  144.        ^"^  Ibid.,  147-150. 


132     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

to  gaining  protection  for  the  transisthmian  canal,*^ 
though  it  had  no  intention  of  recognizing  the  Mosquito 
kingdom."*  The  British,  on  the  other  hand,  took  the 
same  attitude  as  during  the  negotiation  of  the  Clayton- 
Bulwer  treaty.  The  aim  was  to  effect  a  settlement 
entirely  satisfactory  to  the  United  States,  and  at  the 
same  time  to  save  what  the  British  government  called 
its  "  honour  ",  in  connection  with  the  Mosquito  pro- 
tectorate and  the  Mosquito  claims.  Great  Britain  no 
longer  harbored  selfish  designs  in  connection  with  her 
former  allies ;  but  it  was  necessary  that  the  Indians  be 
secured  from  the  possible  tyranny  of  Nicaragua.  The 
object  of  the  supplementary  project  was  to  effect  this, 
and  there  is  no  reason  to  doubt  that  the  British  intended 
to  withdraw  all  of  their  officials  from  the  IMosquito 
territory,  should  the  treaty,  of  which  the  project  was 
meant  to  become  a  basis,  be  ratified.^  However,  out  of 
regard  for  British  pride  no  concession  could  be  made 
to  the  Nicaraguan  government  which  could  possibly  be 
interpreted  as  an  acknowledgment  that  the  seizure  of 
San  Juan  had  been  unjustifiable,  or  that  the  claims  of 
Mosquito  sovereignty  and  independence  on  which  it 
had  been  based  were  a  mere  convenient  pretense.  With 
these  objects  in  view,  the  articles  were  worked  over, 
and,  after  various  changes  had  been  made,  they  were 
signed  by  the  negotiators,  on  April  30.  1852."'  The 
substance  of  the  arrangement  was  as  follows : 

( I )   Definite  boundaries  should  be  established  for  the 
Mosquitos,  who  were  to  relinquish  Greytown  and  a 

"^Webster,  Writings  and  Speeches,  XI\',  6j6. 
^Ibid..  471. 
^'■'^  See  above,  p.  io8. 

^'''' Pari.  Papers,    1856,   Corns.,   LX,  "Correspondence  witli   the   United 
States  respecting  Central  America  ",  158. 


ATTEMPTS  AT  READJUSTMENT,  1850-1852      133 

tract  of  territory  to  the  north  of  San  Juan  River  to 
Nicaragua.  In  return  for  this  cession,  the  Mosquitos 
were  to  have  for  three  years  the  net  receipts  of  all 
duties  levied  and  collected  at  Greytown,  at  the  rate  of 
ten  per  cent,  ad  valorem  on  all  goods  imported  into 
the  state.  The  protection  of  the  Indians  was  to  be 
secured  by  an  agreement  on  the  part  of  Nicaragua  not 
to  molest  them  within  their  territorial  reserve. 

(2)  Nothing  in  the  preceding  article  should  prevent 
the  Mosquitos  from  voluntarily  incorporating  them- 
selves with  the  Nicaraguans,  in  which  case  they  were 
to  be  on  the  same  basis  as  other  citizens  of  Nicaragua. 
Greytown  was  to  be  established  as  a  free  port. 

(3)  Boundaries  were  to  be  defined  between  Nicara- 
gua and  Costa  Rica,  giving  to  the  latter  all  of  the 
territory  south  of  the  San  Juan,  and  limited  privileges 
of  navigation  in  this  river. 

Articles  four  to  seven  contained  provisions  intended 
to  facilitate  the  construction  of  the  canal  or  to  govern 

•,  127 

its  use. 

As  neither  Molina  nor  Marcoleta  had  been  consulted 
regarding  this  last  plan  of  arrangement,^  the  negotia- 
tors attached  to  it  a  statement  that  the  propositions,  so 
far  as  they  pertained  to  the  governments  of  Costa  Rica 
and  Nicaragua,  were  merely  advisory  and  recommen- 
datory ;  but  their  immediate  consideration  by  those 
governments  was  earnestly  invoked.  Furthermore, 
unless  these  states  promptly  agreed  to  the  general  basis 

^'  Ibid.,  155-158. 

^'  Molina  had  been  ignored  because  the  terms  he  demanded  for  land 
on  the  Costa  Rican  side  of  the  San  Juan,  to  be  used  by  the  canal  com- 
pany, were  considered  unreasonable  by  Webster.  Marcoleta  had  re- 
mained without  powers  or  instructions  until  the  project  was  practically 
complete.     U.  S.  Docs. ,^ser.  no.  819,  doc.  25,  pp.  64,  66. 


134     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

of  the  arrangement  and  adopted  proper  measures  for 
carrying  it  into  effect,  the  British  and  American  gov- 
ernments would  immediately  agree  between  themselves 
upon  such  measures  as  they  should  deem  advisable  to 
carry  into  full  execution  the  terms  of  the  treaty  of 
April  19,  1850."' 

Since  it  was  very  desirable  that  the  whole  affair  be 
terminated  before  the  American  Congress  adjourned, 
Webster  suggested  that  the  proposals  be  sent  directly 
to  Central  America  for  submission  to  the  governments 
concerned.  Crampton  agreed  to  this,  although  the 
revised  draft  had  not  yet  been  approved  by  his  govern- 
ment. Accordingly,  it  was  decided  that  Kerr,  who  was 
at  Nicaragua,  should  present  the  project  to  that  govern- 
ment, and  that  a  special  agent,  Robert  Walsh,  should 
be  sent  to  Costa  Rica  to  obtain  her  consent.  In  behalf 
of  the  British  government,  the  proposals  should  be  pre- 
sented to  both  Costa  Rica  and  Nicaragua  by  Wyke,  the 
successor  of  Chatfield,  who  had  some  time  before 
arrived  in  Washington  on  his  way  to  his  post.  At  the 
suggestion  of  President  Fillmore,  he  had  awaited  the 
completion  of  the  project  in  order  that  he  might  pro- 
ceed to  Central  America  in  company  with  the  American 
special  agent,  and  thus  make  apparent  to  the  Nica- 
raguans  that  the  British  and  American  governments 
were  in  harmony  regarding  the  matter.""  The  plan  was 
carried  out,  and  Walsh  and  Wyke  sailed  from  New 
York  on  May  10,  intending  to  proceed  first  to  Costa 
Rica."' 

Some  time  before  this  Webster  had  sent  Kerr  careful 
instructions  for  the  presentation  of  the  subject  to  the 

"^^^  Pari.  Papers,   1856,  Coins.,  vol.  LX,  "Correspondence  with   United 
States  respecting  Central  America  ",  157-158. 
"'>  Ibid.,  146.  ^'^  Ibid.,  159- 


ATTEMPTS  AT  READJUSTMENT,  1850-1852      135 

Nicaraguan  government.  In  anticipation  of  probable 
objection  to  payment  for  the  return  of  Greytown,  Kerr 
was  directed  to  point  out  that  the  port  had  not  been  in 
Nicaraguan  possession  since  January,  1848,  when  Nica- 
raguan authority  was  forcibly  expelled.  The  hopeless- 
ness of  inducing  the  British  government  to  agree  to 
the  cession  without  equivalent  was  also  to  be  hinted  at ; 
but  Kerr  was  to  assure  Nicaragua  that  by  agreeing  to 
pay  the  compensation  the  Nicaraguan  government 
would  by  no  means  be  chargeable  with  inconsistency 
or  dishonor,  but  would  only  be  yielding  to  the  stronger 
party,  a  frequent  occurrence  in  the  world's  history.^ 
Such  arguments  were  not  likely  to  appeal  to  the  proud 
Nicaraguans,  but  they  were  the  strongest  that  Webster 
had  to  offer."" 

Kerr  used  his  best  efforts,  but  the  Nicaraguans 
looked  upon  the  project  with  anything  but  favor.  Vari- 
ous reasons  prompted  their  attitude.  Naturally,  they 
objected  to  giving  any  sort  of  compensation  for  the 
return  of  the  port  which  they  had  repeatedly  and 
emphatically  declared  to  be  their  own.  To  make  this 
objection  more  decided  was  the  fact  that  Castellon, 
who  had  won  prominence  by  his  stand  on  the  claims 
regarding  Greytown,  was  now  secretary  of  foreign 
affairs.*"  Moreover,  the  Nicaraguans  had  begun  to 
feel  that  they  had  been  betrayed  by  the  American 
government,"'  which  seemed  to  have  gone  over  to  the 
enemy.  The  hopes  held  out  by  the  Monroe  doctrine, 
reflected  in  the  speeches  of  Hise  and  Squier,  had  not 
been  fulfilled.  Instead,  the  American  government  had 
united  with  the  British  in  recommending  settlement  on 

1^  U.  S.  Docs.,  ser.  no.  819,  doc.  25,  pp.  77-79. 

'^^  Ibid.,  97-99.        ^^  Ibid.,  p.  93.  ^^  Ibid.,  pp.   loo-ioi. 


136     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

terms  humiliating  to  Nicaraguan  pride  ;  and  the  recom- 
mendation had  been  reinforced  by  a  threat/"  Further- 
more, American  citizens  had  been  guilty  of  high-handed 
conduct  in  Nicaragua.  The  canal  company  had  usurped 
powers  not  granted  by  the  contract ;  *"  San  Juan  had 
been  converted  into  a  free  city,  through  the  influence  of 
North  Americans  ;  and  the  United  States,  in  co-opera- 
tion with  Great  Britain,  continued  to  protect  the  place/" 
As  an  indication  of  its  feelings,  the  Nicaraguan  govern- 
ment on  July  20,  a  few  days  after  the  proposals  were 
presented,  issued  a  decree  which  contained  a  refusal  to 
consider  such  an  arrangement  as  that  recommended,  an 
expression  of  a  desire  for  settlement  by  impartial  arbi- 
tration, and  a  declaration  that  the  state  of  Nicaragua 
solemnly  protested  against  all  foreign  interference  in 
matters  of  her  administration  and  against  the  use  of 
force  to  restrain  her  will  and  her  rights."' 

Wyke,  having  promptly  secured  the  consent  of  the 
Costa  Rican  government  to  the  project,***  proceeded  to 
Managua,  the  Nicaraguan  capital,  which  he  reached  on 
July  26,"'  but  a  few  days  after  the  decree  had  been 
issued.  Kerr  informed  him  of  his  lack  of  success ;  '** 
Wyke  nevertheless  presented  the  proposed  arrange- 
ment in  the  name  of  his  government,  but  was  met  with 
the  answer  that  "  the  sacrifices  demanded  of  Nicaragua 
were  too  great  for  that  Government  ever  to  make,  and 
that  they  were  ready  to  take  the  consequences,  what- 
ever they  might  be,  of  refusing  to  come  to  the  proposed 
arrangement."  "' 

i3«  U.  S.  Docs.,  ser.  no.  819,  doc.  25,  p.   123. 
^^''  Ibid.,  pp.   loo-ioi.  '"^  Ibid.,  pp.  loo-ioi,  104-106. 

^^*  Ibid.,  pp.   103-104.  ^*'' Ibid.,  pp.  91-92. 

^*^  Pari.  Papers,   1856,   Corns.,   LX,   "Correspondence  with   the   I'nited 
States  respecting  Central  .America  ",  191. 
1"  Ibid.  '"  Ibid. 


ATTEMPTS  AT  READJUSTMENT,  1S50-1852      i37 

Thus,  after  negotiations  extending  over  a  period  of 
two  years,  all  attempts  to  carry  out  the  terms  of  the 
Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  had  proved  failures.  Yet  it  is 
by  no  means  certain  that  at  this  time  any  arrangement 
based  upon  that  ambiguous  document  could  have  been 
made  w^hich  v^^ould  have  been  acceptable  to  all  of  the 
parties  concerned.  Though  the  British  were  anxious 
for  a  definite  settlement,  in  view  of  the  concessions 
which  they  had  gained  from  the  United  States  by 
means  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty,  it  seems  hkely 
that  even  a  much  more  aggressive  administration  than 
that  in  power  would  have  found  it  difficult  to  induce 
them  at  this  time  to  give  up  Greytown  without  com- 
pensation to  the  Mosquitos.  England  most  probably 
would  have  met  any  American  attempt  to  secure  such 
terms  by  a  studied  policy  of  evasion. 

Yet  it  seems  clear  that  the  American  negotiator  did 
not  do  his  best  to  effect  a  speedy  and  satisfactory  settle- 
ment, which  would  secure  for  Nicaragua  such  an 
arrangement  as  that  state  had  at  an  earlier  date  been 
led  to  expect.  Though  Webster  for  a  time  firmly  in- 
sisted upon  being  guided  in  the  negotiations  by  the 
wishes  of  Nicaragua,  he  later,  as  has  been  seen, 
retreated  from  this  stand,  though  probably  from  justi- 
fiable reasons,  and  negotiated  a  project  of  arrangement 
which  was  a  virtual  disavowal  of  the  earlier  attitude 
of  the  American  government.  The  project  went  fur- 
ther than  the  much-criticised  treaty,  the  spirit  of  which 
it  was  intended  to  carry  out;  for  while  the  Clayton- 
Bulwer  treaty  tacitly  recognized  the  existence  of  a  pro- 
tectorate in  Central  America,  the  Webster- Crampton 
arrangement  was,  by  its  terms,  practically  an  acknowl- 


138     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

edgment  of  Mosquito  sovereignty/"  This  project 
marks  the  low  tide  of  American  interest  in  Central 
America  during  the  period  between  1850  and  i860, 
and  the  Webster-Fillmore  administration  which  made 
it  possible  covers  the  period  when  British  influence 
most  nearly  dominated  the  policy  of  the  United  States 
in  that  region."" 

i«  After  the  departure  of  Walsh  and  Wyke  for  Central  America,  word 
came  from  Malmesbury  directing  various  changes  in  the  project.  Upon 
learning  that  these  modifications  could  not  be  introduced  before  the 
proposals  should  be  submitted  to  Costa  Rica  and  Nicaragua,  the  Foreign 
Secretary  wrote:  "  If  I  were  not  conscious  of  the  great  difficulties  which 
you  must  have  encountered  in  inducing  the  United  States  Government 
to  enter  into  any  agreement  at  all  by  which  they  should  admit  the 
independence  of  the  Mosquitos,  whose  very  existence  as  a  nation  the 
United  States,  as  well  as  the  Central  American  States,  have  hitherto 
constantly  denied,  I  should  be  unable  to  conceal  the  regret  I  feel  that 
so  wide  a  departure  had  been  admitted  from  the  original  Project."  Pari 
Papers,  1856,  Corns.,  LX,  "  Correspondence  with  the  United  States  re- 
specting Central  America  ",  165. 

""  An  effort  was  made  to  keep  secret  the  terms  of  this  project,  but 
Marcoleta,  to  whom  a  copy  was  loaned,  angry  at  being  left  out  of  the 
discussion,  permitted  them  to  be  published  in  a  newspaper.  U  S  Docs 
ser.  no.  819,  doc.  25,  p.  79;  Dept.  of  State,  Inst,  Am.  States,  vol  15' 
p.  59-  They  appeared  in  the  North  American  and  United  States  Gazette 
of  June  28,  1852,  by  which  they  were  severely  criticised.  The  Clayton- 
Bulwer  treaty,  said  the  article,  was  made  for  the  express  purpose  of 
driving  the  British  out  of  Central  America,  and  of  compelling  the 
relinquishment  of  the  Mosquito  protectorate.  The  present  scheme  of 
settlement  was  a  surrender  of  the  American  policy  on  this  continent; 
It  admitted  England  as  protector  of  the  Mosquito  Indians.  Let  the 
Senate  look  to  it. 


CHAPTER  V. 

The  Bay  Islands  Colony  and  the  New  Interpre- 
tation   OF    THE    ClAYTON-BuLWER    TrEATY, 

1852-1854. 

While  the  English  and  American  negotiators,  in  a 
spirit  of  friendly  understanding,  had  been  vainly  trying 
to  settle  the  Mosquito  question,  trouble  was  brewing  in 
another  quarter.  On  March  20,  1852,  by  royal  procla- 
mation, Ruatan,  Bonacca,  and  four  neighboring  islands 
were  erected  into  the  British  "  Colony  of  the  Bay 
Islands  " ;  and  thus  Clayton's  fears  regarding  the  evil 
possibilities  of  the  word  "  dependencies  "  in  the  Belize 
declaration  were  realized.  This  act  eventually  led  both 
the  British  and  American  governments  to  assume  ex- 
treme and  decided  attitudes  towards  the  Clayton- 
Bulwer  treaty  and  caused  the  Mosquito  question  to 
develop  into  the  more  complicated  and  dangerous  Cen- 
tral American  question.  In  view  of  this  fact,  it  is 
desirable  to  determine,  if  possible,  the  motives  of  the 
British  government  in  its  relations  with  the  Bay 
Islands. 

The  later  interest  of  the  British  government  in  the 
islands,  like  its  interest  in  the  port  and  river  of  San 
Juan,  rose  chiefly  from  a  fear  that  they  might  be  mon- 
opolized by  some  other  government  in  connection  with 
a  transisthmian  highway,  and,  in  consequence,  British 
commercial  and  political  power  be  crippled.  The  most 
dangerous  rival,  obviously,  was  the  United  States ;  and 

139 


140     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

the  bold  and  rapid  advance  of  that  nation  towards  the 
southwest  gave  very  vaHd  grounds  for  suspicion.  The 
aggressions  of  the  British  upon  the  Bay  Islands  pre- 
vious to  1850,  it  will  be  remembered,  kept  pace  with 
American  territorial  expansion. 

There  were  two  important  differences,  however, 
between  the  attitude  of  the  British  government  towards 
the  San  Juan  route  and  towards  Ruatan,  with  its  desir- 
able harbors.  The  former  could  be  made  neutral  and 
of  equal  benefit  to  all  nations ;  but  this  could  scarcely 
be  done  in  the  case  of  the  latter.  After  the  dissolution 
of  the  Central  American  confederation,  it  seemed 
hardly  likely  that,  should  the  canal  be  built,  the  island 
would  remain  under  the  sovereignty  of  the  weak  Hon- 
duran  republic.  Instead,  it  was  almost  certain  to  be 
seized  by  some  strong  commercial  power.  Moreover, 
though  the  British  government  realized  that  the  United 
States  would  never  permit  any  foreign  monopoly  of  the 
canal  route,  there  was  no  particular  reason  to  believe 
that  a  similar  stand  would  be  taken  with  regard  to  the 
Bay  Islands,  especially  as  they  had  been  kept  pretty 
well  out  of  the  early  discussion  preceding  the  formation 
of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty.  Some  such  thoughts 
probably  determined  the  British  government  quietly  to 
maintain  its  hold  upon  the  islands ;  and  the  statement 
which  Bulwer  handed  to  Clayton  at  the  time  of  ratifi- 
cation, containing  as  it  did  the  reference  to  "  depend- 
encies ",*  was  undoubtedly  meant  to  save  the  islands 
from  the  terms  of  the  treaty. 

But  in  view  of  the  unwillingness  of  the  nation  to 
undergo  further  expense   for  the  protection  of  new 

^  It  will  be  remembered  that  tlie  Hay  Islands  were  governed  to  some 
extent  from  Relize. 


BAY  ISLANDS  COLONY,  1852-1854  141 

colonies/  the  British  government  had  discouraged  the 
settlement  of  British  subjects  on  the  islands.'  The  aim 
of  the  cabinet  seems  to  have  been  to  hold  the  islands, 
more  especially  Ruatan,  against  all  intruders  until  the 
canal  should  be  built,  when  they  should  be  declared  a 
British  possession,  and  become  an  important  commer- 
cial station  on  the  way  to  the  Pacific.  But  in  spite  of 
discouragement  from  their  government,  many  British 
subjects  took  up  their  residence  on  the  islands,  and, 
evidently  at  the  instigation  of  British  agents  in  Central 
America,*  sent  repeated  petitions  to  London,  asking  for 
protection."  This  situation,  as  well  as  the  compromis- 
ing attitude  of  Clayton  towards  the  Bay  Islands  while 
the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  was  before  the  Senate,  and 
the  fact  that  the  Webster-Fillmore  administration  had 
been  primarily  interested  in  guaranteeing  the  canal 
route  and  had  seemed  indifferent  to  British  aggressions 
in  other  parts  of  Central  i\merica,  led  directly  to  the 
proclamation  of  the  Bay  Islands  colony. 

What  would  have  been  the  American  attitude 
towards  this  act  had  the  Whigs  won  in  the  election  of 
1852  may  well  be  left  to  conjecture;  but  it  was  very 
evident  from  the  first  that  the  Democrats,  whose  ambi- 
tious plans  had  been  interrupted  by  a  Whig  adminis- 
tration, would  not  passively  acquiesce  in  such  an 
arrangement.  Harbingers  of  coming  difficulty  ap- 
peared before  the  old  administration  went  out.  A 
newspaper  announcement  regarding  the  new  British 

^  Colonial  Office  to  Greaves,  Jan.   18,  1849,  C.  O.,  Hond.,  vol.  78. 

'Lord  Grey  to  Sir  Charles  Grey,  April  14,  185 1,  ibid.,  vol.  80,  no.  iii. 

*  Squier,  Notes  on  Central  America,  375-376;  Michell,  "  Island  of 
Ruatan  ",  in  United  Service  Magazine,  1850,  II,  S44-S4S. 

'Colonial  Office  to  Greaves,  Jan.  18,  1849,  C.  C,  Hond.,  vol.  78;  Sir 
Charles  Grey  to  Lord  Grey,  Dec.  11,  1850,  ibid.,  vol.  80,  no.  33;  Lord 
Grey  to  Sir  Charles  Grey,  April  14,  185 1,  ibid.,  no.  iii. 


142     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

colony  had  attracted  attention  in  the  United  States ;  ° 
consequently,  shortly  after  Congress  met  in  December, 
the  Senate  carried  a  resolution,  offered  by  Cass  of 
Michigan,  requesting  the  President  to  communicate 
any  information  which  he  might  possess  respecting  the 
establishment  of  a  new  British  colony  in  Central  Amer- 
ica, together  with  a  statement  of  what  measures,  if  any, 
had  been  taken  by  the  Executive  to  prevent  the  viola- 
tion of  the  treaty  between  the  United  States  and  Great 
Britain,  which  provided  that  neither  party  should 
"  occupy,  or  fortify,  or  colonize,  or  assume  dominion 
over  Nicaragua,  Costa  Rica,  the  Mosquito  Coast,  or 
any  part  of  Central  America  ".' 

The  President  stated  in  his  reply  of  a  few  days  later 
that  no  information  of  the  character  requested  had  been 
received  by  the  State  Department/  But  with  the  mes- 
sage were  inclosed  Palmerston's  declaration  regarding 
Belize  and  the  notes  exchanged  by  Clayton  and  Bulwer 
with  regard  to  it.'  Thus,  for  the  first  time,  the  declara- 
tion became  known  to  the  Senate  as  a  whole. 

This  at  once  produced  an  attack  on  Taylor's  adminis- 
tration in  general,  and  particularly  on  his  secretary  of 
state,  who  was  charged  with  willfully  concealing  the 
correspondence.  Cass  and  other  Democrats  now  de- 
clared emphatically  that  had  they  understood  that  the 
treaty  was  not  meant  to  apply  to  Belize  they  would 
never  have  voted  for  it.  His  object  in  voting  for  the 
treaty,  Cass  stated,  had  been  to  free  Central  America 

'Travis,  Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty,  141.  A  very  caustic  article  upon 
the  subject,  written  by  Squier,  appeared  in  the  Democratic  Review  for 
November-December,  1852. 

''Pari.  Papers,  1856,  Corns.,  LX,  "Correspondence  with  the  United 
States  respecting  Central  America",  201-202,  205. 

*  Ibid.,  205.  '  Ibid.,  206-207. 


BAY  ISLANDS  COLONY,  1852-1854  143 

from  all  British  influence.  In  view  of  the  declaration, 
the  British  government  had  far  better  grounds  for  its 
supposed  actions  than  he  had  at  first  believed/" 

The  defense  of  the  administration  was  assumed  by 
Seward,  among  others,  and  he  defended  Clayton  from 
the  charges  brought  against  him,  showing  that  the 
opposition  could  hardly  have  been  so  ignorant  of  the 
intentions  of  the  treaty,  immediately  after  ratification, 
as  they  pretended.  The  main  object  of  the  treaty,  the 
defense  declared,  had  been  the  building  of  the  canal, 
and  the  aim  had  been  merely  to  limit  the  encroachments 
of  the  British  within  the  five  republics  of  Central  Amer- 
ica, of  which  Belize  was  not  a  part." 

This  debate,  and  those  following  Clayton's  election 
to  Congress  as  senator  from  Delaware,  were  of  a  very 
bitter  nature;  and  from  an  attack  upon  the  Whig 
administration  they  soon  changed  to  a  denunciation 
of  Great  Britain.  They  pointed  out  that  though  more 
ithan  two  years  had  elapsed  since  the  ratification  of  the 
itreaty,  British  relations  in  Central  America  had  under- 
gone practically  no  change,  and  charged  the  British 
government  with  violating  the  terms  of  compact." 

Throughout  the  debates,  the  extreme  Democrats 
maintained  that  the  intention  of  the  treaty  had  been  to 
remove  all  British  influence  from  Central  America, 
Belize  included.  These  claims,  though  not  without 
foundation  in  the  words  of  the  treaty  itself,  were  evi- 
dently more  extravagant  than  those  held  by  the  same 
members  at  the  time  when  the  treaty  was  completed. 
The  change  was  probably  due  partly  to  the  fact  that 

'"  Cotij/.  Globe,  32  Cong.,  2  sess.,  237-238;  33  Cong.,  i  sess..  Appendix, 
61-72. 

'^^  Ihid.,  32  Cong.,  2  sess.,  247,  266-272,  414-416. 

^^  Ibid.,  2  and  3  sess..  Appendix,  245,  247-256,  257-279,  284-290. 


144     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

the  canal  company  had  failed  to  fulfill  its  contract;" 
and  thus  the  building  of  the  canal,  which  it  had  been 
hoped  would  be  begun  immediately,  was  indefinitely 
postponed.  Naturally,  therefore,  interest  was  shifted 
from  the  theoretical  canal  to  the  actual  British  en- 
croachments. The  bitterness  of  feeling  in  the  Senate, 
caused  by  the  reported  British  colonization  of  the  Bay 
Islands,  was  undoubtedly  also  increased  by  the  recent 
revelation  of  British  efforts  to  thwart  American  de- 
signs in  Cuba.  While  extending  her  own  territory  by 
direct  violation  of  treaty  engagements,  Great  Britain, 
in  co-operation  with  France,  had  tried  to  induce  the 
United  States  to  enter  into  a  tripartite  treaty,  guaran- 
teeing Cuba  to  Spain.  The  proposal  had  been  em- 
phatically refused  by  the  Fillmore  administration,  but 
resentment  at  British  interference  lingered." 

The  President's  message  in  reply  to  the  Senate  reso- 
lution was  referred  to  the  Committee  on  Foreign  Rela- 
tions, which  was  also  instructed  to  determine  what 
measures,  if  any,  should  be  taken  regarding  the  Belize' 
declaration."  In  its  report  the  committee  stated  that  it 
had  obtained  unofficial  information,  which  appeared  tO' 
be  true,  regarding  the  supposed  new  British  colony  in: 
Central  America,  and  had  proceeded  with  its  investiga- 
tion as  if  the  information  were  official.  The  committee 
accordingly  reported  that  the  Bay  Islands  formed  a  part 
of  the  republic  of  Honduras,  and  hence  were  a  part 
of  Central  America ;   consequently,  any  occupation  or 

^^  Pari.  Papers,  1856,  Corns.,  LX,  "Correspondence  with  the  United 
States  respecting  Central  America",  214-216. 

^■' Schouler,  History  of  the   United  States,  V,  251-232. 
"  U.  S.  Docs.,  ser.  no.  671,  doc.  407,  p.   i. 


BAY  ISLANDS  COLONY,  1852-1854  145 

colonization  of  them  would  be  a  violation  of  the  treaty 
of  April  19,  1850." 

As  regarded  Belize,  the  committee  offered  the 
decided  opinion  that  the  settlement,  as  defined  by  the 
treaties  with  Spain,  lay  within  the  territory  of  the 
Guatemalan  republic,  and  therefore  also  formed  a  part 
of  Central  America.  And  it  further  stated  that,  should 
this  opinion  be  correct,  while  it  was  not  prepared  to 
say  that  the  treaty  of  1850  would  require  the  abandon- 
ment of  those  settlements  by  Great  Britain,  yet  the 
United  States  government  would  have  just  cause  of 
complaint  against  any  extension  of  the  boundaries 
beyond  those  prescribed  by  Spain,  or  as  further  allowed 
by  the  republic  where  they  might  be  found ;  and  that 
in  any  manner  to  enlarge  or  change  the  character  of  the 
settlements  by  any  mode  of  jurisdiction  would  be  a 
violation  of  the  treaty."  Furthermore,  even  should  the 
settlements  be  found  later  to  be  outside  of  Central 
America,  and  thus  not  come  within  the  strict  engage- 
ments of  the  treaty,  yet  any  colonies  or  other  perma- 
nent establishments  erected  there  by  Great  Britain  or 
any  other  European  power  must  necessarily  excite  the 
most  anxious  concern  of  the  American  government, 
and  would,  if  persisted  in,  "  lead  to  consequences  of 
most  unpleasant  character  "." 

As  to  the  resolution  of  the  Senate  with  reference  to 
Belize,  the  committee  reported  that  the  declaration  of 
the  British  government  and  the  reply  made  to  it  by  the 
American  secretary  of  state  imported  nothing  more 
than  an  admission  on  the  part  of  the  two  governments, 
or  their  functionaries,  at  the  time  of  the  exchange  of 
ratifications,  that  nothing  contained  in  the  treaty  was 

"7i>td.,  p.  17.         ^'  Ibid.         ^Ibid. 
II 


146    ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

to  be  considered  as  affecting  the  title  or  existing  rights 
of  Great  Britain  to  the  English  settlements  in  Honduras 
Bay,  and,  consequently,  that  no  measures  were  neces- 
sary on  the  part  of  the  Senate  because  of  such  declara- 
tion and  reply." 

This  report  was  plainly  a  sharp  return  to  Monroe- 
doctrine  principles  with  reference  to  Central  America, 
and  it  was  a  strong  indication  of  the  poHcy  to  be  pur- 
sued by  the  incoming  administration. 

The  stir  created  in  Congress  by  the  rumors  of  a  new 
colony  in  Central  America  and  by  the  presentation  of 
the  Belize  correspondence  quickly  became  known  to  the 
British  government,  but  that  government  seemed  un- 
moved by  the  attack  upon  it,  and  determined  to  pursue 
a  conciliatory  policy.  In  fact,  it  rather  appears  as  if 
the  policy  became  more  conciliatory  in  consequence  of 
American  criticism,  for  two  days  after  the  receipt  of  a 
despatch  from  Crampton,  reporting  the  Cass  resolu- 
tion,*" Russell,  now  foreign  secretary,  wrote  to  Cramp- 
ton  offering  terms  for  the  settlement  of  the  Mosquito 
question.  Conditions  had  so  changed,  he  explained, 
since  the  assumption  of  the  Mosquito  protectorate  that 
the  British  now  no  longer  had  any  interest  in  the 
Indians  other  than  that  derived  from  an  honorable 
regard  for  their  old  connection  with  them.  In  conse- 
quence of  this  change,  the  British  government  had  for 
several  years  vainly  tried  to  suit  its  engagements  to  the 
altered  circumstances.  Now  he  suggested  that  an 
agreement  be  made  by  the  British  and  American  gov- 
ernments with  the  authorities  at  Greytown,  making  that 

"  U.  S.  Docs.,  ser.  no.  671,  doc.  407,  p.   17. 

^^  Pari.  Papers,  1856,  Corns.,  LX,  "Correspondence  with  the  United 
States  respecting  Central  America",  200-201,  204-214,  217,  222-235. 


BAY  ISLANDS  COLONY,  1852-1854  H7 

place  a  free  and  independent  port,  after  the  payment 
of  proper  indemnity  to  the  Indians.  Plans  for  the  pro- 
tection of  the  Mosquitos  were  also  offered.  In  conclu- 
sion, the  Foreign  Secretary  added  that  though  it  was 
the  intention  of  the  British  government  to  do  all  that 
honor  and  humanity  demanded  in  behalf  of  the  Mos- 
quitos, it  intended  to  adhere  strictly  to  the  treaty  of 
1850,  and  not  to  assume  any  sovereignty,  directly  or 
indirectly,  in  Central  America.^ 

In  a  letter  written  later  on  the  same  day  Russell 
referred  to  the  plans  already  outlined  and  expressed 
the  desire  of  the  British  government  to  make  Mosquito 
a  reality  instead  of  a  fiction.  He  acknowledged  that 
while  Greytown  was  virtually  a  possession  and  Mos- 
quito a  dependency  of  Great  Britain,  it  was  not  un- 
natural that  the  United  States  should  have  looked  upon 
that  state  of  things  with  jealousy  and  aversion,  and 
should  have  sided  with  Nicaragua ;  this,  however,  had 
all  been  changed  by  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty,  and  the 
great  question  now  was  how  to  turn  the  Mosquito 
country  to  the  best  account  for  the  whole  world. 
Therefore  Crampton  was  instructed  to  present  the 
matter  in  this  light  to  the  American  secretary  of  state, 
explaining  that  honor  required  the  British  government 
to  provide  liberally  and  permanently  for  the  Indians, 
but  that,  this  point  being  secured,  it  had  no  objection 
to  arranging  with  the  United  States  for  insuring  the 
more  rapid  settlement  and  colonization  of  the  Mosquito 
territory,  and  for  establishing  its  future  administration. 
Once  established,  the  new  state  would  soon  become 
independent  of  both  Great  Britain  and  the  United 
States,  and  probably  soon  be  able  to  protect  itself.'" 

^  Ibid.,  202-203.         ^^  Ibid.,  203-204. 


148     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

These  proposals,  it  will  be  noted,  utterly  disregarded 
the  rights  of  Nicaragua  and  were  in  conformity  with 
the  threat  contained  in  the  Webster-Crampton  project, 
to  ignore  the  Central  American  states  concerned, 
should  they  refuse  to  accept  the  project  as  a  basis  of 
settlement. 

But  the  suggestions  of  Russell  met  with  no  favor 
from  Everett,  who  upon  Webster's  death  had  become 
secretary  of  state.  In  a  communication  to  the  Presi- 
dent, Everett  declared  it  more  advisable  to  attempt  to 
secure  Nicaragua's  acceptance  of  the  Webster-Fillmore 
arrangement,  than  to  resort  to  terms  less  favorable  to 
her.^'  However,  as  the  Fillmore  administration  was 
almost  ended,  no  measures  were  taken,  in  consequence 
of  Russell's  proposals,  to  settle  the  dispute  at  that  time. 

The  character  of  the  claims  made  in  the  Senate  for 
the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  soon  convinced  the  British 
government  that  in  order  to  avoid  serious  misapprehen- 
sion it  was  very  desirable  that  the  American  govern- 
ment be  given  clearly  to  understand  the  British  view 
of  the  treaty,  and  the  conduct  which  the  British  govern- 
ment intended  to  pursue  in  regard  to  it.  Consequently, 
on  May  27,  Clarendon,  who  as  Russell's  successor  was 
again  in  the  Foreign  Office,  wrote  to  Crampton  with 
reference  to  the  matter.  Great  Britain,  he  declared, 
intended  to  observe  religiously  all  of  the  engagements 
of  the  treaty,  but  she  had  nowhere  in  that  agreement 
renounced,  and  never  had  intended  to  renounce,  "the 
full  and  absolute  right  which  she  possessed  over  her 
own  lawful  territories  in  Central  America.  Neither 
had  she  renounced  the  protection  which  she  had  for 

^'^  Pari.  Papers,  1856,  Corns.,  LX,  "Correspondence  with  the  United 
States  respecting  Central  America",  218-222. 


BAY  ISLANDS  COLONY,  1852-1S54  149 

centuries  afforded,  and  still  afforded,  to  the  Mosquito 
territory.  The  Foreign  Secretary  then  reverted  to  the 
efforts  which  had  been  made  by  the  British  government 
to  adjust  matters  in  Central  America,  asserting  that  it 
was  still  ready  and  desirous  to  effect  a  settlement.  He 
added,  however,  that  until  such  arrangement  was  made 
his  government  could  not  abandon  its  present  position, 
nor  permit  either  Nicaragua  or  Honduras  to  assert  or 
attempt  to  establish  by  force  a  right  of  possession 
which  the  British  government  had  always  denied,  and 
still  denied." 

Crampton  made  known  this  attitude  to  Marcy, 
Pierce's  secretary  of  state,  who  replied  that  he  was  not 
yet  able  to  say  what  would  be  the  opinion  of  the  Ameri- 
can government  in  regard  to  the  interpretation  of  the 
treaty,  but  that  the  matter  was  then  being  considered 
by  the  cabinet.  He  added  that  Buchanan,  who  had 
recently  been  appointed  United  States  minister  to  Eng- 
land, would  probably  be  instructed  upon  the  subject 
and  empowered  to  discuss  it  with  the  British  foreign 
secretary.^ 

Buchanan,  who  as  Polk's  secretary  of  state  had  taken 
much  interest  in  the  Mosquito  question,  now  shrewdly 
planned  for  the  settlement  of  the  larger  Central  Ameri- 
can question  into  which  it  had  grown.  On  May  29  he 
wrote  to  Marcy  and  revealed  his  plan.  It  provided  that 
the  treaty  with  Great  Britain  regarding  the  Canadian 
fisheries  and  reciprocity  be  perfected  at  Washington, 
where  it  had  been  begun,  with  the  exception  of  its 
final  execution,  which  should  be  made  to  await  the 
result  of  the  negotiation  to  be  carried  on  by  Buchanan 
in  London.'*    Buchanan  believed  that  if  the  reciprocity 

'*  Ibid.,  247-249.         ^  Ibid.,  252. 
^  Buchanan,  Works,  IX,  i. 


150     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

treaty,  which  England  was  anxious  to  conclude,  were 
held  in  suspense,  she  might  be  induced  to  abandon  her 
pretensions  in  Central  America.*'  Should  such  a  plan 
as  he  mentioned  not  prove  feasible,  he  suggested  that 
the  Central  American  question  be  settled  in  connection 
with  the  others  at  Washington.^ 

Pierce,  however,  opposed  the  first  plan,  because  he 
believed  that  the  delay  necessary  to  the  completion  of 
a  Central  American  treaty  might  lead  to  actual  collision 
between  the  two  countries  upon  the  fishing  grounds  ;  " 
the  second  plan  he  found  equally  objectionable,  for  he 
felt  that  to  attempt  to  settle  all  of  the  questions  at 
Washington  would  simply  be  to  complicate  difficulties.^ 
In  consequence  of  the  President's  disapproval  of  his 
suggestions,  Buchanan  declined  the  mission,  for  he 
believed  that  without  some  such  arrangement  as  he  had 
proposed  the  settlement  of  the  Central  American  ques- 
tion would  be  delayed  for  years.^  He  was  finally 
induced  to  accept  the  post,  however,  and  agreed  to  do 
his  best  towards  effecting  a  settlement ;  ^  but  it  was 
only  with  great  reluctance  that  he  gave  up  his  idea  of 
making  the  reciprocity  treaty  wait  upon  a  settlement 
with  reference  to  Central  America." 

Marcy's  instructions  to  Buchanan  were  written  July 
2,  1853.  Since  the  acquisition  of  CaHfornia,  he  stated,  \ 
Great  Britain  had  manifested  a  more  deliberate  design 
to  change  the  Belize  settlement  into  a  British  dominion. 
Such  a  design  would  not  be  disregarded  by  the  Ameri- 
can government.  Acts  passed  by  Great  Britain  in  181 7 
and  1819,  as  well  as  the  treaty  made  with  Mexico  in 

"Buchanan,  Works,  VIII,  511;  IX,  19. 

^  Ibid.,  IX,  2-3,  23-24.  ^''Ibid.,  VIII,  sii;  IX,  I,  10,  19. 

*»/fcid.,  IX,  23-24.       a/fciJ.,  IX,  1-2.       "Ibid.,  2,  24.        "Ibid.,  3. 


BAY  ISLANDS  COLONY,  i8 52-1854  151 

1826,  clearly  showed  that  Belize  was  not  within  British 
dominion ;  therefore,  while  the  American  government 
conceded  that  Great  Britain  had  rights  in  Belize,  it 
positively  denied  that  Belize  was  a  British  province,  and 
it  was  bound  to  resist  any  attempt  to  convert  the  settle- 
ment into  a  colony." 

Though  the  direct  object  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer 
treaty,  Marcy  continued,  was  ostensibly  to  guarantee 
the  transisthmian  canal  route,  the  stipulation  in  the 
treaty  most  regarded  by  the  United  States  was  that  for 
the  discontinuation  of  Great  Britain's  assumed  protec- 
tion over  the  Mosquito  Indians,  and  with  it  the  removal 
of  all  pretext  for  interfering  with  the  territorial 
arrangements  which  the  Central  American  states  might 
wish  to  make  among  themselves.  It  was  the  intention, 
as  it  was  obviously  the  import,  of  the  treaty  of  April 
19,  1850,  to  place  Great  Britain  under  an  obligation  to 
cease  her  interposition  in  the  affairs  of  Central  Amer- 
ica, and  to  confine  herself  to  the  enjoyment  of  her 
limited  rights  in  Belize.  In  spite  of  her  agreement  not 
to  occupy,  colonize,  or  exercise  dominion  over  any  part 
of  Central  America,  Great  Britain  still  asserted  the 
right  to  hold  possession  of  and  to  exercise  control  over 
large  districts  of  that  country  and  important  islands  in 
the  Bay  of  Honduras,  the  unquestionable  appanages  of 
the  Central  American  states.  The  object  which  it  was 
hoped  that  Buchanan  would  be  able  to  accomplish, 
Marcy  pointed  out,  was  to  induce  Great  Britain  to  with- 
draw from  all  control  over  the  territories  and  islands 
of  Central  America,  and,  if  possible,  to  abstain  from 

'^Dept.  of  State,  Inst.,  Gt.  Brit.,  vol.  16,  no.  2. 


152     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

intermeddling  with  the  poHtical  aflfairs  of  the  govern- 
ments and  people  of  that  region.** 

The  policy  of  the  new  administration  with 
reference  to  Central  America  was  quite  in  harmony 
with  Buchanan's  own  ideas ;  it  was,  in  fact,  a  reversion 
to  the  old  Monroe-doctrine  principles  of  the  Polk 
administration,  which,  according  to  Buchanan,  aimed 
to  sweep  geographic  Central  America  clear  of  all 
British  influence  which  had  developed  since  1786;'° 
and  the  basis  of  the  demands  to  be  made  for  British 
evacuation  was  to  be  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty. 

The  wording  of  this  document  is  so  ambiguous  that 
any  discussion,  at  the  present  time,  for  the  purpose  of 
getting  at  its  full  meaning  would  be  of  little  profit. 
However,  an  impartial  examination  of  the  first  article 
in  connection  with  the  statements  in  Marcy's  letter 
leads  to  the  conclusion  that,  on  the  whole,  such  an  inter- 
pretation of  the  article  as  he  made  was  not  so  unreason- 
able as  might  at  first  appear,  though  it  was  in  strong 
contrast  to  that  which  the  Fillmore  administration 
seemed  willing  to  accept. 

It  is  true  that  the  Belize  settlement  was  originally  in 
Mexico,  but  the  encroachments  of  the  settlers  had  been 
to  the  south,  into  what  was  plainly  Guatemalan  terri- 
tory; therefore  the  district  between  the  Sibun  and 
Sarstoon  rivers  would  evidently  come  under  a  strict 
application  of  the  treaty  terms.  Moreover,  though 
Marcy's  intimation  that  the  treaty  required  the  discon- 
tinuation of  British  protection  over  the  Mosquitos  was 
rather  sweeping,  it  is  nevertheless  true  that  a  strict 

''  Dept.  of  State,  Inst.,  Gt.  Brit.,  vol.  i6,  no.  2.  Most  of  this  instruction 
is  printed  in  U.  S.  Docs.,  ser.  no.  840,  doc.   i,  pp.  42-49. 

*°  "  Letters  of  Bancroft  and  Buchanan  "  in  .tm.  Hist.  Rev.,  V,  99. 


BAY  ISLANDS  COLONY,  1852-1854  153 

observance  of  the  other  terms  would  have  made  such 
protection  a  virtual  impossibility. 

On  September  2,  some  time  after  Buchanan's  arrival 
in  London,  Marcy  sent  him  full  powers  to  negotiate  a 
treaty  with  regard  to  Central  America.  In  his  letter 
of  that  date  Marcy  stated  that  though  the  United  States 
could  not  claim  as  a  matter  of  right  that  Great  Britain 
should  altogether  withdraw  from  Belize,  still  it  was  a 
very  important  object  to  prevail  on  her  to  do  so.  As 
to  the  Bay  Islands,  he  believed  that  Great  Britain  had 
never  defined  the  character  of  her  claim  to  possess  the 
so-called  colony;  but  whatever  rights  she  may  have 
had  to  the  islands  were  all  relinquished  by  the  Clayton- 
Bulwer  treaty.  However,  it  seemed  wisest  to  give  the 
British  government  a  chance  to  explain  its  views  upon 
the  matter  before  presenting  a  formal  protest  against 
her  further  occupancy  of  the  colony.^'  The  President, 
he  added,  expected  Buchanan  so  to  treat  the  subject 
as  to  leave  no  doubt  in  the  minds  of  the  British  minis- 
ters that  the  United  States  would  insist  upon  the  aban- 
donment of  the  islands.'* 

As  the  Crimean  War  was  impending  when  Buchanan 
reached  London,  it  was  some  time  before  he  was  able 
to  secure  an  interview  with  Clarendon,  and  he  thought 
it  indiscreet  under  the  circumstances  to  press  the  mat- 
ter,''* but  in  the  last  part  of  October  he  met  Clarendon 
by  appointment  at  the  Foreign  Office  and  had  an  inter- 
view which  he  considered  highly  satisfactory.  The 
Foreign  Secretary  on  his  own  account  introduced  the 

^  Such  a  protest  had  been  previously  suggested  by  Buchanan  and  was 
apparently  a  favorite  idea  of  his.     Buchanan,  Works,  IX,  29,  65. 
*'  U.  S.  Docs.,  ser.  no.  840,  doc.   i,  pp.  49-50. 
""  Buchanan,  H'orks,  IX,  70,  77. 


154     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

subject  of  the  Bay  Islands  and  of  the  general  Central 
American  question,  which  led  Buchanan  to  express  the 
wish  of  his  government  that  the  questions  be  settled 
without  unnecessary  delay.  After  touching  on  the  best 
method  of  procedure  in  regard  to  the  negotiations,  the 
conversation  returned  to  the  Bay  Islands,  and  Claren- 
don remarked  that  he  believed  Ruatan  to  be  a  "  miser- 
able little  Island  "  which  had  been  occupied  for  many 
years  by  British  subjects  whose  request  for  some  kind 
of  government  had  been  granted.  This,  he  declared, 
was  an  entirely  different  case  from  what  it  would  have 
been  had  the  British  but  recently  first  occupied  the 
island.'^ 

Buchanan  replied  that  he  believed  it  would  appear 
that  the  British,  far  from  having  occupied  Ruatan  for 
many  years,  had  taken  the  island  by  force  from  Hon- 
duras as  recently  as  1841 ;  but,  in  any  event,  the  Clay- 
ton-Bulwer  treaty  had  disposed  of  the  question,  for  the 
island  was  unquestionably  a  part  of  Central  America. 
He  concluded  by  averring  that  the  United  States  had 
no  idea  of  acquiring  any  territory  in  Central  America ; 
it  desired  only  that  the  Central  American  states  be  per- 
mitted to  enjoy  in  peace  what  belonged  to  them,  and 
that  the  British  and  American  governments  interpose 
their  good  offices  to  settle  the  boundary  disputes  be- 
tween them.  Neither  Great  Britain  nor  the  United 
States,  he  believed,  had  any  real  interest  to  pursue 
a  different  course ;  moreover,  in  America  all  had  ex- 
pected that  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  would  produce 
that  happy  result.  To  Buchanan's  wish  for  the  welfare 
of  Central  America  Clarendon  heartily  agreed,  and 
with  that  the  conversation  on  the  subject  ended." 

«  Buchanan,  Works,  IX,  77,  80-81.  "  Ibid.,  81-82. 


BAY  ISLANDS  COLONY,  1852-1854  155 

On  November  12,  a  second  interview  took  place.  In 
the  early  part  of  it  the  Foreign  Secretary  asked  if  the 
Webster-Crampton  project  would  do  for  a  basis  of 
settlement;  and  Buchanan  promptly  replied  that  that 
agreement  was  now  at  an  end  and  could  not  be  con- 
sidered. That  project,  he  stated,  "  both  recognized  and 
constituted  the  Mosquito  Indians  as  an  Independent 
Power ;  which  could  never  be  assented  to  by  the  United 
States.  That  these  Indians  were  incapable  of  govern- 
ing themselves ;  and  the  consequence  would  be  that 
they  must  continue  to  be  under  the  dominion  of  the 
British  government."  However  much  the  American 
government  liked  Great  Britain,  it  desired  her  with- 
drawal from  Central  America  as  quickly  as  possible. 
It  was  to  effect  this  withdrawal  that  the  United  States 
had  concluded  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty ;  but  un- 
fortunately the  object  had  not  yet  been  accomplished. 
Besides,  the  United  States  could  never  recognize  the 
right  of  Great  Britain  to  a  protectorate  over  the  Mos- 
quito Indians.  Clarendon  replied  that  the  British  gov- 
ernment earnestly  desired  to  get  rid  of  its  protectorate, 
but  British  honor  required  that  this  be  done  with  a 
proper  regard  for  the  interest  and  well-being  of  the 
Mosquitos.*' 

The  plan  suggested  by  Russell  in  the  preceding  Jan- 
uary was  also  mentioned  by  Clarendon,  but  Buchanan 
objected  to  such  an  arrangement  on  the  ground  that 
it  would  deprive  the  Central  American  states  of  terri- 
tory to  which  they  were  justly  entitled ;  furthermore, 
this  arrangement  would  perpetuate  strife  in  Central 
America,  because  the  states  would  never  cease  trying 

«  Ibid..  88-90. 


156    ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

to  have  the  injustice  redressed;    in  short,  it  would 
make  confusion  worse  confounded." 

At  this  second  interview  Clarendon  showed  a  desire 
to  avoid  mention  of  the  Bay  Islands,  and  the  subject 
was  finally  introduced  by  Buchanan,  whereupon  Claren- 
don, as  before,  tried  to  minimize  the  importance  of  the 
colonization  of  the  islands,  and  intimated  that  the 
Americans  were  making  "  a  Mountain  out  of  a  Mole 
Hill "."  To  this  Buchanan  answered — to  quote  from 
his  despatch  to  Marcy : 

Whatever  you  may  suppose,  I  can  assure  you  that  this  is 
the  dangerous  question ;  because  we  firmly  believe  that  the 
establishment  of  this  Colony  is  a  direct  violation  of  the  Clayton 
and  Bulwer  Treaty  .  .  .  Even  if  it  were  a  fact  that  you  had 
always  been  in  possession  of  Ruatan,  still  your  obligation  to 
withdraw  from  it  would,  in  my  opinion,  be  imperative,  under 
the  Clayton  and  Bulwer  Treaty  .  .  .  Let  me  assure  you  that 
this  will  be  considered  a  most  important  question  by  the  Con- 
gress and  people  of  the  United  States ;  and  I  have  no  doubt 
they  will  arrive  at  the  same  conclusion  with  the  Committee 
of  Foreign  Relations  of  the  Senate." 

At  the  conclusion  of  this  interview,  Buchanan  asked 
Clarendon  for  an  official  document  regarding  the  colo- 
nization of  the  Bay  Islands  which  Clarendon  had  pre- 
viously promised  him,  and  the  Foreign  Secretary  gave 
him  a  copy  of  the  proclamation,  by  the  lieutenant- 
governor  of  the  islands,  erecting  them  into  a  colony  in 
the  name  of  the  Queen.  Buchanan  sent  this  paper — 
which  contained  the  first  official  information  regarding 
the  new  colony  in  Central  America  to  be  received  by 
the  American  government — to  Marcy  with  his  report 
of  the  interview."" 

**  Buchanan,  Works,  IX,  91.  **  Iliid..  94.  *^  Ibid.,  94-95. 

■"  Ibid.,  96,  97.     Cf.  Pari.  Papers,  1836,  Coins.,  XLI\',  "  Hay  Islands  ", 

1-5- 


i 


BAY  ISLANDS  COLONY,  1852-1854  157 

Clarendon  was  so  preoccupied  with  the  Russo- 
Turkish  question  that  Buchanan  did  not  secure  a 
chance  to  resume  the  discussion  until  the  first  part  of 
January.  During  the  interview  which  then  took  place 
the  Foreign  Secretary  astonished  Buchanan  by  pre- 
senting a  new  interpretation  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer 
treaty.  That  arrangement,  he  declared,  was  entirely 
prospective  in  its  operations  and  did  not  require  an 
abandonment  of  any  British  possessions  in  Central 
America."  Bulwer,  it  will  be  remembered,  took  this 
view  of  the  treaty  from  the  first,**  but  a  study  of  the 
previous  correspondence  upon  the  subject  leaves  no 
doubt  that  the  British  government  itself  had  but 
recently  adopted  this  interpretation.*'  Though  it  had 
hoped  that  possible  American  indifference  and  the 
declaration  of  Palmerston  regarding  Belize  and  its 
dependencies  might  limit  attention  to  the  Mosquito 
Shore,  still  the  British  government  clearly  understood 
the  treaty  to  apply  to  existing  as  well  as  to  future 
relations. 

The  change  of  attitude  seems  to  have  been  due  to 
several  causes.  Among  these  might  be  mentioned  the  ' 
temper  which  the  Pierce  administration  had  shown  in 
reference  to  the  Belize  declaration  and  the  colonization 
of  the  Bay  Islands ;  congressional  criticism  of  the 
British  failure  to  withdraw  from  Mosquito  Shore ; 
and  the  actual  difficulty  of  an  honorable  withdrawal 
which  England  had  experienced  in  her  attempts  of  the 
last  two  years.    The  fact  that  the  canal  company  had 

*' Buchanan,   Works,  IX,   117,   134-135. 
"See  above,  p.  108;  also  below,  p.  163,  note  59. 

"See    above,    pp.    108-109,    m.    146-147;    also    below,    p.    161.       Cf. 
Buchanan,  Works,  IX,  341-342. 


158     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

not  carried  out  its  contract  very  probably  was  also 
influential  in  producing  this  new  stand ;  for  now  no 
early  commercial  gain,  as  a  result  of  a  transisthmian 
world  highway,  seemed  likely  to  appear  as  compensa- 
tion for  relinquishing  special  interests  in  Central 
America. 

Thus,  after  this  interview  of  January,  1854,  the 
general  position  of  each  of  the  parties  on  the  Clayton- 
Bulwer  treaty  was  clear  to  the  other :  in  the  opinion  of 
the  American  government,  the  treaty  was  meant  to  be 
retrospective  as  well  as  prospective,  and  demanded 
British  withdrawal  from  Central  America  ;  to  the  Brit- 
ish government  it  was  only  prospective  and  merely 
prohibited  further  territorial  and  political  extension  in 
the  region. 

At  this  meeting  in  January  Buchanan  gave  Claren- 
don a  memorandum  containing  the  views  of  the  Ameri- 
can government  on  the  whole  Central  American 
question.  The  paper  was  temperately  and  logically 
worded  and  was  a  shrewd  defense  of  the  American 
attitude.  The  object  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treat>%  it 
declared,  had  been  to  place  the  two  nations  on  exact 
equality  with  regard  to  the  interoceanic  highway  ;  con- 
sequently, both  had  agreed  never  to  occupy,  fortify, 
or  exercise  dominion  over  any  portion  of  Central 
America.  As  the  United  States  held  no  land  in  the 
region,  she  was  simply  restrained  from  making  future 
acquisitions ;  but  in  the  case  of  Great  Britain  the  lan- 
guage applied  to  the  present  as  well  as  to  the  future, 
because  when  the  treaty  was  made  she  was  exercising 
dominion  over  a  large  portion  of  the  eastern  coast  of 
Central  America.    Notwithstanding  the  agreement,  the 


BAY  ISLANDS  COLONY,  1852-1854  IS9 

British  government  had  not  taken  the  first  step  towards 
withdrawing  from  Central  America.  The  failure  to  do 
so  could  not  result  from  any  obscurity  in  the  treaty 
itself,  for  the  first  article  clearly  meant  that  the  con- 
tracting parties  should  not  exercise  dominion  over 
Central  America,  either  directly  or  indirectly.  Great 
Britain's  disregard  of  treaty  obligations  was  even  more 
palpable  in  the  case  of  Ruatan ;  not  only  had  she  failed 
to  retire  from  there,  but  since  the  completion  of  the 
treaty  she  had  formed  Ruatan  and  five  adjoining 
islands  into  a  British  colony.  In  vain  had  the  self- 
denying  stipulations  been  made,  if  Great  Britain  was  to 
continue  to  exercise  dominion  over  the  Bay  Islands. '"' 

Some  months  elapsed  after  the  interview  in  January 
before  further  opportunity  was  given  Buchanan  regard- 
ing the  matter,  and  before  a  reply  was  made  to  his 
paper.  The  reason  for  this  lapse  of  time  is  partly  to  be 
found  in  the  pressure  of  the  war  question  with  Russia  ; 
but  a  study  of  the  correspondence  leads  to  the  suspicion 
that  it  was  also  due  to  intentional  evasion  of  the  sub- 
ject on  the  part  of  the  British  government.  This  post- 
ponement of  discussion  may  have  resulted  entirely  from 
a  desire  to  see  the  outcome  of  the  quarrel  between 
Russia  and  Turkey  before  a  more  determined  stand 
should  be  taken  upon  the  question  in  dispute  with 
America ;  but  Clarendon's  words  as  well  as  his  actions 
give  cause  for  the  belief  that,  as  Buchanan  sus- 
pected," he  did  not  find  it  as  easy  as  he  had  at  first 
supposed  it  would  be  to  defend  the  British  claims  in 
Central  America,  or  to  justify  the  view  that  the  Clay- 

50  Buchanan,  Works,  IX,  1 18-128. 
^^  Ibid.,  148,  154,  180-181. 


i6o     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

ton-Bulwer  treaty  was  intended  to  be  only  prospective 
in  its  operations. 

At  the  next  interview,  which  was  held  April  ii, 
Clarendon  again  announced  distinctly  that  the  British 
government  considered  the  treaty  to  be  entirely  pros- 
pective, and  not  as  interfering  with  existing  possessions 
in  Central  America.  This  led  Buchanan  to  point  out 
that,  in  view  of  such  interpretation,  Palmerston  had 
put  himself  to  much  unnecessary  trouble  in  insisting 
upon  an  acknowledgment,  before  the  exchange  of  rati- 
fications, that  the  provisions  of  the  treaty  did  not 
embrace  Belize.  To  this  Clarendon  made  no  satisfac- 
tory answer,  and  he  never  did  supply  Buchanan  with 
an  explanation  which  reconciled  Palmerston's  action 
with  the  new  interpretation  of  the  treaty.  As  the 
Foreign  Secretary  promised  a  written  statement  of 
British  views  within  a  few  days,"  but  little  more  was 
said  regarding  the  Central  American  question  during 
this  interview. 

Yet  the  paper  was  not  received  until  the  first  week 
in  May.  The  statement  was,  as  Buchanan  character- 
ized it,  "  rambling  and  inconclusive  in  its  arguments  "." 
Clarendon  summarily  disposed  of  the  Mosquito  ques- 
tion by  stating  that  the  United  States  would  scarcely 
expect  Great  Britain  to  enter  into  an  explanation  of 
acts  committed  by  her  nearly  forty  years  before,  in  a 
matter  in  which  no  right  or  possession  of  the  United 
States  was  involved.  He  added,  however,  that  since 
the  peace  of  1815  Spain  had  never  raised  a  question 
with  respect  to  the  protectorate ;  and  that  the  Central 
American  republics — if  it  were  to  be  admitted  that  the 

»'  Buchanan,  Works.  IX,   i8o. 
-Ibid.,  189. 


BAY  ISLANDS  COLONY,  1S52-1854  161 

rights  and  obligations  of  Spain  were  vested  in  them — 
had  made  no  remonstrance  against  the  protectorate  for 
many  years,  though  they  well  knew  that  it  existed. 
Furthermore,  though  in  1842  the  United  States  govern- 
ment was  informed  of  the  existence  of  the  protector- 
ate," no  objection  was  made  up  to  the  end  of  the  year 
1849.  The  protectorate  had  not  been  abolished  by  the 
terms  of  the  first  article  of  the  treaty ;  the  American 
minister  had  confounded  the  conditions  of  a  sovereignty 
and  a  protectorate  and  had  treated  the  agreement  "  not 
to  colonize,  nor  occupy,  nor  fortify,  nor  assume,  nor 
exercise  dominion  over  ",  as  including  an  agreement 
not  to  protect.  The  British  government  never  claimed, 
and  did  not  then  claim,  any  sovereignty  over  Mosquito  ; 
but  the  treaty  of  1850  did  not,  and  was  not  meant  to, 
annihilate  the  protectorate  which  had  long  been  exer- 
cised over  it.'° 

The  aim  in  forming  the  treaty,  Clarendon  proceeded, 
had  been  to  neutralize  the  proposed  canal ;  and  in 
deciding  upon  the  terms  the  object  of  both  negotiators 
had  been  presumably  to  draw  up  such  a  convention  as, 
without  conceding  any  specific  point  on  which  one 
party  could  not  in  honor  yield,  would  make  such  con- 
cessions on  all  other  points  as  the  other  party  desired. 
An  examination  of  the  treaty  would  show  that  it  was 
drawn  up  in  such  a  manner  as  to  make  it  a  matter  of 
indifference,  so  far  as  the  canal  was  concerned,  whether 
the  port  and  town  of  San  Juan  were  under  the  modified 

"  Macdonald  informed  Murphy,  the  American  agent  in  Central  Amer- 
ica, that  the  protectorate  had  been  reestablished,  and  Murphy  reported 
the  fact  to  his  government.  Murphy  to  the  Secretary  of  State,  January 
20,  1842,  Dept.  of  State,  Des.,  Cen.  Am.,  vol.  2. 

'^  U.  S.  Docs.,  ser.  no.  840,  doc.  i,  pp.  81-84. 

12 


i62     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

protectorate  of  Great  Britain,  or  under  the  government 
of  Nicaragua." 

Though,  the  paper  continued,  the  British  government 
did  not  pretend  that  the  treaty  by  implication  recog- 
nized the  protectorate,  still  it  clearly  acknowledged  the 
possibility  of  Great  Britain  or  the  United  States  afford- 
ing protection  to  Mosquito,  or  any  other  Central  Ameri- 
can state,  and  admitted  that  the  intention  of  the  parties 
was  not  to  prohibit  or  abolish,  but  to  limit  and  restrict, 
such  a  protectorate.  Defending  and  protecting  was  a 
temporary  act  of  friendship ;  occupying,  colonizing, 
fortifying,  or  acquiring  sovereignty  were  acts  having 
a  permanent  result.  No  one  would  maintain  that  the 
bar  to  colonization  was  a  bar  to  all  protection." 

As  to  Belize  and  its  dependencies,  neither  govern- 
ment had  ever  intended  that  the  treat}''  should  interfere 
in  any  way  with  them ;  this  was  shown  by  the  fact  that 
the  term  "  Central  America  "  could  only  be  applied  to 
the  territory  once  included  under  the  term  "  Central 
American  republic  ",  and  also  by  the  declarations  ex- 
changed by  Clayton  and  Bulwer.  Moreover,  the  fact 
that,  in  1847,  the  United  States  sent  to  Belize  a  consul 
who  received  his  exequatur  from  the  British  govern- 
ment, gave  reason  to  believe  that  the  term  "  Belize  "  in 
the  declaration  meant  the  Belize  with  the  limits  of  1850, 
for  this  act  constituted  a  recognition  by  the  United 
States  government  of  the  settlement  of  British  Hon- 
duras, as  it  then  existed.  Furthermore,  the  limits  of 
the  settlement  established  in  1786  were  abolished  by  a 
subsequent  state  of  war  between  Spain  and  England." 

••  U.  S.  Docs.,  ser.  no.  840,  doc.   i,  p.  86. 
"  Ibid.,  p.  87.  M  Ibid.,  pp.  8990. 


BAY  ISLANDS  COLONY,  1852- 1854  163 

With  reference  to  Ruatan  and  the  adjoining  islands, 
Clarendon  stated,  the  only  thing  debatable  was  whether 
they  were  dependencies  of  Belize,  or  of  some  Central 
American  state.  An  attempt  followed  to  show  that  the 
pretensions  of  Great  Britain  to  consider  Ruatan  and 
Bonacca  dependencies  of  Belize  were  of  long  standing 
and  existed  when  the  treaty  of  1850  was  formed,  at 
which  time  it  was  not  questioned  by  the  American 
government.  In  consequence  of  these  facts,  the  British 
government  could  not  admit  that  an  alteration  in  the 
internal  form  of  government  of  these  islands  was  a 
violation  of  the  treaty,  or  afforded  to  the  United  States 
a  just  cause  of  remonstrance.^' 

In  reply  to  the  views  presented  by  Clarendon, 
Buchanan,  on  July  22,  1854,  wrote  a  long  and  able 
paper,  emphasizing  his  former  arguments  and  present- 
ing new  ones  to  meet  those  of  the  Foreign  Secretary. 
An  agreement  on  the  part  of  Great  Britain  not  to 
"  occupy  "  any  territory  then  actually  occupied  by  her, 
he  maintained,  clearly  was  an  agreement  to  withdraw 
therefrom.  If,  as  the  British  government  held,  the 
treaty  was  only  prospective  in  its  nature  it  amounted 
to  an  American  recognition  of  the  British  right  to  ter- 
ritory already  held  in  Central  America.  Such  an  inter- 
pretation entirely  destroyed  the  mutuality  of  the  con- 
vention, for  it  bound  the  United  States,  which  held  no 
territory  there,  not  to  acquire  any.  But  the  British 
government,  at  the  time  of  ratification,  must  have 
regarded  the  treaty  as  applying  to  the  present  as  well 
as  the  future ;   otherwise,  why  the  Belize  declaration  ? 

^'  Ibid.,  pp.  90-93.  Clarendon's  paper  was  based  partially  upon  argu- 
ments furnished  by  Bulwer.  Inclosures  in  Bulwer  to  Hammond,  Sept. 
30,  1854,  F-  0-.  Cen.  Am.,  vol.  83.     See  above,  p.  108. 


i64     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

The  fact  that  no  attempt  was  made  to  except  any  other 
Central  American  territory  amounted  to  an  admission 
that  the  British  were  bound  to  withdraw  from  all  of 
their  other  possessions  there* 

As  for  the  Bay  Islands,  even  admitting  for  the  sake 
of  argument  that  the  Belize  declaration  was  binding, 
these  islands  were  not  excluded  by  it,  for  the  word 
"  dependencies  "  applied  only  to  the  small  islands  in 
the  neighborhood  of  the  settlement,  as  stated  by  Clay- 
ton in  his  note  to  Bulwer,  and  not  to  the  large  island 
of  Ruatan  which  was  hundreds  of  miles  from  Belize. 
The  British  statement  attached  much  importance  to 
the  fact  that  Ruatan  was  occupied  by  the  British  in 
1850;  it  was  for  the  reason  that  not  only  Ruatan  but 
the  whole  eastern  coast  of  Central  America  was  occu- 
pied by  them  that  the  United  States  was  so  anxious 
for  a  convention  requiring  British  withdrawal.  But 
for  this  agreement,  the  United  States,  in  self-defense, 
would  have  been  compelled  to  accept  cessions  of  terri- 
tory in  Central  America."  Then  followed  an  investi- 
gation into  the  British  title  to  Ruatan,  which  Buchanan 
showed  to  rest  on  very  flimsy  foundations." 

When  the  treaty  was  formed,  the  paper  proceeded, 
Great  Britain  had  merely  taken  the  first  step  towards 
possessing  the  island.  Consequently,  no  mention  was 
made  of  the  matter  by  the  United  States  government 
at  the  time,  for,  in  view  of  the  terms  of  the  treaty,  it 
was  not  doubted  that  Great  Britain  would  promptly 
withdraw.  Instead  of  so  doing  the  British  government 
had  erected  Ruatan  and  five  adjoining  islands  into  a 
British  colony.     Clarendon  had   failed  to  assert  any- 

'•  Buchanan,   Works,  IX,  216-217. 
'^  Ibid.,  317-220.        *' Ibid.,  320-225. 


BAY  ISLANDS  COLONY,  1852-18 54  165 

where  in  his  paper  that  any  of  these  five  islands  had 
ever  been  occupied  by  the  British  government  previous 
to  their  formation  into  a  colony." 

The  protection  of  the  San  Juan  route,  far  from  being 
the  only  feature  of  the  convention,  as  the  statement  of 
Clarendon  seemed  to  intimate,  was  only  one  feature  of 
a  policy  far  more  liberal  and  extended.  This  policy 
embraced  all  routes,  whether  for  railroads  or  canals, 
throughout  Central  America ;  and  the  prohibition  of 
occupation  was  co-extensive  with  the  whole  territory 
over  which  such  canals  or  railroads  might  pass.  The 
American  government  could  not  become  a  party  to  any 
arrangement  whereby  Great  Britain  should  merely 
withdraw  from  the  port  and  harbor  of  Greytown  and 
the  northern  bank  of  the  San  Juan,  thus  leaving  the 
remainder  of  the  Mosquito  coast  in  its  present  condi- 
tion ;  the  American  government  stood  upon  the  treaty, 
and  firmly  believed  that  Great  Britain  should  have 
abandoned  the  whole  Mosquito  territory  more  than  four 
years  before." 

The  British  statement  asserted,  Buchanan  continued, 
that  though,  in  1842,  the  American  government  knew 
that  the  protectorate  existed,  it  did  not  complain  until 
1850.  The  American  government  had  no  right  under 
any  treaty  with  Great  Britain  until  1850.  Had  it  inter- 
fered previous  to  this  time  it  could  have  done  so  only 
under  the  Monroe  doctrine,  which  the  British  govern- 
ment did  not  recognize.  But  it  should  not  be  concluded 
that  without  this  convention  the  United  States  would 
not  have  interfered  eventually  to  prevent,  if  possible, 
any  portion  of  Central  America  from  being  permanently 
occupied  or  colonized  by  Great  Britain.^' 

^  Ibid.,  225-226.        "  Ibid.,  230-232.        ^^  Ibid.,  232-238. 


i66     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

Finally,  the  American  statement  declared,  whether 
the  term  "  Central  America "  appearing  in  the  first 
article  of  the  treaty  was  considered  in  a  political  or  a 
geographical  sense,  it  applied  to  the  territor}'  between 
the  Sibun  and  the  Sarstoon,  for  this  was  a  part  of  the 
province  of  Vera  Paz  in  Guatemala.  Moreover,  Clay- 
ton's letter  to  Bulwer  upon  exchanging  ratifications 
referred  to  the  convention  of  1850  as  applying  to  all  of 
the  Central  American  states,  "  with  their  just  limits 
and  proper  dependencies  ".  Hence,  the  territory  in 
question,  being  within  the  just  limits  of  the  state  of 
Guatemala,  was  expressly  embraced  by  the  conventionj 
The  United  States  emphatically  denied  that  the  appoint- 
ment of  a  consul  to  Belize  was  even  the  slightest  recog- 
nition of  British  title  to  the  port.  Consuls  were  mere 
commercial,  and  not  political,  agents.  The  contention 
that  the  territory  between  the  Sibun  and  the  Sarstoon 
was  British  by  right  of  conquest,  Buchanan  proved  to 
be  unsound  by  citing  the  treaties  of  1809  and  1814  with 
Spain  and  the  treaty  of  1826  with  ]\Iexico,  as  well  as 
acts  of  Parliament  pased  in  1817  and  1819.°* 

But  regardless  of  the  nature  of  the  British  claim  to 
this  territory,  the  question,  as  in  the  case  of  the  Bay 
Islands  and  the  Mosquito  coast,  did  not  turn  upon  the 
validity  of  the  claim,  but  upon  the  fact  that  Great 
Britain  had  bound  herself  not  to  occupy  any  portion  of 
Central  America,  or  to  exercise  dominion  over  it.  As 
to  Belize  proper,  limited  by  the  treaties  of  1783  and 
1786,  the  United  States  would  not  for  the  present  insist 
upon  the  withdrawal  of  Great  Britain  from  it,  provided 
all  the  other  questions  between  the  two  governments 
were  settled  amicably.    But  it  must  be  distinctly  under- 

•"  Buchanan,   Works.   IX,  238-240. 


BAY  ISLANDS  COLONY,  1852-1854  167 

stood  that  the  United  States  government  acknowledged 
no  British  claim  there  except  the  right  to  the  usufruct 
specified  in  the  Spanish  treaties,  and  it  recognized  the 
former  Spanish  sovereignty  as  now  belonging  either 
to  Guatemala  or  to  Mexico." 

Thus,  through  Buchanan's  second  formal  statement 
the  attitude  of  the  United  States  was  more  clearly 
revealed,  and  such  arguments  were  presented  against 
the  British  view  as  it  seemed  hardly  likely  that  the 
British  government  would  be  able  to  refute.  This  was 
the  last  word  between  the  two  governments  for  some 
time,  directly  upon  the  controversy  over  the  Clayton- 
Bulwer  treaty.  Meanwhile  events  of  importance  to 
British-American  relations  were  taking  place  in  Central 
America,  and  to  these  attention  is  now  directed. 

*'  Ibid.,  241. 


CHAPTER  VI. 
American  Defiance  of  British  Claims,  1853-1855. 

At  the  time  when  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States 
were  approaching  what  appeared  to  be  irreconcilable 
differences  over  the  meaning  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer 
treaty,  affairs  in  Central  America  were  assuming  a 
correspondingly  serious  aspect.  Borland,  Kerr's  suc- 
cessor as  United  States  minister,  was  one  of  the  earlier 
causes  of  discord.  He  was  a  man  of  the  school  of 
Squier  and  worked  as  assiduously  as  did  the  latter  to 
build  up  American  influence  and  counteract  that  of 
Great  Britain.  Upon  arriving  in  Central  America,  Bor- 
land found  the  British  in  the  ascendancy  in  Costa  Rica 
and  Salvador,  and  especially  in  Guatemala,*  where  the 
American  government  was  particularly  hated  and 
feared  because  of  its  recent  interference  in  Mexico.' 
Even  Nicaragua  was  suspicious  of  the  United  States, 
partly  because  she  had  come  to  regard  the  Clayton- 
Bulwer  treaty  as  an  abandonment  of  the  Monroe  doc- 
trine.* In  fact,  Honduras  was  the  only  state  which  was 
at  this  time  distinctly  friendly  towards  the  American 

1  Wyke  to  Clarendon,  Nov.  27,  1853.  T.  O.,  Cen.  Am.,  vol.  79.  no.  ^t. 
Borland  to  Secretary  of  State,  Dec.  10,  1853,  Dept.  of  State,  Pes.,  Nic. 
vol.    I,  no.    II. 

»  Wyke  to  Clarendon,  Mar.  13,  1854,  F.  O..  Cen.  Am.,  vol.  8a,  no.  9- 
So  fearful  of  American  designs  were  the  Guatemalans  that  they  even 
talked  of  a  Spanish  protectorate.  Wyke  to  Clarendon,  Oct.  30,  iSs.'. 
ibid.,   vol.   79,   no.   33- 

'  Borland  to  Marcy,  Sept.  20,  1853,  Pept.  of  State,  Des.,  Nic.,  vol.  i. 
no.    5. 

168 


DEFIANCE  OF  BRITISH  CLAIMS,  1853-1855      169 

government ;  *  and  this  loyalty  was  obviously  due  to 
the  attitude  of  the  United  States  regarding  the  British 
colonization  of  the  Bay  Islands. 

Borland,  however,  while  complaining  vigorously 
against  the  actions  of  the  British  in  Central  America," 
immediately  set  about  improving  conditions  in  that 
region  for  his  own  country.  By  liberal  promises  he 
soon  regained  Nicaragua's  confidence,'  and,  in  accord- 
ance with  his  Monroe-doctrine  principles,  negotiated  a 
commercial  treaty  with  her,  by  which  her  territorial 
claims  were  again  guaranteed  on  the  part  of  the  United 
States.'  He  went  further  than  this ;  he  criticised  the 
Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  and  urged  its  abrogation  on  the 
ground  that  Great  Britain  had  violated  its  terms ;  *  and 
then  he  proceeded  to  act  as  if  the  treaty  had  been 
already  set  aside.  His  plan,  strongly  hinted  at  in  his 
speeches  and  letters,  was  evidently  to  bring  the  whole 
of  Central  America  under  the  control  of  the  United 
States  for  the  purpose  of  annexing  the  region  to  the 
American  Union.' 

While  Borland  was  working,  in  a  manner  entirely 
unauthorized  by  his  government,  to  strengthen  Ameri- 

*  Ibid.,  Borland  to  Marcy,  Dec.  10,  1853,  ihid.,  no.  11;  Wyke  to  Claren- 
don, Feb.  27,  1854,  F.  O.,  Can.  Am.,  vol.  82,  no.  6. 

'  Borland  to  Marcy,  Dec.  10,  1853,  Dept.  of  State,  Des.,  Nic,  vol.  i, 
no.    II. 

*  Wyke  to  Clarendon,  Oct.  30,  1853,  F.  O.,  Cen.  Am.,  vol.  79,  no.  33. 
'  Crampton  to  Clarendon,  May  i,  1854,  F.  O.,  Am.,  vol.  595,  no.   115; 

July  3,  1854,  ibid.,  vol.  597,  no.  172.  This  treaty  met  with  no  favor 
from  the  American  government.    Ibid. 

*  Borland  to  the  Secretary  of  State,  Aug.  28,  1853,  Dept.  of  State, 
Des.,   Nic,  vol.    i,  no.   3. 

"  Inclosure  in  Borland  to  Marcy,  Aug.  29,  1853,  ibid.,  Borland  to 
Marcy,  Nov.  10,  1853,  ibid.,  vol.  i:  Dec.  i5[?],  1853,  ibid.,  no.  15. 
In  one  of  his  public  speeches  in  Nicaragua  Borland  stated  that  his 
greatest  desire  was  to  see  Nicaragua  forming  a  bright  star  in  the  flag 
of  the  United  States.  Wyke  to  Clarendon,  Nov.  27,  1853,  F.  C, 
Cen.  Am.,  vol.   79,  no.  37. 


170     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

can  interests  in  Nicaragua,  Squier,  as  a  private  citizen, 
was  similarly  engaged  in  Honduras.  During  his  resi- 
dence in  Central  America  as  an  agent  of  the  United 
States  government,  Squier  had  contracted  an  intense 
hatred  of  British  influence  on  the  isthmus.  This  feel- 
ing was  kept  alive  after  his  recall,  and  at  about  the 
time  of  Borland's  arrival  in  Nicaragua  Squier  also 
returned  to  Central  America  and  made  his  headquarters 
in  Honduras.  The  ostensible  purpose  of  his  visit  was 
to  obtain  a  grant  from  that  republic  for  the  construction 
of  an  interoceanic  railway,"  but  he  was  suspected  by  the 
British  of  being  primarily  interested  in  "  the  further- 
ance of  his  well-known  political  views  regarding  Cen- 
tral America  "." 

Indeed,  Squier's  actions  appear  to  have  given  good 
reason  for  British  suspicion.  According  to  reports,  he 
lost  no  opportunity  of  declaring  that  he  staked  all  of 
his  hopes  of  success  in  life  on  the  prospect  of  annihilat- 
ing every  vestige  of  British  influence  in  Central  Amer- 
ica." At  this  time  Honduras  and  Guatemala  were  at 
war,  and,  as  the  latter  was  a  British  stronghold,  Squier 
was  much  interested  in  the  contest.  He  became  the 
chief  instigator  and  adviser  of  Honduras,  and  it  was 
said  that  under  his  influence  a  Honduran  agent  was 
sent  to  Washington  to  secure  aid  in  the  war,  and  pos- 
sibly also  with  the  idea  of  bringing  about  annexation 
to  the  United  States."    Moreover,  rumors  were  afloat 

*"  Crampton  to  Clarendon,  July  24,  1854,  "  Confidential  ",  F.  C 
Am.,  vol.  597,  no.   195. 

"  Ibid. 

"Crampton  to  Clarendon,  Mar.  6,  1854,  "Confidential",  ibid.,  vol. 
594,  no.  58. 

1' Crampton  to  Clarendon,  June  5,  1854,  ibid.,  vol.  596,  no.  147; 
.Seymour  to  the  Secretary  of  the  .\dmiralty,  Mar.  24,  1854,  Ad.  Sec. 
In-I-ctters,  5629,  no.  32. 


DEFIANCE  OF  BRITISH  CLAIMS,  1853-1855      171 

that  Squier  had  secured,  or  was  about  to  secure,  from 
the  United  States,  men  and  arms  for  the  purpose  of 
drivmg  the  British  out  of  Mosquito  territory  and 
Ruatan." 

Though  Great  Britain  felt  at  this  time  that  the 
American  government  intended  honestly  to  observe  the 
terms  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty,  there  was  yet  a 
fear  that  public  opinion  in  the  United  States  might 
force  support  of  Squier;"  consequently,  Crampton 
was  directed  by  the  foreign  secretary  to  inform  Marcy 
that  the  British  government  was  convinced  that  he 
would  give  no  countenance  to  the  schemes  of  Squier." 
As  an  additional  precaution,  it  was  decided  to  reinforce 
the  British  naval  station  in  the  West  Indies." 

While  affairs  were  in  this  condition,  an  event 
occurred  which  on  first  appearance  seemed  likely  to 
produce  a  rupture  between  the  British  and  American 
governments ;  the  famous  British  protectorate  over 
Mosquito  was  put  to  test  by  the  United  States.  The 
occurrence  originated  in  a  quarrel,  begun  early  in  1853, 
between  the  Accessory  Transit   Company "  and  the 

"  Crampton  to  Clarendon,  Mar.  6,  1854,  F.  0.,  Am.,  vol.  594,  no.  58; 
Seymour  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Admiralty,  Mar.  24,  1854,  Ad.  Sec. 
In-Letters,  5629,  no.  32. 

"  Wyke  to  Clarendon,  Nov.  27,  1853,  F.  O.,  Cen.  Am.,  vol.  79,  no.  37. 

"  Clarendon  to  Crampton,  Mar.  24,  1854,  F.  0.,  Am.,  vol.  590,  no.  64. 

"Crampton  to  Clarendon,  Mar.  6,  1854,  ibid.,  vol.  594,  no.  58; 
Seymour  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Admiralty,  Mar.  24,  1854,  Ad.  Sec. 
In-Letters,  5629,  no.  32;  Hammond  to  Merivale,  April  26,  1854,  C.  O., 
Hond.,  vol.  89. 

^'  In  order  to  take  advantage  of  the  increase  of  traffic  across  the 
isthmus,  in  consequence  of  the  discovery  of  gold  in  California,  the 
Atlantic  and  Pacific  Ship-Canal  Company  had  secured  a  modified  charter 
giving  it  the  monopoly  of  a  line  of  transit  across  the  isthmus.  Under 
this  charter  it  styled  itself  the  Accessory  Transit  Company.  Scroggs, 
"  William  Walker  and  the  Steamship  Corporation  in  Nicaragua ",  in 
Am.  Hist.  Rev.,  X,  793- 


172     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

authorities  at  Greytown.  Thoui^h  securing  its  charter 
from  Nicaragua,  the  company  had  obtained  from  Grey- 
town  a  concession  to  build  a  coal  depot  on  Point  Arenas, 
on  the  opposite  side  of  the  river  from  the  town."  The 
terms  of  the  concession  were  quickly  exceeded  by  the 
erection  of  warehouses,  stores,  and  hotels.""  This 
angered  the  town  authorities,  and  the  anger  was  in- 
creased by  the  company's  refusal  to  deliver  its  passen- 
gers on  the  town  side  of  the  harbor,  thus  cutting  off 
the  inhabitants  from  all  share  in  the  profits  from  trans- 
isthmian  traffic."" 

According  to  the  agreement,  the  land  was  to  be  given 
up  upon  requisition  from  the  town ; "  the  requisition 
was  made,  but  the  company  ignored  it.  The  town  then 
ordered  the  removal  of  the  establishments  from  Point 
Arenas  within  thirty  days,"^  but  no  attention  was  paid  to 
the  notice,  and  when  the  time  limit  had  expired  the 
town  officials  destroyed  some  of  the  buildings.^* 

Meanwhile,  as  a  result  of  appeal  from  the  Transit 
Company,""  Captain  HoUins  of  the  American  navy  had 
been  ordered  to  Greytown  with  the  sloop-of-war  Cyane, 
for  the  protection  of  American  interests."  He  arrived 
a  day  or  two  before  the  time  set  for  a  second  attack  on 
the  buildings,  and  upon  learning  of  the  situation  noti- 
fied the  town  authorities  that  he  would  resist  by  force 
any  attempt  to  execute  the  design,"  However,  a  body 
of  armed  men  was  sent  from  Greytown  to  complete  the 

^^  Pari.  Papers,  1856,  Corns.,  LX,  "Correspondence  with  the  United 
States  respecting  Central  America  ",  236. 

M  Ibid. 

"■  Harper's    Magasine,    X,    56. 

^  Part.  Papers,  1856,  Covts.,  LX,  "Correspondence  with  the  United 
States    respecting    Central    America ",    236. 

=»  Ibid.         "  Ibid.,   237-        '^  Ibid.,    243-245.  »  Ibid.,  245. 

"  Ibid.,    240. 


DEFIANCE  or  BRITISH  CLAIMS,  1833-1855      1/3 

work  of  destruction ;  but  upon  landing  they  were  con- 
fronted by  marines  from  the  Cyane,  sent  by  HoHins.  In 
the  face  of  this  resistance  the  party  from  the  town 
retired  and  for  a  time  efforts  against  the  company 
were  abandoned.^ 

This  event  became  the  subject  of  correspondence 
between  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States ;  but  as 
this  was  just  when  the  British  government  was  being 
sharply  attacked  by  the  American  Senate,  Clarendon 
very  wisely  preserved  a  conciliatory  tone,  only  showing 
sufficient  resentment  at  Hollins's  act  to  preserve  the 
dignity  of  his  government."  Alarcy's  reply  to  the  com- 
plaint of  Clarendon  contained  a  hostile  note,*"  however, 
which  further  roused  the  Foreign  Secretary  ;  '^  but  the 
American  government  soon  learned  that  the  Transit 
Company  had  received  its  concession  from  Greytown — 
a  fact  of  which  it  had  previously  been  ignorant  ^ — and 
therefore  assumed  a  milder  tone.'*  The  British  govern- 
ment quickly  responded,  and  the  irritation  produced  by 
the  affair  disappeared.'* 

But  the  Transit  Company's  buildings  remained  on 
Point  Arenas  and,  in  consequence,  bad  feeling  con- 
tinued between  the  company  and  Greytown.  At  first 
the  feeling  was  largely  on  the  side  of  the  latter,  which 
bitterly  resented  the  commercial  monopoly  maintained 
by  the  company,  but  soon  the  enmity  of  the  Transit 
Company  was  increased  by  the  loss  of  large  amounts 
of  goods  stolen  from  their  stores,  apparently  in  retalia- 
tion, by  their  neighbors  in  the  community  across  the 
river.  When  the  company  demanded  the  return  of  the 
goods  and  the  pimishment  of  the  offenders,  the  town 

^  Ibid.         ^  Ibid.,  246-247.        ^^  Ibid.,  2$2-2SS-        ^^  Ibid.,  255-257. 
"  Ibid.,  257-258.        ^^  Ibid..  25S.        ^  Ibid.,  257-258. 


174     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

officials  refused  to  take  any  action."  This  was  the 
situation  in  the  summer  of  1854  just  before  the  second 
clash  came. 

The  initial  act  of  the  second  difficulty  was  the  shoot- 
ing of  a  negro  citizen  of  Greytown  by  Captain  Smith  of 
the  Routh,  one  of  the  Transit  Company's  steamers. 
Smith's  vessel  ran  into  a  bungo  of  merchandise  belong- 
ing to  the  negro,  and  in  the  quarrel  that  followed  the 
negro  met  his  death."  This  took  place  some  miles  up 
the  San  Juan  River.  Borland,  the  United  States  minis- 
ter to  Central  America,  happened  to  be  aboard  the 
Routh  at  the  time,  but  apparently  he  made  no  attempt 
to  interfere." 

After  the  vessel  returned  to  Greytown,  the  municipal 
authorities  attempted  to  arrest  Smith  on  the  charge  of 
murder.  The  latter  resisted  and  Borland  went  to  his 
aid,  informing  the  marshal  of  the  place  that  the  United 
States  government  recognized  no  authority  as  existing 
at  Greytown  to  arrest  an  American  citizen.  When,  a 
few  minutes  later,  a  body  of  men  who  had  accompanied 
the  marshal  in  a  boat  to  the  steamer's  side  threatened 
to  board  the  Routh  and  attack  the  captain,  Borland 
ordered  them  off  with  a  gun.  This  produced  quiet,  and 
the  marshal  withdrew.^ 

But  in  the  evening  of  the  same  day  an  attempt  was 
made  to  arrest  Borland  while  he  was  at  the  home  of 
Fabens,  the  United  States  consul  at  the  port.  A  num- 
ber of  people  gathered  about  Fabens's  house,  and. 
during  a  conversation  between  Borland  and  the  mayor 
of  the  town,  some  one  in  the  crowd  threw  a  broken 

**  U.  S.  Docs.,  ser.  no.  734,  doc.   126,  pp.   19,  20,  32-25. 

"Ibid.,  ser.  no.  918,  doc.  9,  p.  8. 

'"Ibid.,  p.    9. 

^  Ibid.,  ser.  no.  734,  doc.    126,  p.   i6. 


DEFIANCE  OF  BRITISH  CLAIMS,  1853-1855      175 

bottle  at  Borland,  slightly  wounding-  him.  The  mayor 
stated  that  the  second  attempt  at  arrest  was  made  with- 
out his  authority,  so  the  gathering  soon  dispersed,  but 
an  armed  force  was  stationed  between  the  consulate  and 
the  harbor,  thus  keeping  the  American  minister  a  pris- 
oner throughout  the  night.'' 

At  a  meeting  held  in  the  morning  aboard  the  North- 
ern Light,  one  of  the  company's  steamers  about  to  sail 
for  New  York,  it  was  decided  that  the  persons  and 
property  of  American  citizens  were  not  safe  from 
aggression."  Consequently,  Borland  made  arrange- 
ments with  fifty  of  the  passengers,  who  agreed  to 
remain  over  and  afford  the  necessary  protection ;  and 
he  himself  returned  to  the  United  States  aboard  the 
Northern  Light  for  the  purpose  of  laying  the  whole 
subject  before  his  government.*^  Fabens  also  reported 
the  matter  to  Washington,  by  letter,  expressing  the 
opinion  that  frequent  visits  of  a  United  States  man-of- 
war  would  have  a  beneficial  effect  upon  all  concerned." 

In  consequence  of  the  reports  of  Borland  and  Fabens, 
and  of  previous  complaints  on  the  part  of  the  Transit 
Company,^'  the  American  government  determined  to 
send  the  Cyane  to  the  scene  of  difficulties.  In  his 
instructions  Hollins  was  told  to  consult  with  Fabens 
and  learn  the  truth  regarding  the  actions  of  the  Grey- 
town  citizens.  "  It  is  very  desirable  ",  wrote  the  secre- 
tary of  the  navy,  "  that  these  people  should  be  taught 
that  the  United  States  will  not  tolerate  these  outrages, 
and  that  they  have  the  power  and  the  determination  to 
check  them.  It  is,  however,  very  much  to  be  hoped 
that  you  can  effect  the  purposes  of  your  visit  without 

^  Ibid.,  -p.  17.         **  Ibid.         *^Ibid..  pp.    17,    18. 

''-Ibid.,  ser.  no.  702,  doc.  85,  pp.   lo-ii. 

*'  von   Hoist,   History   of   the    United   States,    V,    12. 


176     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

a  resort  to  violence  and  destruction  of  property  and  loss 
of  life.  The  presence  of  your  vessel  will,  no  doubt, 
work  much  good.  The  department  reposes  much  in 
your  prudence  and  good  sense."  " 

On  June  9,  Marcy  wrote  to  Fabens  instructing  him 
to  co-operate  with  Hollins.  Goods  belonging  to  the 
Transit  Company,  he  stated,  had  been  stolen  and  with- 
held by  the  people  or  authorities  of  Grey  town.  It  was 
hoped  that  the  town  would  have  adjusted  that  matter 
to  the  entire  satisfaction  of  the  company,  and  thus 
would  have  relieved  Hollins  from  the  "  disagreeable 
necessity  of  taking  any  action  with  regard  to  the  sub- 
ject ".  The  American  minister  to  Central  America  had 
been  insulted  by  the  authorities  or  people  of  Greytown, 
Marcy  continued,  and  nothing  short  of  an  apology 
would  save  the  place  from  the  infliction  which  such  an 
act  justly  merited.  It  was  expected  that  this  apology 
would  be  promptly  made,  and  satisfactory  assurances 
given  of  future  good  conduct  towards  the  United  States 
and  its  agents  who  might  in  future  be  sent  to  the  place.* 

The  peculiar  character  of  the  above  instructions 
immediately  attracts  attention.  They  implicitly 
directed  that  in  case  of  necessity  violence  should  be 
used  against  Greytown,  but  left  entirely  to  Hollins  and 
Fabens  the  determination  of  the  necessity,  as  well  as 
of  the  degree  of  violence  to  be  employed.  Such  instruc- 
tions seem  to  indicate  a  desire  actually  to  test  the  British 
protectorate  over  Greytown,  as  well  as  a  resolve  to 
ignore  the  agreement,  made  with  Great  Britain  two 
years  before,  to  protect  the  de  facto  government  of  the 
place.     This  defiant  attitude  of  the  American  govern- 

"  U.  S.  Docs.,  ser.,  no.  734,  doc.  126,  p.  2. 
**  Ibid.,  pp.   19-20. 


J 


DEFIANCE  OF  BRITISH  CLAIMS,  1853-1855      177 

inent  seems  to  have  been  produced  by  the  unsatisfactory 
condition  of  the  general  Central  American  question. 
But  two  or  three  weeks  before  the  instructions  were 
sent  to  Fabens  and  Hollins,  Marcy  had  received  from 
Buchanan  Clarendon's  statement  of  May  2,  presenting 
formally  and  officially  the  view  that  the  Clayton-Bulwer 
treaty  was  prospective  in  its  operation,  and  did  not 
apply  to  existing  British  possessions  in  Central  Amer- 
ica. This  unreasonable  stand  apparently  led  the  Amer- 
ican government  to  use  the  opportunity  offered  by  the 
situation  at  Greytown  with  the  aim  of  convincing  Great 
Britain  that  such  an  interpretation  of  the  treaty  would 
not  be  tolerated,  and  that  complete  abandonment  of 
former  claims  in  Central  America  was  essential  to  the 
preservation  of  friendly  relations  with  the  United 
States. 

The  instructions  to  Hollins  and  Fabens  had  been 
made  known  to  the  Transit  Company  and  were  quite 
in  harmony  with  its  wishes  and  plans.  In  fact,  judg- 
ing from  a  letter  written  June  16,  1854,  by  White, 
counsel  for  the  company,  to  Fabens,  a  quiet  understand- 
ing existed  between  the  American  government,  Hollins, 
Fabens,  and  the  company.  Much  discretion  had  been 
given  Fabens,  White  wrote,  and  he  hoped  that  it  would 
"  not  be  exercised  to  show  any  mercy  to  the  town  or 
people.  ...  If  the  scoundrels  are  severely  punished  ", 
he  continued,  "  we  can  take  possession  and  build  it  up 
as  a  business  place,  put  in  our  own  officers,  transfer  the 
jurisdiction,  and  you  know  the  rest.  It  is  of  the  last 
importance  that  the  people  of  the  town  should  be  taught 
to  fear  us.  Punishment  will  teach  them,  after  which 
you  must  agree  with  them  as  to  the  organization  of  a 
new  Government  and  the  officers  of  it.  Everything  now 
13 


178     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

depends  on  you  and  Hollins.  The  latter  is  all  right. 
He  fully  understands  the  outrage,  and  will  not  hesitate 
in  enforcing  reparation."  ** 

The  instructions  were  executed  by  Fabens  and  Hol- 
lins, aided  by  Scott,  agent  of  the  company  at  Grey  town. 
Before  the  arrival  of  the  Cyane,  Fabens.  as  directed, 
notified  the  inhabitants  of  the  town  that  the  United 
States  government  required  reparation  for  the  wrongs 
committed  by  them,  but  had  received  no  reply."  He 
learned  from  private  sources,  however,  that  the  town 
neither  intended  to  pay  damages  nor  to  apologize  for 
the  insult  to  Borland."  As  soon  as  he  arrived,  Hollins 
communicated  with  Fabens  and  the  two  decided  to 
renew  the  demands  already  made.  After  consultation 
with  Scott,  it  was  determined  to  call  for  $24,000  dam- 
ages for  the  loss  of  goods  belonging  to  the  Transit 
Company,''  and  an  apology  for  the  insult  to  Borland, 
with  an  assurance  of  future  good  behavior."" 

Accordingly,  on  July  1 1  such  a  demand  was  made  by 
Fabens."  This  demand  was  likewise  unheeded,  and 
HoUins,  after  consultation  with  the  others,  decided  to 
give  the  town  twenty- four  hours  in  which  to  render 
satisfaction.  Hence,  on  the  following  day  at  Hollins's 
order  a  proclamation  was  posted  in  public  places  about 

**  Inclosvire  in  Crampton  to  Clarendon,  Sept.  lo,  1855,  F.  O.,  Am., 
vol.  623,  no.  188.  There  seems  to  be  no  reason  for  doubting  the  authen- 
ticity of  this  letter.  It  was  printed  in  the  newspapers  and  appears  no' 
to  have  been  questioned.  Moreover,  the  proposed  scheme  was  quite  ir 
harmony  with  the  company's  well-known  character. 

"  U.  S.  Docs.,  ser.  no.  734,  doc.  126,  p.  29. 

«  Ibid. 

*"  In  the  opinion  of  Clarendon,  this  was  an  unreasonable  sum  (Claren- 
don to  Crampton,  Aug.  31,  1854,  F.  O.,  Am.,  vol.  591,  no.  191),  and, 
though  there  are  no  means  of  verifying  this  opinion,  a  knowledge  of 
the  circumstances  leads  to  the  belief  that  it  was  correct. 

"'  U.  S.   Docs.,   ser.   no.   734,  doc.    126,   p.   9. 

"  Ibid. 


DEFIANCE  OF  BRITISH  CLAIMS.  1853-1S55      I79 

the  town,  declaring  that  if  the  demands  were  not  met 
by  nine  o'clock  the  next  morning  the  place  would  be 
bombarded."  A  body  of  marines  sent  by  Hollins 
secured  the  arms  and  ammunition  which  were  at  the 
station  house/^  At  the  same  time  Scott  invited  the 
women  and  children  and  the  aged  and  infirm  as  well  as 
all  who  would  declare  themselves  well-disposed  towards 
the  United  States  to  take  refuge  in  the  river  steamers 
of  the  company.'"  But  only  about  twelve  availed  them- 
selves of  the  oflfer.*" 

While  these  things  were  taking  place,  the  British 
schooner  Bermuda  with  Lieutenant  Jolly  in  charge  lay 
in  the  harbor.  Hollins  notified  Jolly  of  his  intentions,"" 
and  the  latter  entered  a  solemn  protest  against  the  pro- 
posed action.  The  town,  he  pointed  out,  was  entirely 
defenseless  and  the  force  under  his  command  was 
totally  inadequate  to  protect  the  place  against  the 
Cyane"  Hollins  expressed  regret  that  Jolly  considered 
a  protest  necessary,  but  declared  that  he,  Hollins,  must 
enforce  the  reparation  demanded  by  his  government.'^' 

As  no  attention  had  been  paid  to  any  of  the  demands 
made  in  behalf  of  the  United  States  government,  on  the 
morning  of  July  13  Hollins  opened  bombardment. 
When  the  bombardment  was  over,  the  buildings  spared 
by  the  guns  of  the  Cyane  were  set  afire  by  Hollins's 
orders,  and  the  town  was  thus  totally  destroyed."' 

Hollins's  action  met  with  strong  condemnation  from 
the  American  press  and  people.^"  The  New  York 
Times  was  particularly  bitter,  and,  assuming  that  the 

^^  Ibid.,  pp.  6-7,  9-10.  ^  Ibid.,  p.    10.  ^*  Ibid.,  p.  10,  30. 

^^Ibid.,  p.  31.         ^  Ibid.,  p.  7.         «  7bi(J.         ^^  Ibid.,  pp.  7-8. 

^' Ibid.,  ser.  no.  702,  doc.  85,  p.  29. 

'"New  York  Times,  July  26,  31,  Aug.  i,  2,  1854;  New  York  Tribune, 
Aug.  2,  3,  s,  16,  1854;  Boston  Transcript,  July  28,  29,  Aug.  3,  1854; 
Boston  Post,  July  31,  1854;  von  Hoist,  History,  V,  12. 


i8o     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

action  was  directed  or  approved  by  the  government, 
intimated  that  the  terms  of  the  Clayton-Biilwer  treaty 
had  been  broken,  and  denounced  President  Pierce  for 
a  violation  o,f  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States,  on 
the  ground  that  Congress  alone  could  declare  war." 
The  Times  was  an  opposition  paper,  but  the  best  ele- 
ments of  the  Democrats  themselves  felt  that  they  could 
not  honestly  defend  the  deed/'"  The  fact  that  resolu- 
tions from  both  houses  of  Congress,  asking  for  the 
correspondence  upon  the  subject,  with  a  copy  of  Hol- 
lins's  instructions,  were  carried  by  a  large  majority 
and  in  spite  of  administrative  opposition  was  indicative 
of  the  general  disapprobation  of  the  country."* 

The  attitude  of  the  British  government  towards  the 
destruction  of  Greytown  is  of  decided  interest  in  view 
of  the  declaration,  which  the  government  had  repeatedly 
made,  that  the  place  was  under  British  protection  and 
would  remain  so  until  terms  could  be  agreed  upon  for 
its  disposal.  The  town  had  been  utterly  destroyed  by 
a  United  States  war  vessel.  The  protectorate  was  thus 
finally  put  to  a  test. 

Throughout  England  the  affair  was,  of  course,  dis- 
approved, regretfully  by  those  friendly  to  the  United 
States,  and  savagely  by  newspapers  like  the  London 
Times.^*  As  usual,  this  paper  reflected  the  views  of  the 
government.  Clarendon,  writing  to  Crampton  on 
August  31,  1854,  declared  the  outrage  to  be  "  without 
a  parallel  in  the  annals  of  modern  times  ",'"'  but  added 
that  it  was  a  consolation  to  learn,  as  he  had  from 

•"  New  York  Times,  Aug.  1,  1854. 
"'  von  Hoist,  History,  V,  9-10. 

""'Crampton  to  Clarendon,  July  31,  1854,  F.  O.,  Am.,  vol.  598,  no.  204; 
Griffith  to  Hammond,  Aug.  20,  1854,  "  Private  ",  ibid.,  vol.  598. 
"  Buchanan,  Works,  IX,  248. 
*^  F.  0.,  Am.,  vol.   598,  no.    191. 


DEFIANCE  OF  BRITISH  CLAIMS,  1853-1855      181 

Cranipton,  that  the  deed  had  been  indignantly  repro- 
bated by  public  opinion  in  the  United  States,  and  he  had 
no  doubt  that  these  feelings  would  be  shared  by  the 
American  government."' 

Upon  first  learning  of  the  matter,  Buchanan  had 
promptly  assured  the  British  government  of  his  convic- 
tion that  Hollins's  act  was  without  authority  and  would 
be  disavowed  by  the  United  States."  Marcy,  however, 
seems  to  have  been  placed  in  a  quandary  by  the  situation. 
It  is  possible  that  Hollins's  measures  were  more  ex- 
treme than  had  been  desired  by  the  American  govern- 
ment,'' but  in  view  of  the  instructions  furnished  him, 
they  could  hardly  be  disavowed.  On  the  other  hand, 
American  public  opinion,  which  was  probably  much 
more  adverse  than  had  been  expected,  had  to  be  con- 
sidered ;  and  the  British  government  had  to  be  reck- 
oned with.  In  this  dilemma  it  was  evidently  thought 
best  to  avoid  discussion  as  long  as  possible.  Accord- 
ingly, when  approached  by  Cranipton  regarding  the 
subject,  Afarcy  replied  that  for  the  present  he  must 
decline  expressing  any  opinion,  as  the  matter  was  under 
consideration  of  the  American  government."'  A  little 
later  when  Cranipton  broached  the  subject,  Marcy 
declared  that  he  could  not  yet  speak  officially  regarding 
it,  as  he  had  not  heard  from  the  President.  But  during 
this  conversation,  he  tried  to  make  much  of  the  fact 

«"  Ibid. 

«  Buchanan,  Works,  IX,  248. 

^  On  August  8,  Marcy  wrote  in  a  private  letter  to  Buchanan:  "The 
occurrence  at  Greytown  is  an  embarrassing  affair.  The  place  merited 
chastisement,  but  the  severity  of  the  one  inflicted  exceeded  our  expecta- 
tions. The  Government  will,  however,  I  think,  stand  by  Capt.  Hollins." 
Ibid.,  242.  Marcy  may  have  been  perfectly  sincere  in  this  statement,  but 
in  view  of  Buchanan's  expectation  of  a  disavowal,  in  a  letter  to  Buchanan 
Marcy  would  scarcely  have  commended  the  act. 

*' Crampton  to  Clarendon,  July  31,   1854,  F-  O.,  Am.,  vol.  598,  no.  204. 


i82     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

that  the  principal  ringleaders  of  Greytown  had  been 
received  aboard  Jolly's  vessel,  and,  as  Crampton  ex- 
pressed it,  showed  an  attempt  to  shift  the  blame  for  an 
unpopular  act  to  the  shoulders  of  a  British  officer/" 

On  September  21,  when  more  than  two  months  had 
passed  without  a  disavowal  or  an  explanation  from  the 
American  government,  Clarendon  again  addressed  the 
British  minister  at  Washington.  The  British  govern- 
ment, he  wrote,  had  confidently  expected  the  outrages 
and  wrongs  committed  at  Greytown  to  be  indignantly 
disavowed  by  the  United  States  government  as  they  had 
been  by  the  American  people,  but  had  seen  with  sur- 
prise and  regret  that  the  sentiments  of  the  people  had 
not  been  re-echoed  by  the  cabinet  at  Washington,  and 
that  so  long  a  time  had  been  allowed  to  elapse  without 
Hollins's  conduct  being  disavowed.  Crampton  was 
instructed  to  read  this  letter  to  Marcy." 

Finally,  in  the  President's  message  of  December  4, 
1854,  a  definite  stand  was  taken  by  the  American 
government.  The  message  gave  a  detailed  account  of 
the  bombardment  and  the  events  connected  with  it, 
but  with  such  omissions  "  and  misrepresentations  "  as 

'"Crampton  to  Clarendon,  Sept.  i8,  1854,  ibid.,  no.  229.  The  charges 
made  against  Jolly  were  promptly  investigated  by  order  of  the  British 
government,  and  Jolly  was  completely  exonerated.  Fanshawe  to  the 
Secretary  of  the  Admiralty,  Nov.  25,  1854,  .-Vd.  Sec.  In-Letters,  5629, 
no.  204. 

"  F.  O.,  Am.,  vol.  591,  no.  198. 

"  For  instance,  the  message  failed  to  state  that  before  the  bombard- 
ment began  arms  and  ammunition  had  been  removed  from  Greytown  and 
put  aboard  the  Cyane. 

"  The  message  declared  Greytown  to  be  a  "  marauding  establishment 
too  dangerous  to  be  disregarded  and  too  guilty  to  pass  unpunished,  and 
yet  incapable  of  being  treated  in  any  other  way  than  as  a  piratical  resort 
of  outlaws  or  a  camp  of  savages  depredating  on  emigrant  trains  or 
caravans  and  the  frontier  settlements  of  civilized  states ",  which  was 
only  partly  true.     Richardson,  Messages  and  Papers,  V,  282.     Further- 


DEFIANCE  OF  BRITISH  CLAIMS,  1853-1855      183 

to  leave  an  erroneous  impression  of  the  incident.  In 
concluding  his  consideration  of  the  matter,  the  Presi- 
dent wrote :  "  It  certainly  would  have  been  most  satis- 
factory to  me  if  the  object  of  the  Cyane's  mission  could 
have  been  consummated  without  any  act  of  public  force, 
but  the  arrogant  contumacy  of  the  offenders  rendered 
it  impossible  to  avoid  the  alternative  either  to  break  up 
their  establishment  or  to  leave  them  impressed  with  the 
idea  that  they  might  persevere  with  impunity  in  a  career 
of  insolence  and  plunder."  " 

Thus  the  American  government  tried  to  justify  the 
act  of  its  official,  and,  in  view  of  the  instructions  sent 
to  Hollins  and  Fabens,  it  is  rather  difficult  to  see  what 
other  course  was  possible.  But  the  whole  affair  was 
unjustifiable.  It  is  true  that  the  insult  to  Borland  and 
the  depredations  upon  the  property  of  the  Transit  Com- 
pany demanded  some  action  on  the  part  of  the  United 
States  government,  but  to  bombard  and  then  burn  a 
town  deserted  by  its  inhabitants,  and  thus  to  destroy 
the  property  of  the  innocent  with  that  of  the  guilty,  was 
an  act  unworthy  of  a  civilized  nation.  Furthermore, 
in  considering  the  guilt  of  the  Greytown  people  it 
should  be  remembered  that  there  were  mitigating  cir- 
cumstances. Because  of  Hollins's  interference,  their 
grievance  of  the  preceding  year  against  the  Transit 

more,  the  message  stated  that  Hollins  had  appealed  to  Jolly  "  to  interpose 
and  persuade  them  (the  people  of  Greytown)  to  take  some  course 
calculated  to  save  the  necessity  of  resorting  to  the  extreme  measures 
indicated  in  his  proclamation."  Ibid.,  283.  Neither  the  report  of  Fabens 
nor  that  of  Hollins  justify  such  a  statement.  Moreover,  nearly  a  month 
before  the  President's  message  appeared,  Jolly  distinctly  stated  in  reply 
to  a  question  from  the  Admiralty  that  Hollins  "  did  at  no  time  entreat 
or  request  him  to  exert  his  influence  with  the  authorities  at  Greytown 
to  act  differently  ".  Inclosure  in  Fanshawe  to  the  Secretary  of  the 
Admiralty,  Nov.  25,  1854,  Ad.  Sec.  In-Letters,  5629,  no.  204. 
'■*  Richardson,  Messages  and  Papers,  V,  280-284. 


i84     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

Company  still  existed ;  and  Borland  had  protected  the 
murderer  of  one  of  their  number,  who  had  apparently 
been  innocent  of  any  offense. 

The  President's  message  was  practically  the  last 
word  between  the  two  countries  upon  the  general  sub- 
ject of  the  bombardment.  The  British  government  had 
asked  for  a  disavowal  of  the  act,  and  the  President  had 
replied  by  defending  it.  The  British  government  did 
not  press  the  matter  further."  The  protectorate  over 
Mosquito,  like  the  kingdom  which  it  pretended  to  pro- 
tect, was  but  a  shadow  when  a  strong  nation  was  the 
aggressor. 

It  may  be  suggested  that  had  not  the  British  govern- 
ment been  embarrassed  by  the  Crimean  War  at  the 
time,  HoUins's  proceedings  might  have  had  more  seri- 
ous results.  It  is  possible  that  in  such  case  the  call  for 
disavowal  might  have  been  worded  less  mildly,  and  the 
correspondence  might  have  taken  on  a  more  belligerent 
tone,  but  it  is  unlikely  that  the  affair  would  have  gone 
beyond  this.  The  protest  and  call  for  disavowal  by  the 
British  government  were  merely  made  for  the  purpose 
of  saving — or  trying  to  save — British  dignity.  If  a 
disavowal  could  be  obtained,  so  much  the  better;  if 
not,  the  matter  would  be  dropped.  The  British  govern- 
ment fully  realized  that  a  war  over  such  a  flimsy  pretext 
as  the  Mosquito  kingdom  would  not  only  receive  the 
condemnation  of  the  world  at  large,  but,  what  was 

'■*  In  conversation  with  lUichanan,  Clarendon  severely  criticised  the 
presidential  message  relative  to  the  destruction  of  Grcytown,  which 
Buchanan  in  turn  defended.     Buchanan,  H'orks.  IX,  337. 

The  Nicaruguan  government  had  also  protested  against  Ilollins's  act, 
hut  it  had  not  ventured  to  demand  a  disavowal  of  the  act.  Grifluh  to 
Hammond,  .Aug.  :<7,   1854,  "  Private",  F.  O.,  .\ni.,  vol.  598. 


DEFIANCE  OF  BRITISH  CLAIMS,  1853-1855      185 

more  to  the  point,  would  also  fail  to  receive  either  the 
approval  or  the  support  of  the  British  people." 

In  addition  to  a  disavowal  of  the  outrage,  the  British 
government  had  attempted  to  secure  indemnity  for 
property  of  British  subjects  which  had  been  destroyed 
by  Hollins.  In  accordance  with  instructions,  Cramp- 
ton  informed  Marcy  that  his  government  considered 
compensation  due  for  these  losses ; '"  but  the  Secretary 
of  State  gave  little  reason  to  believe  that  such  damages 
would  be  paid,  and  took  the  ground  that  as  the  inhabi- 
tants of  the  town  formed  a  sort  of  de  facto  government, 
they  had  no  claim  to  protection  on  countries  of  which 
they  were  natives.'*  However,  Wheeler,  a  new  minis- 
ter to  Central  America,  with  Fabens,  was  instructed  to 
investigate  the  claims  for  damages  presented  by  various 
nations,"  and  for  a  time  Marcy  held  out  some  hope  that 
"  innocent  sojourners  "  at  the  place  might  be  compen- 
sated ; '"  but  later  he  stated  that  so  far  as  he  had  been 
able  to  examine  the  reports  sent  in  no  such  persons 
existed.*'  He  informed  Crampton,  however,  that  Amer- 
ican citizens  who  claimed  damages  were  treated  just 
as  the  people  of  other  countries.*'    Finally,  after  Cramp- 

'*  The  attitude  of  the  British  public  regarding  the  subject  was  reflected 
in  the  press  in  the  spring  of  1853.  The  London  Globe  for  March  3 
remarked  that  if  cause  for  war  with  the  United  States  were  wanted,  the 
very  positive  grounds  necessary  for  a  quarrel  with  kinfolk  "  should  not 
be  mixed  up  with  the  assertion  of  anything  quite  so  aboriginal  as  the 
ill-defined  rights,  titles,  and  dominions  of  the  tawny, — and  to  confess  the 
truth, — somewhat  trumpery  majesty  of  Mosquito."  And  the  News  for 
April  2  expressed  the  opinion  that  the  sooner  the  British  government  gave 
up  its  interference  in  the  paltry  squabbles  of  the  savages  of  Mosquitia, 
and  the  semi-savages  of  Honduras  and  Nicaragua,  the  better  it  would 
be  for  its  reputation. 

"Clarendon  to  Crampton,  Aug.  31,  1854,  F.  O.,  Am.,  vol.  591,  no.   191. 

'^  Crampton  to  Clarendon,  Sept.  18,  1854,  ibid.,  vol.  598,  no.  229. 

'°  Clarendon  to  Crampton,   Feb.    16,   1855,  ibid.,  vol.   616,  no.   32. 

*"  Crampton  to  Clarendon,  Mar.  12,  1855,  ibid.,  vol.  620,  no.  60; 
Crampton  to  Clarendon,  July  16,  1855,  ibid.,  vol.  622,  no.  136. 

*«  Ibid.  "  Ibid. 


i86     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

ton  had  repeatedly  called  the  attention  of  the  American 
government  to  the  subject  of  claims,*"  the  Foreign  Sec- 
retary consulted  the  law  officers  of  the  Crown  with 
regard  to  it  and  was  informed  by  them  that  as  the 
United  States  government  had  adopted  the  acts  of  its 
naval  officer,  it  could  not,  in  accordance  with  the  prin- 
ciples of  international  law,  be  called  upon  to  make 
compensation  to  British  subjects  for  the  losses  occa- 
sioned to  them  by  those  acts.  In  a  confidential  note 
Clarendon  made  known  this  opinion  to  Crampton,  and 
added  that  it  was  of  great  importance  that  a  maritime 
power  like  England  should  uphold  the  doctrines  of 
international  law  thus  laid  down,  since  her  fleets  were 
likely  often  to  be  engaged  in  hostilities  against  seaport 
towns.  Consequently,  he  wrote,  the  British  govern- 
ment did  not  think  it  advisable  that  Crampton  should 
officially  press  the  Greytown  claims."  With  this  the 
matter  was  dropped  and  no  claims  were  ever  paid  by 
the  United  States  for  damages  caused  by  the  bombard- 
ment of  Greytown. 

Long  before  the  correspondence  arising  from  the 
bombardment  ended,  there  had  grown  from  the  rumors 
of  armed  expeditions  to  be  sent  from  the  United  States 
to  Central  America  a  reality  which  in  time  roused  the 
old  British  suspicion  of  American  designs  on  the  isth- 
mus, and  struck  terror  to  the  hearts  of  the  Central 
American  republics.  This  was  the  filibustering  move- 
ment. Early  in  1854  reports  were  abroad  that  an 
American  colonization  society  had  secured  certain  lands 

"^Crampton  to  Clarendon,  Mar.  12,  1855,  F.  O.,  Am.,  vol.  Oio,  no.  60; 
Clarendon  to  Crampton,  May  21,  1855,  ibid.,  vol.  616,  no.  100;  Crampton 
to  Clarendon,  July  16,  1855,  F.  O.,  .\m.,  vol.  622,  no.  ij6;  Jan.  a8,  1856, 
ihid.,  vol.  640,  no.  1 1. 

"  Ibid.,  vol.  638,  no.  45. 


DEFIANCE  OF  BRITISH  CLAIMS,  1853-1855      187 

in  the  Mosquito  territory."'  These  reports  evidently 
had  reference  to  an  organization  called  the  Central 
American  Agricultural  and  Mining  Association,  formed 
by  Colonel  Kinney  of  Philadelphia.'"  The  land  in  which 
the  association  was  interested  lay  to  the  south  of  the 
San  Juan,  in  territory  claimed  by  Nicaragua,  and  was 
part  of  a  grant  made  in  1839  to  Peter  and  Samuel 
Shepherd  of  Georgia  by  the  Mosquito  king."  The 
organization  professed  that  its  object  was  the  coloniza- 
tion of  this  territory  and  the  development  of  its  re- 
sources.^ 

When  this  report,  somewhat  exaggerated,  was  added 
to  the  rumors  regarding  aid  to  be  sent  Squier,"  the 
British  government  took  a  further  precautionary  step. 
Though  it  felt  that  such  expeditions  would  not  be  coun- 
tenanced by  the  United  States  government,  there  still 
remained  the  danger  that  they  might  escape  the  vigi- 
lance of  the  American  authorities.  Consequently,  on 
March  9,  1854,  Clarendon  instructed  Wyke  to  give 
warning,  confidentially,  to  the  Central  American  repub- 
lics to  which  his  commission  extended."" 

But  the  recent  American  policy  in  Mexico  had 
already  roused  these  states  to  keen  watchfulness  of 
their  northern  neighbor.  All  except  Honduras  were 
now  thoroughly  frightened,  and  turned  towards  Eng- 
land for  protection.  The  situation  offers  an  interesting 
contrast  to  that  which  existed  upon  Squier's  arrival  in 

**  Bowen  to  Wyke,  Feb.  25,  1854,  F.  O.,  Cen.  Am.,  vol.  82,  no.  3. 

^  Crarapton  to  Clarendon,  Dec.   11,   1854,  F.  O.,  .\m.,  vol.  600,  no.  89. 

"  Stout,  Nicaragua,  171-172. 

^  Ibid..   1-3. 

*°  It  seems  likely  that  the  rumors  that  Squier  intended  to  drive  the 
British  from  Mosquito  and  Ruatan  had  their  origin  in  the  preparations 
of  the  Kinney  expedition.  There  is  no  evidence  to  prove  that  Squier 
ever  contemplated  such  action. 

^  F.  O.,  Cen.  Am.,  vol.  82,  no.  5. 


i88     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

1849,  when  three  of  the  states  turned  eagerly  towards 
the  United  States  for  protection  against  British  en- 
croachments. Though  Guatemala  had  not  forgotten] 
her  old  claims  on  Belize  territory,  in  the  last  part  of 
1853  the  prime  minister  of  the  republic  approached 
Wyke  expressing  a  desire  to  settle  the  Belize  bounda- 
ries by  secret  treaty  with  Great  Britain,  in  order  to 
protect  his  state  from  American  designs,"  his  idea 
apparently  being  that  the  American  government  might 
use  the  boundary  dispute  as  an  excuse  for  intervention. 
But  the  British  government  prudently  replied  that  this 
would  not  be  conducive  to  the  interest  of  Guatemala,  as 
such  a  treaty  would  be  more  Hkely  to  produce  than 
avert  the  dangers  anticipated  from  American  encroach- 
ments.°"  A  little  later  Nicaragua  revealed  her  fears  by 
soliciting  a  treaty  which  would  bring  her  into  closer 
relations  with  the  British  government.  She  even  prom- 
ised to  let  her  Mosquito  claims  lie  dormant,  in  the  hope 
that  the  Indians  would  later  voluntarily  unite  them- 
selves with  her,  and  offered  to  acknowledge  Greylown 
a  free  port  imder  the  protection  of  all  nations.'"  The 
matter  was  presented  by  Wyke  to  his  government,  but 
Clarendon  replied  that  if  a  treaty  should  be  formed  with 
Nicaragua  it  was  expedient  that  some  mention  be  made 
of  the  Mosquito  territory."*  Wyke  believed  that  Span- 
ish pride  would  prevent  the  Nicaraguans  from  acknowl- 
edging the  independence  of  the  Mosquitos,  so  it  was 
thought  best  to  let  the  matter  rest  for  a  while.*' 

"Savage  to  Webster,  April  21,  1851,  Dept.  of  State,  Ues.,  Guat.,  vol. 
3,  no.  6;  Wyke  to  Clarendon,  Nov.  27,  1853,  F.  O.,  Cen.  Am.,  vol.  rp. 
no.  37;  Clarendon  to  Wyke,  Jan.  19,  1854,  F.  O.,  Cen.  .\ni..  vol.  82,  no.  .1. 

"■■'  Ibid. 

11:1  Wyke  to  Clarendon,  Mar.   13,  i8r,4,  il'id.,  no.  9. 

"*  Ibid.,  no.  7. 

iti  Wyke  to  Clarendon,  July  29,  1854,  ibid.,  no.  22. 


DEFIANCE  OF  BRITISH  CLAIMS,  1853-1835      189 

Meanwhile,  however,  the  British  government,  though 
on  the  verge  of  the  Crimean  War,  had  not  been  indif- 
ferent on  its  own  account  to  the  reports  of  contemplated 
attacks  on  Central  America  by  American  citizens.  The 
interference  of  the  American  government  in  Mexico 
and  the  filibustering  expeditions  of  William  Walker 
into  that  state  doubtless  quickened  British  attention. 
As  early  as  February  2,  1854,  Clarendon  wrote  to 
Crampton  about  the  matter,  stating  that  such  projects, 
if  carried  out  without  the  knowledge  of  the  United 
States  government,  would  amount  to  buccaneering 
acts ;  and  that  Great  Britain  could  not  believe  that  the 
United  States  would  fail,  on  learning  of  such  inten- 
tions, to  put  an  immediate  stop  to  them.  Crampton 
was  instructed  to  notify  Marcy  immediately  of  these 
views,  and  to  inquire  whether  anything  was  known  of 
the  contemplated  plans,  and  also  whether  means  would 
be  employed  to  prevent  their  execution.** 

About  a  week  later  the  Foreign  Secretary  again 
wrote,  sending  further  information  with  reference  to 
the  proposed  expeditions,  and  directed  Crampton  to 
communicate  with  Marcy  regarding  it.  Should  he  fail 
to  receive  a  satisfactory  reply  from  the  Secretary  of 
State,  he  was  to  express  the  feelings  of  surprise  and 
deep  concern  with  which  the  knowledge  of  these 
manoeuvres  had  been  received  by  the  British  govern- 
ment, which  hoped  that  they  would  not  only  be  dis- 
countenanced, but  prevented,  by  the  United  States ; 
for  it  must  be  obvious  that  if  attempts  should  be  made 
to  execute  such  schemes  other  governments  might  be 
forced  to  take  measures  for  defeating  them — a  course 
which  might  lead  to  misunderstandings  between  Great 

"  F.  O.,  Am.,  vol.  590,  no.  20. 


I90     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

Britain  and  the  United  States."  The  instructions  were 
executed  by  Crampton,  to  whom  Marcy  declared  him- 
self ignorant  of  any  such  designs  as  were  reported,  but 
expressed  the  desire  of  the  American  government  to 
keep  on  good  terms  with  Great  Britain." 

But  Crampton  had  been  preceded,  in  his  representa- 
tions to  the  American  government,  by  Marcoleta,  who 
persistently  labored  to  prevent  the  departure  of  the 
Kinney  expedition.  Later  in  the  year  the  Nicaraguan 
minister  increased  his  efforts,  for  then  the  rumors  took 
more  definite  shape  and  it  was  stated  that  the  coloniza- 
tion association  intended,  if  necessary,  to  use  force  in 
taking  the  land,*^  and  that  the  expedition  also  planned 
to  seize  Greytown.'"  As  many  members  of  the  coloniza- 
tion association  were  also  affiliated  with  the  Transit 
Company,""  there  seemed  good  foundation  for  the  re- 
port. Consequently,  Marcoleta  again  communicated 
with  Marcy,  declaring  that  the  Mosquito  king  could 
not  legally  make  land  grants.'"  Marcy  replied  that  the 
American  government  had  no  power  to  prevent  its 
citizens  from  leaving  the  country  when  "  engaged  in 
business  purposes  ",  and  added  that  the  question  of  the 
validity  of  the  grant  would  have  to  be  settled  between 
the  company  and  the  Nicaraguan  government.'"* 

Though  it  was  more  difficult  to  enforce  the  neutrality 
laws  of  the  United  States  against  the  filibusters  than 
most  foreign  powers  realized,  yet  it  is  quite  evident  that 
the  American  government  did  not  use  its  best  efforts 
to  do  so,  and  that  local  officials  were  at  times  guilty  of 

"'  F.  C,  Am.,  vol.  590,  no.  31. 

"  Crampton  to  Clarendon,  l^Iar.  6,  1854,  ibid.,  vol.  594,  no.  53. 

""Crampton  to  Clarendon,  Dec.  11,  1854,  ibid.,  vol.  600,  no.  89. 

»<»  Ibid.  "«  Ibid.  •»>  Harper's  Magasine,  X.  m^. 

>•"  Crampton  to  Clarendon,  De.-.   11,  1854,  V.  0.,  .Am.,  vol.  600,  no.  89. 


DEFIANCE  OF  BRITISH  CLAIMS.  1853-1855      191 

'gross  neglect  of  duty  in  the  execution  of  orders.  Part 
of  this  neglect  was  undoubtedly  due  to  the  desire  of  the 
South  for  the  extension  of  slave  territory,  but  there 
seems  good  reason  to  believe  that  the  failure  of  the 
British  government  to  withdraw  from  Central  America, 
as  required  by  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty,  also  strongly 
contributed  to  this  indifference  to  international  obli- 
gations. 

Marcoleta's  persistence,  however,  was  not  in  vain. 
Evidently  as  a  direct  consequence  of  his  protests,  a 
correspondence  took  place  between  Marcy  and  Kinney 
with  reference  to  the  proposed  expedition.  The  latter 
declared  that  his  object  was  to  improve  and  occupy  the 
land  within  the  limits  of  his  grant;  everything  was  to 
be  done  peacefully,  without  invading  the  rights  of 
either  communities  or  states.^"^  Marcy  replied  that  if 
the  expedition  was  merely  a  peaceful  emigration,  and 
if  those  connected  with  it  chose  to  abandon  all  claim 
to  protection  from  the  United  States  and  to  submit 
themselves  to  the  jurisdiction  of  some  other  country, 
the  American  government  would  not  interfere  with 
it.'°°  He  expressed  the  determination  of  the  United 
States  government,  however,  to  preserve  the  neutrality 
laws  of  the  nation,^*^  which  required  that  it  prevent  the 
departure  of  any  expedition  intended  to  disturb  the 
peace  of  a  friendly  state. 

This  correspondence  was  published  in  the  Union  of 
February  7,  1855,^"  ^^'^  gave  much  satisfaction  to  those 
concerned  over  the  subject.  A  letter  written  by  Cramp- 
ton  to  Clarendon  a  few  days  later  stated  that  Marcy's 

^'^  Harper's  Magasine,  X,  542. 

^'^Ibid.;  Crampton  to  Clarendon,  Feb.   10,  1855,  F.  O.,  Am.,  vol.  619, 

no.  33.  ^^Ibid.  ^^■' Ibid. 


192     ANGLO-AMERICAS  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

determination  to  enforce  the  neutrality  laws  was  gener- 
ally considered  fatal  to  the  expedition,  for  it  did  not 
seem  likely  that  Kinney  would  persist  in  his  enterprise ' 
in  face  of  the  risk  which  must  now  attach  to  it.'"" 

But  all  hope  that  the  undertaking  had  been  aban- 
doned soon  vanished,  for  in  a  few  weeks  a  letter  de- 
scribing the  proposed  undertaking  was  published  in 
the  newspapers.  It  promised  six  hundred  and  forty 
acres  of  land  to  all  colonists  engaging  to  serve  in  a  i 
military  capacity  for  twelve  months.'™  This  seemed 
to  prove  that,  as  had  been  reported,  the  land  was  to  be 
taken  by  force,  if  necessary.  A  letter  written  by 
Kinney  in  January,  1855,  to  a  prospective  colonist 
reflects  the  same  idea.  After  describing  the  country 
to  be  settled  and  stating  that  the  colonists  should  be 
armed,  Kinney  wrote :  "  We  do  not  suppose  there  will 
be  much  necessity  for  fighting,  but  we  believe  that  the 
establishment  of  such  a  colony  in  that  part  of  the  world 
will  result  in  a  few  years  in  the  entire  control  of  all 
Central  America  by  the  American  people."  '"  The  aim 
was  obviously  to  conquer  Central  America  by  colo- 1 
nization. 

When  the  first-mentioned  letter  appeared  in  the  ■ 
newspapers,  Marcoleta  again  addressed  Marcy,  asking  j 
that  the  United  States  government  prevent  the  "  per-  ; 
fidious  schemes  "  from  being  carried  out."'  This  effort ' 
led  to  investigation  by  the  American  government,  and, 

""  Crampton  to  Clarendon,  I"eb.   lo,  1855,  F.  O.,  .\ni.,  vol.  619,  no.  a. 

*""  Marcoleta  to  Marcy,  Mar.   14,  1855,  Dept.  of  State,  Notes  to  Dept., , 
Cen.   .Am.   I.egat.,  Nic,  vol.  2. 

*'"  Inclosure  in   Ross  to  Clarendon,   Nov.   30,    1855,   F.   O.,  Cen.    Am., 
vol.  87. 

'"  Marcoleta   to    Marcy,    Mar.    1855,    Dept.    of    State,    Notes   to    Pepf., 
Cen.  -Am.  I.egat.,  Nic,  vol.  2. 


DEFIANCE  OF  BRITISH  CLAIMS,  1853-1855      I93 

as  a  result,  on  April  27,  Kinney,  and  Fabens,  who  was 
apparently  his  most  important  colleague,  were  indicted 
on  the  charge  of  preparing  a  military  expedition 
against  Nicaragua."'  However,  when  the  case  came 
up  for  trial  the  two  were  acquitted  for  want  of  suffi- 
cient evidence."^  But  the  latter  was  deprived  of  his 
consular  office,  because  of  the  part  which  he  had  taken 
in  the  affair/"  Nevertheless,  Marcoleta  continued  his 
complaints,"'  and  consequently  the  American  govern- 
ment gave  orders  for  the  detention  of  any  vessel  which 
Kinney  might  attempt  to  use  for  the  purpose  of  his 
expedition.""  But  in  spite  of  these  precautions,  Kinney 
and  several  of  his  associates  escaped  to  Jamaica,  where 
they  waited  a  favorable  opportunity  for  the  execution 
of  their  designs."' 

But  before  Kinney  made  his  escape  the  attention  of 
foreign  diplomats  at  Washington  had  been  attracted  to 
a  more  formidable  foe  to  Central  American  inde- 
pendence. This  was  William  Walker.'"'  On  July  10, 
1855,  Crampton  informed  Clarendon  of  the  aid  given 

"^  U.  S.  Docs.,  ser.  no.  822,  doc.  68,  pp.  8-9. 

"'  Stout,  Nicaragua,  176. 

'i*  Lutnley  to  Clarendon,  May   14,   1855,  F.  O.,  Am.,  vol.  621,  no.   10. 

"'  Marcy  to  Marcoleta,  May  15,  1855,  Dept.  of  State,  Notes  from  Dept., 
Can.  Am.  Legat.,  vol.  i. 

"'  Jbid.,  pp.  80-81. 

"'  Crampton  to  Clarendon,  June  18,  1855,  F.  O.,  Am.,  vol.  621,  no.  124. 
Kinney  soon  reached  Greytown  where  he  remained  for  a  time.  But  he 
seemed  to  give  up  his  plans  for  a  colony  and  later  wandered  in  different 
parts  of  Central  America,  where  he  occasionally  aroused  some  uneasiness 
on  the  part  of  the  British  or  Central  Americans,  but  after  June,  1855,  his 
movements  were  no  longer  a  subject  of  diplomatic  correspondence. 
Sfeymour  to  Bell,  June  17,  1857,  and  Seymour  to  Darling,  Aug.  17,  1857, 
F.  0.,  Hond.,  vol.  3- 

"'  For  an  account  of  Walker's  career  in  Central  America,  see  general 
histories  of  Central  America,  and  also  the  following:  Walker,  War  in 
Nicaragua;  Lucas,  Nicaragua:  War  of  the  Filibutters;  Wells,  Walker's 
Expedition  to  Nicaragua. 

14 


194     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

by  Walker  to  the  Central  American  Liberals,  and  ex- 
pressed the  belief  that  should  a  government  be  estab- 
lished in  Nicaragua  by  either  of  the  contending  parties 
through  the  aid  of  American  auxiliaries,  the  inde- 
pendent existence  of  Nicaragua  might  be  regarded  as 
in  a  very  precarious  condition/"  When  news  of  the 
fall  of  Granada  reached  the  United  States  shortly 
afterwards,  the  concern  of  Crampton  and  of  the  Cen- 
tral American  agents  at  the  capital  was  much  increased, 
for  they  felt  that  Walker  could  not  have  succeeded 
without  aid  from  the  Transit  Company.""  This  state  of 
affairs,  in  the  opinion  of  Crampton,  showed  flagrant 
violation  of  international  duty  on  the  part  of  the  Ameri- 
can government,  as  well  as  an  aim  on  the  part  of 
American  citizens  to  bring  about  the  annexation  of 
Nicaragua  to  the  United  States.^ 

But  though  Crampton  faithfully  sent  in  his  reports 
of  the  filibustering  movement,'"  after  the  first  half  of 
the  year  1854  he  seems  to  have  received  but  few  instruc- 
tions from  his  government  regarding  the  matter.  This 
neglect,  however,  was  probably  not  due  to  indifference, 
but  to  a  realization  that  the  expeditions  had  a  definite 
diplomatic  significance  which  was  at  first  not  suspected. 
The  determined  stand  of  the  United  States  government 
with  reference  to  the  interpretation  of  the  Clayton- 
Bulwer  treaty,  as  well  as  the  bombardment  of  Greytown 
and  the  defense  of  the  act  by  President  Pierce,  had 

"°  F.  O.,  .Am.,  vol.  621,  no.  134. 

*'*  For  a  good  account  of  the  part  played  by  the  Transit  Company, 
see  Scroggs,  "  William  Walker  and  the  Steamship  Corporation  in 
Nicaragua  ",  in  Am.  Hist.  Rev..  X,  793-813. 

'"Crampton  to  Clarendon,  Nov.  13,  1855,  F.  O.,  .\m.,  vol.  634,  no. 
24.^. 

***  Crampton  to  Clarendon,  July  10,  1855,  ibid.,  vol.  631,  no.  134; 
July  30,  1855,  ibid.,  vol.  632,  no.  154;  Nov.  13,  1855,  ibid.,  vol.  634, 
no.  243. 


DEFIANCE  OF  BRITISH  CLAIMS,  1853-1855      195 

evidently  convinced  the  British  government  that  indif- 
ference to  filibustering  was  part  of  American  policy  in 
dealing  with  the  Central  American  question.  In  view 
of  this,  British  protests  might  be  even  worse  than 
useless. 

Marcoleta,  and  Molina,  however,  and  Irisarri,  the 
newly-arrived  representative  of  Salvador  "'  and  Guate- 
mala, continued  and  increased  the  protests  on  behalf  of 
Central  America."*  Perhaps  partly  in  consequence  of 
their  efforts,  the  American  government,  near  the  close 
of  1855,  displayed  a  stronger  sense  of  international 
duty.  Wheeler,  Borland's  successor,  in  spite  of  instruc- 
tions, had  recognized  Walker's  government,  but  his 
act  was  promptly  disavowed  by  the  United  States  and 
the  assurance  given  that  the  American  government 
had  no  intention  of  recognizing  Walker.""  The  favor- 
able impression  made  by  this  announcement  was 
increased  by  the  fact  that  almost  simultaneously  came 
the  refusal  of  the  Washington  authorities  to  receive  a 
representative  sent  by  Walker.""  But  more  effective 
still  in  allaying  the  suspicion  that  the  American  govern- 
ment was  willing  to  connive  at  the  proceedings  of  its 
citizens  in  Central  America  was  the  proclamation  of 
President  Pierce  warning  all  Americans  not  to  take 
part  in  any  hostile  operations  in  Nicaragua,  carried  on 
by  Walker."' 

^"  At  about  this  time  Salvador  tried  to  form  a  treaty  with  England 
for  protection  against  the  filibusters.  Wyke  to  Clarendon,  Nov.  29, 
1835,  F.  O.,  Cen.  Am.,  vol.  85,  no.  57. 

^^*  U.  S.  Docs.,  ser.  no.  822,  doc.  68,  pp.  21,  42-43,  46-47,  48-49. 

"'  Dept.  of  State,  Notes  from  Dept.,  Cen.  Am.  Legat.,  vol.   i,  pp.  99- 

lOI. 

"^^  Crampton  to  Clarendon,  Dec.  17,  1855,  F.  O.,  Am.,  vol.  624.  no.  266; 
Wells,   Walker's  Expedition  to  Nicaragua,   100. 
""  Ibid. 


CHAPTER  VII. 

The  Crisis,  1855-1856;   Signs  of  British  Retreat. 

More  than  a  year  passed  after  Buchanan  presented 
his  second  statement  of  American  views  on  the  Central 
American  question  before  any  serious  attempt  was 
again  made  to  reconcile  the  differences  between  the  two 
governments.  Various  reasons  produced  this  seeming 
unconcern.  The  Foreign  Secretary  was  deeply  en- 
grossed in  the  Crimean  War ;  besides,  he  probably  felt 
after  receiving  Buchanan's  second  paper,  that  the  posi- 
tion which  the  British  government  had  assumed  could 
better  be  maintained  by  evasion  than  by  discussion.' 
Marcy,  too,  had  other  demands  on  his  attention ;  the 
Kansas-Nebraska  struggle  was  on.  Moreover,  since 
the  North  believed  that  the  Democratic  interest  in 
Central  America  originated  largely  in  the  desire  for 
extending  slave  territory,  it  would  have  been  most 
unwise  to  insist  upon  settlement  of  the  Central  Ameri- 
can question,  and  thus  risk  complications  with  England, 
when  the  nation  was  facing  a  domestic  crisis  produced 
by  an  effort  to  introduce  slavery  into  Kansas. 

During  this  period,  therefore,  Buchanan  was  left 
practically  to  his  own  resources  regarding  Central 
American  negotiations.  But  the  completion  of  the 
reciprocity  treaty,"  and  later  the  resignation  from  the 

'  Clarendon  promised  Buchanan  an  answer  to  his  second  paper,  and 
later  said  that  he  had  prepared  one,  but  it  was  never  presented. 
Buchanan,  Works,  IX,  278;   U.  S.  Docs.,  ser.  no.  840,  doc.   i,  p.  76. 

'  London  Morning  Post,  Dec.  s,  1854. 

196 


THE  CRISIS,  1855-1856  197 

premiership  of  Aberdeen,  who  was  friendly  to  the 
United  States,  and  the  accession  of  Palmerston,^  under 
whose  direction  Greytown  had  been  seized  in  the  name 
of  the  Mosquitos,  caused  Buchanan  to  lose  all  hope  of 
an  early  settlement  of  the  Central  American  dispute. 
Furthermore,  such  casual  and  desultory  conversations 
as  he  obtained  with  Clarendon '  were  not  conducive  to 
a  revival  of  the  hope. 

But  in  August,  1855,  the  discussion  was  reopened  by 
the  United  States.  The  approaching  session  of  Con- 
gress made  it  desirable  that  the  question  be  placed  on 
a  more  satisfactory  basis ;  and  the  fact  that  both  of  the 
parties  concerned  were  less  occupied  with  other  matters 
than  in  the  preceding  year  made  the  prospect  of  settle- 
ment better  than  it  had  been.  Moreover,  the  deter- 
mined policy  displayed  by  the  United  States  govern- 
ment was  evidently  now  expected  to  produce  favorable 
results.  Consequently,  Marcy  directed  Buchanan  to 
secure  a  definite  and  final  statement  from  the  British 
government  as  to  the  position  it  proposed  to  maintain 
on  the  subject,  especially  regarding  the  Bay  Islands. 
If  the  British  government  meant  to  avoid  the  operation 
of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  in  reference  to  the  Bay 
Islands,  there  was  little  use  in  asking  it  to  respect  any 
other  of  the  obligations  imposed  by  that  act.  Marcy's 
letter  showed  the  same  attitude  as  the  year  before,  and 
declared  that  a  fulfillment  of  treaty  stipulations  re- 
quired that  Great  Britain  withdraw  from  the  Mosquito 
coast,  the  Bay  Islands,  and  the  Belize  territory  lying 
between  the  Sibun  and  the  Sarstoon.' 

"  Buchanan,  Works,  IX,  297,  299.  3oo,  320,  339-342- 

*  Ibid.,  298,  337-343- 

^  U.  S.  Docs.,  ser.  no.  840,  doc.  i,  pp.  69-72. 


198     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

Buchanan  accordingly  reopened  the  question,'  but 
with  small  hopes  of  a  satisfactory  result.'  Clarendon's 
response  showed  a  determination  consistently  to  main- 
tain the  former  extreme  position.  The  British  govern- 
ment, he  stated,  adhered  to  the  opinion  which  it  had 
"  uniformly  held,  that  the  convention  of  April  19,  1850, 
was  merely  prospective  in  its  operation,  and  did  not  in 
any  way  interfere  with  the  state  of  things  existing  at 
the  time  of  its  conclusion.  If  it  had  been  intended  to 
do  so,  .  .  .  it  would  have  contained,  in  specific  terms, 
a  renunciation,  on  the  part  of  Great  Britain,  of  the 
possessions  and  rights  which,  up  to  the  conclusion  of 
the  convention,  she  had  claimed  to  maintain,  and  such 
renunciation  would  not  have  been  left  as  a  mere  matter 
of  inference."  * 

In  an  unofficial  reply  to  Buchanan's  report  of  the 
result  of  his  efforts,  Marcy  gave  what  may  be  consid- 
ered the  frank  views  of  the  United  States  government 
regarding  the  conduct  of  Great  Britain.    He  wrote : 

Notwithstanding  the  intimation  before  given  by  the  British 
Govt.,  I  was  not  prepared  to  beheve  that  when  pressed  to  a 
definite  decision,  it  would  dare  to  take  the  ground  that  the 
provisions  of  the  Clayton  and  Buhver  treaty  were  only  pros- 
pective in  their  operation  .  .  .  Her  position  in  that  respect 
raises  a  very  serious  question.  The  United  States  will  never 
acquiesce  in  that  interpretation  of  the  Convention  and  Great 
Britain  cannot,  it  seems  to  me,  believe  that  this  government 
will  do  so.  That  she  is  wrong,  no  reasonable,  calm- judging 
man  can  doubt,  and  the  judgment  of  this  country,  and,  I  should 
think,  the  reflecting  portion  of  the  English  people,  will  look 
upon  it  as  something  more  and  worse  than  an  error.  .  .  .  From 
the  present  course  of  the  British  government  on  the  Central 
American  controversy,  ...     1  am  inclined  to  conclude  that  it 

•  Buchanan,  Works,  IX,  403-405. 
^  Ibid.,  394-39S- 

•  U.  S.  Docs.,  scr.  no.  840.  tloc.   i,  pp.  76-77. 


Port  of  Real. 


CENTRAL  AMERUCA 

ISnO  -  18G0 
Sliowiiiii,-  P)iilisli  E]l(•^();l(•hl^t'llt^ 


o 


o 


^> 


^ 


ISLANDS 


C3P® 


^ 


^. 


^ 


^^ 


iCape  Gracias  a'  Dios        y^3^ 


a 


e^ 


Greytown  (San  Juan  del  Norte) 
"  ]  Pt.  Arenas 
[R.Colorado 


THE  CRISIS,  1853-1856  199 

cares  very  little  about  maintaining  cordial  relations  with  the 
United  States.  I  can  discover  nothing  in  the  present  condition 
of  Great  Britain  or  her  future  prospects  to  justify  her  in 
holding  her  head  so  high.  .  .  .  With  her,  as  with  all  others, 
this  country  desires  to  maintain  the  relations  of  friendship,  but 
from  her  and  them  it  claims  a  respect  for  our  sovereign  rights, 
and  good  faith  in  international  compacts ;  and  neither  will  be 
sacrificed  for  the  sake  of  peace.  The  prospect,  to  my  pre- 
vision, looks  a  little  cloudy;  but,  as  our  old  friend  Mr.  Ritchie 
was  wont  to  say  "  nous  vcrrons"^ 

The  determination  of  Great  Britain  to  maintain  her 
unreasonable  interpretation  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer 
treaty  caused  a  change  in  the  United  States  towards 
that  agreement.  The  members  of  the  government  took 
the  attitude  that  the  treaty  obHgations  were  in  a  way 
suspended ; "  and  a  portion  of  the  press  declared  that 
Clarendon's  reply  to  Buchanan  amounted  to  an  abroga- 
tion of  the  arrangement."  Had  not  the  North  con- 
demned filibustering  as  a  slavery  extension  measure,  it 
is  probable  that,  in  consequence  of  the  British  stand, 
the  American  government  would  have  at  this  time 
come  out  more  strongly  in  favor  of  Walker.  As  it 
was,  and  especially  in  view  of  the  feeling  roused  by  the 
Kansas-Nebraska  question,  such  a  result  was  impos- 
sible. Indeed,  as  has  already  been  noted,  in  the  autumn 
of  1855 "  the  American  government  displayed  more 
vigor  in  its  efforts  to  prevent  aid  from  being  sent  to 
Walker.  The  reason  for  this,  however,  was  most  prob- 
ably a  desire  to  place  the  United  States  in  a  more 
advantageous  position  in  the  discussion  rising  from  the 
discovery  of  Crampton's  share  in  the  British  attempt 

®  Dept.  of  State,  Inst.,  Gt.  Brit.,  vol.  16,  pp.  396-397. 
'*  Napier  to  Clarendon,  Oct.  22,  1857,  F.  0.,  Am.,  vol.  674,  no.  220. 
"^  Daily  Alta  California,  Dec.   5,   1855;  Wells,   Walker's  Expedition   to 
Nicaragua,   135. 

"  See  above,  p.  195. 


200     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY       , 

to  recruit  soldiers  in  the  United  States  for  the  Crimean 
War." 

The  appearance  of  the  recruitment  difficulty  coinci- 
dent with  the  more  menacing  attitude  of  the  Central 
American  question  placed  British-American  relations 
in  a  much  more  serious  light.  Though  it  is  evident  that 
the  irritation  caused  by  the  unreasonable  British  inter- 
pretation of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  produced  much 
of  the  American  indignation  over  the  subject  of  British 
enlistment  and  determined  the  attitude  of  the  govern- 
ment regarding  the  latter  subject,"  yet  considerable  ill- 
feeling  was  caused  by  the  recruiting  question  itself ; 
and  the  one  difficulty  so  reacted  upon  the  other  as  soon 
to  put  the  relations  of  the  two  countries  in  a  critical 
state. 

Naturally,  most  of  the  sensitiveness  and  suspicion 
was  found  on  the  American  side ;  and  it  was  quickened 
by  the  belief  that  France  and  England  meant  to  make 
use  of  the  alliance  which  they  had  formed  during  the 
Crimean  War  for  the  purpose  of  interfering  in  Ameri- 
can affairs."  This  belief  appeared  well  founded  when, 
in  the  last  part  of  October,  the  Times  and  other  leading 
British  newspapers  announced  that  the  government  had 
sent  several  war  vessels  to  reinforce  its  West  Indian 
squadron.'"  This  had  been  done,  the  Times  stated,  for 
the  purpose  of  repressing  the  movements  then  in  pro- 
gress in  various  American  cities  for  the  invasion  of 
countries  with  which  the  United  States  was  at  peace. 
Great   Britain   was  determined  to  supply  the  ability 

"  Cramptoii  to  C'larciulon,  Dec.  31,  185s,  V.  O.,  .\in.,  vol.  bJ^,  no.  aSi. 
'*  Ilansaril,    Pari.    Debates.    3d    ser.,    CXI. II,    1511-1513:    Blackwood's 
Magazine,  LXXX,  12a;  Daily  Alia  California,  Dec.   16,  1855. 
"  Buchanan,  H'orks,  IX,  434,  4(.2-463. 
" //>!(/.,  43.1436;  Harper's  Magazine,  XII,  a.sj. 


THE  CRISIS,  1855-1856  201 

which  the  American  government  lacked,  to  enforce  its 
own  laws." 

Such  representations  by  journals  believed  to  enjoy 
the  confidence  and  reflect  the  views  of  the  British  min- 
istry were  certain  to  create  excitement  in  America. 
Therefore,  Buchanan,  who  described  the  outlook  as 
"  squally  "/'  changed  his  plans  for  returning  home  and 
determined  to  await  the  arrival  of  his  successor.  As 
soon  as  possible  "  after  reading  the  Times  article,  he 
secured  an  interview  with  Clarendon  and  asked  the 
purpose  of  increasing  the  British  naval  armament  so 
near  to  American  coasts,  giving  as  his  reason  the  desire 
to  prevent,  if  possible,  the  irritation  in  the  United 
States  which  the  appearance  of  such  a  fleet  would  natur- 
ally produce.'**  The  Foreign  Secretary  emphatically 
condemned  the  statement  of  the  press  "  and  declared 
that  the  fleet  had  not  been  sent  with  the  least  unfriendly 
intention  towards  the  United  States.  Its  despatch, 
he  said,  had  resulted  from  information  secured  by 
the  British  government  that  several  privateers  for 
Russian  service  were  being  built  at  New  York." 

Buchanan  was  not  convinced  by  this  explanation,^ 
but  his  anxiety  was  somewhat  relieved  by  the  attitude 
taken  by  the  British  people.  Recent  events  had 
attracted  the  attention  of  the  British  public  to  the  dis- 
pute, and  had  created  a  desire  to  learn  the  real  facts  of 
the  controversy.  Buchanan  felt  that  this  new  alertness 
of  the  British  public  mind  was  a  strong  indication  that 
Palmerston  would  not  be  sustained  in  raising  difficulties 
with  the  United  States.'* 

"  Harper's  Magazine,  XII,  253. 

"  Buchanan,  Works,  IX,  436. 

» Ibid..  433-434.  "  Ibid..  438.  *»  Ibid..  439-440. 

"  Ibid..  438-  "  Jbid..  438-439-         '*  Ibid.,  446. 


202     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

Later,  after  it  had  been  proved  that  the  report 
regarding  the  building  of  privateers  in  New  York  was 
false "  Buchanan  called  Clarendon's  attention  to  the 
mistaken  nature  of  the  report  and  desired  the  with- 
drawal of  the  fleet.''  The  President's  message,  he 
stated,  would  undoubtedly  present  the  unsatisfactory 
condition  of  the  Central  American  question  and  as  the 
news  of  the  sending  of  the  fleet  would  reach  the  United 
States  but  a  short  time  before  the  message  was  issued, 
the  two  would  be  connected  in  public  opinion,  thus  ren- 
dering the  question  more  complicated.*^  Clarendon 
again  declared  that  the  despatch  of  the  fleet  was  not 
intended  as  a  menace  to  the  United  States,  and  prom- 
ised to  consider  recalling  the  vessels.™  Buchanan  tried 
to  emphasize  the  expediency  of  doing  so.  He  showed 
how  a  withdrawal  could  allay  public  indignation  in  the 
United  States,  and  pointed  out  the  disastrous  character 
of  a  possible  war  between  the  two  nations.** 

As  time  passed,  Buchanan  counted  more  and  more  on 
British  public  opinion  to  keep  the  peace  ;  but  he  realized 
that  an  unfriendly  press  might  bring  the  people  to  a 
willingness  to  fight  America,  especially  if  they  could 
be  induced  to  believe  that  national  honor  required  war.*' 
Therefore  he  was  anxious  that  the  whole  Central 
American  question  be  brought  before  them  clearly  and 
in  a  firm  but  temperate  manner,  for  he  believed  that  this 
would  force  Palmerston  to  adopt  a  more  friendly 
policy,  or  to  retire."  He  counted  on  the  President's 
message  to  effect  this,  and  consequently  looked  forward 

"  I'>tu  haiian,  IVorks,  IX,  450. 

*•/&.</.  "/W</.,  451-  "//..■./. 

"yfci'd.,  452-453.  " /W</.,    (56,  461.  "  /fci'rf.,  4M,  479.480. 


THE  CRISIS,  1855-1856  203 

eagerly  to  the  early  appearance  of  that  document." 
However,  the  political  confusion  of  the  period  delayed 
for  some  time  the  organization  of  the  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives, and  thus  deferred  the  message,  until,  on 
December  31 — probably  in  consequence  of  the  urgings 
of  Buchanan,"  as  well  as  of  the  general  unsatisfactory 
relations  with  England  " — it  was  finally  sent  to  Con- 
gress even  though  the  speaker  of  the  House  still 
remained  unchosen." 

The  message  contained  a  detailed  consideration  of 
British  relations.  On  the  whole  the  language  was  tem- 
perate, but  a  hostile  note  was  discernible  and  a  deter- 
mination not  to  yield  on  either  the  recruiting  difficulty 
or  the  dispute  over  Central  America.^^ 

The  President's  stand  was  supported  by  the  Senate. 
The  speeches  which  followed  the  receipt  of  the  message 
offer  an  interesting  contrast  to  those  produced  three 
years  before  by  Palmerston's  declaration  regarding 
Belize.  Then  there  was  distinct  division  on  party  lines ; 
now  there  was  a  complete  acceptance  of  the  view  repre- 
sented in  the  President's  message,  and  a  practically 
unanimous  denunciation  of  Great  Britain.  Though  a 
few  advocated  abrogation  of  the  treaty,  as  a  whole  the 
Senate  favored  requiring  Great  Britain  to  fulfill  her 
treaty  obligations,  even  though  such  insistence  result 
in  war.  Still,  there  was  a  strong  feeling  that  there 
would  be  no  war ;  but  that  England,  when  she  saw  that 
the  United  States  was  firm,  would  yield,  for  war  over 
such  questions  as  those  in  dispute  would  find  little  favor 

"  Ibid.,  479-480. 

=*'  Ibid. 

**  Rhodes,  History  of  the  United  States,  II,  120-121. 

*°  Schouler,  History  of  the  United  States,  V,  339. 

^'Richardson,  Messages  and  Papers,  V,  328-331. 


204     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

with  the  British  nation."  The  Senate  in  its  attitude 
upon  the  question  evidently  reflected  the  feeUngs  of  the 
nation  as  a  whole.^  1 

The  President's  message  had  been  accompanied  by  | 
the  Central  American  correspondence,  and  had  been  ' 
quickly  followed  by  a  definite  stand  on  the  part  of  the 
American  Senate.  iVll  of  this  expression  of  opinion,  as 
well  as  the  exposition  of  the  matter  in  controversy,  had, 
as  was  expected,  a  marked  influence  in  England. 
Expressions  friendly  to  the  United  States  appeared  in 
the  London  Times  and  the  Nezvs,  which,  Buchanan 
reported,  seemed  to  indicate  the  general  public  opinion 
that  the  United  States  was  right.  He  felt  that  now  the 
Central  American  question  might  easily  be  settled  with 
any  other  premier  than  Palmerston.** 

Parliament  met  on  January  31  and  it  soon  became 
evident  that  British  public  opinion  had  wrought  a 
change  in  British  governmental  attitude.  In  the 
speeches  in  answer  to  the  Queen's  address  Lord  Derby 
criticised  the  British  policy  regarding  America.  There 
was  no  other  nation  on  earth,  he  declared,  with  which 
war  would  be  so  mutually  suicidal  as  with  the  United 
States.  Clarendon,  in  reply  to  the  attack,  stated  that  as 
regarded  the  Central  American  question  the  only  dif- 
ference of  opinion  which  could  take  place  was  as  to  the 
legal  interpretation  of  the  treaty ;  therefore,  believing 
that  when  differences  of  this  kind  arose  between  two 
governments  correspondence  was  generally  useless  as 
a  means  of  settlement,  he  had  lost  no  time  in  making 

"Cong.  Globe,  34  Cong.,  i  ses3.,  pt.  i,  pp.  107-111,  283-286,  323,  468- 
471,  passim;  ibid.,  Appendix,  70-84,  87,  passim. 

'^Harper's  Magaeinc,  XII,  255;  New  York  Times.  Jan.  .1,  19,  1856,  Feb. 
I,  33,  1856. 

"•Buchanan,   Works,  X,  21,  27. 


THE  CRISIS,  1855-1856  205 

the  offer  to  the  United  States  government  to  refer  the 
whole  question  in  dispute  to  any  third  power  that  might 
be  willing  to  undertake  the  reference,  both  parties 
agreeing  to  be  bound  by  the  decision.  This  offer,  he 
regretted  to  say,  had  not  been  accepted  by  that  govern- 
ment ;  but  he  had  since  renewed  it,  and  he  thought  it 
was  so  plain  that  this  was  the  fairest  and  most  rational 
mode  of  settling  the  difference  that  he  earnestly  hoped 
that  the  offer  would  be  in  the  end  accepted.*" 

The  intention  of  Clarendon's  remarks  was  obviously 
to  disarm  public  criticism  and  parliamentary  opposi- 
tion by  making  it  appear  that  the  non-settlement  of  the 
long-standing  and  dangerous  Central  American  ques- 
tion was  due  solely  to  the  unreasonableness  of  the 
American  government.  But,  notwithstanding  the 
efforts  of  the  ministry,  Cobden  in  the  House  of  Com- 
mons called  almost  immediately  for  the  correspondence 
respecting  American  relations."  This  call  was  made 
just  at  the  time  when  it  was  expected  that  any  mail 
would  bring  word  that  the  refusal  of  the  British  minis- 
try to  recall  Crampton  had  been  answered  by  his 
prompt  dismissal  by  the  United  States ;  ^  and  it  was 
evidently  the  aim  of  Cobden  and  his  associates  to  fore- 
stall any  retaliatory  measures  on  the  part  of  their 
government,  should  the  dismissal  take  place. 

Palmerston  tried  to  avoid  producing  the  correspond- 
ence by  stating  that  it  was  not  complete ;  but  Cobden 
was  insistent.  He  wished  the  correspondence  laid 
before  the  House  in  order  that  it  might  discuss  the 
Central  American  dispute :  the  causes  of  the  quarrel 
should  be  made  known  and  the  question  met  fearlessly 

**  Hansard,  Pari.  Debates,  3d  ser.,  CXL,  39-40. 

"  lUd..  462. 

"  Buchanan,  Works,  X,  30. 


2o6     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

and  honestly."  The  subject  of  American  relations,  he 
declared,  would  be  safer  in  the  hands  of  the  House 
than  in  the  hands  of  the  government  or  of  the  press. 
A  hostile  collision  with  the  United  States  would  be  a 
most  horrible  calamity,  and  would  find  no  favor  with 
the  British  people.  Yet  the  policy  of  the  government 
was  producing  a  deadlock  which  would  make  it  impos- 
sible to  escape  war.*^ 

Palmerston  responded  by  emphasizing  the  view  of 
the  British  government  that  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty 
was  intended  to  be  prospective  in  its  operation,"  and 
stated,  as  Clarendon  had  done,  that  the  government  had 
offered  to  submit  the  question  to  arbitration,  but  had 
received  no  reply  from  the  United  States.^  He  then 
admitted  that,  though  the  correspondence  on  the  enlist- 
ment question  was  not  yet  complete,  that  regarding 
Central  America,  though  perhaps  not  technically  closed, 
was  ready  to  be  presented  and  would  be  laid  on  the  tabic 
at  once."'  In  conclusion  he  agreed  with  Cobden  that  a 
war  with  the  United  States  would  be  most  lamentable, 
and  expressed  his  determination  to  do  all  possible  to 
end  the  dispute  peacefully." 

A  week  later  the  same  subject  was  introduced  in  the 
House  by  Roebuck,  who  asked  for  Crampton's  instruc- 
tions. He  denounced  the  action  of  the  government  on 
the  recruiting  question,  declaring  that  the  facts  of  the 
case  had  been  so  misrepresented  as  to  make  it  appear 
that  the  British  were  in  the  right  and  had  done  all  that 
honor  demanded,  while  the  Americans  were  in  the 
wrong."    Roebuck's  desire,  like  Cobden's,  was  to  pro- 

*"lFansard,  Pari.  Debati-s.  3d  ser.,  C".\L,  .J67. 

**  Ibid..  466-467.  "  Ibid..  467-468.  *•  Ibid.,  460. 

*^  Ibid.  *"  Ibid..  471-472.         *' Ibid..  S37-844. 


THE  CRISIS,  1855-1856  207 

mote  a  discussion  which  would  show  the  friendly  feel- 
ings of  the  British  nation  towards  America.  Palmer- 
ston's  reply  to  Roebuck  was  similar  to  that  made  to 
Cobden ;  while  defending  the  action  of  the  government 
and  declaring  that  the  recruiting  correspondence  was 
not  yet  closed,  he  expressed  the  strong  desire  of  the 
British  nation  to  remain  at  peace  with  their  American 
kindred."" 

The  announcement  that  an  offer  of  arbitration  on  the 
Central  American  dispute  had  been  made  by  Great 
Britain  came  as  a  complete  surprise  to  Buchanan.  In 
various  conversations  the  Foreign  Secretary  had  sug- 
gested referring  the  matter  to  a  third  power,  but 
Buchanan  had  regarded  such  suggestions  merely  as 
informal  and  as  originating  entirely  with  Clarendon. 
Consequently,  though  he  had  carefully  reported  the 
conversations  to  Marcy,  he  had  not  taken  them  seri- 
ously and  had  simply  expressed  the  opinion  that  there 
was  nothing  in  the  question  to  arbitrate,  and  that, 
besides,  it  would  be  difficult  to  find  an  impartial  arbi- 
trator."' 

Upon  learning  of  Clarendon's  remarks  in  the  House, 
however,  Buchanan  promptly  called  upon  Clarendon 
and  inquired  whether  the  suggestions  made  to  him  had 
constituted  the  offers  referred  to.  Clarendon  replied 
in  the  affirmative,  stating  that  the  offer  had  been  made 
in  a  most  formal  manner  by  direction  of  the  Cabinet. 
The  offer  had  been  made  thus  orally  as  a  preliminary  to 
more  formal  consideration  of  it.  On  November  10, 
1855,  Clarendon  added,  he  had  reported  the  last  offer 

=•'  Ihid..  844-850. 

'^  Par].   Papers,    1856,   Corns.,   LX,   "  Correspondence  with  the  United 
States  respecting  Central  America  ",  297-298;  Buchanan,  Works,  IX,  456. 


2o8     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

of  arbitration  made  to  Buchanan  in  a  letter  to  Cramp- 
ton,  instructing  him  to  communicate  the  contents  of 
the  letter  to  the  American  secretary  of  state." 

Immediately  after  this  interview  Buchanan  wrote  to 
Marcy  reporting  the  matter,"  and  Clarendon  also  com- 
municated it  to  Crampton,"  and  it  soon  appeared  that 
there  had  been  a  general  misapprehension  of  the 
Foreign  Secretary's  meaning.  Not  only  had  Buchanan, 
and,  consequently,  Marcy,  gained  a  wrong  impression 
of  Clarendon's  intention,  but  Crampton,  believing  that 
Buchanan  was  to  have  full  charge  of  the  Central  Amer- 
ican question,  had  simply  considered  what  Clarendon 
had  told  him  with  reference  to  the  offer  of  arbitration 
as  for  his  own  private  information ;  consequently  he 
had  not  read  the  letter  carefully,  and  had  entirely  over- 
looked the  instruction  to  communicate  the  offer  to 
Marcy.'"  As  soon,  however,  as  the  misunderstanding 
was  cleared  up,  Crampton  acquainted  various  members 
of  the  American  government  with  the  fact  that  arbi- 
tration had  been  offered  by  Great  Britain."*  Though 
some  criticism  followed  because  of  what  was  called 
Crampton's  negligence,"  the  information  undoubtedly 
had  a  beneficial  effect  on  American  public  feeling,  espe- 
cially as  it  was  preceded  by  a  conciliatory  tone  in  the 
parliamentary  debates  and  in  the  British  press. 

Still,  an  offer  of  arbitration  was  not  a  settlement  of 
the  question ;  and  it  appealed  to  the  nation  as  a  whole 
as  little  as  it  had  appealed  to  Buchanan.     Moreover, 

"  Pari.  Paf'ers,  1856,  Corns.,  LX,  "  Correspondence  with  the  United 
States  respecting  Central  America  ",  297. 

"Ibid.;  Buchanan,  IVorks,  X,  35. 

"  Pari.  Papers,  1856,  Corns.,  LX,  "  Correspondence  with  the  United 
States  respecting  Central  America  ",  297-298. 

"  Ibid.,  298299.         "  Ibid.,  299.  "  Ibid. 


THE  CRISIS,  1855- 1856  2og 

the  horizon  was  again  darkened  by  the  persistently 
unsatisfactory  attitude  of  the  British  government 
towards  the  enhstment  dispute.  On  February  25  the 
Senate  called  for  the  correspondence  on  the  subject,'' 
and  President  Pierce  promptly  transmitted  it.'"  The 
following  day  the  President  sent  a  message  to  both 
houses  of  Congress  recommending  to  their  favorable 
consideration  a  request  from  the  secretary  of  war  for 
a  special  appropriation  of  three  million  dollars  for  mili- 
tary equipment.'"  In  the  debates  which  followed,  the 
question  of  war  with  Great  Britain  was  freely  dis- 
cussed, and  at  this  time,  as  earlier  in  the  year,  a  deter- 
mination was  shown  to  insist  upon  the  fulfillment  of 
treaty  terms  even  at  the  price  of  war ;  but  there  was 
also  the  conviction  that  if  the  American  government 
stood  firm  Great  Britain  would  avoid  war  by  retreating 
from  her  position." 

For  some  weeks  after  this,  the  two  matters  in  dispute 
remained  in  practically  a  state  of  deadlock.  With 
regard  to  the  Central  American  question,  it  was  no  easy 
matter  to  determine  upon  a  course  of  action.  Though 
throughout  the  country  there  were  some  who  favored 
arbitration  and  others  who  advocated  annulling  the 
Clayton-Bulwer  treaty,  still  there  were  strong  objec- 
tions to  both.  The  other  alternative  was  to  force  the 
British  to  fulfill  treaty  obligations,  even  at  the  risk  of 
war,  a  course  for  which  the  majority  of  the  nation 
seemed  ready,  but  one  which  was  not  to  be  chosen 
lightly.**  The  enlistment  question  was  in  a  graver  state ; 

^»  U.  S.  Docs.,  ser.  no.  819,  doc.  35,  p.   i. 
6»  Ibid. 

*"  Richardson,  Messages  and  Papers,  V,  362. 

*^  Cong.  Globe,  34  Cong.,  i  sess.,  pt.  i,  pp.  618-627,  Appendix,  175-177. 
234-242,  300-306,  435-442. 
«'Dept.  of  State,  Inst.,  Gt.  Brit.,  vol.  16,  pp.  468-469. 

IS 


210     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

the  published  correspondence  had  made  it  evident  that 
the  demand  for  Crampton's  recall  was  justifiable,  yet 
the  order  of  recall  had  not  been  given,  and  no  other 
adequate  amends  had  been  oflfered  by  Great  Britain." 

During  the  month  of  May  the  situation  became  more 
tense.  The  dismissal  of  Crampton  seemed  certain  and 
imminent,  and  it  was  felt  by  many  that  this  step  on  the 
part  of  the  American  government  would  be  the  signal 
for  an  outbreak  of  hostilities  between  the  two  nations. 
Different  causes  had  also  increased  feeling  on  the  Cen- 
tral American  question.  Though  Crampton  had  con- 
tinued to  call  attention  to  the  evil  which  the  filibusters 
wrought  in  Central  America,  and  though  Marcy  had 
denounced  Walker  and  his  methods,**  still,  by  one 
means  or  another  large  numbers  of  American  citizens 
with  filibustering  aims  were  able  to  leave  the  United 
States ;  and  recently  Marcy  had  tried  to  avoid  discus- 
sion of  the  subject  with  foreign  diplomats,  and  had 
displayed  impatience  and  ill-humor  when  approached 
regarding  it.*^  Moreover,  Walker,  by  his  high-handed 
proceedings,  not  only  constantly  endangered  the  lives 
and  property  of  British  subjects  in  Nicaragua,"  but 

"^Harper's  Magazine,  XII,  689. 

"Clarendon  to  Crampton,  Jan.  17,  and  Feb.  19,  i8.s6,  F.  O.,  .'\ni., 
vol.  638,  nos.  21,  46;  Crampton  to  Clarendon,  Mar.  31,  1856,  ibid.,  vol. 
64J,  no.  75- 

"Crampton  to  Clarendon,  Mar.  4,  1856,  ibid.,  vol.  641,  no.  53;  .\pril 
29,  1856,  ibid.,  vol.  643,  no.  ii.  Marcy's  ill-humor  was  probably  in- 
creased by  the  fact  that  he  had  consistently  been  opposed  to  Walker's 
schemes  from  the  first,  but  had  not  been  supported  by  the  President. 
Marcy  to  Dallas,  June  16,  1856,  "  Unofficial  ",  Dept.  of  State,  Inst.,  Cit. 
Brit.,  vol.   16,  Walker,  War  in  Nicaragua,  267. 

"•Clarendon  to  Crampton,  Jan.  10,  and  Feb.  19,  1856,  F.  C,  \m.,  vol. 
638,  nos.  14,  46;  Wyke  to  Clarendon,  June  24,  1856,  F.  O.,  Cen.  .\m., 
vol.  89,  no.  37. 


THE  CRISIS,  1S55-1856  211 

even  levied  exactions  upon  the  British  as  well  as  upon 
other  foreigners  in  the  region." 

The  seeming  connivance  on  the  part  of  the  American 
government  at  a  violation  of  the  spirit  of  the  Clayton- 
Bulwer  treaty,  while  assuming  an  air  of  righteous 
indignation  towards  Great  Britain  for  an  alleged 
infraction  of  its  letter,  naturally  produced  a  feeling 
of  distrust  and  resentment  in  England.  Moreover,  the 
similarity  between  Crampton's  offense,  for  which  the 
American  government  indignantly  demanded  amends, 
and  the  shortcomings  of  local  American  officials — evi- 
dently winked  at  by  the  Washington  authorities — 
which  made  possible  the  establishment  and  maintenance 
of  Walker's  government,  did  not  escape  British  notice." 
Consequently,  when  Costa  Rica  determined  to  open  war 
upon  Walker,  the  British  government,  while  refusing 
all  of  her  appeals  for  direct  protection,*"  consented  to 
sell  Costa  Rica  two  thousand  muskets  to  aid  her  in  the 
war  against  the  filibuster.'"  Knowledge  of  this  soon 
reached  the  United  States  through  the  Nicaraguan 
seizure,  on  the  San  Juan,  of  the  mail  for  Costa  Rica 
which  contained  the  correspondence  upon  the  subject 
which  had  passed  between  the  Costa  Rican  minister  and 
the  British  foreign  secretary."  The  usual  charges  of 
treaty  violation  were  made  against  Great  Britain,  and 

"  Crampton  to  Clarendon,  Mar.  3,  1856,  F.  O.,  Am.,  vol.  641,  no.   52. 

**  Lumley  to  Clarendon,  June  19,  1856,  F.  O.,  Am.,  vol.  643,  no.  4; 
San  Francisco  Evening  Bulletin,  Aug.  i,  1856. 

''Hansard,  Pari.  Debates,   3d  ser.,  CXLII,  310-311. 

''"Pari.  Papers,  1856,  Corns.,  LX,  "Correspondence  with  Wallerstein  ", 
11-12,  15-17.  The  Costa  Rican  agent  decided  not  to  accept  the  terms  of 
the  British  government,  so  the  arms  were  never  delivered.  Hansard, 
Pay'.  Debates.  3d  ser.,  CXLII,  311. 

"^  Wells,   Wc.'ker's  Expedition  to  Nicaragua,   149. 


212     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

much  excitement  was  created."  Largely  as  a  result  of 
this  act  of  Great  Britain  the  President  determined  to 
receive  Padre  Vijil,  a  new  representative  from  Walker's 
government."  American  resentment  was  further  in- 
creased by  the  news  that  Captain  Tarleton  of  the  Brit- 
ish vessel  Eurydice  had  boarded  the  American  packet 
Orizaba  for  the  purpose  of  examining  the  ship's  papers 
in  an  effort  to  prevent  recruits  from  reaching  Walker.'* 
So  serious  did  the  situation  become  that  both  nations 
found  it  desirable  to  increase  their  naval  forces  in  the 
Gulf  of  Mexico." 

These  hostile  acts  reported  against  Great  Britain  led 
Dallas,  who  had  recently  succeeded  Buchanan,  to  take 
a  very  gloomy  view  of  the  future  as  well  as  of  the  situ- 
ation in  general.  Recent  British  action  in  connection 
with  Central  America,  he  believed,  showed  the  intention 
to  dispose  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  and  to  bring 
the  isthmus  under  British  control,  thus  disjointing  the 
American  Union.'"  He  felt  that  British  disregard  for 
American  friendship  would  also  appear  in  connection 
with  the  recruitment  dispute,  and  expected  that  news  of 

"  Crampton  to  Clarendon,  May  5,  1856,  F.  C,  :\m.,  vol.  643,  no.  113; 
Cong.  Globe.  34  Cong.,  1  sess.,  pt.  2,  pp.   1069-1072. 

"  Dept.  of  State,  Inst.,  Gt.  Brit.,  vol.  16,  p.  529.  The  presidential 
message  announcing  the  reception  of  Vijil,  stated  that  the  establishment 
of  diplomatic  relations  with  Nicaragua  was  imperative  because  of  the 
interruption  of  interoceanic  communication  across  both  Nicaragua  and 
Panama.     Richardson,  Messages  and  Papers.  V,  373-3"4. 

'♦Crampton  to  Clarendon,  May  12,  1856,  F.  ().,  .\m..  vol.  643.  no.  118. 
Captain  Tarleton's  act  was  taken  up  by  Dallas  with  the  British  govern- 
ment, but  it  soon  became  evident  that  no  insult  had  been  intended  against 
the  American  flag;  consequently  the  matter  was  dropped.  Dallas  to 
Marcy,  July  11,  1856,  Dept.  of  State,  Des.,  Eng..  vol.  69,  no.  19;  cf. 
Wells,  Walker's  ilxpedition  to  Nicaragua,  203-224. 

"  Keasbcy,  S'icaragua  Canal,  236;  Han.sard,  Pari.  Debates,  3d  sir.. 
CXLII,  i;o8. 

'■■  Dept.  of  State,  Des..  Eng.,  vol.  69,  no.  11.  Most  of  the  despatch  is 
printed  in  U.  S.  Docs.,  scr.  no.  3853,  doc.  161,  p.  38. 


THE  CRISIS,  1855-1856  213 

Crampton's  dismissal  would  be  followed  by  the  notice 
that  his  own  passports  were  at  his  disposal." 

A  letter  of  June  16,  1856,  from  Marcy  to  Dallas 
shows  that  Dallas's  belief  in  British  bad  faith  was 
shared  by  his  government.  The  President,  Marcy 
wrote,  had  recognized  Walker's  government  because 
of  the  aid  furnished  Costa  Rica  by  Great  Britain.  The 
intercepted  documents,  he  stated,  had  satisfied  the 
American  people  that  Great  Britain  was  aiding  Costa 
Rica  and  other  Central  American  governments  to 
"  crush  out  "  the  only  existing  authority  in  Nicaragua ; 
and  the  object  of  her  policy  was  not  considered  ques- 
tionable. "  This  government  could  not  remain  entirely 
inactive  and  see  Great  Britain  obtain  complete  ascend- 
ancy in  all  the  states  of  Central  America."  "  The  un- 
reasonable interpretation  which  the  British  government 
had  placed  upon  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty,  as  well  as 
its  colonization  of  the  Bay  Islands,  certainly  gave 
strong  support  to  the  conviction  of  British  perfidy. 

On  May  28,  1856,  the  American  government  discon- 
tinued diplomatic  relations  with  Crampton  in  conse- 
quence of  his  having  aided  in  violating  American 
neutrality  laws  by  recruiting  soldiers  for  the  Crimean 
War  within  the  territory  of  the  United  States."  But 
before  the  fact  of  Crampton's  dismissal  was  known  in 
England,  it  became  very  evident  that  Dallas  and  his 
government  were  mistaken  in  their  analysis  of  the  situ- 
ation, and  in  their  predictions  regarding  the  future. 
The  news  that  Walker's  agent  had  been  received  at 

"  Dept.  of  State,  Des.,  Eng.,  vol.  69,  no.   13. 

"Dept.  of  State,  Inst.,  Gt.  Brit.,  vol.   16,  p.  529.     Cf.  Wells,  IValker's 
Expedition  to  Nicaragua,  226-236. 
'»  Die.  Nat.  Biog.,  XII,  6-7. 


214     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

Washington '"  reached  London  a  few  days  before  the 
report  of  Cranipton's  dismissal."  It  was  this  American 
recognition  of  the  fihbuster  government  which  caused 
the  British  nation  to  reveal  its  real  feelings  and  inten- 
tions. The  Times,  which,  earlier  in  the  year,  had 
blustered  and  threatened,  in  the  face  of  the  real  crisis 
quickly  assumed  a  conciliatory  tone.  After  remarking 
about  the  low  state  of  political  morality  in  America 
which  made  Vijil's  reception  possible,  it  added: 

But  it  is  no  case  of  war,  it  is  not  even  necessarily  a  ground 
of  diplomatic  complaint.  The  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  has  not 
been  in  terms  violated,  and  it  may  probably  be  expedient  in 
the  present  critical  state  of  the  relations  between  the  two 
countries,  rather  to  pass  this  matter  by  in  silence  than  to  incur 
the  risk  of  introducing  fresh  difficulties  into  a  discussion 
already  sufficiently  perilous,  or  give  an  excuse  to  those  who  are 
even  now  only  too  ready  to  seek  an  occasion  of  quarrel.  If 
war  does  come  we  must  meet  it  as  we  may.  Let  us,  at  any  rate, 
have  the  satisfaction  of  reflecting  that  this  greatest  of  human 
calamities  has  not  been  precipitated  by  any  undue  sensitive- 
ness or  any  avoidable  interference  on  our  part." 

The  Times  now  also  advocated  a  policy  of  peace  in 
reference  to  the  recruiting  question.  Though  the  dis- 
missal of  Dallas  must  immediately  succeed  the  receipt 
of  notice  that  Crampton  had  been  dismissed,  such  an 
act,  the  Times  declared,  by  no  means  implied  a  state  of 
war.  "  We  may  be  at  peace  with  America  ",  it  added, 
"  though  without  any  diplomatic  representative ;    and, 

•*  U.  S.  Docs.,  ser.  no.  3853,  doc.  161,  p.  30.  Disgusted  at  the  studied 
coldness  of  tlie  diplomatic  body  at  Washington,  Vijil  soon  returned  to 
Nicaragua.  I.uniley  to  Clarendon,  June  30,  1856,  F.  O.,  .Am.,  vol.  644, 
no.  26;  Dublin  Review,  XI^,  376-377.  His  successor  was  not  received  by 
the  .Xnicriian  government.  Marcy  to  Wheeler,  Sept.  18,  1856,  Dept.  of 
State,  Inst.,  -Am.  States,  vol.  15,  p.  279. 

"Crampton  to  Clarendon,  May  28,  1856,  I'.  O.,  Am.,  vol.  643,  no.   134. 

"  I^ondon  Times,  June  2,  1856,  quoted  in  Littell's  Lit-ing  Age,  anil  ser., 
-XIV,  113-114. 


THE  CRISIS,  i8 55-1856  215 

perhaps,  at  the  point  at  which  matters  have  arrived,  the 
absence  of  an  Ambassador  may  in  some  degree  dimin- 
ish the  apprehension  of  danger."  ^' 

The  other  leading  newspapers  took  a  similar  attitude. 
The  Examiner^  and  the  Press"^  were  even  more 
strongly  for  peace  than  the  Times.  The  News  ex- 
pressed the  hope  that  the  British  cabinet  might  think 
twice  before  sending  away  Dallas ;  *°  while  the  Tele- 
graph, less  friendly  to  the  government,  seized  the 
occasion  to  denounce  its  policy  while  pointing  out  the 
folly  of  war  with  America.  A  war  with  the  United 
States,  because  of  the  American  navy,  would  be  a 
much  more  serious  contest  than  the  Crimean  War. 
"  Surely  ",  it  said,  "  the  war  just  terminated  by  a  dis- 
graceful peace,  which  we  were  obliged  to  accept,  ought 
to  be  a  lesson  to  curb  the  overweening  pride  of  our 
countrymen."  " 

That  the  attitude  of  the  country  thus  reflected  in  the 
press  was  quite  in  harmony  with  the  views  of  the  Brit- 
ish government  Dallas  learned  in  an  interview  with  the 
foreign  secretary  early  in  June.  At  this  time  he  read 
to  Clarendon  two  letters  from  Marcy  upon  the  subjects 
in  dispute.  In  the  letter  on  recruiting,  which  was  writ- 
ten in  a  conciliatory  tone,  Marcy  stated  that  the  Ameri- 
can government  gladly  accepted  the  assurance  of  Great 
Britain  that  no  violation  of  the  law  had  been  authorized 

*'  London  Times,  June  3,  1856,  quoted  in  Littell's  Living  Age,  2nd  ser,, 
XIV,  114- 

**  London  Examiner,  June  7,  1856,  quoted  in  Littell's  Living  Age, 
2nd  ser.,  XIV,  242. 

^  London  Press,  June  2,  1856,  quoted  in  Littell's  Living  Age,  2nd 
ser.,  XIV,  122. 

*'  London  News,  June  4,  1856,  quoted  in  Littell's  Living  Age,  2nd 
ser.,  XIV,  118. 

'"  London  Telegraph,  June  2,  1856,  quoted  in  Littell's  Living  Age, 
2nd  ser.,  XIV,  118-119. 


2i6    ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

or  countenanced,  and  explained  that  the  withdrawal  of 
Crampton  had  been  requested  because  of  his  personal 
acts ;  however,  the  United  States  was  anxious  to  con- 
tinue diplomatic  relations  with  Great  Britain." 

The  second  letter,  written  May  24,  reviewed  in  a 
temperate  manner  the  history  of  the  Central  American 
question,  and  added  that,  while  the  United  States 
government  could  not  consent  to  arbitration  on  the 
meaning  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty,  which  seemed 
to  it  beyond  doubt,  yet  it  would  not  object  to  the  sub- 
mission of  some  of  the  questions  of  fact  connected 
with  it  to  arbitration,  such  as  the  question  of  the  sover- 
eignty over  the  Bay  Islands,  and  of  the  boundaries  of 
Belize  and  Mosquito  territory.  But  Dallas  was  in- 
structed first  to  communicate  with  the  foreign  secretary 
in  order  to  determine  whether  the  differences  could  not 
be  promptly  terminated  by  direct  negotiation ;  and  if 
they  could  not,  to  discuss  the  conditions  to  govern  the 
arbitration  of  the  points  of  difTerence.^' 

Dallas  reported  to  IMarcy  that  Clarendon  had  shown 
himself  much  gratified  at  the  tone  and  import  of  the 
communication  regarding  Central  America,  and  had 
remarked  that  "  it  would  be  disreputable  to  both  gov- 
ernments, if,  upon  a  platform  written  with  so  much 
clearness,  and  in  a  spirit  so  candid  and  conciliatory, 
they  failed  to  reach  an  adjustment  of  the  whole  diffi- 
culty." The  United  States,  Clarendon  declared  em- 
phatically, did  not  seem  to  realize  the  immense  change 
which  had  taken  ])lace  in  British  jniblic  opinion  and 
pohcy  regardng  colonial  establislunents  ;  "  while  Great 
Britain  could  not  submit  to  be  i)usheil  out  i)f  a  place 

"'Brit,  and  For.  Slate  Papers,  XLVIII,  256-27U- 
"•I/.   S.  Docs.,  srr.   no.   ,l8.s.l,  doc.    161,  pp.   a-io. 


THE  CRISIS,  i8 55-1856  217 

she  actually  occupied,  he  would  not  give  three  coppers 
to  retain  any  post  on  the  Central  American  territory  or 
coast  from  which  she  could  honorably  retire  ".^ 

Dallas  was  much  encouraged  by  the  interview,  and 
informed  Marcy  that  he  felt  that  there  now  existed  in 
Great  Britain  a  real  disposition  to  close  all  difficulty 
over  the  Central  American  question.  "  Indeed,  I  was 
agreeably  surprised,"  he  wrote,  "  though  I  forebore  to 
manifest  it,  at  the  apparent  warmth  of  welcome  given 
to  your  paper,  and  augur  beneficial  results." '' 

The  same  conciliatory  attitude  was  displayed  three 
days  later  in  the  House  of  Commons  when  Lord  Russell 
tried  to  forestall  any  governmental  retaliation  upon 
Dallas  in  consequence  of  Crampton's  dismissal.'"  It 
seemed  particularly  desirable,  he  said,  that  Dallas  be 
retained,  since  a  discussion  of  the  Central  American 
question  had  been  reopened  by  him  in  such  a  manner 
as  to  give  hopes  of  a  settlement.'"  Russell  also  called 
attention  to  the  danger  of  a  collision  between  the  Brit- 
ish and  American  naval  forces  on  the  coast  of  America 
in  consequence  of  Crampton's  dismissal,  and  inquired 
whether  suitable  precautions  had  been  taken  to  prevent 
it,  dwelling  strongly  upon  the  misfortunes  which  would 
result  from  war  between  the  two  countries.'"  In  reply 
Palmerston  gave  the  assurance  that  Dallas  would  not  be 
dismissed,  and  expressed  a  readiness  on  the  part  of  the 
government  to  enter  into  communication  with  him  for 
a  settlement  of  the  Central  American  question."'  "  It 
would  be  lamentable  in  the  extreme",  he  stated,  "if 

^  Dallas  to  Marcy,  June  13,  1856,  Dept.  of  State,  Des.,  Eng.,  vol.  69, 
no.  15.  Extracts  from  the  despatch  are  given  in  U.  S.  Docs.,  ser.  no. 
3853,  no.   161,  pp.  33-35- 

"  U.  S.  Docs.,  ser.  no.  3853,  no.  161,  p.  35. 

"-Hansard,  Pail.  Debates,  3d  ser.,  CXLII,  1502-1503. 

^^Ibid..   1503.  '^Ibid..  1504-1505.         ^'' Ibid..  1508. 


2i8     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

two  countries  which  have  so  many  interests  in  common 
should,  through  the  perverseness  of  any  man,  be 
brought  into  a  state  of  hostihty  with  each  other."  ** 

The  attitude  here  displayed  by  Palmerston  put  an 
end  to  the  recruiting  dispute  "  and  really  opened  a  new 
and  more  friendly  era  in  the  relations  between  the  two 
countries.  It  gave  Dallas  high  hopes  of  an  agreement 
on  the  Central  American  question."  In  the  opinion  of 
Dallas  and  of  the  English  public,  the  favorable  turn  in 
the  relations  between  the  two  governments  was  due 
exclusively  to  the  "  equally  able,  firm,  and  conciliatory 
despatches  last  sent  to  be  laid  before  Lord  Clarendon  ".** 
That  the  increased  friendliness  of  the  American  gov- 
ernment, probably  produced  in  part  by  the  unexpected 
close  of  the  Crimean  War,  gave  the  British  govern- 
ment an  opportunity  to  adopt  a  more  moderate  attitude 
without  loss  of  dignity,  and  that  it  also  made  possible  a 
reopening  of  the  Central  American  negotiations  under 
more  favorable  conditions,  is  quite  obvious ;  but  this 
increased  friendliness  did  not  avert  any  real  danger  of 
war,  for  in  the  questions  in  dispute  no  such  danger  had 
existed.  During  this  whole  period  war  could  have  been 
produced  only  by  some  rash  act  on  the  part  of  the 
Americans  which  would  have  forced  the  British  to  fight 
in  order  to  vindicate  their  honor ;  and  in  such  a  case  it 
would  have  been  necessary  that  the  grievance  against 
the  United  States  be  a  very  real  one. 

•*  Hansard,  Pari.  Debates,  3d  ser.,  CXLII,   1509. 

"'  The  only  display  of  resentment  on  the  part  of  the  British  government 
in  consequence  of  Crampton's  dismissal  was  several  months'  delay  in 
appointing  his  successor. 

••  Dept.  of  State,  Des.,  F.ng.,  vol.  (19,  no.  16.  Tart  of  the  despatch  is 
given  in  U.  S.  Docs.,  ser.  no.  3853,  doc.  i6i,  pp.  35-37- 

•'  U.  S.  Docs.,  ser.  no.  3853,  doc.  161,  p.  36. 


THE  CRISIS,  1855-1856  219 

Reasons  various  and  of  varying  importance  deter- 
mined the  British  attitude.  The  enlistment  question 
needs  scarcely  to  be  considered  here,  since  the  feeling 
produced  in  connection  with  it  was  largely  due  to 
irritation  over  British  conduct  regarding  the  Clayton- 
Bulwer  treaty  and  Central  America."*"  Besides,  sooni 
after  the  facts  came  to  light,  the  conviction  seems  to 
have  become  general  in  England  that  the  fault  lay 
largely  with  the  British.  The  two  matters  which 
caused  practically  all  of  the  feeling  in  the  Central 
American  dispute  were  the  retention  of  the  Mosquito 
protectorate  and  the  colonization  of  the  Bay  Islands. 
Though  consistency  led  the  American  government  to 
demand  the  withdrawal  of  British  settlers  from  the 
territory  between  the  Sibun  and  the  Sarstoon,  that 
government  realized  that  a  compliance  with  the  demand 
was  not  likely  to  result,  and  that  it  was,  under  the  cir- 
cumstances, rather  too  much  to  expect."^ 

Of  the  other  two  matters,  the  simpler  was  that  of  the 
protectorate.  It  has  been  shown  that  the  British  gov- 
ernment was  sincere  in  its  desire  to  rid  itself  of  this, 
and  had  only  been  prevented  from  so  doing  by  a  false 
sense  of  honor,  and  by  the  political  confusion  in  Central 
America.  Aloreover,  war  between  Great  Britain  and 
the  United  States  could  not  have  been  produced  by 
the  j\Iosquito  question  in  itself.  Since  the  British  gov- 
ernment considered  the  j\Iosquito  kingdom  a  farce  and 
a  joke,  it  had  no  intention  of  making  the  nation  ridicu- 
lous in  the  eyes  of  the  world  by  going  to  war  to  defend 
such  a  make-believe.     Besides,  no  support  could  have 

^'^  See  above,  pp.   199-200. 

^"^  Pari.    Papers,    i860.    Corns.,    LXVIII,    "Correspondence   respecting 
Central  America  ",  99. 


220     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

been  secured  from  the  British  people  for  the  pursuit 
of  such  a  war. 

With  the  Bay  Islands  the  case  was  somewhat  differ- 
ent ;  the  British  government  had  seized  these  to  pre- 
vent their  occupation  by  any  other  power,  and  had 
organized  them  into  a  colony  to  protect  British  subjects 
settled  there.  Like  the  assertion  of  the  British  pro- 
tectorate, the  colonization  of  the  Bay  Islands  had  not 
met  with  popular  favor ;  furthermore,  it  was  a  clear 
violation  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty.  The  British 
government  had  realized  this  for  some  time,  and  the 
British  public  had  also  come  to  question  the  action  of 
the  government.'" 

In  June,  1854,  while  searching  for  data  with  which 
to  refute  the  statements  of  the  American  government,*" 
the  foreign  secretary  had  learned,  through  evidence 
from  the  Colonial  Office,  that  in  the  period  between 
1830  and  1840  the  British  government  had  more  than 
once  acknowledged  the  sovereignty  of  Central  America 
over  Ruatan.'"'  This  fact  might  have  been  kept  con- 
cealed from  the  United  States ;  but  there  was  evi- 
dence still  more  damaging  to  the  position  taken  by  the 
British  government.  This  was  in  the  form  of  a  letter 
written  in  1836  by  the  Colonial  Office  itself  to  one  S. 
Coxe,  who  had  inquired  in  behalf  of  a  colonization  com- 
pany regarding  the  boundaries  claimed  by  the  British 
government  for  Belize.  The  reply  from  the  Colonial 
Office,  after  naming  the  boundaries  on  the  north,  south, 
and  west,  added,  "  The  British  Crown  claims  also  the 

'"■' l-ondon   Daily  News,  Jan.   31,   1853;   London   Economist,  XI\',   560; 
Wodehouse  to  Labouchere,  Mar.  28,  1857,  V.  O.,  Ilond.,  vol.  3. 
'""  Hammond  to  Merivale,  May  30,  1854,  C  O.,  Hond.,  vol.  89. 
'"*  Merivale  I0  naminoiul,  June   u,  1854,  C  O.,  Hond.,  vol.  80. 


THE  CRISIS,  1855- 1856  221 

waters,  islands,  and  cays  lying  between  the  coast  defined 
and  the  meridian  of  the  easternmost  point  of  Light- 
house Reef."  ^"^  Unfortunately  for  the  claims  of  the 
British  government — that  the  Bay  Islands  were  de- 
pendencies of  Belize — these  islands  were  situated  sixty 
miles  to  the  east  of  the  meridian  described."*  More 
unfortunately  still,  from  the  British  point  of  view,  a 
copy  of  the  letter  had  fallen  into  the  hands  of  a  member 
of  Kinney's  colonization  association  who  had  recently 
made  a  public  statement  as  to  its  contents.*"' 

In  view  of  these  facts,  the  British  government  had 
no  resort  but  to  retreat  as  gracefully  as  possible.  The 
stubborn  policy  of  the  Pierce  administration,  shown  as 
clearly  by  the  defense  of  Hollins's  destruction  of  Grey- 
town  and  the  indifference  to  filibustering,  as  in  the 
correspondence  over  the  meaning  of  the  Clayton- 
Bulwer  treaty,  undoubtedly  emphasized  the  necessity 
for  a  prompt  and  definite  concession.*'* 

But,  all  question  of  justice  of  British  claims  aside, 
the  British  government  and  people,  for  commercial 
reasons,  were  strongly  averse  to  war  with  the  United 

^'^  Pari.  Papers,  1856,  Corns.,  XLIV,  "Belize",  i.  What  appears  to 
be  the  original  draft  of  this  letter,  found  in  the  Public  Record  Office, 
gives  the  boundaries  as  above,  states  that  claim  is  made  to  the  islands 
along  the  coast,  and  then  adds,  "  as  well  as  any  other  islands  and  keys  in 
the  Bay  of  Honduras  which  G.  Britain  may  have  heretofore  occupied  or 
been  entitled  to  occupy  ",  but  the  lines  quoted  were  struck  out.  Glenelg 
to  Coxe,  Nov.  23,  1836,  C.  O.,  Hond.,  vol.  49.  The  idea  of  making 
known  the  British  claim  to  the  Bay  Islands  was,  apparently,  after  more 
careful  consideration,  abandoned. 

"»Z)«  Bow's  Rei-iew,  XXVII,  558. 

"'Hansard,  Pari.   Debates.  3d  sen,  CXLIII,  645. 

10s  -pjjg  bombardment  of  Greytown  was  declared  by  the  British  govern- 
ment to  be  an  obstacle  in  the  way  of  settling  the  Central  American  dispute, 
but  the  actions  of  the  government  indicate  that  this  was  merely  an  excuse 
offered  in  the  vain  hope  of  delaying  the  retreat  insisted  upon  by  the 
United  States.     Buchanan,  Works,  IX,  250,  298,  300. 


222     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

States ;  though  willing  to  evade  and,  if  possible,  to 
delay  the  issue  to  save  their  pride,  they  intended  caii- 
tiously  to  avoid  having  war  thrust  upon  them.  Durir.L^ 
the  preceding  few  years,  trade  with  America,  especiall\' 
in  cotton  and  cotton  products,  had  increased  tremen- 
dously. Consequently,  when  the  Central  American  dis- 
pute began  to  look  serious  the  members  of  Parliamo: 
from  the  manufacturing  districts  became  concerned 
and  promptly  after  the  meeting  of  Parliament  began  to 
bring  pressure  to  bear  upon  the  government."*  Later, 
at  the  time  of  Crampton's  dismissal,  the  British  press 
in  general  took  alarm  and  emphatically  called  attention 
to  the  disaster  to  British  trade  which  would  result  from 
war  with  America."'  But  the  same  consideration  had 
secured  the  attention  of  the  British  government ;  "* 
and,  as  is  shown  by  a  Foreign  Office  "  departmental 

"»  Buchanan,  Works.  IX,  365. 

""  Cobden  represented  Manchester,  and  Roebuck,  Sheffield. 

^"  The  London  Examiner  for  June  7,  1856  called  attention  to  the 
tremendous  amount  of  trade  carried  on  between  the  two  countries.  In 
1854,  it  stated,  the  total  value  of  imports  from  the  United  States  was 
£29,795,590,  and  of  this  the  value  of  the  raw  cotton  alone  amounted  to 
£17,274,677.  In  the  same  year  the  value  of  British  exports  to  the  United 
States  was  £21,410,369.  Such  were  the  liritish  commercial  interests  in 
time  of  peace.  Great  would  be  the  scandal  to  humanity  if  two  coinitries 
which  so  served  to  enrich  each  other  should  turn  their  powers  to  injur- 
ing each  other.     Quoted  in  LitteU's  Lhing  Age,  2nd  ser.,  XI\',  242. 

The  London  Telegraph  for  June  2,  1856,  pointed  out  that  a  war  with 
the  United  States  would  be  a  guerilla  war  on  the  ocean,  which  would 
end  in  the  destruction  of  British  commerce.  The  mills  in  the  north 
would  stop  and  hundreds  of  thousands  of  people  would  be  thrown  out 
of  work.     Quoted  in  LitteU's  Living  Age,  2nd  ser.,  XI\',   119. 

*"  The  fact  that  great  damage  to  .\merican  commerce  would  result  in 
consequence  of  war  with  England  was  early  realized  in  the  United  States, 
but  the  .'\mericans,  who  had  the  grievance  on  their  side,  were  willing  to 
risk  war  and  face  its  consequences.  Besides,  there  was  the  strong  prob- 
ability that  if  the  American  government  put  on  a  bold  front  the  British 
would  concede  the  points  in  dispute.  New  York  Times.  Mar.  6,  1856; 
Pliiladclphia  Evening  Journal,  June  25,  1856,  quoted  in  the  London  Times, 
July  IS,  1856;  Cong.  Globe,  34  Cong.,  i  sess.,  79-80,  84,  241. 


¥ 


THE  CRISIS,  1855-1856  223 


minute  "  of  1856,  that  government  decided  that  the 
trade  in  cotton  with  the  United  States  was  of  far  more 
value  than  any  interests  possessed  in  Central  America ; 
consequently,  it  could  not  afford  to  risk  war  by  further 
offending  the  United  States.  This  decision  shaped  the 
whole  British  policy  towards  America  during  the  years 
immediately  preceding  the  Civil  War."' 

*"  See  below,  p.  230,  note  25. 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

Adjustment  in  Accordance  with  American  View, 
1 856- 1 860. 

The  war  cloud  past,  conditions  were  more  favorable 
than  ever  before  to  a  final  and  satisfactory  settlement 
of  the  dispute.  For  the  first  time  in  the  history  of  the 
Central  American  question,  the  differences  of  opinion 
which  produced  it  had  been  thoroughly  discussed  by 
the  British  and  American  governments  and  were  so 
well  known  that  little  chance  remained  for  misunder- 
standing or  evasion.  Moreover,  England  was  willing 
to  meet  any  reasonable  demands  of  the  United  States, 
Consequently  much  might  have  been  expected  from  the 
last  attempt  at  direct  settlement  between  the  two  gov- 
ernments, made  in  1856  and  1857. 

On  June  26,  1856,  Clarendon  wrote  Dallas  a  reply 
to  Marcy's  instruction  communicated  to  him  on  June 
1 1 .  The  Foreign  Secretary's  letter  was  cordial  in  tone, 
and,  while  still  maintaining  that  the  Clayton-Bulwer 
treaty  was  prospective  in  intention,  it  declared  the 
British  government  to  be  as  anxious  as  the  President 
to  preserve  the  friendly  relations  between  the  two  coun- 
tries, and  expressed  a  readiness  to  resume  negotiations 
with  a  sincere  desire  to  bring  them  to  a  speedy  and 
satisfactory  conclusion.  Attention  was  again  called  to 
the  wish  of  the  British  government  to  retire  from  the 
Mosquito  protectorate.  As  to  Belize,  Clarendon  added, 
the  only  question  to  be  settled  regarding  it,  which  con- 
cerned Central  America,  was  that  of  boundaries  be- 

224 


ADJUSTMENT,  1S56-1S60  225 

tween  the  two ;  and  no  insurmountable  difficulties  need 
be  expected  in  this  regard.  Since  the  United  States 
government  held  that  under  any  interpretation  of  the 
treaty  the  Bay  Islands  were  no  part  of  British 
dominions  previous  to  1852,  this  question  might  be 
arbitrated,  should  it  not  respond  to  direct  negotiation/ 

With  the  elements  of  the  problem  thus  laid  before 
them,  Dallas  and  Clarendon  began  discussion.  An 
interview  held  on  June  30  made  it  clear  that  the  Mos- 
quito protectorate  would  give  but  little  trouble ;  BeHze 
and  the  Bay  Islands  were  the  subjects  over  which  diffi- 
culties were  likely  to  arise.  But  Dallas  expressed  the 
hope  that  the  British  government  would  let  the  islands 
return  to  Honduras  ;  and  Clarendon,  on  the  other  hand, 
was  anxious  that  the  United  States  would  not  even  in 
appearance  "  be  ingenious  to  make  difficulties  "  regard- 
ing Belize."  Thus  was  indicated  the  general  basis  on 
which  a  settlement  would  be  possible,  and  from  the 
first  the  negotiators  seem  to  have  tacitly  adopted  it. 

During  the  preliminary  discussion,  however,  little 
was  said  about  the  Bay  Islands,  for  Herran,  an  agent 
from  Honduras,  had  arrived  in  London  to  negotiate 
for  their  restoration.'  Since  the  British  press,  include 
ing  even  the  Times,  regarded  the  return  of  the  islands 
as  required  by  justice  as  well  as  consistent  with  British 
honor,*  Dallas  had  little  doubt  of  Herran's  success ; 
but  he  anxiously  watched  the  negotiations  between 
Clarendon  and  Herran  and  cautioned  the  latter  not  to 
yield  to  the  British  desire  to  make  Ruatan  a  free  port 
but  to  insist  upon  its  unconditional  surrender.^    After 

*  Pari.   Papers,    1856,   Corns.,   LX,   "  Further   correspondence  with   the 
United  States  respecting  Central  America  ",  7-9. 
^  U.  S.  Docs,,  ser.  no.  3853,  doc.  161,  pp.  40-43. 
3  Ibid.,  p.  46.  *  Ibid.  '  Ibid.,  p.  51. 

16 


226     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

the  Bay  Islands  treaty  was  complete,  Dallas  learned 
that  it  made  the  islands  a  free  state  under  the  sover- 
eignty of  Honduras.*  This  arrangement  was  obviously 
intended  as  a  protection  to  the  British  subjects  settled 
on  the  islands.  While  feeling  that  the  terms  of  Great 
Britain  were  not  very  magnanimous,  Dallas  believed 
that  if  Honduras  was  willing  there  was  no  cause  for 
oppposition  from  the  United  States ; '  consequently, 
he  raised  no  objection,  and  the  treaty  was  transmitted 
to  the  Honduran  government  for  ratification. 

When  the  arrangement  between  England  and  Hon- 
duras seeemed  on  a  fair  way  to  satisfactory  conclu- 
sion, the  negotiations  between  Dallas  and  Clarendon 
progressed  more  rapidly.  The  draft  of  a  treaty  was 
drawn  up,  and  after  certain  changes  in  detail  by  the 
United  States  government,  it  was  signed  by  the  nego- 
tiators on  October  17.'  This  document,  like  the 
Webster-Crampton  project,  was  a  set  of  proposals  for 
adjustment  to  be  offered  Nicaragua  and  Costa  Rica, 
but  it  was  first  to  be  ratified  by  the  British  and  Ameri- 
can governments.'  Like  that  project  also,  the  new 
arrangement  established  boundary  limits  for  the  Mos- 
quito Indians,  within  which  they  were  to  be  permitted 
to  govern  themselves.  By  voluntary  compact,  however, 
they  might  become  incorporated  with  the  republic  of 
Nicaragua.  All  of  the  Mosquito  territory  south  of  the 
Wanx  River,  not  included  within  the  reservation, 
should,  without  prejudice  to  the  rights  of  the  republic 
of  Honduras  or  to  any  question  of  boundary  of  the 

•  U.  S.  Docs.,  ser.  no.  3853,  doc.    161,  p.   55. 
'  Ibid. 

*  Pari.    Pat>crs,     i860,    Corns.,    LXVIII,    "Correspondence    respecting 
Central  America  ",  24-29. 

»  Ibid.,  27. 


ADJUSTMENT,  1856-1S60  227 

latter  and  Nicaragua,  be  regarded  as  within  the  limits 
and  under  the  sovereignty  of  Nicaragua.  Greytown 
also  came  under  this  last  stipulation,  but  as  a  free  city 
with  a  free  port.  In  return  for  its  privileges,  the  town 
should  pay  an  indemnity  to  the  Mosquitos  for  a  limited 
period.  The  treaty  gave  Costa  Rica  free  use  of  San 
Juan  harbor  and  certain  rights  of  navigation  on  the 
river.  Her  boundary  dispute  with  Nicaragua  was  to 
be  arbitrated  by  the  British  and  American  govern- 
ments.^" 

The  questions  concerning  Belize  and  the  Bay  Islands 
were  adjusted  by  separate  articles.  These  called  for 
definition  of  the  Belize  boundary  limits  as  they  existed 
April  19,  1850,  by  treaty  between  Great  Britain  and 
Guatemala ;  and  stated  that,  in  consideration  of  the 
agreement  negotiated  by  Herran  and  Clarendon,  the 
two  contracting  parties  engaged  to  recognize  the  free 
territory  of  the  Bay  Islands  as  part  of  the  republic  of 
Honduras." 

President  Pierce  approved  the  treaty  and  mentioned 
it  favorably  in  his  annual  message  of  December,  1856."^ 
That  such  a  compromise  arrangement  should  have  been 
satisfactory  to  the  President  is  a  matter  of  some  sur- 
prise, in  view  of  his  former  demand  that  Great  Britain 
completely  withdraw  from  Central  America ;  and  it 
leads  to  the  conclusion  that  Pierce's  early  aggressive- 
ness was  assumed  partially  for  political  purposes. 
After  he  had  failed  of  renomination  by  the  Demo- 
cratic convention,  his  demands  on  the  British  became 
much  more  modest.  But  the  Dallas-Clarendon  treaty 
did  not  receive  congressional  attention  until   Pierce 

'0  Ibid.,  24-28.  ^  Ibid.,  28-29. 

"  Richardson,  Messages  and  Papers,  V,  410-41 1. 


228    ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

went  out  of  office ;  and  when  it  did  come  up  for  con- 
sideration it  met  with  Uttle  favor  from  Buchanan,  the 
new  President,  or  from  the  Senate.  Particular  objec- 
tion was  made  to  the  article  relating  to  the  Bay  Islands. 
As  the  islands  were  considered  Honduran  territory, 
there  was  strong  feeling  against  any  mention,  in  an 
agreement  made  with  England,  of  the  treaty  for  their 
restoration."  Furthermore,  though  the  Senate  had  not 
yet  seen  a  copy  of  the  Herran-Clarendon  treaty,  it  had 
learned  that  that  treaty  contained  a  clause  prohibiting 
the  introduction  of  slavery  into  the  Bay  Islands."  Such 
a  stipulation  was  offensive  to  southern  members." 

Finally,  after  various  changes  the  Dallas-Clarendon 
arrangement  was  ratified  on  March  12,  1857,"  by  a 
majority  of  but  one  vote.^'  The  chief  change  in  the 
treaty  was  in  connection  with  the  article  regarding  the 
Bay  Islands.  This  was  struck  out  and  replaced  by  a 
simple  engagement  on  the  part  of  the  contracting 
parties  to  recognize  and  respect  those  islands,  as  under 
the  sovereignty  and  as  part  of  the  republic  of  Hon- 
duras." 

The  treaty  thus  modified  was  returned  to  Dallas  by 
Cass,  Buchanan's  secretary  of  state,  accompanied  by  a 
note  explaining  that  the  amendments  had  made  the  pact 
more  acceptable  to  the  President  than  before,  but  not 
entirely  satisfactory.    However,  in  order  to  remove  the 

^' Pari.  Papers,  i860,  Corns.,  LXVIII,  "Correspondence  respectinR 
Central  America  ",  40-41. 

"  Ibid.,  23. 

^^  Ibid.,  39-40,  41.  London  Morning  Post,  Dec.  aa,  1857;  Napier  to 
Clarendon,  May  3,   1857,  F.  O.,  Am.,  vol.  671,  no.  64. 

^'^  Pari.  Papers,  i860,  Corns.,  LXVIII,  "Correspondence  respecting 
Central  America",  31-33. 

"  Ibid.,  40. 

^  Ibid.,  31-33.     Cf.  above,  p.  237. 


ADJUSTMENT,  1856-1860  229 

only  remaining  cause  for  misunderstanding,  he  had 
thought  it  best  to  ratify  the  agreement." 

As  soon  as  the  British  cabinet  had  examined  the 
amended  treaty,  Clarendon  reported  that  since  the 
treaty  with  Honduras  was  not  yet  ratified,  the  change 
in  the  article  relating  to  the  Bay  Islands  had  raised  an 
insurmountable  difficulty.  The  adoption  by  the  British 
government  of  the  Senate  amendment  would  tempt 
Honduras  to  reject  the  arrangement  negotiated  by 
Herran,  and  thus  the  Bay  Islands  would  be  resigned 
without  satisfactory  guarantees  for  protecting  the 
British  settlers."^  But  as  he  was  very  loath  to  see  the 
negotiations  again  fail,"^  Clarendon  immediately  revised 
the  treaty  amended  by  the  Senate,  adding  to  the  article 
by  which  the  contracting  parties  recognized  the  Bay 
Islands  as  under  the  sovereignty  of  Honduras,  the 
clause:  "whenever  and  so  soon  as  the  Republic  of 
Honduras  shall  have  concluded  and  ratified  a  treaty 
with  Great  Britain  by  which  Great  Britain  shall  have 
ceded  and  the  Republic  of  Honduras  shall  have  ac- 
cepted, the  said  islands,  subject  to  the  provisions  and 
conditions  contained  in  such  Treat3^"  *" 

Thus  modified,  the  treaty  was  again  returned  to  the 
United  States  and  presented  to  Cass  by  Napier,  the 

"  Ibid.,  32-33- 

^  In  a  letter  to  Cass  of  April  16,  1857,  Dallas  stated  that  the  Senate 
amendment  would  not  have  constituted  an  impediment  to  ratification  had 
it  not  been  for  Palmerston's  remarkable  success  in  the  recent  elections. 
Dept.  of  State,  Des.,  Eng.,  vol.  70,  no.  49. 

^  The  opposition  earlier  shown  by  Buchanan  to  the  Sarstoon  as  the 
southern  boundary  of  Belize  had  caused  the  British  government  to  fear 
that,  as  president,  he  would  refuse  his  consent  to  any  such  arrangement. 
In  appreciation  of  his  concession  on  this  point,  the  British  government 
was  anxious  to  save  the  treaty.  Foreign  office  memorandum,  April  8, 
1857,  F.  O.,  Cen.  Am.,  vol.  94. 

'^  Pari.  Papers,  i860.  Corns.,  LXVIII,  "Correspondence  respecting 
Central  America  ",  39. 


230     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

recently-appointed  British  minister.^  After  it  had  been 
examined  by  the  President,  Napier  was  promptly  noti- 
fied that  the  proposition,  though  changed  in  form,  was 
the  same  in  substance  as  that  recently  rejected  by  the 
Senate ;  therefore  it  could  not  be  considered.  Believ- 
ing as  he  did  that  the  Bay  Islands  belonged  to  Hon- 
duras, the  President  could  not  possibly  sanction  any 
arrangement  by  which  their  restoration  should  be  made 
dependent  upon  conditions  either  already  prescribed 
or  left  to  be  prescribed.  Moreover,  there  was  another 
obstacle  to  American  acceptance  of  the  arrangement. 
Napier  had  supplied  Cass  with  a  copy  of  the  Herran- 
Clarendon  treaty,  the  conditions  of  which  the  American 
government  found  highly  unsatisfactory.  Should  Hon- 
duras ratify  this  treaty,  Cass  declared,  she  would  ratify 
the  establishment  of  an  independent  state  within  her 
own  limits — a  state  at  all  times  liable  to  foreign  influ- 
ence and  control.  On  the  other  hand,  should  this  treaty 
or  a  similar  one  be  rejected  by  Honduras,  Great  Britain 
would  retain  possession  of  the  islands  with  the  implied 
concurrence  of  the  United  States,  and  these  islands 
might  eventually  become  a  permanent  portion  of  the 
British  empire.  The  American  government  could  not 
become  a  party  to  such  an  arrangement.'*  But  before 
Cass's  letter  was  received  by  Napier,  a  despatch  from 
Wyke  had  reached  Clarendon,  reporting  the  failure  of 
the  Honduran  assembly  to  ratify  the  treaty  negotiated 
by  Herran."  Consequently,  the  many  months  of  nego- 
tiation had  again  brought  no  result. 

"  PuW.  Papers,  i860,  Corns.,  LXVIII,  "Correspondence  rcspcctiuK 
Central  .America  ",  43-43. 

"  Ibid.,  44-46. 

"  Ihid.,  40.  The  oilier  Central  American  states  were  influential  in 
securing  the  rejection  of  the  treaty.  They  feared  that  under  the  terms 
of    svirrciuler    liomhiras    woulj    be    unable    to    protect    the    islands    from 


ADJUSTMENT,  1856-1860  231 

Following  this  last  failure,  the  American  government 
revealed  a  strong  inclination  towards  the  abrogations 
of  the  Clayton-Buhver  treaty.  In  conversation  with 
Napier,  Cass  clearly  intimated  that  this  would  be  the 
best  solution  of  the  difficulty,"*  and  Buchanan  showed 
the  same  attitude/'  Senator  Douglas,  of  Illinois,  Cass 
informed  Napier,  had  contemplated  nullifying  the 
treaty  by  a  vote  of  the  Senate  declaring  it  not  to  be 
binding;  if  the  motion  were  made,  he  declared,  it 
would  be  based  on  the  alleged  violation  or  non-execu- 
tion of  the  treaty  by  Great  Britain.  Upon  inquiry  from 
Napier  whether  the  American  constitution  contained 
any  provision  for  such  action,  Cass  replied  that  such  a 
course  had  been  taken  before — about  1798 — and  it 
might  be  again."*  This  attitude  on  the  part  of  the  Presi- 
dent and  Secretary  of  State  convinced  Napier  that 
unless  the  discussion  was  closed  before  the  next  meet- 
ing of  Congress,  an  attempt  would  be  made  to  set  aside 
the  treaty.^  Therefore,  on  June  7,  he  wrote  to  Claren- 
don reporting  the  unsatisfactory  state  of  affairs.  The 
Clayton-Bulwer  treaty,  he  said,  could  not  long  be  main- 
tained on  the  British  interpretation  of  it.  If  the  British 
government  wished  to  stand  upon  the  treaty,  it  would 
be  necessary  to  reconcile  it  to  the  views  of  the  United 

filibusters.  Wyke  to  Clarendon,  April  16,  1857,  F.  O.,  Guat.,  vol.  95. 
no.  32.  On  July  28,  1857,  Wyke  wrote  to  Hammond  with  reference  to 
the  fears  of  the  Guatemala  government,  "  they  are  now  inclined  to 
believe  that  for  the  sake  of  our  Cotton  market  we  would  sacrifice  them  on 
the  shrine  of  American  A.mbition  and  allow  these  countries  to  be  over- 
run and  conquered  by  American  Adventurers  sooner  than  risk  a  quarrel 
with  the  Northern  Union."  F.   C,  Guat.,  vol.   95. 

*  Napier  to  Clarendon,  May  3,  1857,  F.  0.,  Am.,  vol.  671,  no.  64; 
June  7,  1857,  ibid.,  vol.  672,  no.  90;  June  7,  1857,  ibid.,  vol.  673,  no.  96. 

«  Ibid. 

^Napier  to  Clarendon,  May  3,  1857,  ibid.,  vol.,  671,  no.  64.  The  refer- 
ence was  evidently  to  the  treaty  of  alliance  with  France,  made  in  1778. 

»  Ibid. 


232     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

States  by  concessions  to  Central  America.     This  per- 
haps could  not  be  accomplished  before  Congress  met. 
but  if  the  intentions  of  the  British  government  were  of 
a  liberal  and  conciliatory  character,  and  were  frankly 
made  known  to  the  American  government,  the  danger 
of  a  violent  explosion  in  Congress  might  be  averted. 
Hence,  in  order  to  expedite  matters,  Napier  suggested  \ 
that  an  able  commissioner  be  sent  to  Central  America  • 
for  the  purpose  of  settling  the  Belize  boundaries,  and  , 
the  Mosquito  question,  and  for  arranging  the  surrender  | 
of  the  Bay  Islands  on  fair  terms.    It  would  be  well,  he  '' 
believed,  for  the  commissioner  to  make  a  preHminary 
visit  to  Washington  as  a  public  mark  of  friendly  feel- 
ings as  well  as  for  invoking  the  unofficial  aid  of  the 
United  States  in  the  matter.    Though  the  arrangement 
would  be  a  virtual  execution  of  the  American  interpre- 
tation of  the  treaty,  it  would  be  attained  by  an  inde- 
pendent and  benevolent  course  of  action  on  the  part  of 
the  British  government.     Moreover,  this  plan  would 
avoid  direct  negotiation  at  Washington,  and  the  con- 
sequent intervention  of  the  Senate.*' 

Two  weeks  later  Napier  again  wrote,  expressing 
greater  certainty  that  Congress  would  attempt  to  abro- 
gate the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty.  Even  if  the  President 
did  not  recommend  abrogation  in  his  message,  he  would 
be  likely  to  use  language  such  as  would  arouse  bad 
feeling  between  the  two  countries.  Therefore,  Napier 
stated,  he  was  convinced  that  the  best  way  to  secure 
the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  would  be  by  promptly  and 
frankly  conforming  the  British  position  to  the  Ameri- 
can construction  of  it ;  accordingly  he  once  more  urged 

*•  F.  O.,  Am.,  vol.  672,  no.  90. 


ADJUSTMENT,  1856-1860  233 

that  a  commissioner  be  sent  to  Central  America  to  make 
suitable  arrangements." 

Recent  events  connected  with  the  Panama  Railroad, 
;an  American  line  opened  in  1855,"  increased  British 
/  fears  for  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty.  In  April,  1856, 
^the  train  on  this  route  was  attacked  by  Panamanian 
outlaws,  who  killed  several  of  the  passengers  and  stole 
a  large  quantity  of  goods.""  In  consequence,  American 
newspapers  reported  that  the  United  States  intended  to 
obtain  a  strip  of  territory  across  Panama  in  order  to 
secure  the  safety  of  the  route."*  This  immediately 
aroused  British  suspicion,"  which  was  increased  by  the 
fact  that  the  President's  message,  appearing  shortly 
after  these  reports,  had  referred  to  the  neutralization 
features  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  as  applicable  to 
any  transit  line  across  the  isthmus  of  Panama,  "  within 
the  limits  of  Central  America  "."'  An  article  from  the 
Panama  Herald,  copied  in  the  Union,  seemed  to  put  an 
ominous  interpretation  upon  this  part  of  the  message. 
Panama  was  not  in  Central  America,  it  declared,  and, 
as  the  eighth  article  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  was 
merely  provisional,"  it  was  a  mistake  to  suppose  that 
Great  Britain  had  promised  or  guaranteed  any  protec- 
tion to  the  Panama  Railroad."' 

In  consequence  of  these  suspicions,  and  of  reports  of 
proposals   made  by   American   commissioners   to   the 

^  Ibid.,  no.  109. 

^^  Edwards,  Panama,  426. 

^  U.  S.  Docs.,  ser.  no.  3853,  doc.  237,  p.  26. 

**  Lumley  to  Clarendon,  Nov.  19,  1856,  "Confidential",  F.  O.,  Am., 
vol.  647,  no.  no. 

**  Foreign  Office  to  Lumley,  Nov.  19,  1856,  ibid.,  vol.  639,  no.  32. 

^  Richardson,  Messages  and  Papers,  V,  411. 

^'  See  above,  p.  98. 

^  Lumley  to  Clarendon,  Dec.  9,  1856,  "  Confidential  ",  F.  O.,  Am., 
vol.  647,  no.  122. 


234     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

New  Granada  government,**  Clarendon  had  instructed 
Napier  to  observe  to  Cass  that  the  British  government 
did  not  doubt  that  the  United  States  would  admit  that 
for  either  of  the  two  powers  to  exercise  exclusive  con- 
trol over  the  Panama  route  would  be  contrary  to  the 
spirit  and  intention  of  the  eighth  article  of  the  Clayton- 
Bulwer  treaty.*" 

In  reply  to  Napier's  representations,  Cass  denied  any 
intention  on  the  part  of  the  United  States  to  occupy  or 
acquire  any  part  of  New  Granada  or  to  obtain  posses- 
sion of  the  railroad  route."  Cass's  letter,  however,  was 
not  entirely  reassuring,  for  the  Secretary  of  State  failed 
to  commit  himself  to  any  acknowledgment  that  the 
eighth  article  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  contem- 
plated a  joint  protection  by  the  United  States  and  Great 
Britain  over  the  Panama  Railroad."  This  omission 
attracted  Napier's  attention,  and  led  him  to  fear  that  if 
the  pending  claims  for  damages  against  New  Granada 
were  not  settled  before  Congress  met,  hostile  measures 
might  be  passed  by  the  American  government  causing 
New  Granada  to  forfeit  to  the  United  States  her  right 
to  Panama,  or,  at  least,  her  rights  over  the  railway." 
These  views  were  also  communicated  by  Napier  to  his 
government,"  and  they  most  probably  had  weight  in 
aiding  it  to  reach  a  decision  regarding  his  suggestions 
for  settling  the  Central  American  dispute. 

"These  commissioners  were  empowered  to  form  a  treaty  with  New 
Granada  for  transferring  the  control  of  the  Panama  Railroad  to  the 
United  States  and  for  seciirinj;  to  the  United  States  in  full  sovereignty 
five  islands  in  the  harbor  of  Panama.  U.  S.  Docs.,  ser.  no.  3853,  doc.  337, 
pp.   25-34.     The  treaty  was  not  ratified. 

■•"Clarendon  to  Napier,  .\pril   10,   1857,  F.  C,  \m.,  vol.  667,  no.   50. 

"■  The  commissioners  had  been  appointed  by  the  Pierce  administration. 

**  Napier  to  Clarendon,  April  28,   1857,  F.  O.,  .\m.,  vol.  670,  no.  55. 

<*  Napier  to  Clarendon,  June  24,  1857,  ibid.,  vol.  673,  no.   114. 

«*  Ibid. 


ADJUSTMENT,  1856-1860  235 

The  situation  in  Central  America  made  Napier's  plan 
for  settlement  by  a  special  mission  seem  particularly 
feasible  at  this  time.  The  experience  of  the  Central 
American  states  with  the  filibusters,  as  well  as  the 
greater  friendliness  of  the  British  government  and  its 
agents  towards  Central  America,  had  produced  a  con- 
fidence which  augured  well  for  the  success  of  direct 
negotiation.  Therefore,  the  British  government  de- 
cided to  carry  out  Napier's  suggestions  to  the  letter. 
Sir  William  Gore  Ouseley,  who  had  filled  various  diplo- 
matic offices  "  and  was  intimately  known  to  Buchanan,** 
was  selected  as  special  commissioner. 

As  the  time  for  the  opening  of  Congress  approached, 
however,  the  American  government  had  grown  more 
impatient  over  the  delay  in  the  settlement  of  the  Central 
American  question."  Napier  realized  this,  and  on 
October  19,  as  soon  as  he  learned  that  his  suggestions 
had  been  adopted,  he  obtained  an  interview  with 
Buchanan  and  informed  him  of  the  intentions  of  his 
government.  The  decision  had  been  made  some  time 
past,  he  explained,  but  delay  had  been  occasioned  by 
the  difficulty  of  selecting  a  competent  person  for  the 
mission  and  also  by  recent  reports  from  India,  which 
had  absorbed  the  attention  of  the  British  government. 
Though  he  could  not  say  what  would  be  the  exact 
nature  of  Ouseley's  instructions,  Napier  stated  that  he 
believed  the  British  government  intended  to  execute 
the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  according  to  the  general 
tenor  of  the  interpretation  put  upon  it  by  the  United 
States,  but  to  do  so  by  separate  negotiation  with  the 
Central  American  republics.** 

^  Die.  Nat.  Biog.,  XLII,  364. 

**  U.  S.  Docs.,  ser.  no.  3853,  doc.  194,  p.  114. 

*' Ibid.,  pp.    112-114.  *^  Ibid.,  p.  115. 


236     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

The  British  minister  later  referred  to  the  contingency 
which  he  aimed  to  prevent,  remarking  that  if,  in  conse- 
quence of  the  language  in  the  President's  message,  a 
resolution  should  be  proposed  in  Congress  for  abrogat- 
ing the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  such  a  step  would  not 
only  frustrate  the  purposes  of  the  special  mission  but 
"  would  have  a  calamitous  influence  on  the  future  rela- 
tions of  England  and  America  ".  It  would  therefore 
be  very  gratifying  to  him,  he  stated,  to  be  able  to  inform 
his  government  that,  pending  Ouseley's  negotiations, 
no  proposal  to  annul  the  treaty  would  be  sanctioned  or 
encouraged  by  the  President  or  the  members  of  his 
government/" 

Buchanan  replied  that  he  intended  to  give  an  account 
of  the  Dallas-Clarendon  negotiations  in  his  message, 
and  admitted  that  this  part  of  the  message  was  already 
prepared;  yet,  notwithstanding  this,  he  asserted,  if  the 
British  government  really  intended  to  execute  the  Clay- 
ton-Bulwer treaty  according  to  the  American  interpre- 
tation and  would,  before  Congress  met,  make  some 
communication  to  him  in  that  sense,  such  as  he  could 
use,  he  would  cancel  what  he  had  written  and  insert 
another  passage  referring  to  the  special  mission  to  be 
sent  by  the  British.  Moreover,  under  the  circum- 
stances, no  attempt  in  Congress  against  the  Clayton- 
Bulwer  treaty  would  receive  any  support  from  him." 

Subsequent  conversations  with  Buchanan,  however, 
revealed  the  fact  that  he  expected  the  unequivocal 
restoration  of  the  Bay  Islands,  the  abandonment  of  the 
Mosquito  protectorate,  and  the  restriction  of  Belize  to 
its  boundaries  of  1786."     Napier  felt  that  his  govern- 

**  U .  S.  Docs.,  ser.  no.  3853,  doc.   194,  p.   116. 
°*  Ibid.,  pp.  116-117. 

^^  Pari.  Pafeis,  i860,  Cotns.,  LWIII.  "  Correspoiulencc  respecting 
Central  America  ",  60-62. 


ADJUSTMENT,  1856-1860  237 

ment  would  not  yield  to  the  last  demand ;  hence  he 
seriously  questioned  whether  such  a  statement  as  the 
British  government  would  be  willing  to  make  with 
reference  to  Ouseley's  mission  would  be  sufficient  to 
restrain  Buchanan  from  inserting  in  his  message  lan- 
guage such  as  would  cause  difficulties  between  the  two 
governments."  Consequently,  he  suggested  to  Claren- 
don that  the  formal  proposal  to  arbitrate  the  question 
be  renewed.  Such  a  proposal,  connected  with  the  mis- 
sion of  Ouseley,  would,  he  beheved,  place  the  policy 
of  the  British  government  in  a  very  favorable  light.'^ 

Though  Clarendon  instructed  Napier  to  renew  the 
offer  of  arbitration,"  his  suspicions  as  to  Buchanan's 
intentions  were  roused,  and  he  doubted  the  efficacy  of 
the  measures  suggested  to  save  the  Clayton-Bulwer 
treaty  from  a  hostile  attack.  Therefore,  after  Ouse- 
ley's departure  for  the  United  States,  he  wrote  him  that 
in  consequence  of  the  probability  that  the  Clayton- 
Bulwer  treaty  would  be  abrogated  by  the  American 
Congress,  it  was  necessary  to  proceed  with  great  cau- 
tion ;  that  he  must  not  commit  the  British  government 
in  any  way  as  regarded  the  Bay  Islands  until  the  inten- 
tions of  the  American  Congress  with  reference  to  the 
Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  were  fully  ascertained."^ 

Clarendon's  distrust  of  the  American  government 
had  probably  been  increased  not  only  by  what  Napier 
had  told  him  of  Buchanan's  expectations  in  connection 
with  the  Ouseley  mission,  but  also  by  further  develop- 
ments in  reference  to  Panama.  Though  Napier's  fears 
of  difficulty  in  connection  with  the  American  collection 
of  damages  against  New  Granada  had  evidently  been 
averted  by  the  appointment  of  a  joint  American  and 

"  Ibid.,  63.         "=  Ibid.         "  Ibid.         =5  Ibid.,  64. 


238     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

New  Granadian  commission  for  the  adjustment  of  the 
claims,""  the  British  government  was  still  uneasy  over 
the  matter.  Consequently  it  had  proposed  a  tripartite 
guarantee  of  the  Panama  route  on  the  part  of  Great 
Britain,  France,  and  the  United  States.  The  United 
States,  however,  had  promptly  refused,  on  the  ground 
that  she  had  already  made  such  an  agreement  with  New 
Granada  in  the  treaty  of  1846  ;  moreover,  it  was  against 
the  policy  of  the  United  States  to  enter  into  such 
engagements  as  that  suggested."  Somewhat  later  still, 
a  report  reached  England  of  a  movement  in  Panama  to 
separate  that  state  from  Xew  Granada  and  secure 
annexation  to  the  United  States."  As  a  result,  Claren- 
don instructed  Napier  to  inquire  unofficially  what 
course  the  American  government  would  pursue  in  case 
such  annexation  should  be  offered."^  There  seems  to  be 
no  record  that  such  inquiry  was  made  by  Napier ;  but 
Clarendon's  letter  contains  the  last  indication  of  sus- 
picion against  the  United  States  during  this  period,  in 
connection  with  Panama. 

On  November  18,  Ouseley  arrived  in  Washington, 
and  two  days  later  was  presented  to  Cass,  by  Napier, 
who  stated  that  he  would  in  a  few  days  make  a  written 

"Napier  to  Clarendon,  Aug.  3,    1857,  1".   O.,  Am.,  vol.  673,  no.    155. 

"  Clarendon  to  Napier,  Oct.  15,  1857,  ibid.,  vol.  669,  no.  278. 

"'Clarendon  to  Napier,  Nov.  27,  1857,  ibid.,  no.  322.  It  was  evidently 
upon  the  suspicions  of  the  Hritish  government  and  the  proposals  of  the 
American  commissioners  (see  above,  pp.  2.25-2^6)  that  Harral-Montferrat, 
De  Monroe  a  Rooserelt.  81-82,  based  his  statement  that  President 
Buchanan,  through  Marcy,  proposed  to  the  British  government  that  the 
two  nations  divide  their  influence  on  the  .\merican  isthmus,  England 
carrying  out  her  own  plans  in  Nicaragua  and  Honduras,  and  the  United 
States  doing  the  same  in  Panama.  This  statement  is  both  confused  and 
erroneous.  Cass,  and  not  Marcy,  was  Buchanan's  secretary  of  state. 
Moreover,  while  neither  the  British  nor  -American  archives  contain  any 
evidence  that  such  proposal  was  made  by  the  .\mcrican  government,  the 
data  found  and  given  above  clearly  disprove  it. 

••Clarendon  to  Napier,  Nov.  27,  18571  f-  O.,  Am.,  vol.  669,  no.  ^22. 


ADJUSTMENT,  1856-1860  239 

communication  to  the  American  government  respecting 
the  special  mission.  This  commmiication  was  made 
on  November  30.  The  specific  objects  of  the  mission, 
Napier  wrote,  would  be  the  cession  of  the  Bay  Islands 
to  Honduras,  the  localization  of  the  Mosquito  Indians 
under  Nicaraguan  sovereignty,  and  the  definition  of  the 
boundaries  of  British  Honduras.  The  transfer  of  the 
islands  would  not  be  unconditional,  but  it  would  be 
unambiguous ;  the  government  of  Honduras  would 
obtain  not  only  a  titular,  but  a  virtual  and  useful  pos- 
session under  provisions  necessary  for  the  security  of 
the  settlers  and  favorable  to  the  expansion  of  com- 
merce. In  arranging  for  the  settlement  of  the  Mosquito 
question,  Ouseley  would  be  guided  by  the  provisions  of 
the  Dallas-Clarendon  treaty.  Modifications  might  be 
made  in  the  boundaries  mentioned  in  that  document, 
but  they  would  not  be  less  favorable  to  Nicaragua  and 
Honduras ;  nor  would  they  trespass  on  the  territory 
appHcable  to  transit  purposes.  In  arranging  details 
the  aim  would  be  to  grant  an  indulgent  consideration  to 
the  wishes  and  necessities  of  the  Central  American  gov- 
ernments, when  they  were  compatible  with  the  safety 
and  welfare  of  the  Indians.  The  boundary  limits  of 
Belize  would  be  arranged  by  negotiation  with  Guate- 
mala. The  British  government  trusted  to  obtain  al 
recognition  of  limits  for  Belize,  which,  judging  from 
previous  communications  on  the  subject,  might  be 
accepted  in  a  spirit  of  conciliation,  if  not  with  absolute 
approval  by  the  President.  Though  the  proposed 
arrangement,  Ouseley  concluded,  might  not  strictly 
coincide  with  the  interpretation  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer 
treaty  adopted  by  the  United  States,  it  nevertheless 

involved  no  slight  relaxation  of  the  sense  in  which  the    , 

I 


240     ANGLO-AMERICAS  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

engagements  of  1850  were  contracted  by  Great  Britain. 
Consequently,  it  was  hoped  that  the  concessions  of  the 
British  government  would  be  met  in  a  similar  temper 
by  the  United  States,  and  that,  if  successfully  accom- 
plished, its  results  would  be  regarded  as  an  honorable 
compromise  of  contending  opinions,  and  as  a  definite 
settlement  of  the  Central  American  dispute." 

No  formal  expression  of  opinion  upon  this  com- 
munication seems  to  have  been  made  by  the  American 
government  before  the  appearance  of  the  President's 
message — which  made  mention  of  it — on  December  8. 
The  message  first  called  attention  to  the  Dallas-Claren- 
don negotiations  and  to  the  objectionable  treaty  made 
by  Great  Britain  with  Honduras,  and  then  continued  : 

The  fact  is  that  when  two  nations  like  Great  Britain  and  the 
United  States,  mutually  desirous,  as  they  are,  and  I  trust 
ever  may  be,  of  maintaining  the  most  friendly  relations  with 
each  other,  have  unfortunately  concluded  a  treaty  which  they 
understand  in  senses  directly  opposite,  the  wisest  course  is  to 
abrogate  such  a  treaty  by  mutual  consent  and  to  commence 
anew.  .  .  .  Whilst  entertaining  these  sentiments,  I  shall,  never- 
theless, not  refuse  to  contribute  to  any  reasonable  adjustment 
of  the  Central  American  questions  which  is  not  practically  in- 
consistent with  the  American  interpretation  of  the  treaty. 
Overtures  for  this  purpose  have  been  recently  made  by  the 
British  government  in  a  friendly  spirit,  which  I  cordially 
reciprocate,  but  whether  this  renewed  effort  will  result  in 
success  I  am  not  yet  prepared  to  express  an  opinion.  A.  brief 
period  will  determine." 

The  message  was  hardly  as  conciliatory  as  might 
have  been  expected  from  the  assurances  given  Napier 
by  Buchanan,  but  in  view  of  the  President's  deep  dis- 
like for  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty,  the  language  is  not 

^  Pari.  Papers,  i860,  Corns..  L.W'III,  "Correspondence  respecting 
Central  America  ",  70-72. 

•'  Richardson,  Messages  and  Papers,  \' ,  44^-445. 


ADJUSTMENT,  1856-1860  241 

to  be  wondered  at.  Moreover,  it  was  undoubtedly 
influenced  by  a  conviction,  gained  since  Napier's  first 
communication  regarding  the  special  mission,  that,  in 
negotiating  wth  Central  Amerca,  Great  Britain  did  not 
intend  to  follow  the  American  interpretation  of  the 
treaty  as  closely  as  was  at  first  expected. 

Though  Napier  felt  that  the  language  of  the  Presi- 
dent might  afford  some  cause  for  exception  on  the  part 
of  the  British  government,  he  reported  to  Clarendon 
on  the  day  the  message  appeared,  that  in  the  United 
States  it  would  be  considered  conciliatory.*" 

A  few  days  later,  Napier  again  wrote  to  Clarendon 
in  reference  to  the  message,  stating  that  it  now 
remained  for  the  British  government  to  decide  whether 
to  arrange  for  the  abrogation  of  the  treaty  by  mutual 
consent,  which  Buchanan  had  favored,  or  to  pursue  the 
earlier  plan  to  send  a  commissioner  to  Central  America. 
Should  the  cabinet  decide  on  either  course,  he  suggested 
that  its  decision  be  made  known  to  the  United  States 
and  be  carried  out  immediately."' 

The  British  government,  however,  had  been  dis- 
appointed in  the  lack  of  American  cordiality  shown 
towards  its  overtures  for  the  settlement  of  the  dispute," 
and  by  the  equivocal  character  of  the  President's  mes- 
sage. It  felt  that  it  had  gone  far  enough  in  the  display 
of  a  conciliatory  spirit.  Consequently,  Clarendon 
replied  that  the  government  was  decidedly  of  opinion 
that  it  would  neither  be  consistent  with  British  dignity 
nor  interest  to  make  any  proposal  to  the  United  States 
government  until  it  had  received  a  formal  answer  to  the 

"^  F.  O.,  Am.,  vol.  67s,  no.  277. 

^  Pari.  Papers,  i860,  Corns.,  LXVIII,  "Correspondence  respecting 
Central  America  ",  75. 

'^'^  Ibid.,  73;  Clarendon  to  Napier,  Nov.  20,  1857,  F.  O.,  Am.,  vol.  669, 
no.  314. 

17 


242     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

offer  of  arbitration/'^  which  had  been  made  by  Napier 
on  November  30/" 

This  decision  of  Great  Britain  produced  a  triple  dead- 
lock which  lasted  for  several  weeks.  The  American 
government  had  agreed  not  to  make  any  move  towards 
abrogating  the  treaty  until  it  could  be  seen  what  inter- 
pretation of  its  provisions  would  result  from  Ouseley's 
mission.  Moreover,  as  appeared  later,  Cass  was  wait- 
ing for  further  details  regarding  Ouseley's  instructions, 
which  Napier  had  intimated  that  he  would  receive ; " 
Ouseley  could  not  proceed  until  instructed  to  do  so ; 
and,  finally,  Napier  was  prohibited  from  taking  any 
action  until  the  American  government  made  reply  to 
the  formal  offer  of  arbitration. 

The  existing  situation,  however,  seemed  particularly 
favorable  to  a  settlement  of  the  Central  American  dis- 
pute. Presumably  in  consequence  of  Walker's  an- 
nouncement that  he  intended  to  maintain  Nicaragua  as 
an  independent  sovereignty,"*  as  well  as  because  of  the 
more  reasonable  attitude  shown  by  Great  Britain 
towards  the  matter  in  dispute,  the  American  govern- 
ment had  for  some  time  displayed  unusual  energy 
against  the  filibuster,  and  Nicaragua  was  at  least  tem- 
porarily freed  from  Walker.""     Furthermore,  a  good 

'^  Pari.  Papers,  i860,  Corns.,  LXVIII,  "Correspondence  respecting 
Central  America  ",  78. 

"  Ibid.,  74.  "  Ibid.,  78,  79,  89,  90. 

•"Walker,  War  in  Nicaragua,  265-269;  Blackwood's  Magaciuc,  LXXXl, 
552;  Napier  to  Clarendon,  June  i,  1857,  F.  O.,  Am.,  vol.  67a,  no.  8r; 
Cong.  Globe,  35  Cong.,  i  sess.,  pt.  i,  p.  295. 

"'Pari.  Papers,  i860,  Corns.,  LXVIII,  "Correspondence  respecting 
Central  America  ",  78,  80.  In  the  autumn  of  1857  Napier  reported  to 
Clarendon  that  he  helieved  both  Huclianan  and  Cass  now  to  be  honestly 
opposed  to  the  filibustering  attempts  against  Nicaragua;  but  that  this 
attitude  was  not  shared  by  other  members  of  the  American  cabinet. 
Napier  to  Clarendon,  Sept.  22,  1857,  "  Private  and  unofficial  ",  F.  O., 
Am.,  vol.  673;  Napier  to  Clarendon,  Nov.  16,  1857,  ibid.,  vol.  674,  no.  248. 


ADJUSTMENT,  1856-1860  243 

understanding  existed  between  the  United  States  and 
Great  Britain  regarding  a  transit  treaty  negotiated  by 
the  former  with  Nicaragua,  to  take  the  place  of  the 
Squier  treaty,  which  had  never  been  ratified  by  the 
American  Senate.  This  later  arrangement,  the  Cass- 
Yrissari  treaty,  provided  for  an  open  and  neutral  transit 
through  Nicaragua,  and  granted  to  the  United  States 
the  power  to  land  troops,  if  necessary,  to  protect  the 
route."  Such  an  arrangement  was  hardly  in  strict  con- 
formity with  the  letter  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty ; 
but  the  British  government  learned  indirectly  that 
should  it  oppose  this  measure  as  a  treaty  violation,  a 
movement  would  be  initiated  for  the  purpose  of  annull- 
ing the  Clayton-Bulwer  agreement  by  act  of  Congress." 
Probably  in  consequence  of  this,  the  British  government 
had  made  no  objection,  and  finally  Napier  had  frankly 
announced  to  Cass  that  none  would  be  made.^ 

Napier  was  anxious  that  advantage  be  taken  of  these 
favorable  conditions  for  the  adjustment  of  difficulties." 
Consequently,  on  February  17,  1858,  he  addressed  Cass, 
informing  him  that  the  British  government  wished  to 
know  the  decision  of  the  United  States  upon  the  offer 
of  arbitration,  and  remarking  that  should  the  United 
States  be  opposed  to  this  mode  of  settlement  his  gov- 
ernment would  give  a  friendly  consideration  to  any 
observations  which  Cass  might  choose  to  make  on  the 
objects  of  the  special  mission." 

'*  Ibid.,  69-70.  The  obstruction  of  the  route  by  the  conflict  in  Nicaragua 
made  this  stipulation  seem  necessary. 

'^Napier  to  Clarendon,  Nov.  30,  1857,  ibid.,  vol.  675,  no.  266. 

"  Pari.  Papers,  i860,  Corns.,  LXVIII,  "  Correspondence  respecting 
Central  America  ",  78. 

"  Ibid.,  78,  80. 

"Ibid.,  80-81. 


244     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

But  since  the  Kansas  question  was  again  absorbing 
the  attention  of  the  American  government,  there  was 
further  delay."  Meanwhile,  desultory  conversations 
upon  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  took  place  between 
Napier  and  Cass.  Napier,  upon  Clarendon's  authoriza- 
tion," unof^cially  notified  Cass  that  the  British  govern- 
ment would  not  object  to  abrogation  of  the  treaty  by 
mutual  consent,"  and  suggested  that,  should  the  United 
States  favor  such  action,  a  proposal  to  that  effect  be 
inserted  in  the  reply  to  the  oflFer  of  arbiration.  The 
treaty  of  abrogation,  Napier  thought,  should  contain  a 
self-denying  engagement  with  reference  to  the  inter- 
oceanic  route,  and  he  mentioned  this  to  Cass,  adding 
that  the  abrogation  of  the  treaty  would  throw  Central 
America  open  to  territorial  acquisition  by  the  United 
States.  The  British  government,  however,  would 
retain  British  Honduras  and  the  Bay  Islands."  Later, 
Napier  was  instructed  by  Malmesbury,  who  had  suc- 
ceeded Clarendon  in  February,  1858,  to  inform  Cass 
that  the  British  government  was  willing  to  consent  to 
unconditional  abrogation.  Such  stipulation  as  Napier 
had  suggested  regarding  the  canal,  the  Foreign  Secre- 
tary feared,  might  perpetuate  the  entanglement  with 
the  United  States.  Should  the  British  government  be 
so  fortunate  as  to  extricate  itself  from  the  difficulties 
resulting  from  the  treaty,  it  wished  to  guard  itself 
against  any  similar  difficulties  in  the  future.     Napier, 

"  PoW.  Papers,  i860,  Corns..  I.W'III,  "  Correspondence  respecting  Cen- 
tral America  ",  86-87. 

'"  Ibid..  83. 

"On  January  22,  1858,  Clarendon  wrote  to  Napier:  "The  more  1 
consider  the  matter,  the  more  I  incline  to  the  belief  that  throwing  over 
the  C.-B.  Treaty  will  be  our  best  way  out."    V.  O.,  .\m.,  vol.  695. 

''*  Pari.  Papers,  i860.  Corns.,  LXVIII,  "Correspondence  respecting 
Central  America  ",  83-84. 


ADJUSTMENT,  i8 56-1860  245 

however,  was  to  show  no  eagerness  for  settlement  by 
either  abrogation  or  arbitration." 

The  statement  of  the  British  government  regarding 
the  conditions  under  which  it  would  consent  to  abroga- 
tion undoubtedly  influenced  the  United  States  to  make 
a  definite  choice  of  the  three  alternatives  offered  by 
the  British  for  settling  the  dispute.  Its  views  were 
expressed  in  a  letter  written  by  Cass  to  Napier  on 
April  6.  After  reviewing  the  recent  history  of  the 
question,  Cass  complained  of  not  receiving  the  further 
details  promised  regarding  Ouseley's  mission.  Since 
the  President  was  asked  to  co-operate  in  the  arrange- 
ments, it  was  necessary  that  he  know  the  nature  of 
these  arrangements.  This  information  was  the  more 
important  in  consequence  of  the  idea  which  seemed  to 
prevail  that  the  American  interpretation  of  the  Clayton- 
Bulwer  treaty  was  found  in  the  provisions  of  the 
Dallas-Clarendon  treaty,  for  such  an  idea  was  entirely 
erroneous.  Yet  the  President  trusted  that  the  more 
complete  information  which  he  hoped  to  receive  con- 
cerning the  mission  of  Ouseley  might  justify  him  in 
anticipating  from  it  a  substantial  execution  of  the 
Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  according  to  the  general  tenor 
of  the  American  interpretation.  In  that  event  he  would 
be  happy  to  give  his  cordial  co-operation,  and  to  direct 
the  ministers  of  the  United  States  in  Central  America 
to  render  any  assistance  in  their  power  towards  pro- 
moting its  success.^ 

''*  Ibid.,  85-86.  In  conversation  with  Dallas  upon  the  subject,  Malmes- 
bury  said,  "  we  do  not  offer  to  abrogate  the  Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty, 
but  if  such  be  the  disposition  of  the  President,  we  shall  make  no 
difficulty  whatever."  Dallas  to  Cass,  April  13,  1858,  Dept.  of  State, 
Des.,  Eng.,  vol.  71,  no.  99. 

'"'  Pari.  Papers,  i860.  Corns.,  LXVIII,  "  Correspondence  respecting 
Central  America  ",  87-90. 


246    ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

The  prosecution  of  the  plan  to  adjust  the  difficulty  by 
special  mission,  Cass  continued,  must  naturally  exclude 
the  adoption  of  any  other  alternative.  Therefore  he 
had  been  much  surprised  upon  receiving  an  offer  of 
arbitration,  after  the  President  had  been  notified  of  the 
mission  of  Ouseley  and  had  expressed  his  concurrence 
in  it;  and  he  had  regarded  the  oflfer  as  sufficiently 
answered  by  the  President's  express  agreement  to  the 
mode  of  adjustment  contemplated  by  the  mission,  even 
if  it  had  not  been  twice  rejected  before.  But,  Cass 
added,  in  order  to  avoid  misunderstanding,  he  was 
instructed  to  state  that  the  same  reasons  which  caused 
the  rejection  of  the  first  oflfer  of  arbitration  still  existed, 
and  for  these  reasons  it  was  still  declined." 

Should  Ouseley 's  mission  prove  successful,  there 
would,  of  course,  be  no  need  to  consider  the  question 
of  abrogation ;  but  it  appeared  that,  should  the  treaty 
be  abrogated,  the  British  government  would  relinquish 
none  of  its  pretensions  in  Central  America,  and  that  the 
Bay  Islands  in  particular  "  would  remain  attached  to 
the  British  Crown  ".  Since  it  was  well  known  that  the 
views  of  the  United  States  were  wholly  inconsistent 
with  these  pretensions  and  that  it,  therefore,  could 
never  willingly  acquiesce  in  their  maintenance  by 
Great  Britain,  Napier  must  readily  perceive  what  seri- 
ous consequences  might  follow  a  dissolution  of  the 
treaty,  if  no  provisions  should  be  made  at  the  same  time 
for  adjusting  the  questions  which  led  to  it.  If,  there- 
fore, the  President  did  not  hasten  to  consider  the  alter- 
native of  repealing  the  treaty  of  1850,  it  was  because 
he  did  not  wish  prematurely  to  anticipate  the  failure  of 
Ouseley's  mission,  and  was  disposed  to  give  a  new 

*^  Pari.  Papers,  i860,  Corns.,  LXVIII,  "Correspondence  rcspcclinK 
Central  America",  90-91. 


ADJUSTMENT,  1856-1860  247 

proof  to  the  British  government  of  his  sincere  wish  to 
preserve  the  amicable  relations  which  now  subsisted 
between  the  two  governments." 

This  decision  of  the  United  States  in  favor  of 
arranging  the  dispute  through  the  proposed  Ouseley 
mission  would  seem  on  first  appearance  to  have  been  a 
diplomatic  victory  for  Great  Britain;  but  the  victory 
was  more  apparent  than  real,  as  soon  became  evident. 
American  dislike  for  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  was 
still  as  intense  as  ever.  In  May  a  joint  resolution  for 
its  abrogation  was  reported  from  the  Committee  on 
Foreign  Relations ; "  and  though  neither  Cass  nor 
Buchanan  encouraged  congressional  action,  abrogation 
had  evidently  been  the  course  which  they  favored  for 
disposing  of  the  dispute,"  until  it  became  clear  that  in 
such  case  the  British  government  would  retain  the  Bay 
Islands.  The  aim  of  both  men  was  evidently  to  dispose 
of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty,  which  was  opposed  to 
the  expansionist  policy  of  the  administration,  and  also 
to  drive  the  British  out  of  Central  America.  The  latter 
consummation  was  the  most  immediately  desired ; 
hence  after  it  became  clear  that  the  British  would 
retain  the  Bay  Islands  if  the  treaty  were  set  aside, 
choice  was  made  of  the  plan  to  settle  the  dispute  by  a 
special  commissioner. 

Yet,  after  this  decision  had  been  imparted  to  the 
British  government,  Cass,  with  surprising  frankness, 
expressed  to  Napier  a  desire  for  the  dissolution  of  the 
treaty   after  the   arrangements   contemplated   by   the 

^Ubid..  91. 

^*  Cong.  Globe,  35  Cong.,  i  sess.,  pt.  2,  pp.   1944-1943. 

^♦Napier  to  Clarendon,  May  3,  1857,  F.  O.,  Am.,  vol.  671,  no.  64; 
June  7,  1857,  ibid.,  vol.  672,  no.  90;  Ouseley  to  Malmesbury,  July  6, 
1858,  F.  O.,  Guat.,  vol.  98.  no.  55. 


248     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

Ouseley  mission  should  have  been  made.  The  treaty, 
he  said,  was  obnoxious  to  the  American  people,  and  an 
impediment  to  cordial  understanding  between  the  two 
countries."  Napier,  however,  pointed  out  that  the  con- 
cessions committed  to  the  Ouseley  mission  "  w^ere  based 
on  the  supposition  that  the  stipulations  of  the  Clayton- 
Bulwer  Treaty  were  to  remain,  and  be  the  future  rule 
of  the  relations  of  the  two  countries  in  Central  Amer- 
ica." If  the  British  government  gave  up  its  posses- 
sions, he  said,  it  would  keep  the  treaty ;  it  could  not  be 
expected  that  both  possessions  and  treaty  would  be 
abandoned.*^ 

Since  the  American  government  had  made  known  its 
choice  as  to  methods  of  settling  the  dispute,  it  was 
decided  by  the  British  government  that  Ouseley  should 
proceed  at  once  to  Central  America.  On  July  15 
Malmesbury  notified  him  of  this  decision,  but  stated  that 
his  business  would  be  confined  to  making  treaties  with 
Nicaragua  and  Honduras  with  reference  to  the  Mos- 
quitos,  and  with  Guatemala  defining  the  Belize  bound- 
aries. He  was  to  have  no  commission  to  negotiate 
regarding  the  Bay  Islands."  This  deviation  from  the 
instructions  of  the  previous  administration  was  evi- 
dently due  to  suspicion,  roused  by  Cass's  remarks  to 
Napier,  that  the  United  States  still  had  secret  designs 
against  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty.  The  Bay  Islands, 
the  possession  which  the  government  was  most  reluctant 
to  give  up,  were  not  to  be  relinquished  until  it  was  cer- 
tain that  the  American  government  meant  to  abide  by 
the  treaty.  Before  Ouseley's  definite  powers  were  sent, 
the  British  plan  was  further  changed  and  the  com- 

*^  Pari.    Patters,    i860,    Corns.,    I, XVIII,    "  Corrcsponilence    respecting 
Central  America",  99100. 
»»  Ibid.  "  Ibid..  99. 


ADJUSTMENT,  1856-1860  249 

missioner  was  simply  instructed  to  form  commercial 
treaties  with  Nicaragua  and  Costa  Rica  and  an  addi- 
tional treaty  with  the  former  with  reference  to  the 
Mosquitos.^  No  authority  was  given  for  the  settle- 
ment of  the  Belize  boundaries. 

On  August  18  Malmesbury  replied  to  Cass's  letter 
of  April  6.  A  tone  of  resentment  at  the  attitude  of  the 
American  government  is  discernible  in  the  reply. 
Napier  was  instructed  to  inform  the  American  secre- 
tary of  state  that  the  British  government  had  nothing 
further  to  add  to  the  explanations  already  given  with 
reference  to  Ouseley's  mission.  Offers  of  arbitration 
and  abrogation  had  been  refused  by  the  United  States  ; 
therefore  Great  Britain  appeared  completely  to  have 
exhausted  the  means  of  arrangement  at  her  disposal. 
Consequently  there  was  no  alternative  but  to  leave  it  to 
the  American  government  to  originate  any  further 
overtures  for  an  adjustment  of  the  controversies.^' 

A  little  later  Napier  was  instructed  with  reference  to 
his  relations  with  the  United  States  government.  At  a 
convenient  season  he  should  inform  that  government 
of  the  intentions  and  objects  of  the  British  cabinet 
relating  to  Ouseley's  errand,  but  in  doing  so  he  must 
not  ask  either  advice  or  assistance  from  the  United 
States ;  such  requests  would  be,  under  existing  circum- 
stances, derogatory  to  the  dignity  of  the  Crown.  The 
United  States  government  had  successively  refused 
every  solution  of  the  controversies  which  had  been 
offered ;  hence  Great  Britain  and  Nicaragua  were  now 
about  to  treat  as  independent  states,  and  the  United 
States  government  was  to  be  informed  of  this  merely 
as  an  act  of  friendship  and  courtesy .°° 

^  Ibid.,  100-120.  *^  Ibid.,  123-124.  ^  Ibid.,  124. 


250     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

The  perversity  of  the  United  States,  however,  had  by 
no  means  made  Great  Britain  indifferent  to  American 
friendship.  The  situation  was  a  delicate  one.  Though 
the  British  government  was  willing  to  abrogate  the 
Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  if  the  first  move  for  the  purpose 
were  made  by  the  American  government,"  British  honor 
could  not  endure  its  abolition  by  the  American  Con- 
gress. Such  action  must  require  a  reckoning  between 
the  two  governments,  and  this  would  be  certain  to  pro- 
duce strained  relations,  disastrous  to  commerce,  if  not 
even  war  itself.  Both  results  were  to  be  avoided,  if 
possible,  and  the  latter  was  not  to  be  thought  of  at  this 
time,  as  there  was  possibility  of  war  with  France." 
Hence,  it  was  highly  desirable  to  preserve  the  treaty 
against  congressional  action ;  and  efforts  were  made  to 
keep  in  close  touch  with  the  American  government  and 
to  convince  it  of  British  good  intentions. 

Malmesbury  now  showed  considerable  anxiety  lest 
nothing  be  accomplished  towards  settlement  of  the 
Central  American  dispute  before  the  meeting  of  Con- 
gress, and  he  urged  Ouseley  to  execute  his  instructions 
as  quickly  as  possible  and  arrange  to  have  the  negotia- 
tions terminated  not  later  than  the  last  of  November. 
Any  delay  in  commencing  the  negotiations,  he  said, 
would  frustrate  the  objects  which  the  government  had 
in  view  and  render  the  continuance  of  his  mission 
unnecessary."' 

For  some  weeks  after  Ouseley's  departure,  the 
American  government  remained  silent  upon  the  general 

"Clarendon  to  Napier,  Jan.  22,  1858,  F.  C,  Am.,  vol.  695. 

'"Napier  to  Malmesbury,  .April  12,  1858,  ibid.,  vol.  691,  no.  85;  Napier 
to  Malmesbury,  April  13,  1858,  ibid.,  nos.  89  and  90. 

"^  Pari.  Papers,  i860.  Corns.,  LXVIII,  "Correspondence  respecting 
Central  America",   125,   134. 


ADJUSTMENT,  1856-1860  251 

subject  of  his  mission,  but  on  November  8  Cass  wrote 
Napier  a  reply  to  Malmesbury's  communication  of 
August  18.  Though  Cass's  letter  displayed  a  slight 
tone  of  resentment  at  some  of  the  statements  made  by 
Malmesbury,  it  was,  on  the  whole,  frankly  conciliator}'. 
The  American  government  had  evidently  come  fully  to 
realize  that  in  trying  to  grasp  all  it  might  lose  all — 
that  if  the  British  were  to  be  driven  from  Central 
America,  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty,  which  also  barred 
the  isthmus  to  the  Americans,  must  be  preserved. 
Hence  the  change  in  tone.  In  his  letter  Cass  considered  . 
the  elements  of  the  dispute  and  called  attention  to  the  * 
fact  that  there  was  no  apparent  disagreement  except  as 
to  the  conditions  governing  the  surrender  of  the  Bay 
Islands,  and  as  to  the  limits  to  be  set  for  Belize.  Was  it 
possible  that  these  difi'erences,  if  approached  in  a  spirit 
of  conciliation  and  good  feeling,  could  not  be  adjusted 
in  a  friendly  manner?  To  believe  this  would  be  to 
underestimate  the  importance  of  the  adjustment  and  the 
intelligent  appreciation  of  this  importance,  which  must 
be  entertained  by  both  nations.  What  the  United  States 
wanted  in  Central  America,  next  to  the  happiness  of 
its  people,  was  the  security  and  neutrality  of  the  inter- 
oceanic  routes  leading  through  it.  This  -was  equally  the 
desire  of  the  whole  commercial  world.  Such  an  object 
would  be  accomplished  if  the  principles  and  pohcy  of 
the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  were  carried  into  effect.  An 
adjustment  of  the  Central  American  question  accord- 
ing to  the  general  tenor  of  the  American  interpretation 
of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  was  all  that  the  President 
had  ever  desired,  and  instead  of  having  rejected  the 
proposal  for  such  a  settlement  he  had  expressed  his 
cordial  acceptance  of  it,  so  far  as  he  understood  it,  and 


252     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

had  anticipated  from  it  the  most  gratifying  conse- 
quences. Nothing  now  remained  but  to  inquire 
whether  the  good  results  expected  in  the  beginning 
from  Ouseley's  mission  might  not  yet  be  happily  accom- 
plished.** 

Malmesbury  quickly  responded  to  the  cordial  tone  in 
this  letter,  and  in  his  reply  to  Napier  expressed  his 
"  lively  satisfaction  "  with  it.  The  friendly  character 
of  the  letter  and  the  high  appreciation  it  displayed  of 
the  importance  of  ending  the  irritating  discussion,  he 
believed,  could  not  but  tend  to  bring  the  dispute  to  a 
speedy  and  permanent  conclusion.  The  existing  admin- 
istration, Malmesbury  informed  Napier,  considereii 
itself  morally  obliged  to  carry  out  the  political  views  of 
its  successors,  as  embodied  in  Napier's  note  to  Cass  of 
November  30,  1857,  in  respect  to  the  Bay  Islands.  Con- 
sequently, it  was  the  intention  of  the  British  govern- 
ment, as  soon  as  Ouseley  should  have  settled  the  ques- 
tion of  the  Mosquito  territory,  to  instruct  him  to  enter 
immediately  into  negotiations  with  Honduras  regard- 
ing the  Bay  Islands.  As  soon  as  Ouseley's  present  task 
should  be  accomplished,  the  details  of  this  second  mis- 
sion would  be  made  known  to  the  American  govern- 
ment. The  British  government,  Malmesbury  con- 
cluded, interpreted  Cass's  note  of  the  8th  of  November 
as  meaning  that  if  the  principles  of  the  Mosquito  terri- 
tory were  arranged,  the  Bay  Islands  ceded  to  Honduras, 
and  the  boundaries  of  British  Honduras  established,  the 
Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  would  remain  as  the  acceptable 
and  practical  rule  for  the  relations  of  England  and  the 
United  States  in  Central  America  and  would  thereafter 

^' Pari.  Papers,  i860,  Corns.,  LXVIII,  "Correspondence  respecting 
Central  America  ",    147-154. 


ADJUSTMENT,  1856-1860  253 

be  recognized  and  respected  as  such  by  the  United 
States.  It  was  the  wish  of  the  British  government  as  it 
was  also  the  wish  of  the  United  States  that  the  good 
results  expected  in  the  beginning  from  the  Ouseley 
mission  might  yet  be  effected.'' 

A  copy  of  this  letter,  furnished  by  Napier  and  read  at 
a  meeting  of  the  President's  cabinet,  gave  much  satis- 
faction."' But  before  Malmesbury's  letter  was  received 
the  American  government  had  fully  settled  upon  a  con- 
ciliatory course.  Though  no  report  of  progress  had 
come  from  Ouseley,  on  December  6,  the  President's 
message  appeared  containing  a  clause  in  reference  to 
British  relations  quite  in  harmony  with  the  friendly  tone 
of  Cass's  letter  written  a  month  before.  An  earnest 
desire  was  expressed  in  the  message  for  the  settlement 
of  every  misunderstanding  with  Great  Britain,  as  any 
serious  interruption  of  the  commerce  between  the  two 
countries  would  be  equally  injurious  to  both.  In  fact, 
no  two  nations  had  ever  existed  which  could  do  each 
other  so  much  good  or  so  much  harm  as  these  two. 
Though  gratified  that  he  could  announce  that  the  con- 
troversy over  visitation  and  search  had  been  settled, 
the  President  was  truly  sorry  not  to  be  able  to  say  the 
same  for  the  controversy  over  the  Clayton-Bulwer 
treaty.  As  the  purposed  negotiations  mentioned  in  the 
last  message  were  still  pending,  their  present  condi- 
tions could  not  be  reported.  A  final  settlement  of  the 
question  was  greatly  to  be  desired,  as  it  would  wipe 
out  the  last  subject  of  dispute  between  the  two  coun- 
tries."^ 

The  increase  in  cordiality  on  the  part  of  the  United 
States  produced  a  greater  briskness  in  the  British  gov- 

»'7fctrf.,  155-157.         ^  Ibid.,  165. 

^'  Richardson,  Messages  and  Papers,  V,  507-508. 


254     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

ernment  with  reference  to  the  Central  American  nego- 
tiations. Ouseley  had  not  made  as  much  progress  as 
had  been  hoped  for,  hence,  in  order  to  avoid  unneces- 
sary delay,  on  December  i6  IMalmesbury  authorized 
Wyke  to  resume  and  complete  the  negotiations,  should 
Ouseley  be  incapacitated  by  illness.**  On  the  same  date 
Malmesbury  notified  Ouseley  that  he  could  not  exert 
himself  too  much  to  conclude  the  treaties  for  the  nego- 
tion  of  which  he  had  been  empowered.** 

Yet  in  spite  of  the  Foreign  Secretary's  efforts,  the 
Central  American  negotiations  failed  to  make  satis- 
factory progress.  This  was  partly  caused  by  new  diffi- 
culties which  had  arisen  in  Central  America,  but  more 
through  the  inefficiency  of  Ouseley  himself.  The  new 
difficulties  were  largely  due  to  the  intrusion  of  Felix 
Belly,  the  agent  of  a  French  company  desirous  of  con- 
structing an  isthmian  canal.  The  Cass-Yrissari  treaty 
had  not  been  ratified  by  the  Nicaraguan  government 
when  Belly  arrived,  and  he  at  once  proceeded  to  work 
against  its  ratification  in  order  to  secure  for  his  own 
company  exclusive  control  of  the  route.^""  The  Ameri- 
can government,  he  declared,  supported  the  filibusters, 
and  should  the  treaty  go  into  effect  the  whole  of  Cen- 
tral America  would  be  dominated  by  the  United  States."' 
Nicaragua,  as  a  result  of  Belly's  efforts,  set  aside  the 
Gass-Yri&&a*>  tseat)i,^  and  settled  her  boundary  dispute 

'^  Pari.  Papers,  i860,  Corns.,  LXVIII,  "Correspondence  respecting 
Central  America  ",  i6o-i6i. 

"'Ibid.,  161.  British  interest  in  the  removal  of  all  obstacles  to  the 
formation  of  a  neutral  transisthmian  highway  had  probably  been  stim- 
ulated by  the  recent  organization  of  British  Columbia,  a  colony  result- 
ing from  the  discovery  of  gold  on  I'raser  River.  Dallas  to  Cass,  Nov.  26. 
1858,  Dept.  of  State,  Des.,  Eng.,  vol.  72,  no.  138. 

'""  Scroggs,  "  William  Walker  and  the  Steamship  Corporation  in 
Nicaragua",  in  Am.  Hist.  Rev.,  X,  8io. 

^"^  Ibid.,  Lamar  to  Cass,  June  26,  1858,  Dept.  of  State,  Des.,  Nic.  and 
Costa  Rica,  vol.  3. 


ADJUSTMENT,  1856-1860  -   255 

with  Costa  Rica,""  after  which  the  two  states  granted 
Belly  a  joint  canal  concession."'  It  had  been  the  aim  of 
the  British  government  to  introduce  into  the  commer- 
cial treaty  with  Nicaragua  terms  for  the  neutralization 
of  the  transit  similar  to  those  contained  in  the  Cass- 
Yrissari  treaty;  Belly's  manipulation  made  the  Nica- 
raguans  unreasonable  in  their  demands,  and  caused 
delay.^" 

Belly's  representations  regarding  American  support 
of  filibustering  movements  also  proved  a  handicap  to 
Ouseley,  for  they  increased  Central  American  fears  of 
attack  from  Walker,  who  was  at  this  time  in  the  United 
States  preparing  a  new  expedition.  There  was  little 
danger  of  trouble  from  the  filibusters,  however,  for  the 
British  government  had  ordered  an  extra  war  vessel  to 
the  Central  American  coast  to  protect  it  pending  nego- 
tiations. The  commander  was  instructed  to  prevent 
any  descent  upon  Greytown  or  Mosquito,  but  if  the 
filibusters  attempted  to  go  up  the  San  Juan  he  was  not 
to  act  except  in  conjunction  with  the  forces  of  Nica- 
ragua and  Costa  Rica,  and  then  only  upon  written 
request  from  the  commanders."'    As  France  was  plan- 

1**  In  consideration  of  aid  in  case  of  the  return  of  the  filibusters, 
Nicaragua  made  a  large  cession  of  territory  to  Costa  Rica,  Scroggs,  of.  cit. 

In  the  summer  of  1857  the  American  government  had  sent  Carey 
Jones  as  special  agent  to  Central  America  to  investigate  the  quarrel 
between  Costa  Rica  and  Nicaragua,  with  a  view  to  effecting  a  settlement; 
but  Jones  was  inefficient  and  his  efforts  vain.  Napier  to  Clarendon, 
July  6,  1857,  F.  O.,  Am.,  vol.  672,  no.  133;  Oct.  31,  1857,  ibid.,  vol.  674, 
no.  228. 

^^  Scroggs,  op.  cit.;  Johnson,  Four  Centuries  of  the  Panama  Canal,  65. 
The  efforts  of  Belly  came  to  nothing  as  far  as  forming  an  open  route  in 
Nicaragua  was  concerned.  American  attempts  in  this  direction  also 
resulted  in  failure,   and  interest   was   diverted   to   the   Panama   railway. 

"«  Lamar  to  Cass,  April  28,  1859,  Dept.  of  State,  Des.,  Nic.  and  Costa 
Rica,  vol.  4,  no.  50. 

^**  The  American  government  objected  to  these  instructions  and  de- 
clared that  the  landing  of  troops  to  protect  Ouseley's  negotiations  would 


256     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

ning  to  negotiate  a  commercial  treaty  with  Nicaragua, 
by  friendly  understanding  the  same  instructions  were 
given  the  French  naval  commanders ."^ 

The  most  serious  obstacle,  however,  to  a  prompt  and 
satisfactory  settlement  of  the  Central  American  diffi- 
culty, was  Ouseley's  lack  of  ability  for  his  task,  which 
was  quickly  shown.  At  the  very  outset  he  made  a  blun- 
der by  first  negotiating  the  commercial  treaty  for  which 
Nicaragua  was  very  anxious,  and  which  was  little  likely 
to  cause  difficulty,  and  neglecting  the  Mosquito  arrange- 
ment, the  terms  of  which  might  have  been  expected  to 
give  trouble."'  He  was  rebuked  by  his  government  for 
this  lack  of  judgment  and  again  told  that  the  Mosquito 
treaty  was  the  important  one.  No  general  commercial 
treaty  with  Nicaragua  would  be  approved  by  the  Brit- 
ish government,  Malmesbury  informed  him,  until  the 
convention  for  the  adjustment  of  the  Mosquito  question 

be  a  direct  violation  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty.  The  British  govern- 
ment replied  that  such  an  act  would  be  the  same  in  principle  as  the  land- 
ing of  American  troops  to  protect  the  transit  route,  as  contemplated  by 
the  Cass-Yrissari  treaty,  and  insisted  that  it  intended  to  protect  the 
negotiations.  No  occasion  for  landing  British  troops  arose,  however, 
and  with  the  accession  of  Russell  to  the  Foreign  Office  the  instructions 
were  changed  and  permission  withdrawn  from  the  British  naval  com- 
manders for  operations  against  the  filibusters  on  Central  .-Xmerican  soil. 
Pari.  Papers,  i860,  Corns.,  LXVIII,  "  Correspondence  respecting  Central 
America",   137-138,   139-141,  280. 

^''^  Ibid.,  159,  161,  231.  The  American  government  had  refused  to 
co-operate  with  the  British  naval  forces  in  protecting  Central  .-Smerica. 
Napier  to  Clarendon,  Oct.  22,  1857,  F.  C,  Am.,  vol.  674,  no.  220. 

""  PoW.  Papers,  i860.  Corns.,  I.XVIII,  "Correspondence  respecting 
Central  America",  170-171,  185.  The  British  government  attributed 
Ouseley's  inefficiency  to  his  constant  illness  while  in  Central  -Vmcrica. 
Dallas  to  Cass,  May  2,  1859,  Dept.  of  State,  Des.,  Eng.,  vol.  73,  no.  181. 
He  was  also  handicapped  by  conflicting  instructions.  Before  leaving 
England  he  was  told  that  the  cession  of  Mosquito  to  Nicaragua  should 
be  treated  as  a  concession  for  which  Central  .Xmerica  was  to  thank  Eng- 
land's moderation  and  good  will.  It  was  to  be  his  duty  to  try  to  save 
the  dignity  and  honor  of  Great  Britain  even  at  the  expense  of  material 
interests,  and  he  was  not  to  show  anxiety  for  a  settlement.  Ouscley  to 
Malmesbury,  Mar.  31,   1859,  F.  O.,  Guat.,  vol.   103,  no.  40. 


ADJUSTMENT,  1856-1860  257 

had  been  signed.  The  aim  was  to  settle  the  latter  point 
and  thus  to  obviate  any  further  discussion  with  the 
United  States  regarding  it."" 

But  the  difficulty  of  communicating  with  him  pre- 
vented the  interruption  of  Ouseley's  mistaken  course/"' 
and,  consequently,  the  commercial  treaty  was  signed 
and  awaiting  the  ratification  of  the  Nicaragua  assem- 
bly "°  before  any  headway  could  be  made  on  the  other 
treaty.  ]\Ioreover,  when  the  draft  of  the  former  was 
received  by  the  British  government  it  was  disclosed  that, 
in  violation  of  instructions,"'  Ouseley  had  introduced 
important  alterations  in  the  original  which  had  been 
furnished  him."^ 

Ouseley's  unsatisfactory  progress  decided  the  British 
government  to  entrust  to  Wyke  the  settlement  of  the 
Belize  boundary.  Accordingly,  on  February  16,  1859, 
Malmesbury  sent  him  instructions,  enclosing  a  draft  of 
a  convention.  The  proposed  line  of  boundary  at  the 
south  was  to  be  the  Sarstoon  River ;  but  in  view  of  the 
claim  of  the  United  States  that  the  territory  between  the 
Sibun  and  the  Sarstoon  belonged  to  Central  America, 
the  instructions  stated  that  it  was  necessary  that  the 
line  to  be  established  by  the  proposed  convention  should 
be  described  therein,  "  not  as  involving  any  cession  or 
new  acquisition  from  the  Republic  of  Guatemala,  but 
as  it  is  in  fact,  simply  as  the  definition  of  a  boundary 
long  existing,  but  not  hitherto  ascertained." '"  Conse- 
quently, the  first  paragraph  of  the  convention  read  : 

It  is  agreed  between  Her  Britannic  Majesty  and  the  Re- 
public of  Guatemala,  that  the  boundary  between  the  British 

^"^  Pari.  Papers,  i860,  Corns.,  LXVIII,  "Correspondence  respecting 
Central  America  ",  170-171. 

"*  Ouseley  to  Malmesbury,  Mar.  30,  1859,  F.  0.,  Guat.,  vol.  103,  no.  38, 

^^^  Pari.  Papers,  i860.  Corns.,  LXVIII,  "Correspondence  respecting 
Central  America  ",  186. 

^^Ibid.,  120,  197.         "-Ibid.,  186-195.  "^  Ibid.,  172 

18 


258     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

Settlement  and  Possessions  in  the  Bay  of  Honduras,  as  they 
existed  previous  to  and  on  the  ist  day  of  January,  1850,  and 
have  continued  to  exist  up  to  the  present  time,  was,  and  is  as 
follows."' 

Two  years  before,  a  basis  had  been  laid  for  the 
contemplated  treaty  by  the  superintendent  of  Belize.'" 
This,  with  the  fact  that  Wyke  was  well  acquainted  with 
the  Central  American  character  and  also  possessed  con- 
siderable diplomatic  ability,  prompted  a  quick  and  easy 
accomplishment  of  the  task  assigned.  As  soon  as  he 
received  his  full  powers,  Wyke  set  to  work.  At  first  he 
found  the  Guatemalan  government  opposed  to  the  terms 
stipulated  by  the  draft,"'  but  he  devised  a  plan  which, 
while  it  made  the  arrangement  satisfactory  to  the 
Guatemalans,  would  tend  to  aid  the  British  commer- 
cially.'" Owing  to  better  communications  between 
Guatemala  and  the  Port  of  San  Jose  on  the  Pacific 
and  to  the  competition  of  the  United  States,  for  the 
past  few  years  the  commerce  of  Guatemala  with  Belize, 
as  well  as  the  British  carrying  trade  with  Guatemala, 
had  been  on  the  decline.  Hence  a  route  of  transport  to 
some  point  on  the  Atlantic  was  very  desirable.'"  By  an 
additional  article  to  the  treaty,  Wyke  pledged  the  Brit- 
ish government  to  aid  Guatemala  in  establishing  stich 
a  line  of  transport,""  and  thereby  induced  the  republic 
to  accept  the  remainder  of  the  draft  just  as  it  stood.'"" 
The  convention  was  signed  by  the  negotiators  and  rati- 
fied by  the  Guatemalan  assembly  on  April  30.'"  The 
arrangement  received  the  approval  of  the  British  gov- 
ernment, and  ratifications  were  exchanged  in  the  early 
part  of  September.'"'    Thus  one  element  of  contention 

"*  Pari.    Patcis,    i860,    Corns.,    LXVIIl,    "  Correspondence    respecting 
Central  America",  173,  174. 

"'/fcid.,  171.  "•/fr»d.,  aso.  '"  Ibid..  2Si.  "'Ibid. 

"' Ibid.,  254-        '"'/fcid.,  251-355.        "' Ibid..  2Si.  ^^  Ibid..  300. 


ADJUSTMENT,  1856- 1860  259 

between  the  British  and  American  governments  ap- 
peared to  be  removed. 

Notwithstanding  the  slow  progress  of  the  Central 
American  negotiations,  the  cordial  relations  which  had 
been  established  between  Great  Britain  and  the  United 
States  remained,  on  the  whole,  uninterrupted  during 
the  remainder  of  the  period  considered  in  this  chapter. 
Though  Cass  did  not  fail  to  call  Napier's  attention  to 
the  delay  in  the  iMosquito  negotiations  and  to  the  un- 
satisfactory quality  of  the  commercial  treaty  formed  by 
Ouseley  with, Nicaragua,^"  by  a  poHcy  of  perfect  frank- 
ness the  British  government  retained  the  confidence  of 
the  United  States."^  However,  as  the  year  advanced 
and  it  became  known  that  the  Belize  boundary  question, 
regarding  which  Great  Britain  had  had  her  wishes,  was 
settled,  but  that  the  other  matters  in  dispute,  which  it 
was  expected  would  be  arranged  according  to  Ameri- 
can views,  were  not,'''  the  American  press  began  to  show 
some  impatience  and  irritation.^  This  state  of  aflfairs 
roused  Cass  to  remind  Lyons,  who  had  succeeded 
Napier,  that  it  would  be  necessary  for  the  President  to 
treat  the  Central  American  question  in  his  message. 
If,  at  the  opening  of  Congress,  Great  Britain  should 
still  be  in  possession  of  Mosquito  and  the  Bay  Islands, 
a  strong  effort  would  most  probably  be  made  by  certain 

"^^  Ibid.,  214,  215-217,  224-225,  234.  Ouseley  had  admitted  into  the 
commercial  treaty  a  clause  regarding  the  landing  of  armed  expeditions, 
indirectly  aimed  at  American  filibusters.     Ibid.,  193-194,  224-225. 

'^  Ibid.,  213,  216-217,  224-225,  239-246,  247,  250.  On  May  31,  1859, 
Ouseley  himself  wrote  to  Buchanan  explaining  and  excusing  his  delay 
in  making  the  settlement  regarding  Mosquito.     Buchanan,  Works,  X,  322- 

323- 

^^  Pari.  Papers,  i860,  Corns.,  LXVIII,  "  Correspondence  respecting 
Central  America  ",  267. 

^2«  Ibid.,  234. 


26o     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

young  and  ardent  politicians  of  the  "  manifest  destiny  " 
school,  to  abrogate  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty.  He  had 
no  doubt,  Cass  assured  Lyons,  but  that  the  British 
government  would  execute  with  the  most  scrupulous 
good  faith  the  arrangements  regarding  which  the  two 
governments  had  come  to  an  understanding ;  but  the 
essential  point  was  to  do  this  in  time.  It  was  impossible, 
he  declared,  to  overrate  the  importance  of  enabling  the 
President  to  announce  the  conclusion  of  the  whole  affair 
in  his  message  in  December ;  he  therefore  begged 
Lyons  to  omit  no  effort  to  impress  this  fact  upon  the 
British  government.'" 

About  a  month  later,  on  August  ii,  the  President 
himself  spoke  in  the  same  strain,  but  with  more  em- 
phasis, and  complained  that  the  Belize  boundary  ques- 
tion only,  of  the  whole  dispute,  had  been  settled.  Should 
things  be  in  the  existing  condition  when  Congress  met, 
he  warned  Lyons,  there  would  be  an  outburst  of  feeling 
in  the  country  with  which  it  might  be  impossible  to  con- 
tend. "  It  would  indeed  be  lamentable  ",  he  added,  "  if 
two  countries  whose  interests  were  more  deeply  in- 
volved in  a  mutual  good  understanding  than  those  of 
any  other  two  nations  in  the  world,  should  be  kept  asun- 
der by  questions  which  might  be  settled  so  easily."  '^ 

But  before  the  American  government  began  to  com- 
plain, the  fact  that  Ouseley  had  been  in  Central  America 
for  several  months  without  having  accomplished  any- 
thing towards  settling  the  dispute,  as  well  as  the  con- 
viction of  his  inefficiency,  had  determined  the  British 

^'"  Pari.  Papers,  1860,  Corns.,  LW'III,  "  Correspoiulcnce  respecting 
Central  America  ",  264-266. 

'^"*  Ibid.,  287-288.  To  allay  the  existing  irritation  the  government 
published  articles  in  the  Washington  Union,  explaining  the  purpose  of 
Ouseley's  mission.  Napier  to  Malmcsbury,  April  4,  1859,  V.  O.,  .\m., 
vol.  712,  no.  108. 


ADJUSTMENT,  1856-1860  261 

government  to  place  the  negotiations  for  the  transfer 
of  the  Bay  Islands  in  other  hands.  But,  unfortunately, 
Wyke,  who  had  demonstrated  his  fitness  for  the  task, 
had  been  forced  by  ill  health  to  return  to  England."' 
However,  he  was  soon  able  to  resume  his  duties,  and, 
on  August  15,  Russell,  who  had  succeeded  Malmesbury 
in  June,  instructed  Ouseley  to  return  home,  as  his  mis- 
sion had  been  conducted  in  an  unsatisfactory  manner,"" 
and  commissioned  Wyke  to  complete  the  negotiations,"' 
as  well  as  to  treat  for  the  disposal  of  the  Bay  Islands."' 
Since  the  latter  was  the  most  pressing  point  in  dispute, 
this  was  to  be  settled  first.  In  connection  with  it, 
arrangement  was  to  be  made  for  the  transfer  to  Hon- 
duras of  the  part  of  Mosquito  territory  which  lay  within 
the  Honduras  frontier.'^  These  arrangements  being 
accomplished,  Wyke  should  proceed  to  Nicaragua  and 
complete   the   commercial    and   Mosquito   treaties,   if 

^^  Pari.  Papers,  i860,  Corns.,  LX^'III,  "Correspondence  respecting 
Central  America  ",  255-256. 

^^  Ibid.,  281-282.  The  Nicaraguans  according  to  Ouseley,  were  afraid 
that  the  filibusters  might  snatch  Mosquito  from  them  as  soon  as  the 
British  protectorate  was  abandoned,  so  in  their  perplexity,  they  seemed 
to  wish  to  delay  the  transfer  of  the  territory.  Believing  that  this  would 
seriously  affect  the  negotiations  of  the  treaty  regarding  the  Mosquitos, 
Ouseley  dropped  the  Mosquito  negotiations  and  went  to  Costa  Rica  where 
he  negotiated  a  commercial  treaty.  After  his  return  to  Nicaragua  no 
further  progress  was  made;  hence,  when  Ouseley  finally  received  notice 
of  his  recall  a  year  after  his  arrival  in  Central  America,  the  Mosquito 
question  was  as  far  from  settlement  as  it  had  been  when  he  came,  though 
much  discussion  had  taken  place.  Ibid.,  205,  206-207,  225-233,  238-239, 
241-248,  256,  259-263,  283-286,  294,  297-298. 

^^Ibid.,  268. 

^'^  On  August  2,  1858,  Russell  had  written:  "  I  believe  our  occupation 
of  the  Bay  Islands  to  be  a  violation  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty  and  the 
sooner  we  settle  that  matter  the  better."  Note  on  draft  of  treaty  with 
Nicaragua,  F.  O.,  Supplement,  Guat.,  vol.  91. 

'''^  Pari.  Papers,  i860.  Corns.,  LXVIII,  "Correspondence  respecting 
Central  America  ",  269-272. 


262     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

Ouseley  had  not  already  done  so  before  he  arrived.'" 
Drafts  for  all  of  the  treaties  were  enclosed.'" 

Meanwhile  Lyons,  at  the  direction  of  Russell/" 
expressed  to  Cass  regret  at  the  unfortunate  delays 
which  had  prevented  the  settlement  of  the  dispute.  The 
British  government,  he  said,  could  make  no  promise 
that  the  matter  would  be  settled  before  the  President's 
message  was  issued,  but  it  would  use  its  utmost  eflForts 
to  accomplish  that  object,  and  if  it  failed  it  would  be 
made  clear  that  such  failure  was  not  due  to  any  fault 
of  the  British  government.  A  fresh  mission  was  about 
to  be  sent  to  Central  America  with  a  view  to  finishing 
the  negotiations."'  Both  the  President  and  the  Secre- 
tary of  State,  Lyons  reported  to  Russell,  expressed 
their  pleasure  and  satisfaction  at  the  announcement."* 

This  continued  display  of  British  frankness  and  good 
faith  now  finally  produced  in  the  American  government 
a  willingness  to  aid  actively  in  facilitating  the  proposed 
arrangements.""  Accordingly,  Dimitry,  the  newly- 
appointed  minister  to  Nicaragua  and  Costa  Rica,  was 
instructed  to  use  every  effort  to  form  the  most  frank 
and  friendly  relations  with  the  British  negotiator,  and 
to  co-operate  with  him  in  any  manner  which  he  might 

"*  Pari.  Papers,  i860,  Corns..  LXN'III,  "  Corresponiience  respectins 
Central  America  ",  269,  272-275.  Later,  in  order  to  insure  the  prompt 
success  of  the  negotiations,  instructions  were  sent  Wyke  to  permit  certain 
modifications  calculated  to  make  the  treaties  more  satisfactory  to  the  Cen- 
tral American  governments  concerned.  Russell  to  Wyke,  .^ug.  16,  1859, 
"  Confidential  ",   F.  O.,   Guat.,  vol.    102,  no.  9;   Nov.   29,   1859.  ibiJ.,  no. 

IS. 

"^  Pari.  Papers,  i860.  Corns.,  LXVIII,  "Correspondence  respecting 
Central  America  ",  270-272,  275-280. 

""  Ibid.,  266.  "'  Ibid..  289.  "»  Ibid. 

"*  On  Ouseley's  departure  for  Central  .\mcrica,  the  .Xnierican  govern- 
ment had,  after  reflection,  refused  even  to  notify  its  aKont  in  Central 
America  that  the  government  had  no  desire  to  impede  the  negotiations. 
Napier  to  Malmesbury.  Oct.  25,  1858,  F.  O.,  .\m.,  vol.  694,  no.  245;  Nov. 
8,  1858,  ibid.,  no.  251;  Nov.  9,   1858,  ibid.,  no.  257. 


ADJUSTMENT,  i8 56-1860  263 

desire.  Dimitry  was  also  to  urge  the  Nicaraguan  gov- 
ernment to  come  to  an  agreement  with  Great  Britain 
regarding  the  Mosquito  protectorate  without  further 
delay/*"  Clarke,  the  United  States  minister  at  Guate- 
mala, was  directed  to  go  to  Honduras  for  the  purpose 
of  forwarding  to  the  best  of  his  ability  the  success  of 
Wyke's  mission.'" 

But  the  presence  of  the  two  American  agents  proved 
a  hindrance  instead  of  a  help  to  Wyke ;  for  Clarke 
failed  to  learn  of  the  altered  policy  of  his  government 
in  time,'*^  and  Dimitry  did  not  interpret  his  instruc- 
tions with  sufficient  broadness  ;  "^  consequently,  during 
practically  the  remainder  of  the  negotiations  the  two 
followed  the  policy  of  their  predecessors  and  tried  to 
hinder  British  action.'" 

Notwithstanding  the  demonstrations  of  friendship 
on  the  part  of  the  United  States,  the  British  govern- 
ment anxiously  watched  lest  something  rise  to  provoke 
a  note  of  hostility  in  the  President's  message  on  the 
Central  American  question.  But  the  good  feeling  re- 
mained undisturbed,  and  before  the  message  was  issued 
its  substance  on  the  matter  in  dispute  was  made  known, 
in  a  spirit  of  friendliness,  to  Lyons,  who  found  it  of  an 
entirely  satis factor}'^  nature."'  It  merely  stated  that  as 
a  result  of  unexpected  obstacles  the  British  govern- 

'*  U.  S.  Docs.,  ser.  no.  3853,  doc.  237,  pp.  164-166. 

^■"  Lyons  to  Russell,  Sept.   19,  1859,  F.  O.,  Am.,  vol.  715,  no.   196. 

^— Wyke  to  Russell,  Nov.  29,  1859,  F.  O.,  Guat.,  vol.  102,  no.  8;  Jan. 
10,  i860,  ibid.,  vol.  108,  no.  i;  Inclosure  in  Lyons  to  Russell,  Feb.  28, 
i860,  F.  O.,  Am.,  vol.  735,  no.  75. 

143  Wyke  to  Russell,  Jan.  28,  i860,  F.  O.,  Guat.,  vol.  108,  no.  2. 

^"Hall  to  Russell,  Feb.  29,  i860,  ihid.,  vol.  109;  Hall  to  Russell,  April 
30,  i860,  ibid.,  no.  25. 

*^  Inclosure  in  Lyons  to  Russell,  Nov.  30,  1859,  F.  O.,  Am.,  vol.  716, 
no.  275;  Lyons  to  Russell,  Dec.  i,  1859,  ibid.,  no.  276;  Jan.  17,  i860,  ibid., 
vol.  734,  no.  23. 


264     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

ment  had  not  been  able  to  complete  treaty  arrangements 
with  Honduras  and  Nicaragua  ;  consequently  the  Presi- 
dent could  not  announce,  as  he  had  earlier  believed  that 
he  would  be  able  to,  that  the  Central  American  ques- 
tion had  been  satisfactorily  settled ;  but  it  was  confi- 
dently expected  that  the  final  adjustment  of  the  difficulty 
would  soon  be  effected."" 

The  confidence  of  the  American  government  in 
British  good  faith  prevented  support  in  Congress  for 
movements  against  the  treaty.  Both  a  joint  resolution 
for  abrogation  "'  and  a  call  for  the  correspondence  upon 
the  subject  '**  failed  to  endanger  the  agreement. 

Meanwhile,  negotiations  in  Central  America  were 
progressing  rapidly  and  in  an  entirely  satisfactory 
manner.  On  November  28,  Wyke  signed  a  treaty  with 
the  Honduras  government  regarding  the  Bay  Islands 
and  the  IMosquito  Indians.  The  opening  paragraph  of 
the  first  article  of  this  treaty  was  so  worded  as  to  save 
British  pride  while  it  satisfied  Honduras.'"    It  read : 

Taking  into  consideration  the  peculiar  geographical  position 
of  Honduras,  and  in  order  to  secure  the  neutrality  of  the 
islands  adjacent  thereto,  with  reference  to  any  railway  or  other 
line  of  interoceanic  communication  which  may  be  constructed 
across  the  territory  of  Honduras  on  the  mainland,  Her  Bri- 
tannic Majesty  agrees  to  recognize  the  Islands  of  Ruatan, 
Guanaca,  Elena,  Utile,  Barbarete,  and  Morat,  known  as  the 
Bay  Islands,  and  situated  in  the  Bay  of  Honduras,  as  a  part 
of  the  Republic  of  Honduras."" 

The  terms  governing  the  restoration  were  simple 
and  reasonable ;    the  Honduras  government  engagetl 

'*■  Richardson,  Messages  and  Pafcrs,  \ ,  561. 
^^  Cong.  Globe,  35  Cong.,  2  si-ss.,  pt.    i,  pp.  9,   104-106. 
'*"  Ibid.,  pp.  45-47- 

'"  C/.  Pari.  Papers,  i860.  Coins..  I. Will,  "Correspondence  respecting 
Central  America  ",  22. 
'"  Ibid.,  308. 


ADJUSTMENT,  1856-1860  265 

not  to  transfer  the  islands  to  any  other  state,  and  to 
permit  the  British  inhabitants  freedom  of  rehgion  and 
the  right  to  property  previously  held,  as  well  as  the 
right  to  emigrate  from  the  islands."*  The  treaty  fur- 
ther recognized  the  Mosquito  territory  lying  within  the 
frontier  of  Honduras  as  part  of  the  republic,  and  the 
Indians  residing  thereon  as  under  Honduran  sover- 
eignty.'" A  new  clause,  added  by  Wyke  "''  to  the  origi- 
nal draft,  pledged  the  government  of  Honduras  to  pay 
to  the  Indians  semi-annually  for  ten  years  the  sum  of 
two  thousand,  five  hundred  dollars.''' 

After  six  weeks  of  work,  Wyke  was  equally  success- 
ful in  his  negotiations  with  Nicaragua,  and  signed  a 
treaty  with  that  government  on  January  28,  i860.  By 
this  Great  Britain  agreed  to  recognize  as  under  the 
sovereignty  of  Nicaragua  the  part  of  Mosquito  terri- 
tory lying  within  Nicaraguan  frontiers.  The  British 
protectorate  over  the  Indians  should  cease  three  months 
after  the  ratification  of  the  treaty.  A  definitely  bounded 
reservation  was  to  be  set  aside  for  the  Mosquitos,  within 
which  they  should  be  permitted  to  govern  themselves 
under  any  regulations  which  they  might  adopt  not 
inconsistent  with  the  sovereign  rights  of  Nicaragua ; 
but  nothing  in  the  treaty  should  be  construed  to  prevent 
the  Mosquitos  from  later  incorporating  themselves  into 
the  Nicaraguan  republic.  All  bona  fide  land  grants 
made  by  the  Indians  subsequent  to  January  i,  1848, 
lying  within  the  territorial  reserve,  with  certain  excep- 
tions, should  be  confirmed.  Like  Honduras,  Nicaragua 
agreed  to  pay  to  the  Indians  two  thousand,  five  hundred 
dollars  semi-annually  for  ten  years.  Greytown,  under 
Nicaraguan  sovereignty,  was  to  be  a  free  port.'" 

>■■»  Ibid.  ^=2  ii,ij_^  30P  153  7^;^^  307^  305 

'»■'  Ibid.  "=  Ibid.,  315-318. 


266     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

Wyke's  manner  of  executing  his  instructions  received 
the  hearty  approval  of  his  government.'"  After  some 
slight  changes  both  treaties  were  ratified  and  in  due 
time  carried  into  effect."'  On  August  4,  Russell  trans- 
mitted copies  of  the  treaties  to  Lyons,  with  instructions 
to  communicate  them  to  Cass.  "  These  Treaties  ",  Rus- 
sell wrote,  "  as  you  will  perceive,  provide  for  the  relin- 
quishment of  the  Protectorate  of  the  Mosquito  Indians 
by  Great  Britain,  and  for  the  cession  of  the  Bay  Islands 
to  Honduras ;  and  thus,  it  may  be  hoped,  finally  set  at 
rest  the  questions  respecting  the  interpretation  of  the 
Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty  which  have  been  the  subject  of 
so  much  controversy  between  this  country  and  the 
United  States." '" 

The  belief  that  this  long-desired  consummation  had 
been  effected  was  voiced  in  President  Buchanan's  mes- 
sage of  December,  i860.  With  reference  to  the  Central 
American  controversy  he  wrote : 

Our  relations  with  Great  Britain  are  of  the  most  friendly 
character  .  .  .  The  discordant  constructions  of  the  Clayton 
and  Bulwer  treaty  between  the  two  Governments,  which  at 
different  periods  of  the  discussion  bore  a  threatening  aspect, 
have  resulted  in  a  final  settlement  entirely  satisfactory  to  this 
government.^" 

•"  C/.  Pari.  Pat'ers,  i860,  Corns.,  LXVIII,  "  Correspondence  respecting 
Central  America",  311,  324. 

'"  Fear  of  Walker  caused  Honduras  to  request  that  the  transfer  of  the 
Bay  Islands  be  postponed  for  a  time.  This  request  was  granted  by  the 
British  government,  and  the  delay  was  acquiesced  in  by  the  I'nited  States. 
Russell  to  Lyons,  Sept.  22,  i860,  F.  O.,  .Am.,  vol.  733,  no.  213;  Irwine  to 
Russell,  Oct.  9,  i860,  ibid.,  vol.  739,  no.  44. 

''"Pari.  Pat'ers,  i860,  Corns.,  LXVIII,  "Correspondence  respecting 
Central  America  ",  329. 

"'  Richardson,  Messages  and  Papers.  V,  639-640.  In  a  letter  to  Russell, 
Lyons,  the  British  minister  at  Washington,  stated  that  this  pass.ige  prob- 
ably contained  the  most  cordial  mention  of  (ireat  Britain  which  had  ap- 
peared in  any  presidential  message.     F.  O.,  .\m.,  vol.  740.  no.  311. 

Lyons  had  been  fearful  that  the  part  played  by  a  British  man-of-war 
in     Walker's    defeat    and    <leath    might    cause    an    outcry    aguin<st    fireat 


ADJUSTMENT.  1856-1860  267 

Through  the  negotiations  of  Wyke,  the  Clayton- 
Bulwer  treaty  was  restored  to  its  original  authority  as 
the  rule  governing  future  British  and  American  rela- 
tions in  Central  America ;  and  by  the  President's  mes- 
sage it  was  virtually  recognized  by  the  United  States 
government  as  being  so  restored.  This  rehabilitation 
of  the  treaty  was  brought  about  not  through  a  complete 
victory  of  one  government  over  the  other,  but  through 
a  compromise,  though  an  unequal  one,  for  Great  Britain 
conceded  the  more.  In  1853  Great  Britain  maintained 
that  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  applied  only  to  the 
future,  and  that  her  existing  possessions  in  Central 
America  were  untouched  by  it ;  the  United  States,  on 
the  contrar}',  held  that  the  treaty  was  retrospective  as 
well  as  prospective,  and  that,  consequently,  the  British 
were  bound  by  it  to  withdraw  from  the  whole  of  Cen- 
tral America.  By  Wyke's  treaties  the  British  gave  up 
their  occupation  of  ]\Iosquito  and  relinquished  the  Bay 
Islands,  but,  contrary  to  the  earlier  demands  of  the 
United  States,  retained  the  Belize  territory  south  of 
the  Sibun.  The  arrangement  corresponded  almost 
exactly  with  the  Dallas-Clarendon  treaty  as  amended 
by  the  American  Senate ;  the  concession  which  the 
British  government  could  not  make  directly  to  Ameri- 
can demands  in  1857,  was  accomplished  indirectly  two 
years  later  by  the  negotiation  of  a  new  treat>'  with 
Honduras. 

In  the  decade  since  the  negotiation  of  the  Clayton- 
Bulwer  treaty,  however,  the  attitude  of  the  contracting 

Britain;  but  no  such  demonstration  took  place.  Its  non-appearance  was 
perhaps  partly  due  to  the  fact  that  the  news  of  Walker's  end  arrived 
during  the  Prince  of  Wales'  tour.  Lyons  to  Russell,  Nov.  6,  i860,  ibid., 
vol.  739,  no.  278.  However,  Walker's  selfishness  and  cruelty  had  before 
this  turned  the  majority  of  .Americans  against  him. 


268     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

parties  had  changed  very  materially  towards  Central 
America,  and  the  shifting  of  viewpoints  was  not  with- 
out its  influence  in  promoting  a  settlement  of  the  dis- 
pute. Though  in  1850  Great  Britain  had  not  the  inter- 
est in  territorial  expansion  on  the  isthmus  of  which 
the  United  States  suspected  her,  yet  for  commercial 
reasons  she  was  not  indifferent  to  it,  and  was  keenly 
jealous  of  the  United  States ;  on  the  other  hand,  the 
American  government,  under  a  Whig  administration, 
was  little  inclined  to  territorial  acquisition  for  itself,  in 
Central  America,  but  was  much  opposed  to  British 
control  there.  During  the  three  or  four  years  preceding 
Wyke's  negotiations  British  interests  in  the  region  had 
decreased  while  American  interests  had  increased ; 
Great  Britain,  as  it  were,  resigned  in  favor  of  the 
United  States.  British  interests  in  the  region  had 
become  almost  wholly  commercial,  and  were  directed 
not  so  much  towards  the  establishment  of  an  inter- 
oceanic  transit  route  as  to  the  development  of  the 
resources  of  Central  America  itself.  The  British  gov- 
ernment had  become  convinced  that  that  region,  ex- 
ploited by  American  enterprise,  protected  by  a  stable 
Anglo-Saxon  government,  would  contribute  much  more 
to  British  commercial  wealth  than  would  be  possible  in 
a  state  of  political  independence  attended  by  confusion 
and  unrest  which  paralyzed  all  industrial  development. 
With  this  new  viewpoint  died  all  British  jealousy  of  the 
United  States  in  connection  with  Central  America,  and 
England  began  to  hope  as  well  as  to  expect  that  the 
Central  American  states  would  eventually  become  a| 
part  of  the  American  Union.'"" 

'""Hansard,  Pari.  Debates.  3cl  ser.,  CXLII,   1511-1512;   London  Times, 
Dec.  4,  1856,  Dec.  20,  1858;  Blackwood's  Magasine,  LXXIX,  74^;  l.ittell's 


ADJUSTMENT,  1856-1860  269 

In  the  United  States,  meanwhile,  attention  to  Central 
America  for  transit  purposes  was  somewhat  subordi- 
nated to  interest  in  the  territory  itself — partly  with  the 
view  to  increasing  slave  soil,  and  a  strong  belief  had 
developed  that  in  spite  of  opposition,  even  in  spite  of 
treaties,  sooner  or  later  Central  America  would  be 
Americanized  and  absorbed  into  the  Union/"^  Had 
Democratic  control  of  the  government  continued  a  few 
years  longer,  and  with  it  the  demand  for  extension 
of  slavery,  it  seems  more  than  likely  that  such  expecta- 
tions would  have  been  realized ;  but  with  a  Republican 
victory  came  the  War  for  Secession,  one  great  reason 
for  territorial  expansion  was  swept  aside,  and  Ameri- 
can interests  and  energies  were  diverted  into  other 
channels. 

Living  Age,  2nd  ser.,  XIV,  312;  San  Francisco  Evening  Bulletin,  July 
18,  1856,  Aug.  14,  1856;  Buchanan,  Works,  X,  114-116. 

On  July  31,  1858,  Napier  wrote  confidentially  to  Malmesbury  suggest- 
ing that  it  be  made  known  to  the  United  States  government  that  the 
mission  of  the  United  States  in  the  regeneration  of  the  Spanish  colonies 
was  recognized  by  the  British  government,  which  would  view  with  satis- 
faction the  extension  of  United  States  authority  southward  in  a  peaceful 
and  legitimate  manner,  in  so  far  as  the  rights  of  others  were  not 
intrenched  upon.     F.  O.,  Am.,  vol.  693,  no.   193. 

A  few  weeks  before,  these  sentiments  had  been  expressed  by  Malmes- 
bury to  Dallas,  with  the  request  that  the  latter  make  them  known  to  his 
government.  Malmesbury  said,  Dallas  reported  to  Cass,  "  that  he  was 
one  of  that  class  of  statesmen  who  believed  that  all  the  Southern  part  of 
North  America  must  ultimately  come  under  the  government  of  the  United 
States:  that  he  had  no  objection  to  what  seemed  the  inevitable  course 
of  things:  that  on  the  contrary,  he  thought  it  would  be  beneficial  as  well 
to  the  population  occupying  the  countries  referred  to  as  to  the  United 
States,  and  the  rest  of  the  world."  Dept.  of  State,  Des.,  Eng.,  vol. 
71,  no.  99. 

""•1  Lumley  to  Clarendon,  Sept.  9,  1856,  F.  O.,  Am.,  vol.  646,  no.  69; 
U.  S.  Docs.,  ser.  no.  964,  doc.  74,  p.  7 ;  Schouler,  History  of  the  United 
States,  V,  416;  Cong.  Globe,  34  Cong.,  i  sess.,  pt.  i,  p.  395,  Appendix, 
PP-  87,  306;  Daily  Alta  California,  Jan.  22,  1857. 


CHAPTER  IX. 

Development    of    American    Opposition    to    the 

Clayton-Bulwer   Treaty,    1860-1895;    End  of 

Mosquito  Reserve,  1894. 

For  many  years  subsequent  to  i860  the  United  States 
paid  little  attention  to  Central  America.  This  was 
partly  due  to  preoccupation  with  the  Civil  War  and 
the  problems  to  which  it  gave  rise,  but  other  changes 
had  also  taken  place  which  had  decreased  American 
interest  in  the  isthmus :  with  the  abolition  of  slavery 
was  removed  the  chief  demand  for  territorial  expan- 
sion ;  and  the  building  of  the  Panama  Railroad  and  the 
completion  of  the  transcontinental  line  to  the  Pacific 
for  a  time  diverted  attention  from  Central  America  as 
the  solution  for  interoceanic  transportation  problems. 
Consequently  for  some  time  nothing  arose  clearly  to 
reveal  how  the  nation  as  a  whole  regarded  the  settle- 
ments made  by  the  Wyke  treaties,  or  to  show  whether 
it  was  satisfied  to  consider  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty 
the  future  rule  of  conduct  for  the  British  and  American 
governments  in  reference  to  Central  America.  Yet, 
in  the  first  two  decades  of  the  period  now  under  con- 
sideration, a  few  occasions  arose  which  led  first  the 
United  States  government,  and  later  the  American 
people,  to  reveal  their  attitude  towards  the  treaty  and 
gradually  to  disclose  and  emphasize  a  new  interpreta- 
tion of  it. 

In  1866  Seward  wrote  to  Adams,  the  American 
minister  to  London,  regarding  the  need  of  the  United 

270 


AMERICAN  OPPOSITION,  1860-1895  271 

States  for  a  coaling  station  between  Panama  and  San 
Francisco.  Tigre  Island,  he  said,  would  be  very  desir- 
able for  the  purpose,  but  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty 
stood  in  the  way  of  its  acquisition.  Therefore  Adams 
was  instructed  to  "  sound  "  Clarendon  upon  the  subject, 
but  to  use  only  general  terms  and  not  let  it  be  known 
that  the  American  government  particularly  coveted 
Tigre.  In  this  connection  the  Secretary  of  State 
remarked  that,  should  the  canal  never  be  begun  it  was 
a  question  whether  the  renunciatory  clauses  of  the 
Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  were  to  have  perpetual  opera- 
tion. Technically  speaking,  he  thought,  the  question 
might  be  decided  in  the  negative ;  still,  as  long  as  it 
remained  a  question  it  w'ould  not  be  consistent  with 
good  faith  for  either  of  the  nations  to  do  anything  con- 
trary to  even  the  spirit  of  the  treaty.*  These  reflections 
of  Seward  contain  the  first  definite  hint  of  the  view  later 
emphatically  stated  by  the  American  government. 

A  month  after  this  Adams  took  occasion  to  approach 
the  British  foreign  secretary  on  the  subject,  but  avoided 
stating  definitely  to  what  territory  on  the  Central  Amer- 
ican coast  he  had  reference,  on  the  ground  that  the 
terms  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  were  not  clear  in 
his  mind;  and  Clarendon  also  stated  that  his  remem- 
brance of  the  treaty  was  vague  but  suggested  that  both 
look  into  its  stipulations.'  Whether  or  not  this  was 
done,  and  the  question  again  broached,  is  not  evident, 
but  Tigre  remained  a  Honduran  possession. 

A  little  later  the  American  government  gave  further 
evidence  of  its  attitude  towards  the  Clayton-Bulwer 

treaty.    In  1862  Great  Britain  had  taken  advantage  of 

I 

'  U.  S.  Docs.,  ser.  no.  3853.  doc.  194,  pp.  i55-iS7- 
'Ibid.,  doc.  237,  p.  20. 


2^2     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

America's  embarrassment  by  the  Civil  War  to  place  the\ 
Belize  settlement  on  full  footing  as  a  British  colony.*  1 
Though,  technically,  the  colonization  of  the  territory  \ 
between  the  Sibun  and  the  Sarstoon  was  a  violation  of 
the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty,  the  American  government 
paid  no  attention  to  the  action.    However,  in  1872  the 
minister  from  Guatemala  complained  to  the  Washing- 
ton authorities  that  the  British  in  Belize  were  encroach-  ,' 
ing  upon  the  territory  south  of  the  Sarstoon.    Conse- ' 
quently,  in  April  of  the  following  year  Fish,  the  Ameri- 
can secretary  of  state,  communicated  with  Schenck,  the 
American  minister  to  England,  stating  that  if  author- 
ized or  countenanced  by  the  British  government,  such 
encroachments  would  be  tantamount  to  a  breach  of  the 
engagement  not  to  occupy  any  part  of  Central  America. 
Schenck  was  instructed  to  ascertain  the  correctness  of 
the  representations  made  to  the  American  government, 
and  should  they  prove  to  be  correct,  he  was  to  remon- 
strate formally  to  the  British  foreign  secretary  against 
any  trespass  by  British  subjects  with  the  connivance 
of  their  government,  upon  the  territory  of  Guatemala, 
as  an  infringement  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  which 
would  be  very  unacceptable  to  the  United  States.*    The 
result  of  Schenck's  execution  of  these  instructions  does 

'Lucas,  Historical  Geography,  II,  309;  Gibbs,  British  Honduras.  134; 
Trendell,  Her  Majesty's  Colonics,  349.  In  1856  when  the  relations 
between  the  British  and  American  governments  were  critical,  there  was 
a  renewed  attempt  on  the  part  of  the  Belize  settlers  to  have  the  settle- 
ment declared  a  colony.  Bell  to  Lahouchere,  .Aug.  8,  1S56,  C.  O.,  Hond., 
vol.  9J.  I'or  a  time  Clarendon  thought  of  securing  the  view  of  the 
American  government  on  the  matter,  in  order  to  avoid  misunderstanding, 
but  finally  it  was  thought  inexpedient  to  do  anything  at  that  time  in 
regard  to  it.  Clarendon  to  Hammond,  Oct.  28,  1856,  F.  C,  Cen.  .\\n., 
vol.  94;  Merivale  to  Hammond.  June  8,  1856,  ibid.,  vol.  93;  Clarendon 
to  the  Admiralty  Office,  June  10,  185b,  ibid. 

*  U.  S.  Docs.,  ser.  no.  3853,  doc.  194,  PP.  162164. 


AMERICAN  OPPOSITION,  1860-1895  273 

not  appear,  but  Fish's  letter  shows  the  American  view 
that  the  first  article  of  the  treaty  was  still  binding — at 
least  as  regarded  the  British  government. 

The  attitude  of  Fish  was  consistently  maintained 
seven  years  later  by  Evarts,  when  it  was  rumored  that 
Great  Britain  was  about  to  acquire  the  Bay  Islands. 
Evarts  wrote  to  Logan,  American  minister  to  Central 
America,  that  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  seemed  un- 
questionably to  preclude  British  acquisition  of  that  ter- 
ritory. Therefore,  the  report  of  British  intentions 
might  well  be  discredited,  though  it  should  awaken  the 
attention  and  excite  the  vigilance  of  the  American 
government.^ 

•      From  the  first,  however,  there  was  a  tendency  on  the 
I  part  of  the  United  States,  acquiesced  in  or  unnoticed  by 
,"  Great  Britain,  to  ignore  the  eighth  article  of  the  Clay- 
[  ton-Bulwer  treaty  by  which  the  contracting  parties 
;    agreed  "  to  extend  their  protection  by  treaty  stipula- 
tions to  any  other  practicable  communications,  whether 
by  canal  or  railway,  across  the  isthmus  which  connects 
North  and  South  America  ",  and  provided  that  such 
i  canals  or  railways  be  open  on  equal  terms  to  the  sub- 
I  jects  and  citizens  of  Great  Britain  and  the  United 
\  States.'    No  such  joint  protection  was  extended  to  the 
Panama  Railway,  completed  before  i860.     Moreover, 
the  American  government  negotiated  two  new  canal 
treaties  with  Colombia  which  completely  ignored  the 
eighth  article  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty.    The  first 
of  these,  negotiated  in  1869,  stipulated  by  its  sixth 
article  that :  "  As  fast  as  the  canal  and  its  appendages 
and  appurtenances  shall  be  constructed,  the  control, 

'  Wharton,  Digest  of  International  Law,  II,  209. 

"Pari.  Papers,  1856,  Corns.,  LX,  "Correspondence  with  the  United 
States  respecting  Central  America  ",  52. 

19 


274     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

possession,  direction,  and  government  of  the  same  shall 
belong  to,  and  be  exercised  by,  the  United  States  of 
America." '  The  other,  made  the  following  year,  con- 
tained the  same  stipulation.'  Neither  of  the  treaties 
was  ratified,  but  they  show  a  distinct  tendency  on  the 
part  of  the  American  government  away  from  the  policy 
of  internationalism  in  the  control  of  a  transisthmian 
canal,  and  towards  an  American  canal  controlled  by 
Americans. 

The  formal  opening  of  the  Suez  Canal  in  1869 
undoubtedly  had  a  very  strong  influence  in  causing  the 
[negotiation  of  the  treaties  just  mentioned.  The  suc- 
Icessful  completion  of  this  first  interoceanic  canal  roused 
great  enthusiasm,  and  naturally  inspired  American 
desire  to  undertake  a  similar  labor  in  the  New  World. 
This  feeling  was  voiced  in  a  report  of  the  secretary  of 
the  navy  on  December  i,  1869,  which  emphasized  the 
importance  of  constructing  a  ship-canal  across  Darien. 
Now  that  the  Suez  Canal  had  been  opened,  the  report 
said,  the  United  States  was  undoubtedly  stimulated  to 
such  eflForts  as  would  lead  to  the  success  of  its  own  great 
enterprise:  "  It  would  be  a  matter  of  lasting  regret,  if 
the  people  and  government  of  the  United  States  were 
anticipated  in  this  great  work."  Investigations  should 
be  at  once  commenced  for  determining  the  most  feasible 
route." 

Various  surveys  of  the  isthmus  followed,"  but 
nothing  definite  was  accomplished  before  de  Lesseps, 
in  1878,  secured  a  concession  from  Colombia  for  build- 
ing a  canal  across  Panama.     The  news  of  such  an 

^  U.  S.  Docs.,  ser.  no.  1885,  doc.  112,  pp.  34-.i8. 

*  Ibid.,  pp.  38-46;  cf.  Arias,  Panama  Canal.  20. 

■  U.  S.  Docs.,  8cr.  no.   141 1,  doc.   i,  p.  24- 

"  Coolidgc,  The  United  States  as  a  World  Power,  272-273. 


AMERICAN  OPPOSITION,  1860-1895  27s 

undertaking,  by  the  successful  builder  of  the  Suez 
route,  filled  the  American  people  with  jealousy  and 
alarm.  Resolutions  were  introduced  into  both  houses 
of  Congress  declaring  that  control  over  any  trans- 
isthmian  canal  must  be  in  the  hands  of  the  United 
States."  This  opinion  was  shared  by  President  Hayes 
and  expressed  by  him  in  a  special  message  to  Congress, 
March  8,  1880 : 

The  policy  of  this  country  is  a  canal  under  American  control. 
The  United  States  cannot  consent  to  the  surrender  of  this 
control  to  any  European  power  or  to  any  combination  of 
European  powers.  If  existing  treaties  between  the  United 
States  and  other  nations  or  if  the  rights  of  sovereignty  or 
property  of  other  nations  stand  in  the  way  of  this  poHcy — a 
contingency  which  is  not  apprehended — suitable  steps  should 
be  taken  by  just  and  liberal  negotiations  to  promote  and 
establish  the  American  policy  on  this  subject  consistently  with 
the  rights  of  the  nations  to  be  afifected  by  it. 

The  capital  invested  by  corporations  or  citizens  of  other 
countries  in  such  an  enterprise  must  in  a  great  degree  look  for 
protection  to  one  or  more  of  the  great  powers  of  the  world. 
No  European  power  can  intervene  for  such  protection  with- 
out adopting  measures  on  this  continent  which  the  United 
States  would  deem  wholly  inadmissable.  If  the  protection  of 
the  United  States  is  relied  upon,  the  United  States  must  exer- 
l  cise  such  control  as  will  enable  this  country  to  protect  its 
\  national  interests  and  maintain  the  rights  of  those  whose 
j^ivate  capital  is  embarked  in  the  work." 

The  President's  allusion  to  existing  treaties  which 
might  stand  in  the  way  of  the  American  canal  policy 
evidently  called  attention  to  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty, 
for  a  strong  movement  promptly  set  in  against  that 
agreement.    On  March  22  a  joint  resolution  was  intro- 

^'^Cong.  Record,  IX,  2312;  X,  1392;  XI,  107,  1568. 
"  Richardson,  Messages  and  Papers,  VII,  585-586. 


276     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

duced  into  the  House  of  Representatives  requesting  the 
President  to  notify  the  British  government  of  the  abro- 
gation of  the  treaty."  This  resolution  was  referred  to 
the  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations,  which,  on  April 
i6,  returned  a  report"  requesting  that  the  President 
take  immediate  steps  towards  abrogating  the  treaty." 
In  connection  with  the  demonstrations  against  the 
treaty  "  plans  were  discussed  by  Congress  for  defeat- 
ing the  aims  of  the  French  company." 

On  June  24,  1881,  Blaine  took  definite  action  for  the 
execution  of  this  newly-voiced  policy.  An  excellent 
opportunity  for  this  was  offered  by  the  report  that 
Colombia  desired  to  terminate  the  treaty  made  with 
the  United  States  in  1846  and  to  secure  from  the 
powers  of  Europe  a  joint  guarantee  of  the  neutrality 
of  the  proposed  Panama  Canal."  Accordingly,  the 
Secretary  of  State  sent  identical  letters  to  the  American 
diplomatic  agents  at  the  various  European  courts," 
instructing  them,  that  should  the  rumors  take  tangible 
shape,  they  were  to  call  attention  to  the  provisions  of 
the  treaty  of  1846,  and  to  intimate  to  the  governments 
to  which  they  were  accredited  that  any  attempt  to  sup- 
plement the  guarantee  contained  in  that  treaty  would 
necessarily  be  regarded  by  the  American  government  as 
"  an  uncalled-for  intrusion  into  a  field  where  the  local 
and  general  interests  of  the  United  States  of  America 
must  be  considered  before  those  of  any  other  power 
save  those  of  the  United  States  of  Colombia  alone." 
This  position,  the  American  ministers  were  reminded, 
was  not  the  development  of  a  new  policy  ;  it  was  simply 

^^  Cong.  Record,   X,  1775. 

'■•  U.  S.  Docs.,  ser.  no.  1937,  doc.  1121.  "  Ibid.,   p.  7. 

'*  Ibid.,   ser.  no.  1982,  doc.  224.  "  Ibid.,  pp.  1-40. 

^*  Ibid.,   ser.  no.  3853,  doc.  194,  p.  174.  "Ibid.,   177. 


AMERICAN  OPPOSITION,  1860-1895  277 

the  pronounced  adherence  to  principles  long  since  enun- 
ciated and  firmly  established  as  a  part  of  the  national 
policy,  and  should  be  so  represented  to  the  foreign 
governments.'"  It  is  noteworthy  that  Blaine's  letter 
contained  no  hint  of  the  existence  of  the  Clayton-Bul- 
wer  treaty ;  that  agreement  was  utterly  unnoticed,  and 
the  declarations  were  directly  contrary  to  its  terms. 

In  his  reply  to  Blaine's  letter,  Granville,  the  British 
foreign  secretary,  merely  called  attention  to  the  fact 
that  the  position  of  the  two  nations,  as  regarded  the 
canal,  was  determined  by  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty. 
The  British  government,  he  added,  relied  with  confi- 
dence upon  the  American  observance  of  all  of  the 
engagements  of  that  treaty.'" 

But  before  Granville's  communication  was  received, 
Blaine  again  wrote,  this  time  with  reference  to  the 
Clayton-Bulwer  treaty."  That  arrangement,  he  stated, 
had  been  made  more  than  thirty  years  before,  under 
temporary  conditions  which  had  long  ago  ceased  to 
exist  and  could  never  be  reproduced.  The  President 
believed  that  some  changes  in  the  treaty  were  necessary, 
and  as  the  British  interests  in  the  question  were  slight 
as  compared  with  those  of  the  United  States,  it  was 
hoped  that  a  readjustment  of  the  treaty  terms  might  be 
reached  in  a  spirit  of  amity  and  concord.  Reasons  for 
the  desired  modifications  followed.  Great  Britain  had 
a  large  navy  and  the  United  States  had  not ;  the  treaty 
bound  the  United  States  not  to  use  its  military  force 
for  the  defense  of  the  interoceanic  route,  while  it  left 
the  naval  power  of  Great  Britain  unrestrained,  ready  at 

" /bid.,  pp.  174-177.  ^  Ibid.,  178. 

--  It  would  seem  from  this  that  Blaine's  failure  to  mention  the  treaty 
in  his  first  letter  was  due  to  forgetfulness  or  ignorance  of  its  terms,  and 
not  to  a  determination,  later  abandoned,  to  ignore  it. 


278     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

any  moment  to  seize  both  ends  of  the  canal,  thus  render- 
ing its  military  occupation  entirely  within  the  discretion 
of  Great  Britain.  Furthermore,  the  United  States  gov- 
ernment would  not  consent  to  perpetuate  any  treaty 
which  impeached  the  right  of  the  nation  to  priorit}'  on 
the  American  continent.  Should  the  Pacific  coast  be 
attacked,  the  United  States  would  be  handicapped  in 
an  attempt  to  protect  it,  for  no  discrimination  was  made 
by  the  treaty  in  favor  of  American  vessels  going 
through  the  canal  to  defend  United  States  territory,  as 
compared  with  vessels  bent  on  a  hostile  errand.  For 
purposes  of  self-protection  the  United  States  claimed 
the  right  to  control  the  isthmian  transit,  and  offered  by 
such  control  the  absolute  neutralization  of  the  canal  as 
respected  European  powers,  which  could  in  no  other 
way  be  attained  and  perpetuated.  The  fact  that  since 
the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  had  been  completed,  com- 
mercial powers,  other  than  the  contracting  parties,  had 
developed,  required  a  modification  of  the  treaty ;  other- 
wise these  powers  might  interfere  with  the  transit. 
If  the  non-intervention  enjoined  upon  the  United  States 
by  the  treaty  should  be  appHed  to  the  canal  projected 
by  the  French,  it  would  prevent  the  American  govern- 
ment from  asserting  the  rights  and  privileges  acquired 
from  Colombia  before  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  was 
formed.  Consequently,  the  United  States  wished  the 
treaty  so  modified  as  to  enable  it  to  treat  with  all  other 
nations  seeking  a  foothold  on  the  isthmus  on  the  basis 
of  impartial  justice  and  independence.  It  was  desired 
khat  the  terms  of  the  treaty  be  so  changed  as  to  give  the 
Rjnited  States  a  right  to  protect  and  control  the  canal, 
In  conjunction  with  the  couiUry  in  which  it  was  located, 
'witli  tlie  exception  of  the  acquisition  of  sites  necessary 


AMERICAN  OPPOSITION,  1860-1895  279 

for  military  and  naval  stations,  no  territory  would  he\ 
acquired  in   Central  America  by  the  United   States.  | 
Finally,  since  the  eighth  article  which  was  designed  to ' 
extend  the  terms  of  the  treaty  to  other  practicable  lines 
of  communication  between  the  two  oceans  had  never 
beeen  put  into  effect,  the  American  government  wished 
to  consider  it  obsolete/* 

Ten  days  later  Blaine  again  wrote,  replying  to  Gran- 
ville's letter  received  a  few  days  before.  He  denounced 
the  Claylon-Bulwer  treaty  as  a  source  of  former  mis- 
understanding and  controversy,  and  declared  that  the 
eighth  article  did  not  stretch  the  guarantees  of  article 
one  over  the  Panama  route.  That  article  was  simply 
an  agreement  to  extend,  by  treaty  stipulations,  the  pro- 
tection of  both  countries  to  that  or  any  other  practi- 
cable transisthmian  waterway  or  railway  outside  of 
'^Central  America.  The  obligations  entered  into  by  the 
United  States  with  Colombia  in  1846  required  that  the 
United  States  be  freed  from  the  unequal  and  unequi- 
table obligations  to  Great  Britain  "  under  the  vague 
\and,  as  yet,  unperfected  compact  of  1850  ".'* 

On  January  7,  1882,  Granville  replied  to  Blaine's 
letter  of  November  19,  defending  the  Clayton-Bulwer 
^^ty.  The  principles  upon  which  the  Secretary  of. 
State's  arguments  were  fnrmed^^^re.  he  thought,  novel 
in  international  law.  The  British  government  could  not 
believe  that  the  changes  in  the  treaty  suggested  by  the 
American  government  would  promote  the  object  in- 
tended, or  be  beneficial  in  themselves.  The  principles 
I  which  guided  the  negotiators  of  the  treaty  were  sound, 
land  still  applicable  to  the  present  state  of  affairs.    The 

^  U.  S.  Docs.,  ser.  no.  3853,  doc.   194,  pp.   178-184. 
^*  Ibid.,  pp.  184-190. 


28o     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

wish  of  the  British  government  was  that  these  principles 
be  put  into  effect ;  and  that  other  states  be  invited  by 
the  contracting  parties  to  enter  into  similar  stipulations 
with  them.  Great  Britain  would  be  glad  to  see  the 
United  States  take  the  initiative  in  extending  the  invi- 
tation to  other  powers,  and  was  ready  to  join  or  support 
and  indorse  it/' 

A  little  later  a  reply  came  to  Blaine's  attack  on  the 
Clayton-Bulwer  treaty.  The  differences  which  had 
formerly  arisen  between  the  two  governments  regard- 
ing it,  the  Foreign  Secretary  pointed  out,  did  not  relate 
to  the  general  principles  to  be  observed  in  reference  to 
interoceanic  routes,  but  to  the  acquisition  of  territory. 
During  the  controversy  the  United  States  had  indicated 
no  desire  to  fortify  the  canal  or  to  exercise  political 
control  over  it ;  on  the  contrary,  she  had  disclaimed  any 
wish  for  exclusive  or  preferential  control.  During  the 
dispute  Great  Britain  had  contemplated  the  abrogation 
of  the  treaty,  but  only  on  condition  of  reversion  to  the 
status  quo,  a  solution  which  was  then  possible  though 
dangerous  to  the  cordiality  between  the  two  nations, 
but  which  subsequent  events  had  rendered  impossible. 
However,  a  better  and  more  conciliatory  settlement  had 
been  made  by  the  independent  and  voluntary  action  of 
the  British  government.  The  points  in  dispute  were 
practically  conceded  by  Great  Britain  and  the  contro- 
versy terminated  in  a  manner  declared  to  be  "  entirely 
satisfactory  "  by  the  President  of  the  United  States.'" 

Frelinghuysen,  who  became  secretary  of  state  on  the 
/accession  of  President  Arthur,  undertook  to  answer 
Granville  by  a  new  line  of  argument.    Blaine  had  repre- 

'"  U.  S.  Docs.,  ser.  no.  3853,  doc.  194,  pp.  191194. 
"  Ibid.,  pp.  194-203. 


AMERICAN  OPPOSITION.  1860-1895  281 

sented  that  a  wholly  new  situation  had  risen  since  the 
conclusion  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty,  and  had  urged 
that  Great  Britain  recognize  the  changes  wrought  by 
thirty  years  and  consent  to  alterations  in  the  trj 
Blaine's  efforts  proving  vain,  his  successor  turned  to  -^ 
technical  argument,  with  the  idea  of  justifying  inde- 
pendent American  action.  In  1859,  he  wrote,  Great 
Britain  had  formed  a  treaty  with  Guatemala,  in  which 
what  had  been  called  the  settlement  at  Honduras,  in 
the  declaration  made  on  the  exchange  of  ratifications 
of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty,  was  styled  "  Her  Britan- 
nic Majesty's  settlement  and  possessions."  The  United 
States  had  never  given  its  consent  to  the  conversion  of 
this  settlement  into  a  British  possession  with  British 
sovereignty.  This  step  on  the  part  of  the  British  gov- 
ernment, Frelinghuysen  intimated,  was  a  violation  of 
the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty.  Moreover,  it  was  under- 
stood that  the  British  had  spread  beyond  the  boundaries 
made  with  Guatemala.  If  Great  Britain  had  violated 
the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  and  continued  to  violate  it, 
that  agreement  was,  of  course,  voidable  at  the  pleasure 
of  the  United  States.  When  President  Buchanan  spoke 
of  an  amicable  and  honorable  settlement  of  the  dispute 
as  having  been  made,  he  had  referred  not  to  the  colo- 
nization of  Belize,  but  to  the  adjustment  of  the  Mos- 
quito controversy." 

As  to  the  provision  in  article  eight  of  the  Clayton- 
Bulwer  treaty,  no  such  "  treaty  stipulation  "  as  was 
therein  proposed  had  been  made  or  suggested  by  Great 
Britain  for  the  purpose  of  joining  the  United  States  in 
the  protection  of  the  canal  or  railway  by  the  Panama 
route.    After  thirty  years  of  independent  protection  of 

-'  Ibid.,  pp.  9-16. 


282     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

the  Panama  railway,  the  American  government  was 
convinced  that  such  joint  protection  was  not  needed. 
Moreover,  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  was  subject  to 
the  provisions  of  the  treaty  of  1846  with  New  Granada, 
while  the  latter  treaty  bound  the  United  States  to  the 
sole  protectorate  of  any  transit  by  the  Panama  route. 
Furthermore,  as  the  persons  who  had  the  concession  for 
the  canal — which  the  United  States  understood  to  be 
accepted  by  the  two  governments,  under  the  provisions 
of  the  treaty — had  not  carried  out  the  proposed  enter- 
prise, the  United  States  felt  justified  in  refusing  to 
afford  its  joint  protection  to  any  other  persons  or  com- 
pany ;  and  it  felt  free  to  protect  any  interoceanic  com- 
munication in  which  it  or  its  citizens  might  become 
interested,  in  such  a  way  as  treaties  with  the  local 
sovereign  powers  might  warrant  and  their  interests 
might  require.  The  American  government  could  not 
take  part  in  extending  an  invitation  to  other  powers  to 
participate  in  an  agreement  based  on  the  convention 
of  1850,  and  it  would  look  with  disfavor  upon  an 
attempt  at  concerted  political  action  by  other  powers  in 
that  direction.  There  was  no  provision  in  the  Clayton- 
Bulwer  treaty  to  invite,  or  obliging  the  United  States  to 
accept,  the  aid  of  other  nations  to  protect  or  guarantee 
the  neutrality  of  the  Panama  route." 

This  letter  brought  a  reply  from  Granville,  showing 
that  by  the  eighth  article  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty 
the  contracting  parties  had  intended  to  establish  a 
"  general  principle "  applicable  to  "  all  interoceanic 
communications,  and  not  to  any  one  particular  scheme 
or  schemes  ".  The  correctness  of  this  view,  he  declared, 
was  proved  by  the  character  of  the  treaties  made  by 

"  U.  S.  Docs.,  ser.  no.  3853,  doc.  194,  pp.  16-25. 


AMERICAN  OPPOSITION,  1860-1S95  283 

Great  Britain  with  Honduras  in  1856,  and  with  Nica- 
ragua in  i860,  and  by  treaties  made  by  the  United 
States  with  Honduras  in  1864  and  with  Nicaragua  in 
1867.  Moreover,  in  its  treaty  with  Nicaragua  the 
American  government  had  not  only  agreed  to  extend 
its  protection  "  to  all  such  routes  of  communication 
(between  the  Atlantic  and  Pacific  oceans),  and  to  guar- 
antee the  neutrality  and  innocent  use  of  the  same  ",  but 
did  further  agree  to  employ  its  influence  with  other 
nations  to  induce  them  to  guarantee  such  neutrality  and 
protection.  The  government  of  the  United  States 
having,  therefore,  since  the  conclusion  of  the  treaty  of 
1846  with  New  Granada,  entered  into  treaties  of  a  more 
recent  date  with  Great  Britain  and  other  powers,  carry- 
ing out  the  "  general  principle  "  established  by  the  Clay- 
ton-Bulwer  treaty,  it  could  hardly  now  appeal,  without 
inconsistency,  to  its  treaty  with  New  Granada  as  giving 
it  exclusive  rights  of  protection  over  the  projected 
canal  across  the  Isthmus  of  Panama.  Besides,  there 
was  nothing  in  the  treaty  with  New  Granada  which 
conferred  on  the  United  States  any  exclusive  right  of 
protection,  or  which  was  inconsistent  with  the  joint 
protection  of  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States."' 

Granville  next  turned  to  the  American  allegation  thati 
such  acts  had  been  committed  by  Great  Britain  in  Brit-  I 
ish  Honduras  in  violation  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  | 
as  would  entitle  the  United  States  to  denounce  the-p 
agreement.    The  United  States  was  not  justified  in  any  f 
claim  to  abrogate  the  treaty  on  such  grounds,  for  thel 
treaty  was  not  intended  to  apply  to  British  Honduras. I 
That  territory  had  become  British  by  conquest,  and  was! 
possessed  by  Great  Britain  long  prior  to  the  conclusion 

'^  Ibid.,  doc.  237,  pp.  411-413. 


284     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty ;  and,  furthermore,  by  a 
postal  convention  made  between  Great  Britain  and  the 
United  States  in  i860  the  latter  had  recognized  British  j 
Honduras  as  being  a  British  "  colony  ".    Consequently,  1 
the  contention  of  the  American  secretary  of  state  was  i 
not  sound.'"  1 1 

Some  further  correspondence  took  place  upon  the 
subject  in  the  following  year,  1883,"  which,  however, 
added  little  to  the  arguments  already  given,  and  the 
discussion  was  brought  to  a  close  by  Granville,  who  felt 
that  a  prolongation  of  it  would  be  useless.'' 

An  examination  of  the  arguments  presented  shows 
clearly  that  Great  Britain  had  decidedly  the  best  of  the 
controversy,  for  by  incontrovertible  evidence  she  had 
shown  that  the  treaty  by  its  eighth  article  established  a 
general  principle  applicable  to  all  transisthmian  routes, 
and,  therefore,  to  Panama.  The  defense  offered  by 
Granville  in  regard  to  Belize  was  obviously  defective 
in  part ;  but  the  charges  made  by  Frelinghuysen  were 
scarcely  less  so.  Though  Belize  was  not  British  by 
conquest,  a  long,  unchallenged  occupation  of  the  terri- 
tory gave  Great  Britain  a  strong  title  to  it.  Moreover, 
the  United  States  by  acquiescing  in  the  Sarstoon 
boundary  made  by  Wyke  had  virtually  agreed  to  a 
British  occupation  of  the  territory  between  the  Sibun 
and  the  Sarstoon,  and,  consequently,  was  scarcely 
entitled  to  object  to  its  formal  establishment  as  a  colony. 
Finally,  though  the  colonization  had  taken  place  twenty 
years  before,  until  1882  the  American  government  had 
not  thought  fit  to  criticise  the  step. 

The  determined  effort  made  by  the  American  govern- 
ment from  1880  to  1883  to  secure  the  right  to  protect 

'"  U.  S.  Docs.,  ser.  no.  3853,  doc.  237,  pp.  413-417. 
''■Ibid.,  pp.  417-425.  -^  Ibid.,  p.  423. 


AMERICAN  OPPOSITION,  1860-1895  285 

all  transisthmian  lines  of  communication,  and  the  attack 
on  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty,  which  obstructed  this 
exclusive  policy,  raises  a  question  as  to  the  cause  of 
the  American  attitude.  The  question  is  practically 
answered  by  the  fact  that  since  the  completion  of  the 
Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  thirty  years  of  growth  and  prog- 
ress had  taken  place  in  the  United  States.  Shortly 
previous  to  1850  the  nation  had  annexed  the  Ore- 
gon Country  and  the  Southwest.  During  thirty  years 
this  vast  region  had  been  settled  and  its  resources 
were  being  rapidly  developed.  The  population  of  the 
country  as  a  whole  had  doubled,  and  there  had  been  a 
tremendous  increase  in  wealth  and  prosperity.  These 
changes  made  inevitable  a  new  feeling  of  dignity  and  a 
greater  degree  of  self-confidence  in  the  nation.  More- 
over, the  conduct  of  most  of  the  European  powers  dur- 
ing the  Civil  War  inclined  the  United  States  more  fully 
to  realize  that  these  nations  were  not  to  be  trusted  in 
matters  involving  American  welfare. 

These  facts  in  themselves  are  sufficient  to  explain 
'  the  American  policy,  but  it  seems  desirable  to  consider 
others  in  connection  with  them.  In  the  first  place,  it 
should  be  remembered  that  long-established  British 
influence  in  Central  America  was  what  produced  the 
treaty  of  1850,  which  admitted  Great  Britain  to  a  part- 
nership with  the  American  government  in  the  regula- 
tion of  transisthmian  communication.  The  settlement  - 
of  the  dispute-4)y-sueh-^  treaty  wa* -encouraged  by  the 
lack  of  sufficient  American  capita]  to_huild-the  canal" 
But  the  treaty  from  the  first  was  unpopular  because  it 
compromised  with  the  Monroe  doctrine.  Even  as  early 
as  1856  the  United  States  was  averse  to  extending  the 

^  Ibid.,  pp.  229-230. 


286     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

provisions  of  the  eighth  article  to  the  Panama  route/* 
The  stand  of  Blaine  and  Frelinghuysen  was,  conse- 
quently, a  definite  voicing  of  an  attitude  long  held  in 
•silence  rather  than  the  presentation  of  a  new  interpre- 
tation of  the  treaty. 

The  great  interest  roused  by  the  opening  of  the  Suez 
Canal  has  been  mentioned,  and  the  consequent  desire 
of  the  American  nation  to  be  the  leader  in  a  similar 
undertaking  in  the  New  World.  Closely  following 
this  stimulation  of  interest,  came  news  of  de  Lesseps's 
contract  with  Colombia.  Though  hitherto  various  for- 
eign nations  had  directed  attention  to  projects  for  routes 
across  the  Central  American  isthmus,  never  before, 
since  growth  in  prosperity  had  made  possible  the  con- 
struction of  a  canal  by  American  capital,  had  a  danger- 
ous rival  appeared.  De  Lesseps's  success  at  Suez 
seemed  to  guarantee  success  at  Panama.  Such  a  situa- 
tion was  bound  to  reveal  a  bold  and  exclusive  policy 
on  the  part  of  the  United  States. 

Although  worsted  in  argument,  the  United  States 
gave  little  sign  of  acquiescing  in  the  British  view ; 
and  in  1884  she  proceeded  again  to  ignore  the  Clay- 
ton-Bulwer  treaty  by  negotiating  with  Nicaragua  a 
treaty  for  a  canal  to  be  entirely  under  American 
control,  built  by  the  United  States  and  jointly  owned 
by  herself  and  Nicarsgtta.^'^  This  treaty  was  still  before 
the  Senate  for  ratification  upon  the  accession  of  Cleve- 
land, who  withdrew  it  and  reverted  to  the  policy  of  a 
neutralized  canal  under  international  guarantee.*'  But 
Cleveland's  action  only  caused  a  temporary  check  to  an 

'■•  See  above,  pp.   233-234. 

*"  Sparks,  National  Development,  225-226. 

"  Richardson,  Messages  and  Papers,  VIII,  327. 


AMERICAN  OPPOSITION,  1860-1S95  287 

irresistible  national  movement;  with  the  Harrison 
administration  the  former  poHcy  was  resumed.  The 
growing  likelihood  that  de  Lesseps's  undertaking  would 
prove  a  failure,  however,  somewhat  abated  American 
enthusiasm,  and  also  again  turned  attention  to  the  Nica- 
ragua route."  The  Maritime  Canal  Company,  in  1887, 
obtained  a  concession  for  the  construction  of  a  canal  on 
this  line.  Work  was  begun  two  years  later,''  but  as  the 
company's  funds  soon  began  to  fail  it  appealed  to  the 
United  States  government  for  help.  The  subject  was 
taken  up  by  the  Senate  in  1890,  and  in  the  following 
year  a  bill  was  reported,  amending  the  company's  char- 
ter. The  amendments  provided  for  the  guarantee  of 
the  company's  bonds  by  the  American  government, 
secured  the  government  against  loss,  and  gave  it  a  con- 
trolling voice  in  the  management  of  the  canal.''  Accom- 
panying the  bill  was  a  statement  from  the  committee 
that  as  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  was  obsolete  it  could 
not  be  an  obstacle  to  the  passage  of  the  measure.*" 

The  matter  frequently  came  up  for  debate  in  the  next 
four  years  and  the  treaty  was  vigorously  denounced, 
but  that  the  country  was  unwilling  to  assume  responsi- 
bility for  its  abrogation,  independent  of  England,  was 
evident  from  the  fact  that  several  joint  resolutions  for 
that  purpose  failed  to  pass.  However,  in  January, 
1895,  the  canal  bill  passed  by  a  good  majority,  showing 
the  increasing  determination  of  the  country  to  have  a 
canal  under  American  control." 

The  action  of  the  Senate  did  not  escape  the  notice  of 
Great  Britain.    In  July,  1894,"  and  again  in  February, 

"  Coolidge,  The  United  States  as  a  World  Power,  274. 

"Travis,  Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty.  240-241. 

'*  Dewey,  National  Problems,  118-121. 

*"  Travis,  Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty,  241-242.  ■**  Ibid.,  242. 

*'Parl.  Debates,  4th  ser.,  XXVII,  15. 


/, 


288     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

1895,"  attention  was  called  to  it  in  the  House  of  Com- 
mons, but  the  reply  of  Grey,  the  under  secretary  of 
state  for  foreign  affairs,  was  that  there  was  no  reason 
to  believe  that  the  American  government  did  not  intend 
to  keep  its  treaty  engagements."  This  confidence  in 
American  integrity  was  justified  by  the  stand  taken  in 
1896  by  Secretary  of  State  Olney.  In  a  memorandum 
upon  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  he  declared  Freling- 
huysen's  contention — that  the  treaty  referred  to  a  par- 
ticular canal — to  be  "  ingenious  rather  than  sound  ", 
and  held  that  the  treaty  was  still  in  force.  "If  ",  he 
wrote,  "  changed  conditions  now  make  stipulations, 
which  were  once  deemed  advantageous,  either  inappli- 
cable or  injurious,  the  true  remedy  is  not  in  ingenious 
attempts  to  deny  the  existence  of  the  treaty  or  to 
explain  away  its  provisions,  but  in  a  direct  and  straight- 
forward application  to  Great  Britain  for  a  reconsidera- 
I  tion  of  the  whole  matter."  "  This  stand  of  Olney  was 
substantially  a  return  to  the  attitude  of  Blaine. 

A  second  element  of  the  old  Central  American  dis- 
pute attracting  attention  during  the  period  now  under 
consideration  was  the  relations  between  the  English 
and  the  Mosquitos.  The  treaty  of  Managua,  negotiated 
by  Wyke  in  i860,  failed  to  banish  British  influence  as 
completely  as  had  been  expected.  Many  foreigners, 
particularly  English,  continued  to  reside  in  the  old 
Mosquito  territory,  and  were  the  controlling  power, 
advancing  their  own  interests  with  little  regard  to  the 
welfare  of  the  Nicaraguans  or  Indians.  This  foreign 
element  produced  discord  between  the  Mosquitos  and 

"^  Pari.  Debates,  4th  ser.,  XXX,  745-746. 

^'/frtd.,  XXVII,  16;  XXX,  746. 

■"Moore,  Digest  of  International  Law,  III,  208-209. 


AMERICAN  OPPOSITION,  1860-1895  289 

the  Nicaragua!!  government,  and  quarrels  were  fre- 
quent. The  dissensions  led  to  appeals  to  England,  and 
the  consequent  interference  of  the  British  government. 
A  dispute  soon  developed  regarding  the  meaning  of 
the  treaty  of  IManagua.^ 

Nicaragua  was  finally  persuaded  by  the  British 
government  to  submit  the  dispute  to  the  arbitration  of 
the  Emperor  of  Austria.  His  award,  given  in  1880, 
favored  the  British  interpretation  of  the  treaty ;  it 
made  Nicaraguan  sovereignty  over  the  reserve  merely 
nominal,  and  practically  established  the  right  of  the 
British  to  interfere  in  behalf  of  the  Mosquitos."  How- 
ever, there  is  no  reason  to  believe  that  either  previous 
or  subsequent  to  the  award  the  interference  of  the 
British  was  such  as  to  constitute  a  violation  of  the 
Clayton-Bulwer  treaty.  If  it  had  been,  it  is  pretty 
certain  that  this  lack  of  good  faith  would  have  attracted 
American  attention.** 

There  is  no  available  evidence  that  the  American 
government  took  any  notice  of  British  relations  with 
the  Mosquitos  from  i860  until  1888;  and  the  interest 
finally  then  roused  was  largely  due  to  the  renewed 
popularity  of  the  Nicaragua  route,  and  to  the  project 
of  the  Maritime  Canal  Company."  In  October,  1888, 
the  Nicaraguan  minister  at  Washington  presented  to 
Secretary  of  State  Bayard  a  letter  from  the  British 

^  Brit,  and  For.  State  Papers,  LXXXI,  752. 

"Ibid.,  LXXII,  1212-1213. 

*' Travis,  Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty,  208-210,  gives  the  British  interference 
in  Mosquito  as  one  of  the  causes  for  the  American  attack  on  the  Clayton- 
Bulwer  treaty  in  1880;  but  this  view  scarcely  seems  sound,  for  had  such 
interference  attracted  the  attention  of  the  United  States,  a  point  would 
undoubtedly  have  been  made  of  it  by  Blaine  or  Frelinghuysen  in  their 
correspondence  of  1880- 1883. 

*°  U.  S.  Docs.,  ser.  no.  3275,  doc.  20,  pp.  69-70,  96. 

20 


290     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

minister  in  Central  America  to  the  Nicaraguan  govern- 
ment, complaining  that  the  Nicaraguans  had  infringed 
upon  the  boundaries  of  the  Mosquito  reserve  and  had 
also  established  a  post  office  at  Bluefields,'"  "  thus  inter- 
fering with  the  domestic  affairs  of  the  Reserve  ".  The 
establishment  of  forts,  arsenals,  post  offices,  etc.,  in  the 
reserve  by  the  Nicaraguans,  was,  in  the  opinion  of  the 
British  government,  inconsistent  with  the  treaty  of 
Managua  as  interpreted  by  the  award." 

In  consequence  of  this  communication,  Bayard  wrote 
to  Phelps,  the  American  minister  to  England.  Had  the 
United  States  anticipated,  he  said,  that  under  cover  of 
the  treaty  of  Managua  the  British  government  would 
continue  to  attempt  any  interference  with  the  affairs  of 
the  Indians,  it  would  not  have  hailed  that  treaty  as  a 
solution  and  termination  of  disputes  concerning  the 
British  protectorate  over  the  Mosquitos,  but  Avould 
have  regarded  the  arrangement  as  a  serious  obstacle  to 
any  such  settlement.  However,  he  declared,  nothing  in 
the  treaty  of  Managua  or  in  the  Austrian  award  was 
incompatible  with  the  right  of  Nicaragua  to  establish 
post  offices  in  the  reserve  or  military  posts  for  the 
common  defense.  Such  a  right  was  an  essential  inci- 
dent of  paramount  sovereignty,  and  could  be  properly 
exercised  only  by  Nicaragua.  It  was  important  to  the 
United  States  as  to  all  other  powers  that  Nicaraguan 
sovereignty  exist  in  fact  over  the  Mosquito  reserve, 
for  with  the  sovereign  alone  could  diplomatic  relations 
be  maintained,  and  to  it  alone  could  the  powers  look 
for  redress  of  possible  wrongs  to  their  citizens." 

">  Bluefields  was  the  residence  of  the  Mosquito  government. 
'>  Brit,  and  For.  State  Papers,  LXXXI,  758-759. 
"/fctd.,  746-754- 


AMERICAN  OPPOSITION,  1860-1895  291 

But  more  important  than  the  question  of  Nicaraguan 
authority  in  the  reserve,  was  the  general  question  of 
the  right  of  the  British  government  to  interfere  in  dis- 
putes between  Nicaragua  and  the  Mosquitos.  The 
President  could  not  but  regard  the  continued  exercise 
of  the  claim  on  the  part  of  Great  Britain  to  interfere 
on  behalf  of  these  Indians  as  the  assertion  of  a  British 
protectorate  in  another  form ;  more  especially  when 
this  effort  was  directed  to  preventing  Nicaragua  from 
exercising  military  jurisdiction  in  the  immediate  neigh- 
borhood of  the  Atlantic  mouth  of  the  projected  canal. 
The  United  States  could  never  see  with  indifference  the 
reestablishment  of  such  a  protectorate.  It  would  not 
only  be  contrary  to  the  Monroe  doctrine,  but  also  to  the 
terms  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty,  the  binding  force 
of  which  Great  Britain  had  hitherto  so  emphatically 
asserted.  The  history  of  the  former  controversy  with 
regard  to  the  same  subject  should  admonish  the  British 
and  American  governments  to  spare  no  effort  to  avoid 
misunderstandings  and  to  promote  cordial  co-operation 
and  good  intelligence  between  the  two  countries.  With 
this  purpose  in  view  the  American  government  desired 
that  its  attitude  be  made  known  to  Great  Britain.^' 

Salisbury,  the  British  foreign  secretary,  replied  in  a 
reasonable  and  conciliatory  manner.  Because  of  com- 
plaints from  the  Mosquito  chief,  he  explained,  the 
British  agent  in  Central  America  had  been  instructed 
to  make  friendly  remonstrance  to  the  Nicaraguan  gov- 
ernment and  to  draw  its  attention  to  the  wording  of  the 
treaty  of  Managua  and  to  the  interpretation  given  it 
by  the  Austrian  award.  If  Mosquito  rights  were  in- 
fringed upon  by  Nicaragua,  by  whom  could  remon- 

'-^  Ibid.,  754-758. 


292     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

strance  be  made  if  not  by  Great  Britain,  with  whom 
Nicaragua  concluded  the  convention  defining  these 
rights  ?  However,  the  British  government  did  not 
claim  the  right  to  intervene  in  every  dispute  between 
the  Mosquitos  and  their  sovereign ;  the  extent  of  the 
intervention  was  indicated  in  the  report  annexed  to  the 
award.  Moreover,  the  British  government  had  no 
desire  to  assert  a  protectorate,  or  anything  in  the  nature 
of  a  protectorate  over  the  Mosquitos,  and  it  would  give 
that  government  the  greatest  possible  satisfaction  if 
Nicaragua  and  the  Indians  would  come  to  an  amicable 
arrangement  for  the  incorporation  of  the  latter  into  the 
Nicaraguan  republic,  thus  relieving  Great  Britain  from 
any  further  responsibility/^  This  explanation  was  evi- 
dently satisfactory  to  the  United  States,  for  with  it  the 
correspondence  ended." 

The  Austrian  award  practically  established  Mosquito 
independence  of  Nicaragua,  and  after  it  was  given 
foreign  influence  increased.  Extensive  banana  planta- 
tions were  established  by  American  immigrants,  and  a 
thriving  commerce  developed,  particularly  with  the 
United  States.""  The  peaceful  prosperity  of  the  terri- 
tory roused  the  jealousy  of  the  disorganized,  poverty- 
stricken  remainder  of  Nicaragua,  and  led  the  Nica- 
raguan government  to  determine  to  extend  its  influence 
over  the  reserve."    Consequently,  in  1893,  a  Nicaraguan 

"  Brit,  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  LXXXI,  754-758. 

"  Four  years  later  Lincoln,  the  .American  minister  to  London,  ad- 
dressed a  letter  to  the  British  foreign  secretary,  reopening  the  discus- 
sion, but  no  reply  was  given  him.  U.  S.  Docs.,  ser.  no.  3275,  doc.  20, 
p.  28. 

"  Keely,  "  Nicaragua  and  the  Mosquito  Coast  ",  in  Pop.  Set.  Mo.,  XLV. 
164-165.  In  1894  it  was  reported  that  ninety-four  per  cent,  of  the  wealth, 
enterprise,  and  commerce  of  the  reserve  was  American.  Bluefields  was 
"  American  to  the  core  ".     U.  S.  Docs.,  ser.  no.  3275,  doc.  20,  pp.  70,  87. 

"  Ibid.,  p.  37. 


AMERICAN  OPPOSITION,  1860-1895  293 

commissioner,  General  Lacayo,  was  appointed/'*  with 
instructions  to  assert  the  sovereignty  of  the  republic 
over  the  reserve  and  to  use  his  influence  to  secure  its 
incorporation  into  Nicaragua.""  Lacayo's  efforts,  how- 
ever, were  vain.'" 

This  was  the  situation  in  1893  when  war  broke  out 
between  Honduras  and  Nicaragua."  As  a  result  of 
rumors  of  a  Honduran  invasion  of  the  reserve,  the 
Nicaraguan  government  sent  troops  there  who  estab- 
lished martial  law.""  Immediately  great  excitement  pre- 
vailed and  the  Americans  in  the  reserve  petitioned  their 
government  for  protection  by  a  war  vessel."^  The  Nica- 
raguan commissioner  meanwhile  had  meddled  with 
Mosquito  affairs  in  various  ways,  and  had  placed  a  duty 
on  bananas  sent  out  of  the  reserve.'^  In  February,  1894, 
Bingham,  the  British  consul,  warned  him  that  should 
he  persist  in  his  course,  the  British  war  vessel  in  the 
harbor  would  interfere."'  Finally,  however,  because  of 
the  danger  to  life  and  property  in  the  reservation,  the 
commissioner  himself  and  the  foreign  consuls  requested 
protection  from  the  British  vessel  Cleopatra ; ""  and,  on 
March  5,  marines  who  were  landed  from  the  ship  com- 
pelled the  Nicaraguans  to  raise  the  siege  laid  upon 

^^  Ibid.,  pp.  37-38,  84.  The  appointment  of  a  Nicaraguan  commissioner 
was  permitted  by  the  treaty  of  Managua.  Brit,  and  For.  State  Papers, 
LXXII,  1212. 

'■'^  U.  S.  Docs.,  ser.  no.  3275,  doc.  20,  p.  84. 

^'>  Ibid.,  pp.  11-12,  84-85. 

'^^  Ibid.,  pp.  lo-ii.  A  clear  and  interesting  account  of  the  Mosquito 
coast  in  1893  may  be  found  in  Pop.  Sci.  Mo.,  XLV,  160-175. 

^^  U.  S.  Docs.,  ser.  no.  3275,  doc.  20,  pp.  19,  20-23. 

'^^  Ibid.,  pp.  12-13.  The  Kearsarge  which  was  sent  was  lost  on  the  way. 
When  the  loss  became  known  the  San  Francisco  was  ordered  from 
Brazil  to  Bluefields.    Ibid.,  p.  68. 

'■•  Ibid.,  p.  38.  This  was  a  violation  of  the  Austrian  award.  Brit,  and 
For.  State  Papers,  LXXII,  1213. 

"  U.  S.  Docs.,  ser.  no.  3275,  doc.  20,  p.  14. 

«=  Ibid.,  p.  36. 


294     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

Bluefields."  Following  this,  a  provisional  government 
was  formed  for  the  reservation  by  Captain  Howe  of 
the  Cleopatra,  the  British  consul,  Lacayo,  and  the  com- 
mander of  the  Nicaraguan  troops.  The  American  citi- 
zens and  Braida,  the  American  consul,  refused  to  have 
any  part  in  the  arrangement.*^  The  Americans  were 
strongly  opposed  to  the  provisional  government  for 
they  felt  it  to  be  a  step  towards  Nicaraguan  rule  in 
Mosquito,  which  they  believed  would  be  fatal  to  indus- 
try and  commerce.'"  What  they  desired  was  local  self- 
government  based  on  the  lines  laid  down  in  the  treaty 
of  Managua.^"  Thus  it  appeared  that  the  interests  of 
American  citizens  in  Mosquito  were  at  variance  with 
the  contention  of  the  American  government  as  to  the 
rightful  control  of  the  territory. 

An  account  of  the  occcurrence  at  Bluefields  was 
promptly  telegraphed,  and  later  written,  to  the  Ameri- 
can government  by  Baker,  the  American  minister  at 
Managua ;  "  and  immediately  upon  receiving  the  tele- 
gram, Gresham,  the  American  secretary  of  state, 
telegraphed  to  Bayard,  then  minister  to  England, 
instructing  him  to  investigate  and  report  the  cause  for 
Captain  Howe's  action." 

A  telegram  from  Bayard,  dated  March  15,  stated  that 
the  British  government  had  given  no  instructions  for 
the  landing  of  the  troops,  and  was  waiting  for  further 
information  regarding  the  matter.  As  soon  as  addi- 
tional intelligence  should  be  received,  it  would  be 
promptly  communicated  to  the  United  States.    Kimber- 

"  U.  S.  Docs.,  ser.  no.  3275,  doc.  20,  pp.  15,  36.  Thanks  were  formerly 
extended  by  the  Americans  to  the  captain  of  the  Cleopatra  for  his  pro- 
tection.    Ibid.,  pp.  32,  45. 

'^^  Ibid.,  pp.   32-34.         «»7?)irf.,  pp.  32-33.  '"Ibid.,  pp.  32-33,  43- 

^^  Ibid.,  pp.  17-18.  ''Ibid.,  p.  26. 


AMERICAN  OPPOSITION,  1860-1895  295 

ley,  the  foreign  secretary,  had  assured  Bayard,  however, 
that  the  British  government  had  no  desire  or  intention 
to  estabhsh  a  protectorate  in  Central  America.  Bayard 
himself  believed  that  the  troops  had  been  landed  merely 
for  protection  to  the  residents."  Some  time  later 
Bayard  sent  further  details  regarding  the  incident 
which  went  to  show  that  his  opinion  had  been  correct.'* 

A  telegram  from  Gresham  to  Baker,  sent  on  March 
14,  had  brought  no  further  details ; "  but  on  April  19 
Captain  Watson,  of  the  American  vessel  San  Francisco, 
which  had  been  sent  to  Bluefields  to  protect  American 
interests,  telegraphed  a  statement  to  the  Navy  Depart- 
ment. The  landing  of  the  British  troops,  he  said,  was 
justifiable,  and  permission  of  the  Nicaraguan  commis- 
sioner had  been  first  obtained.  The  troops  had  been 
believed  necessary  to  the  protection  of  life  and  prop- 
erty. Later,  however,  the  British  force  had  retired 
and  now  the  Nicaraguans  were  in  full  control.'" 

By  April  30  a  fairly  accurate  account  of  the  afifair 
had  reached  Washington,  and  on  that  date  Gresham 
wrote  to  Bayard,  objecting  to  the  joint  assumption  of 
authority  in  Mosquito  by  the  British  and  Nicaraguan 
agents,  as  incompatible  with  the  terms  of  the  treaty  of 
Managua.  The  stipulations  of  that  treaty,  Gresham 
stated,  left  no  room  for  foreign  intervention,  or  for  the 
administration  of  affairs  in  the  reserve  by  aliens.  The 
arrangement  for  a  provisional  government  would  tend 
to  strengthen  the  assumption  that  Mosquito  was  a 
territorial  entity  with  sovereign  rights.  Such  govern- 
ment could  have  no  support  from  the  United  States. 
While  the  American  government  was  pleased  to  learn 
that  the  British  forces  had  been  landed  simply  for  the 

'^  Ibid.,  pp.  26-27.         "  Ibid.,  pp.  34-40.  "  Ibid.,  p.  26. 

•"  Ibid.,  p.  50. 


296     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

protection  of  life  and  property,  the  President  hoped 
that  the  anomalous  situation  in  the  Mosquito  reserve 
might  speedily  cease,  and  that  no  foreign  agency  would 
be  permitted  to  dictate  or  participate  in  the  adminis- 
tration of  affairs  there." 

Bayard,  on  May  22,  telegraphed  a  reply  to  this.  In 
an  interview  just  concluded  with  Kimberley,  the  latter 
had  again  assured  him  that  Great  Britain  had  no  inten- 
tion or  desire  of  forming  a  protectorate  over  any  part 
of  Nicaraguan  territory ;  instead  it  wished  to  act  thor- 
oughly in  concert  with  the  United  States,  and  to  con- 
tinue the  treaty  of  1850  "  in  unbroken  force  and  effect  ". 
The  British  consul,  Kimberley  had  stated,  had  acted 
without  instructions  in  helping  to  form  a  provisional 
government,  but  had  done  so  because  he  believed  the 
lives  and  property  of  the  residents  to  be  in  danger.  It 
was  the  wish  of  the  British  government  to  consult  with 
the  United  States  in  order  to  guard  against  Nicaraguan 
violence  to  British  and  American  interests.  The  British 
minister  at  Washington  had  been  instructed  to  this 
effect.^ 
.^  Later,  a  letter  from  Bayard  expressed  the  belief 
that  the  British  government  had  no  desire  for  the 
abrogation  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty,  or  to  do 
anything  inconsistent  with  its  provisions,  or  to  interfere 
in  any  way  with  the  plans  or  works  of  the  United  States 
in  relation  to  the  proposed  canal.  They  desired,  he 
believed,  to  have  only  the  most  friendly  and  mutually 
\  Accommodating  relations  with  the  American  govern- 

I  ,70 

ment. 

"  U.  S.  Docs.,  ser.  no.  327S.  doc.  20,  pp.  68-69. 
"  Ibid.,  p.  91.  '»  Ibid.,  pp.  96-97- 


AMERICAN  OPPOSITION,  1860-1895  297 

Gresham  replied,  on  July  19,  that  to  accept  the 
implied  invitation  to  join  with  Great  Britain  for  the 
purpose  of  settling  the  questions  originating  in  the 
recent  incident  at  Bluefields  might  indicate  a  willing- 
ness on  the  part  of  the  existing  American  administra- 
tion to  depart  from  the  policy  of  its  predecessors  in 
dealing  with  Central  American  questions.  The  gov- 
ernment in  the  reserve  was  not  Mosquito,  but  alien, 
especially  at  Bluefields.  No  matter  how  conspicuous 
the  American  or  other  alien  interests  which  had  grown 
up  under  the  fiction  of  Indian  self-government,  neither 
the  United  States  nor  Great  Britain  could  fairly  sanc- 
tion or  uphold  this  abuse  of  Nicaraguan  sovereignty. 
American  rights  in  the  reservation  must  be  treated  by 
the  United  States  like  similar  rights  in  other  parts  of 
Nicaragua,  and,  should  these  be  invaded,  the  American 
residents  could  look  only  to  the  Nicaraguan  govern- 
ment for  redress.*" 

Aleanwhile,  the  provisional  government,  supported 
by  the  Nicaraguan  authorities,  had  acted  in  a  very  arbi- 
trary manner  and  had  become  unpopular.  Encouraged 
by  the  aliens — especially  the  Americans  of  poor  repu- 
tation " — the  Indians  and  Jamaica  negroes  revolted, 
drove  out  the  Nicaraguans,  and  restored  Clarence,  the 
Mosquito  chief,  to  his  ofifice."  The  two  contending 
parties  at  first  displayed  considerable  violence,  but  the 
presence  of  marines  from  the  American  vessel  Marble- 
head  helped  restore  order.^' 

The  Nicaraguan  authorities,  however,  soon  regained 
control  of  the  reserve,  and  by  tactful  treatment  of  the 

^  Ibid.,  pp.  126-128. 

^^  Ibid.,  pp.  128,  158-161,  163,  164,  168,  169. 

s»  Ibid.,  p.  128. 

^^  Ibid.,  pp.   128,   132,   137-142. 


298     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

Indians  won  their  confidence/'  In  a  short  time,  at  the 
express  desire  of  the  Mosquitos,  steps  were  taken 
towards  their  incorporation  into  the  Nicaraguan  repub- 
lic. Delegates  from  the  leading  tribes  met  in  conven- 
tion, voted  for  incorporation,  and  formally  recognized 
the  constitution  of  Nicaragua.  The  Mosquitos  were 
given  all  of  the  rights  of  other  Nicaraguan  citizens  and 
also  some  special  privileges.  The  former  reserve 
became  the  department  of  Zelaya  in  the  republic." 

The  fact  of  Mosquito  incorporation,  made  known  to 
the  American  government  through  a  telegram  from 
Baker,  was  received  with  much  satisfaction.*'  The 
arrangement  was  equally  gratifying  to  Great  Britain. 
On  December  22,  1894,  Bayard  sent  the  following 
announcement : 

Her  Majesty's  Government  are  well  pleased  with  the  pros- 
pect of  having  "  Clarence  "  and  his  fortunes  eliminated  from 
their  political  responsibility. 

There  was  the  most  open  expression  of  satisfaction  at  the 
foreign  office  upon  the  reported  voluntary  incorporation  of  the 

*'  The  foreigners  who  were  suspected  of  having  incited  the  Mosquitos 
to  revolt  escaped  less  fortunately.  Two  American  citizens  and  twelve 
British  subjects,  including  Hatch,  the  British  vice-consul  at  Bluefields, 
were  arrested  and  after  rough  treatment  were  sent  to  Managua.  Ibid., 
p.  173.  Upon  protest  being  made  from  their  government,  the  Americans 
were  soon  released;  but  the  release  of  the  British,  and  particularly  of 
Hatch,  was  long  delayed,  as  was  also  the  redress  demanded  by  the 
British  government.  Ibid.,  pp.  190-195.  Finally,  by  seizure  of  the  harbor 
of  Corinto,  Great  Britain  forced  Nicaragua  to  restore  Hatch  and  to 
pay  an  indemnity  of  seventy-five  thousand  dollars.  Travis,  Mosquito 
History,  31.  This  roused  some  Americans  who  believed  that  the  British 
were  trying  to  gain  control  of  the  Nicaragua  canal  route;  but  the  .Amer- 
ican government  itself  took  a  more  reasonable  view,  as  did  the  majority 
of  the  population.     Colquhoun,  The  Nicaragua  CanaJ,  293-395. 

"  U.  S.  Docs.,  ser.  no.  3275.  doc.  20,  pp.  204-206.  The  firm  stand  of  the 
American  government  for  the  rights  of  Nicaragua  in  the  reserve  was  .t 
very  important  factor  in  producing  this  final  settlement;  and  the  friendl\ 
action  of  the  United  States  was  fully  appreciated  by  Nicaragua.  Ibid., 
p.  205. 

'"  Ibid.,  p.  201. 


AMERICAN  OPPOSITION,  1860-1895  299 

Indians  with  the  rest  of  Nicaragua,  for  it  was  a  consummation 
devoutly  to  be  wished,  and  they  were  glad  to  be  free  from  the 
subject." 

Thus,  in  a  manner  agreeable  to  all  concerned,  was 
at  last  settled  the  famous  Mosquito  question,  which  had 
been  a  source  of  disagreement  between  the  United 
States  and  Great  Britain  for  nearly  fifty  years,  and 
between  the  latter  and  Central  America  for  more  than 
two  centuries. 

'^  Ibid.,  pp.  203-204.  By  a  treaty  with  Nicaragua,  ratified  in  1906, 
Great  Britain  formally  recognized  the  abrogation  of  the  treaty  of 
Managua  and  the  incorporation  of  the  Mosquitos  into  the  Nicaraguan 
republic.  Pari.  Papers,  1906,  CXXXVI,  "  Treaty  between  the  United 
Kingdom  and  the  Republic  of  Nicaragua  with  regard  to  the  Mosquito 
Territory  ",   1-6. 


CHAPTER  X. 

The  New  Canal  Treaties,  and  New  Conditions  in 
Central  America. 

For  many  years  a  growing  desire  had  existed  in  the 
United  States  for  a  transisthmian  canal  owned  and 
controlled  by  Americans,  but  up  to  the  close  of  the  last 
century  there  seemed  little  prospect  of  its  prompt  reali- 
zation. Though  the  less  responsible  element  in  Con- 
gress frequently  urged  abrogation,  the  members  with 
a  clearer  sense  of  international  honor  felt  with  Olney 
that  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  could  not  be  set  aside 
except  by  joint  action  with  England.  Such  action 
seemed  but  a  remote  possibiHty,  for  the  British  govern- 
ment had  expressed  its  satisfaction  with  the  treaty  and 
its  firm  determination  to  stand  by  it. 

The  last  few  years  of  the  century,  however,  brought 
a  change  in  British  and  American  affairs  which  pro- 
foundly affected  the  relations  of  the  two  governments. 
The  Boer  War  and  the  events  immediately  preceding  it 
had  given  rise  to  a  coldness  between  England  and  other 
European  powers.  England  felt  herself  isolated,  and 
therefore  sought  support  beyond  Europe.'  This  new 
policy  undoubtedly  influenced  the  British  attitude 
towards  the  United  States  during  the  Spanish-Ameri- 
can War.    English  sympathy  probably  would  have  been 

*  Coolidge,   The    United  States  as  a   It'orlJ  Power,  275;    Barral-Mont- 
ferrat,  De  Monroe  ii  Roosevelt,  239. 

300 


THE  NEW  CANAL  TREATIES  301 

on  the  American  side  in  any  case,  but,  as  it  was,  an 
unusual  cordiality  accompanied  the  sympathy.' 

The  friendliness  of  Great  Britain  was  reciprocated 
by  the  Americans,  but  the  British  government  fully 
realized  that  such  unusual  cordiality  would  not  long 
survive  if  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  were  maintained 
as  an  obstacle  to  an  American  transisthmian  canal.  The 
long  cruise  of  the  Oregon  around  Cape  Horn  in  1898, 
for  the  purpose  of  joining  the  Atlantic  squadron,  had 
called  attention  to  the  need  for  a  canal,  while  the 
acquisition  of  the  Philippines  and  Hawaii,  in  the  Pacific, 
and  of  Porto  Rico,  which  strengthened  the  American 
position  in  the  Caribbean  Sea,  further  increased  the 
arguments  in  favor  of  it.'  The  time  was  fully  ripe  for 
the  undertaking,  and,  in  order  to  place  on  a  secure  basis 
the  new  Anglo-American  relations,  Great  Britain  was 
inclined  to  humor  the  United  States  in  her  long- 
cherished  desire. 

Accordingly,  after  the  presidential  message  of 
December,  1898,  had  again  called  attention  to  the  need 
of  the  nation  and  urged  action,  Pauncefote,  the  British 
ambassador  at  Washington,  approached  the  secretary 
of  state  in  order  to  learn  the  exact  attitude  of  the 
American  government.  This  was  frankly  given.  The 
President,  Pauncefote  was  emphatically  assured,  had 
no  intention  of  ignoring  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty,  and 
would  faithfully  observe  its  stipulations ;  but,  in  view 
of  the  demand  for  a  canal,  the  United  States  wished, 

'  Coolidge,  The  United  States  as  a  World  Power,  275;  Latane,  America 
as  a  World  Power,  63-64. 

'Coolidge,  The  United  States  as  a  World  Power,  274;  Pari.  Papers, 
1901,  [Cd.  438],  "Correspondence  respecting  the  Convention  Signed  at 
Washington  relative  to  the  Establishment  of  a  Communication  by  Ship- 
Canal  ",  4;  Keasbey,  "  Terms  and  Tenor  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty  ", 
in  Annals  of  the  American  Academy,  Nov.  1899,  pp.  1-26. 


302     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

by  friendly  negotiation  with  England,  to  secure  such 
modification  of  the  treaty  as  would,  without  affecting 
the  "  general  principle  "  therein  declared,  enable  the 
enterprise  to  be  undertaken  by  the  American  govern- 
ment.* 

The  British  government  expressed  a  willingness  to 
consider  the  matter,  and,  in  consequence,  a  draft  con- 
vention was  drawn  up  by  Secretary  of  State  Hay,  and 
handed  to  Pauncefote  in  January,  1899.  However,  just 
at  this  time  the  Joint  High  Commission,  to  which  had 
been  assigned  the  settlement  of  the  Alaskan  boundary 
and  other  questions  between  the  two  governments,  had 
come  seriously  to  question  whether  an  adjustment  of 
these  difficulties  could  be  effected,  because  of  the  un- 
willingness of  the  American  government  to  yield 
regarding  the  contested  boundary.  In  consequence, 
Great  Britain  hesitated  to  make  concessions  on  the 
question  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty,  and  for  some 
months  nothing  was  accomplished  with  regard  to  it. 
But  early  in  1900  the  British  government  was  again 
stirred  to  activity.  A  bill  was  before  Congress  em- 
powering the  President  to  acquire  from  Nicaragua 
and  Costa  Rica  the  control  of  territory  for  a  canal 
route,  and  directing  the  secretary  of  war  to  construct 
the  canal  and  make  provision  for  its  protection.  It 
seemed  likely  that  the  bill  would  pass,  and  thus  cause 
embarrassment  between  the  two  governments.  To 
obviate  such  a  possibility  the  British  government 
decided  to  accept  the  convention  as  presented  by  Hay.* 

This  convention,  signed  February  5,  1900,  gave  the 
American  government  full  power  to  direct  the  construc- 

*  Pari.  Papers,   1901,   [Cd.  438],  "Correspondence  respecting  the  Con- 
vention sig^ned  at  Washington  .  .  .  ",  etc.,  4. 
»  Ibid..  4-5. 


THE  NEW  CANAL  TREATIES  303 

tion  of  the  canal  and  to  provide  for  its  regulation  and 
management.  In  order  to  preserve  the  "  general  prin- 
ciple "  of  neutralization  established  by  the  Clayton- 
Bulwer  treaty,  the  following  rules  for  the  free  navi- 
gation of  the  canal,  substantially  those  agreed  upon  in 
1888  for  the  Suez  route,  were  adopted: 

( 1 )  The  canal  was  to  be  open  in  time  of  war  as  in 
time  of  peace  to  vessels  of  commerce  and  war  on  terms 
of  entire  equality. 

(2)  The  canal  was  never  to  be  blockaded,  or  any 
right  of  war  exercised,  or  any  act  of  hostility  com- 
mitted within  it. 

(3)  War  vessels  of  a  belligerent  should  not  revictual 
or  take  any  stores  in  the  canal,  except  so  far  as  was 
strictly  necessary ;  and  the  transit  of  such  vessels 
should  be  effected  with  the  least  possible  delay.  Prizes 
were  to  come  under  the  same  rule  as  war  vessels. 

(4)  No  belligerent  should  embark  or  disembark 
troops,  munitions  of  war,  or  warlike  materials  in  the 
canal  except  in  case  of  accidental  hindrance  of  the 
transit,  in  which  case  the  transit  should  be  resumed  as 
quickly  as  possible. 

(5)  War  vessels  of  a  belligerent  should  not  remain 
in  the  waters  within  three  marine  miles  of  either  end 
of  the  canal  longer  than  twenty-four  hours,  except  when 
in  distress,  in  which  case  they  should  depart  as  soon  as 
possible.  But  a  war  vessel  of  one  belligerent  should  not 
depart  within  twenty-four  hours  from  the  departure  of 
a  war  vessel  of  the  other  belligerent. 

(6)  The  works,  etc.,  necessary  to  the  construction, 
maintenance,  and  operation  of  the  canal  were  to  be 
considered  part  of  the  canal  and  should  enjoy  complete 
immunity  from  hostile  attacks. 


304     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

(7)  No  fortifications  should  be  erected  to  command 
the  canal  or  the  adjoining  waters,  but  the  United  States 
was  free  to  maintain  such  miHtary  pohce  as  would 
protect  it  against  lawlessness  and  disorder. 

Immediately  after  the  ratification  of  the  treaty  the 
contracting  parties  were  to  bring  the  arrangement  to 
the  notice  of  other  powers  and  invite  them  to  adhere 
to  it." 

The  treaty  was  promptly  presented  to  the  Senate,  but 
ratification  of  it  was  not  accomplished  before  Congress 
adjourned,  though  the  bill  for  the  American  construc- 
tion and  defense  of  a  canal  was  passed  by  a  large 
majority,  on  ]\Iay  2.    When  Congress  resumed  its  ses- 
sion in  the  autumn,  the  treaty  formed  by  Hay  and 
Pauncefote  was  ratified,  but  only  after  three  amend- 
ments, seriously  changing  its  meaning,  had  been  added  : 
the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  was  declared  to  be  super- 
seded by  the  new  arrangement ;  a  new  clause  was  added 
to  rule  five  stating  that  the  first  five  rules  should  not 
\^^     /  apply  to  measures  which  the  United  States  might  find 
^^    it  necessary  to  take  for  securing  by  its  own  forces  the 
defense  of  the  United  States  and  the  maintenance  of 
^~^0^>   public  order ;  the  provision  for  inviting  the  adherence 
of  other  powers  to  the  treaty  was  entirely  omitted.' 
t  These  changes  were  practically  an  elimination  of  the 
J  neutralization  policy,   and   would  place  the  canal   in 
I  control  of  the  United  States  with  the  protection  of  the 
/  route  for  the  use  of  other  powers  left  entirely  to  Anieri- 
j   can  discretion. 

'  *  Pari.  Papers,  1900,  [Cd.  -30],  "Convention  between  Her  Majesty  ;iii«l 
the  United  States  Supplementary  to  the  Convention  of  April  19,  1850  ", 
1-2. 

''Ibid.,    1901,    [Cd.    4j8],   "Correspondence   respecting   the   Convention 
signed  at  Washington  .  .  .  ",  etc.,  2-5. 


THE  NEW  CANAL  TREATIES  305 

From  the  first  it  seemed  hardly  possible  that  the,' 
British  government  would  favor  the  amended  treaty. 
Though  the  British  press  fully  admitted  that  fifty  years 
of  change  justified  the  American  demand  for  modifi- 
cation of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty,  it  declared  that  the\ 
draft  signed  by  Hay  and  Pauncefote  accomplished  this,\ 
and  denounced  the  amended  treaty.'     The  President  I 
also  was  criticised  for  permitting  its  ratification,  after  ' 
being  so  amended.* 

A  letter  written  on  February  22,  1 901,  by  Lansdowne, 
the  British  foreign  secretary,  to  Pauncefote,  after  call- 
ing attention  to  the  conciliatory  spirit  which  had  led  the 
British  government  to  resume  negotiations,  presented 
the   British   view   of   the    Senate   amendments.    The 
Clayton-Bulwer    treaty,    Lansdowne    wrote,    was    an 
international  contract  of  unquestionable  validity,  and, 
according   to   well-established   usage,    should    not   be 
abrogated  or  modified  except  with  the  consent  of  both 
parties  to  the  contract.     In  spite  of  this,  the  Britishl! 
government  had  been  confronted  by  a  proposal  fromij 
the  American  Senate — without  any  previous  attempt  to  i 
ascertain   British   views — for  the   abrogation   of   the  i 
treaty.     But  the  second  and  third  amendments  were  \ 
even    more    objectionable.      The    second,    giving   the  ' 
United  States  control  of  the  canal  in  time  of  war,  was  a 
distinct  departure  from  the  principle  hitherto  acceptable 
to  both  governments.     The  change  proposed  by  the 
United  States  would  presumably  permit  warlike  acts, 
on  the  part  of  that  government,  in  or  near  the  canal — 
acts   clearly   inconsistent   with   the   neutral   character 
which  it  had  always  been  sought  to  give  the  canal,  and 

*  London  Morning  Post,  Dec.  5,  14,  1900;  London  Daily  News,  Jan.  17, 
1901;  London  Times,  Jan.  16,  18,  1901. 

*  London  Times,  Dec.  24,  1900. 

21 


3o6     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

which  would  deny  its  free  use  to  the  commerce  and 
navies  of  the  world.  Such  an  arrangement  would 
strike  at  the  very  root  of  the  general  principle  of  neu- 
tralization upon  which  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  was 
based.  But  the  import  of  the  second  amendment  was 
peculiarly  emphasized  when  considered  in  connection 
with  the  third.  If  the  adherence  of  the  powers  were 
given,  the  neutrality  of  the  canal  would  be  secured ; 
without  that  adherence,  it  would  depend  only  upon  the 
guarantee  of  the  two  contracting  parties.  The  last 
amendment,  however,  not  only  removed  all  prospect  of 
the  wider  guarantee,  but  also  placed  the  British  govern- 
ment in  a  position  of  marked  disadvantage,  compared 
with  the  other  powers,  which  would  not  be  subject  to 
the  self-denying  ordinance  which  Great  Britain  was 
desired  to  accept." 

In  view  of  these  facts,  the  British  government  could 
not  accept  the  amended  convention,  and,  under  exist- 
ing circumstances,  preferred  to  retain  the  Clayton- 
Bulwer  treaty.  The  British  government,  Lansdowne 
concluded,  had  shown  an  earnest  desire  to  meet  the 
views  of  the  United  States,  and  would  have  been  ready 
to  consider  in  a  friendly  spirit  any  amendments — not 
inconsistent  with  the  principles  accepted  by  both  gov- 
ernments— which  the  United  States  might  have  desired 
to  propose ;  and  it  would  sincerely  regret  a  failure  to 
come  to  a  friendly  understanding  in  regard  to  this 
important  subject." 

The  British  refusal  to  accept  the  amended  treaty 
immeiiiately  produced  a  Senate  resolution  for  the  abro- 

'^'^  Pari.  Paters,   1901,   [Cd.  438],  "Correspondence  respecting  the  Con- 
vention sigiieil  at  Washington  .  .  .  ",  etc.,  5-7. 
"  Ibid..  7. 


THE  NEW  CANAL  TREATIES  307 

gation  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  convention."  Hay.  how- 
ever, promptly  proceeded  to  form  a  new  draft,  which, 
on  April  25,  1901,  Pauncefote  transmitted  to  Lans- 
downe."  This  draft  was  similar  to  the  former  treaty 
as  amended  by  the  Senate  in  that  by  separate  article  it 
declared  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  to  be  superseded 
and  made  no  provision  for  inviting  other  powers  to 
adhere  to  the  stipulations  agreed  upon;  but  the  rules 
for  the  regulation  of  the  canal  were  modified  with  the 
aim  of  meeting  British  objections  and  yet  preserving 
the  principle  contended  for  by  the  United  States.  From 
the  first  rule  were  omitted  the  words,  "  in  time  of  war 
as  in  time  of  peace  " ;  rule  seven  prohibiting  the  fortifi- 
cation of  the  canal  by  the  United  States  was  omitted, 
but  to  rule  two  was  added  the  reservation :  "  The 
United  States,  however,  shall  be  at  liberty  to  maintain 
such  military  police  along  the  canal  as  may  be  necessary 
to  protect  it  against  lawlessness  and  disorder  "  ;  finally, 
the  clause  added  to  rule  five  in  the  former  draft  was 
entirely  omitted." 

The  changes  made  by  Hay  rendered  the  arrangement 
more  acceptable  to  the  British  government,  but  certain 
further  modifications  were  proposed  by  Lansdowne.  In 
order  to  preserve  the  "  general  principle  "  stipulated 
for  in  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty,  a  new  article  was 
added  reaffirming  this  general  principle  and  asserting 
that  the  rules  governing  the  use  of  the  canal  should  as 
far  as  applicable  control  all  interoceanic  communica- 
tions across  the  isthmus  connecting  North  and  South 

"  Cong.  Record,  XXXV,  8,  13-22,  23-28. 

'^^  Pari.  Papers,  1902,  [Cd.  905],  "Correspondence  respecting  the 
Treaty  signed  at  Washington  relative  to  the  Establishment  of  a  Communi- 
cation by  Ship- Canal  ",  i. 

^^Ibid..  1-2. 


3o8     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

America ;  and  that  no  change  of  territorial  sovereignty 
or  other  change  of  circumstances  should  affect  such 
general  principle  or  the  obligations  of  the  contracting 
parties  under  the  treaty.  The  first  rule  for  regulating 
the  use  of  the  canal  was  so  modified  as  to  admit  to  it 
only  the  vessels  of  those  nations  which  should  agree  to 
observe  the  rules  above  described ;  and  to  the  same 
rule  was  appended  the  stipulation  that  the  conditions 
and  charges  in  connection  with  the  use  of  the  canal 
should  be  just  and  equitable." 

The  American  government  objected  to  the  first 
change  mentioned.  This,  it  claimed,  repeated  what  was 
already  stated  in  the  preamble,  and  seemed  to  give  a 
wider  application  to  article  eight  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer 
treaty  than  was  originally  intended.  Instead  of  the 
article  added  by  the  British  government,  Hay  suggested 
a  simple  statement  providing  that  no  change  of  terri- 
torial sovereignty  or  of  the  international  relations  of  the 
country  or  countries  traversed  by  the  canal  should  affect 
the  general  principle  of  neutralization,  or  the  obligation 
of  the  contracting  parties.  The  second  change  was  also 
objected  to,  because  of  the  strong  American  aversion  to 
inviting  other  powers  to  become  contracting  parties  to 
the  canal  treaty ;  in  its  place  were  proposed  the  words, 
"  the  canal  shall  be  free  and  open  to  the  vessels  of 
commerce  and  of  war  of  all  nations  observing  these 
Rules  "." 

These  modifications  were  accepted  by  the  British 
government,  which  suggested  a  slight  further  alteration 
in  the  wording  of  the  preamble  and  of  the  first  article, 

'^  Pari.  Papers,  1902  [Cd.  905],  "  Correspomlcnce  respecting  the  Treaty 
signed  at  Washington  relative  to  the  Establishment  of  a  Communication 
by  Ship-Canal  ",  2-7. 

'«  Ibid.,  7-8. 


THE  NEW  CANAL  TREATIES  309 

in  order  to  make  it  perfectly  clear  that  the  treaty  was 
meant  to  apply  to  all  other  canals  across  the  American 
isthmus  as  well  as  that  through  Nicaragua."  These 
changes  were  in  turn  accepted  by  the  American  govern- 
ment, and  the  treaty  was  signed  on  November  18, 
1901,"  by  Hay  and  Pauncefote.  The  next  month  it 
passed  the  Senate  by  a  vote  of  seventy -two  to  six,"  and 
ratifications  were  exchanged  between  the  two  govern- 
ments in  the  following  February.^" 

In  view  of  the  modifications  which  Great  Britain  had 
permitted  in  the  rules  providing  for  the  neutralization 
of  the  canal,  it  is  difficult  to  see  how  neutralization  was 
guaranteed  in  the  case  of  war  between  the  United 
States  and  any  other  power."  The  new  treaty,  however, 
met  the  approval  of  both  nations.  As  Great  Britain 
seemed  to  think  her  interests  secured  by  this  treaty, 
she  had  no  objection  to  giving  up  some  of  the  earlier 
measures  for  which  she  had  contended,  or  to  setting 
aside  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty,  which  both  countries 
acknowledged  to  be  outgrown."  Moreover,  the  British 
felt  that  the  right  to  protect  and  control  the  canal  was 
only  a  reasonable  demand,  considering  that  the  whole 
cost  of  construction  was  to  be  borne  by  the  American 
nation.^  In  fact,  the  satisfactory  completion  of  the 
treaty  was  regarded  as  the  conclusion  of  a  long  period 

"Ibid.,  8-9.  ^^  Ibid.,  lo-ii.  "Ibid.,   11. 

''Ibid.,  [Cd.  1007],  "Treaty  between  the  United  Kingdom  and  the 
United  States  of  America  for  the  Establishment  of  a  Ship-Canal  ",  i. 
/"^  ^  For  a  discussion  of  the  neutralization  provisions  of  the  treaty,  see 
I  Latane,  "  Neutralization  Features  of  the  Hay-Pauncefote  Treaty  ",  in 
I  Am.  Hist.  Assn.,  Antiua!  Report,  1902,  I,  289-303;  also  Woolsey,  "Suez 
I  and  Pajiagia — a  Parallel  ",  pp.  305-312  of  the  same  volume. 

^London  Daily  News,  Nov.  18,  Dec.  17,  1901;  London  Times,  Nov.  19, 

19"'- 

^  Pari.  Papers,  1902,  [Cd.  905],  "  Correspondence  respecting  the  Treaty 
signed  at  Washington  .  .  .  ",  etc.,  4. 


310     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

of  controversy  and  misunderstanding,  and  the  opening 
of  a  new  era  of  more  friendly  feeling  between  the  two 
overnments.^ 

Even  before  the  ratification  of  the  Hay-Pauncefote 
treaty  the  American  government  had  taken  steps 
towards  the  construction  of  a  canal.  In  1899  it 
appointed  a  commission  which  was  instructed  to  exam- 
ine into  all  practicable  routes.  The  following  year  the 
commission  reported  in  favor  of  the  Nicaragua  route, 
as  the  French  company  which  had  the  franchise  for  the 
Panama  route  seemed  unwilling  to  sell  all  of  its  rights 
to  the  American  government.**  This  report,  however, 
led  the  French  company  to  change  its  attitude,  and  in 
1902  it  offered  to  sell  out  to  the  United  States  for  forty 
million  dollars.  In  consequence  of  the  offer,  the  canal 
commission  altered  its  decision  and  advised  the  adop- 
tion of  the  Panama  route."*  On  June  28,  1902,  the 
President  was  authorized  to  purchase  the  French  com- 
pany's property,  and  to  obtain  from  Colombia  the  con- 
trol of  the  territory  traversed  by  the  canal  route.  If 
reasonable  terms  could  not  be  obtained  from  the  com- 
pany or  from  Colombia,  the  President  was  empowered 
to  form  a  canal  treaty  with  Nicaragua  and  Costa  Rica."" 
Negotiations  with  Colombia  followed,  and  the  Hay- 
Herran  treaty  of  January,  1903,  was  the  result ;  but 
the  Colombian  Senate  refused  to  ratify  the  agreement," 
and  for  a  time  it  seemed  as  though  the  United  States 

^*  London   Times,   Dec.    18,   1901. 

="  Lindsay,  Panama  and  the  Canal  Today,  88;  Johnson,  Four  Cen- 
turies of  the  Panama  Canal.    116,    120-121;   Edw.nrds,  Panama.  464. 

*•  Johnson,   op.   cit.,    121-126;    Kdwards,    Panama.    464-465. 

^  Lindsay,  Panama  and  the  Canal  Today,  89-90;  Johnson,  op.  cit., 
126-128. 

'»  Lindsay,  Panama  and  the  Canal  Today,  90-9';  Johnson,  op.  cit..  130- 
149;  Edwards,  Panama,  465-467. 


THE  NEW  CANAL  TREATIES  311 

would  again  turn  to  the  Nicaraguan  route.  However, 
a  revolution  which  the  United  States  was  accused  of 
fomenting,^  soon  took  place  in  Panama,  and  that  prov- 
ince declared  its  independence  of  Colombia,  in  Novem- 
ber, I903>  and  established  itself  as  a  separate  republic.'" 
A  speedy  recognition  of  the  new  government  by  the 
United  States  followed,  and  within  a  month  a  new 
canal  treaty,  which  was  promptly  ratified,  was  formed 
between  the  United  States  and  Panama.")  Further 
investigation  led  to  a  decision  in  favor  of  a  lock  canal," 
and  in  1907  the  American  government  itself  determined 
to  undertake  the  construction.  The  commission,  with 
Major  G.  W.  Goethals  at  its  head,  was  put  in  control  of 
the  enterprise,  and  work  was  promptly  begun." 

By  19 1 2  it  was  evident  that  the  canal  would  soon  be 
ready  for  use ;  therefore  it  was  necessary  that  Congress 
pass  measures  for  its  regulation.  The  Panama  Canal 
bill,  originating  in  the  House,  was  framed  for  this  pur- 
pose. Among  other  provisions  it  fixed  the  tolls  to  be 
paid  by  vessels  passing  through  the  canal,  but  exempted 
all  American  vessels  from  such  payment."'  The  bill 
went  to  the  Senate  and  while  it  was  before  that  body, 

"  Lindsay,  Panama  and  the  Canal  Today,  92-93.  For  the  part  played 
by  the  United  States  in  this  connection,  see  the  source  collections.  The 
Panama  Canal  Question,  and  "I  Took  the  Isthmus  " ,  also  U.  S.  Docs., 
ser.  no.  4587,  doc.  51;  ser.  no.  4588,  doc.  95. 

^Edwards,  Panama,  467-476;  Arias,  Panama  Canal,  64-68. 

'*  5en.  Doc.  no.  456,  63  Cong.,  2  sess.,  pp.  74-84.  In  consequence  of 
the  attitude  of  the  United  States,  much  bitterness  has  been  displayed  by 
Colombia  towards  that  country.  This  seems  likely  to  be  wiped  out  by  a 
treaty,  now  ready  for  the  ratification  of  the  American  Senate,  by  which 
the  American  government  agrees  to  pay  Colombia  twenty-five  million 
dollars  for  the  loss  of  Panama  and  the  transfer  of  the  canal  zone  to  the 
United  States.     Cong.  Record,  LI,  12676,  passim;  LII,  403-405. 

"Edwards,  Panama,  488-490;  Johnson,  Four  Centuries  of  the  Panama 
Canal,  316-325. 

^Edwards,  Panama,  505-510. 

^^  New  International  Year  Book,  1912,  p.  495. 


312     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

a  protest  was  presented  by  the  British  government 
against  such  exemption  in  favor  of  the  United  States, 
on  the  ground  that  it  was  a  violation  of  the  Hay- 
Pauncefote  treaty/" 

The  canal  bill  was  the  subject  of  a  long,  sharp  debate 
in  the  Senate,'"  and  finally  the  exemption  clause  was  so 
modified  as  to  include  only  American  vessels  engaged  in 
coastwise  trade.  In  this  form  the  bill  was  passed  by 
the  Senate  on  August  9  and  was  promptly  signed  by 
President  Taft."  On  November  13  the  President 
issued  a  proclamation  fixing  the  rates  of  tolls  to  be  paid 
by  vessels  using  the  Panama  Canal.^  On  the  following 
day  the  British  foreign  secretary  instructed  Bryce,  the 
British  ambassador  at  Washington,  to  present  to  the 
American  government  a  protest  against  the  canal  legis- 
lation. This  protest,  which  was  presented  December  9, 
was  an  amplification  of  that  of  the  preceding  July. 
"  The  intention  of  the  Hay-Pauncefote  treaty  ",  the 
protest  stated,  "  was  that  the  United  States  was  to 
recover  the  right  to  construct  the  transisthmian  canal 
upon  the  terms  that  when  constructed  the  canal  was  to 
be  open  to  British  and  United  States  ships  on  equal 
terms."  If  any  American  vessel  were  permitted  to  pass 
through  the  canal  toll  free,  British  vessels  would  be 
forced  to  bear  more  than  an  equal  share  of  the  cost  and 
current  expenses  of  the  canal.  The  British  govern- 
ment, the  communication  intimated,  expected  the 
United  States  either  to  repeal  the  objectionable  part 

"Sen.  Doc.  no.  ii,  63  Cong.,  1  sess.,  pp.  lo-ii. 

''Cong.  Record,  XLVIII,  1818-1825,  9168-9189,  9221-9227,  9231-9239, 
9278-9284,  9359-9365. 

*''  New  International  Year  Book.  1912,  p.  495. 
'"Sen.  Doc.  no.   11,  63  Cong.,  i  scss.,  pp.  lo-ii. 


THE  NEW  CANAL  TREATIES  313 

of  the  canal  act  or  to  submit  the  matter  to  arbitra- 
tion." 

The  reply  of  the  American  government  was  evasive 
and  its  arguments  unsound.  The  protest  of  the  British 
government^  it  implied,  was  premature,  as  the  canal  was 
not  yet  complete  and  no  unfair  tolls  had  yet  been  paid 
by  Great  Britain ;  consequently,  there  was  nothing  to 
arbitrate.  After  all,  the  remission  of  tolls  to  American 
ships  was  only  a  subsidy  for  which  America  had  to  pay, 
and  not  Great  Britain.  The  protest  of  the  British,  the 
reply  intimated,  was  really  an  attempt  to  read  into  the 
Hay-Pauncefote  treaty  a  surrender  by  the  American 
government  of  its  right  to  regulate  its  own  commerce. 
The  letter  concluded,  however,  with  an  expression  of 
willingness  to  submit  the  matter  to  arbitration.*" 

But  it  early  became  evident  that  the  American 
government  by  no  means  had  the  undivided  support  of 
the  nation.  Expressions  of  disapproval  came  from  all 
over  the  country,  on  the  ground  that  such  discrimina- 
tion in  favor  of  the  United  States  was  inexpedient  as 
well  as  a  violation  of  treaty  obligations."    In  the  face 

^  Ibid.,  pp.  11-19.  The  protest  also  called  attention  to  the  fact  that 
vessels  of  Panama  had  been  exempted  from  the  payment  of  tolls  by  the 
canal  treaty  with  Panama  in  1903,  and  intimated  that  discretion  seemed 
to  be  given  the  President  to  discriminate,  in  fixing  the  tolls,  in  favor  of 
American  vessels  in  general  as  against  foreign  vessels.     Ibid.,  pp.  16,  18. 

^  Ibid.,  pp.  3-10.  The  toll  controversy  was  probably  influential  in 
rousing  a  fear  in  the  United  States  that  Great  Britain  or  some  other 
foreign  power,  dissatisfied  with  American  regulation  of  the  Panama  Canal, 
might  determine  to  construct  a  rival  route.  In  an  effort  to  guard  against 
this,  a  treaty,  now  ready  for  ratification  by  the  Senate,  was  formed  with 
Nicaragua.  This  treaty  secures  to  the  United  States  a  perpetual  and 
exclusive  right  of  way  across  Nicaragua  for  an  interoceanic  canal,  and 
also  establishes  a  virtual  American  protectorate  over  the  Nicaraguan 
republic.     Nation,  XCVII,  92-93;  Outlook,  CVI,  20-21. 

■"  The  "  Coastwise  Exemption  " :  the  Nation  Against  It;  Cong,  Record, 
XLIX,  1818-1825;  Root,  "  Panama  Canal  Tolls  ",  in  World  Peace  Founda- 
tion Pamphlet  Series,  III,  no.  3;  Nation,  XCVI,  26;  Outlook,  CIII,  249- 
253;  Independent,  LXXIV,  224-226;  Century  Magazine,  LXXXV,  630- 
631;  Literary  Digest,  XLV,  1165-1166;  LXVT,  220. 


314     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

of  opposition  from  home  and  protest  and  criticism  from 
abroad  it  seemed  unlikely  that  the  toll  legislation  could 
long  stand.  A  definite  attitude  of  disapprobation  on  the 
part  of  President  Wilson  shortly  after  his  accession  to 
office  hinted  at  an  early  reversal  of  government  policy 
regarding  the  question;  and  on  March  5,  1914,  in  an 
address  delivered  at  a  joint  session  of  the  houses  of 
Congress  the  President  asked  for  the  repeal  of  the 
Panama  Canal  Act,  on  the  ground  that  exemption  of 
American  vessels  from  the  payment  of  tolls  constituted 
a  mistaken  economic  policy  and  was  a  "  plain  contra- 
vention of  the  treaty  with  Great  Britain  "."  On  the  day 
following,  a  bill  for  repealing  the  exemption  clause  of 
the  canal  act  was  introduced  into  the  House,  and  it  was 
passed  by  the  House  a  few  weeks  later.  In  the  Senate 
the  measure  was  hotly  debated,  but  it  was  finally  passed 
on  June  ii,  with  an  amendment  attached.  The  amend- 
ment provided  that  the  repeal  of  the  exemption  clause 
should  not  be  regarded  as  a  relinquishment  of  any  right 
which  the  United  States  might  have  under  the  Hay- 
Pauncefote  treaty  or  the  treaty  with  Panama,  or  other- 
wise, to  discriminate  in  favor  of  American  vessels  by 
exempting  them  from  the  payment  of  tolls ;  or  as 
impairing  any  right  of  the  United  States  under  those 
treaties,  or  otherwise,  with  respect  to  the  sovereignty 
over  or  the  control  of  the  canal."  The  House  promptly 
concurred  in  the  Senate  amendment,  and  President 
Wilson  signed  the  repeal  bill  on  June  15.**  Thus  was 
removed  the  latest  cause  for  friction  between  England 
and  the  United  States  with  relation  to  the  Central 
American  isthmus. 

"House  Doc,  no.  813,  63  Cong.,  2  sess. 
*' Cong.  Record.  LI,  5895-11214,  t>assim. 
**  Nation.  XCVIII,  711.  712. 


t/0  ('■ 


THE  NEW  CANAL  TREATIES  .31S 

The  abrogation  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  by  the 
Hay-Pauncefote  agreement  removed  the  former  re- 
straint upon  British  and  American  relations  in  connec- 
tion with  Central  America.  Upon  Great  Britain  this 
change  had  merely  a  negative  influence ;  she  reduced 
her  garrisons  in  the  West  I;idi£S.and  withdrew  her  war 
vessels,  tjius  practically  recogniziiig'-American  suprem- 
acy  in  the  Gulf  region,"'  But  with  the  United  States  f^*^-*^ 
the  case  was  quite  different.  The  large  investment  of 
American  capital  in  Central  America  and  the  proximity 
of  the  region  to  the  Panama  Canal  Zone  was  bound 
greatly  to  increase  American  interest  in  the  Central 
American  states,  and  to  cause  the  United  States  govern- 
ment to  assume  a  decided  policy  towards  them. 

In  consequence,  a  system  of  interference  in  Central 
American  matters,  resembling  tutelage,  developed. 
Repeatedly  the  United  States  stepped  forward  to  pre- 
vent the  states  from  meddling  in  one  another's  affairs, 
and  to  prevent  or  end  war  between  them.^  Nicaragua, 
because  of  her  disorganized  condition,  has  received  the 
largest  share  of  attention.  In  December,  1907,  under 
the  auspices  of  the  United  States  and  Mexico,  a  con- 
vention of  Central  American  delegates  met  at  Washing- 
ton and  formed  a  treaty  providing  for  the  arbitration 
of  all  international  differences."  However,  Zelaya, 
the  Nicaraguan  dictator,  refused  to  abide  by  the 
arrangement,  and  while  the  convention  was  still  sitting 
he  planned  an  invasion  of  Salvador.^  The  American 
government  prevented  the  execution  of  the  plan,"  but 

•"  CooHdge,  The  United  States  as  a  World  Power,  276. 
■"  Palmer,  Central  America  and  its  Problems,  291-292,  294-295;  Calderon, 
Latin  America:  its  Rise  and  Progress,  292. 

■*''  Palmer,  Central  America  and  its  Problems,  292-293,  307-330. 
•*'  Ibid.,  294-295.  **  Ibid.,  295. 


<ee- 


3i6     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

shortly  afterwards  a  revolt,  aided  by  American  citi- 
zens, was  started  against  Zelaya's  rule.  Two  American 
captives  from  the  revolutionary  army  were  shot  at  the 
order  of  the  dictator.  This  act,  and  Nicaragua's  failure 
to  observe  the  arbitration  convention,  caused  the  sus- 
pension of  diplomatic  relations  between  her  and  the 
United  States.  In  consequence,  Zelaya,  realizing  that 
his  position  was  hopeless,  fled  from  the  country." 
Anarchy  in  Nicaragua  followed,  and  the  United  States 
again  interfered,  for  the  purpose  of  promoting  a  free 
general  presidential  election  and  the  establishment  of  a 
stable  government." 

The  Nicaraguans,  however,  failed  to  follow  the  plans 
of  the  American  government,  and  confusion  and  dis- 
order increased  to  such  an  extent  that  Nicaragua  finally 
appealed  to  the  United  States  for  aid.  In  response,  the 
American  government  appointed  Thomas  C.  Dawson, 
who  had  had  much  diplomatic  experience  with  the 
Latin-American  republics,  for  the  purpose  of  aiding  the 
disorganized  state  to  establish  itself  politically  and 
economically  on  a  sounder  basis.  Under  Dawson's 
influence  the  political  leaders  pledged  themselves  to 
agree  upon  a  presidential  candidate  in  191 3."  Dawson's 
financial  plans  were  similar  to  those  which  he  had 
recently  put  into  execution  in  San  Domingo ; "  Nica- 
ragua's debt  was  to  be  taken  over  by  New  York  bankers 
and  her  customs  houses  were  to  be  put  under  American 
protection."*    This  arrangement  was  approved  by  the 

•'  Palmer,  Central  America  and  its  Problems.  296,  3,10-335. 

'^  Hale,  "With  the  Knox  Mission  to  Central  .'\merica ",  in  H'orld's 
Work,  XXIV,  184;  Ilale,  "Our  Diniger  in  Central  America",  ibid., 
446. 

^''American  Rei'icu'  of  Reviews,  XLVI,  573. 

'•■'Ibid.;  llale,  "With  the  Knox  Mission  to  Central  America",  in 
World's  Work,  XXIV,  183-185. 

M/Wd.,  184. 


THE  NEW  CANAL  TREATIES  317 

Nicaragua!!  government,  but  the  American  Senate 
refused  to  ratify  the  treaty." 

The  actions  of  the  United  States  in  San  Domingo  and 
Panama,  however,  had  roused  general  suspicion  in 
Latin  America  against  American  designs.  In  Central 
America  this  suspicion  was  aggravated  by  constant 
interference  by  the  Washington  authorities,  and  by  the 
Dawson  mission.  Annexation  to  the  United  States  was 
feared  and  a  strong  faction  opposing  all  American 
interference  had  developed."  In  order  to  allay  these 
fears,  Secretary  of  State  Knox  went  to  Central  America 
in  1912,  while  the  Dawson  treaty  was  still  before  the 
American  Senate.  The  aim  of  the  visit  was  to  explain 
that  the  United  States  wished  merely  to  establish  such 
conditions  of  peace  and  security  as  would  remove  all 
necessity  for  direct  intervention."  However,  aside 
from  revealing  the  full  extent  of  dislike  and  suspicion 
felt  by  the  Central  Americans  for  their  northern  neigh- 
bor, the  Knox  mission  appears  to  have  accomplished 
but  little.'' 

Following  the  Senate's  refusal  to  ratify  the  Dawson 
treaty,'"  war  broke  out  in  Nicaragua  between  the  par- 
tisans of  the  United  States  and  the  foes  of  American 
intervention.  American  naval  forces  took  part  in  the 
struggle  and  defended  the  capital  against  the  anti- 

^  Ibid.;  Outhok,  CI,  845-846. 

"  Hale,  "  With  the  Knox  Mission  to  Central  America  ",  in  World's 
Work,  XXIV,  184,  190;  Current  Literature,  LIII,  377. 

"  Conant,  "  Our  Mission  in  Nicaragua  ",  in  A^.  Am.  Rev.,  CXCVI,  63; 
Hale,  "  With  the  Knox  Mission  to  Central  America  ",  in  World's  Work, 
XXIV,  179-180. 

'^  Ibid.,  182,  186,  190-193;  Literary  Digest,  XLV,  286. 

"  Though  the  treaty  failed,  Nicaragua  voluntarily  placed  the  administra- 
tion of  her  customs  in  the  hands  of  an  American,  to  decided  advantage, 
and  obtained  a  loan  of  New  York  bankers,  so  she  was  soon  on  a  better 
basis  financially.     Outlook,  CVI,  21-22. 


3i8     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

American  party,  which  was  led  by  ]\Iena,  the  former 
secretary    of    war.™     During    this    disturbance,     in 
♦■'wV     f      September,  1912,  a  note  of  warning  was  issued  from 
^  ^  ^^Q        Washington,  setting  forth  the  policy  of  the  Taft  admin- 
y^O ^         istration  towards  Central  America.    Under  the  Wash- 
^^  ""^      xington  convention  of  1907,  the  note  declared,  the  United 
\   *"/■  /t  OStates  had  a  "  moral  mandate  "  to  exert  its  influence 
K.'Vx^        for  preserving  peace  in  Central  America.    Its  aim  was 
XK  *^  '        to  foster  true  constitutional  government  and  free  elec- 
tions, and  to  this  end  it  would  support  established 
governments  against  revolutions  based  upon  the  selfish 
designs  of  would-be  despots.    Force  would  be  used,  if 
necessary,  to  maintain  free  communication  with  Ameri- 
can legations,  and  to  protect  them.*^    The  announcement 
of  the  moral  mandate  was  an  exposition  of  what  was 
denounced  as  "  dollar  diplomacy  "  by  opponents  of  the 
Taft  administration.     These  claimed  that  it  was  the 
policy  of  the  administration  to  support  Central  Ameri- 
can leaders  favorable  to  the  United  States  government 
or  friendly  to  American  business  interests  in  Central 
America.^    The  situation  formed  an  interesting  con- 
trast to  that  existing  in  Central  America  in  1848  andl 
1849.    -^t  that  time  Great  Britain  was  practicing  "  dol- 
lar diplomacy  ",°* 

As  the  Panama  Canal  approached  completion  the 
constant  confusion  in  Central  America  gave  rise  to 
serious  questions  regarding  future  relations  between 
the  United  States  and  the  Central  American  Republics, 
and  in  this  connection  the  Monroe  doctrine  became  the 

"'^Current  Literature.  LIII,  376;  Literary  Digest,  XLV,  286. 

''^Outlook,  CII,  :so-i5i;  Literary  Digest,  XLV,  505. 

'*  Palmer,  Central  America  and  its  Problems,  304-305;  N.  Am.  Rev., 
CXCVII,  s8-6i;  Current  Literature,  I-III,  376;  Literary  Digest.  XLV, 
505-506. 

"^  See  above,  pp.  55  IT.    Also  see  above,  p.  313,  note  40. 


THE  NEW  CANAL  TREATIES  319 

subject  of  considerable  discussion  and  criticism,  in  the 
United  States  as  well  as  in  Europe  and  Latin  America." 
Many  Americans  felt  that  the  doctrine  had  outlived  its 
usefulness,  for  while  it  no  longer  aided  Latin  America, 
it  caused  the  United  States  to  be  hated  and  feared  by 
her  neighbors  to  the  south. 

Within  the  preceding  few  months,  however,  a  decided 
reaction  has  developed  in  favor  of  a  "  new  Monroe 
doctrine  ".  President  Wilson  is  a  strong  exponent  of 
this  doctrine,  which  carries  with  it  a  less  selfish  and 
more  helpful  Latin-American  policy  than  that  which 
has  existed  during  the  past  decade."  Coincident  with 
this  change  of  attitude  has  developed  the  idea  that  the 
rapid  progress  of  Argentina,  Brazil,  and  Chile,  and  the 
degree  of  stability  and  culture  displayed  by  these  states, 
entitle  them  to  a  voice  in  the  management  of  the  affairs 
of  the  Western  World.  Consequently,  the  conviction 
is  growing  that  the  United  States  should  invite  these 
republics  to  become  partners  with  her  in  supporting  the 
Monroe  doctrine  and  in  promoting  peace  and  progress 
in  the  weaker  parts  of  Latin  America.  The  American 
acceptance  of  mediation  offered  by  representatives  of 
the  "  A.  B.  C.  republics  "  in  the  difficulty  with  Mexico 
in  the  spring  of  1914  was  in  conformity  with  the  new 
attitude  of  the  United  States  towards  her  southern 
neighbors.    And  this  mediation  not  only  relieved  the 

"  Calderon,  Latin  America:  its  Rise  and  Progress,  298-312;  Palmer, 
Central  America  and  its  Problems,  284-2S7;  Crichfield,  Rise  and  Progress 
of  the  South-American  Republics,  II,  632-644;  Winter,  Guatemala  and 
her  People  of  Today,  226-227;  Bingham,  The  Monroe  Doctrine:  an 
Obsolete  Shibboleth;  Hale,  "  Our  Danger  in  Central  America  ",  in 
World's  Work,  XXIV,  443-452;  Literary  Digest.  XLIV,  583,  978-979, 
1151-1152;   XLV,  412,   1117-1118. 

**  Brown,  "A  New  Era  of  Good  Feeling",  in  Atlantic,  CXV,  99-111; 
Current  Opinion,  LIV,  3-5. 


320     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

strained  situation  between  the  United  States  and  Mex- 
ico, but  it  also  established  a  new  precedent  by  recogniz- 
ing these  powers  as  equals  of  the  United  States ;  and 
it  virtually  admitted  that  "  differences  which  gravely 
menace  the  relations  of  individual  American  states  are 
matters  of  concern  to  all  the  American  nations  ",*"  The 
recent  appointment,  by  the  Pan-American  Union,  of  a 
commisssion  to  consider  the  problems  of  international 
law  which  have  risen  in  consequence  of  the  great  war 
in  Europe  is  another  noteworthy  step  in  the  same  direc- 
tion." If  this  policy  is  continued,  genuine  Pan-Ameri- 
can friendship  and  understanding  are  bound  to  result, 
and  solidarity  upon  questions  of  Western  international 
interest.  The  Central  American  states,  with  the  remain- 
der of  Latin  America,  will  participate  in  the  benefits 
resulting  from  the  change. 

*•  Moore,  "  Is  there  a  Latin  America?  ",  in  Independent,  LXXXI,  91-93- 
•'  Nation,  XCIX,  702. 


CHAPTER  XL 

General  Resume. 

In  the  preceding  chapters  has  been  traced  a  century 
of  British-American  diplomatic  relations  regarding  the 
Central  American  isthmus,  with  the  purpose  of  showing 
the  changes  in  attitude  which  have  taken  place  between 
the  two  governments  and  also  of  determining  the 
causes  producing  these  changes.  This  has  necessitated 
— in  addition  to  a  consideration  of  the  main  question — 
a  study  of  the  relations  of  the  Central  American  states 
to  each  other,  as  well  as  notice  of  the  attitude  of  the 
British  and  American  governments  regarding  other 
matters  whenever  an  influence  upon  the  question  under 
consideration  was  evident  or  probable. 

For  more  than  a  century  and  a  half  previous  to  the 
formation  of  the  American  Union,  Great  Britain  en- 
croached upon  Central  America ;  and  for  more  than 
four  decades  after  the  establishment  of  the  United 
States,  the  aggressions  continued  in  a  fluctuating  man- 
ner without  rousing  any  feeling  between  the  two 
countries.  But  British  suspicions  of  American  opposi- 
tion were  roused  by  the  publication  of  the  Monroe 
doctrine.  Consequently,  for  the  following  twenty 
years,  through  a  desire  to  avoid  trouble  with  the  United 
States,  as  well  as  because  of  a  temporary  waning  of 
governmental  interest  in  Central  America,  Canning's 
anti-American  policy  was  neglected  ;  British  encroach- 
ments were  slow  and  were  initiated  largely  by  British 
agents  in  the  region.  With  the  rapid  movement  of  the 
22  321 


322    ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

United  States  to  the  southwest,  however — insuring  the 
acquisition  of  CaHfornia  as  well  as  other  Mexican  terri- 
tory— the  British  government  became  fearful  that  the 
Americans  meant  to  seize  the  isthmus,  and,  by  monopo- 
lizing the  transisthmian  routes,  to  strike  a  blow  at 
British  commerce.  As  a  result,  under  governmental 
direction,  British  interest  in  Central  America  now 
greatly  increased.  The  weakness  and  subsequent  dis- 
solution of  the  Central  American  republic,  produced 
partly  by  the  intrigues  of  the  British  agents,  particu- 
larly favored  foreign  interference. 

When  California  became  an  American  possession, 
the  interest  of  the  United  States  in  Central  America 
was  for  the  first  time  thoroughly  roused.  This  was 
largely  because  the  Nicaraguan  isthmus  was  then  be- 
lieved to  supply  the  most  feasible  route  to  the  Pacific 
coast.  Attention  thus  being  directed  to  Central  Amer- 
ica, the  nation  came  to  realize  the  predominance  of 
British  influence  there,  and  promptly  showed  resent- 
ment at  finding  the  eastern  terminus  of  the  San  Juan 
route  across  Nicaragua  controlled  by  the  British  in  the 
name  of  the  Mosquitos.  Determination  to  eliminate 
British  control  from  Central  America  was  influential 
in  producing  a  more  aggressive  version  of  the  Monroe 
doctrine  by  President  Polk ;  but  plans  to  assert  Amer- 
ica's leading  position  on  the  isthmus,  delayed  by  the 
Mexican  War,  were  as  yet  unrealized  at  the  close  of  the 
Polk  administration.  The  discovery  of  gold  in  Cali- 
fornia greatly  increased  American  demand  for  a  trans- 
isthmian  highway,  as  well  as  added  to  the  resentment  at 
apparent  British  intention  to  monopolize  the  best  route. 

This  situation  faced  the  new  Whig  administration 
and  led  it  to  take  definite  steps,  primarily  for  securing 


RESUME  323 

a  neutral  transit  route,  but  also  with  the  aim  of  forcing 
the  British  to  withdraw  from  Central  America.  With 
this  in  view,  negotiations  were  begun  early  in  1849,  but 
under  unusual  difficulties.  Though  at  the  time  neither 
nation  desired  to  monopolize  the  Nicaragua  route,  each 
suspected  the  other  of  such  a  purpose.  After  such  sus- 
picions were  partially  removed,  there  remained  the 
serious  difference  of  opinion  concerning  the  British 
protectorate  over  the  Mosquitos ;  but  since  feeling  in 
America  was  so  strong  as  to  threaten  a  hostile  outbreak 
between  the  two  nations,  it  was  decided  to  negotiate  for 
the  guarantee  of  neutrality  of  the  interoceanic  transit 
and  to  avoid  discussion  of  the  Mosquito  question,  on 
which  an  agreement  was  little  likely  to  be  reached.  The 
Clayton-Bulwer  treaty,  which  violated  the  spirit  of  the 
Monroe  doctrine,  was  the  result.  This  agreement  con- 
tained self-denying  clauses  with  reference  to  Central 
American  territory,  and  stipulations  intended  to  secure 
the  entire  neutrality  of  the  prospective  Nicaragua 
canal,  as  well  as  articles  for  extending  the  guarantee  to 
all  other  practicable  routes  across  the  American  isth- 
mus. But  as  Clayton  had  labored  to  secure  such  word- 
ing as  would  force  British  withdrawal  from  Central 
America  and  as  Bulwer  had  endeavored  to  preserve 
the  IVIosquito  protectorate,  the  language  of  the  treaty 
was  vague,  and  augured  future  trouble. 

Promptly  after  the  ratification  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer 
treaty,  the  British  government  began  negotiations  for 
adjusting  its  Central  American  relations  in  conformity 
with  the  new  treaty ;  but  the  disorganized  condition  of 
affairs  in  Central  America,  the  unwillingness  of  the 
British  to  make  sufficient  concessions,  and  the  lack  of 
interest  of  the  Fillmore  administration  in  securing  a 


324    ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

just  and  final  settlement,  all  tended  toward  delay,  and 
no  result  was  reached  after  two  years  of  effort. 

When  Pierce  became  president  a  more  aggressive 
American  policy  was  asserted,  since  the  Democrats 
were  more  favorable  than  the  Whigs  to  a  stiff  tone  in 
foreign  relations — especially  as  regarded  England. 
British  action  served  to  increase  this  attitude ;  shortly 
before  the  accession  of  Pierce,  the  Bay  Islands,  contrary 
to  treaty  engagements,  had  been  formed  into  a  British 
colony.  A  dispute  over  the  interpretation  of  the  Clay- 
ton-Bulwer  treaty  followed.  The  American  govern- 
ment declared  that  the  treaty  required  British  with- 
drawal from  the  Mosquito  protectorate,  the  Bay 
Islands,  and  the  Belize  territory  between  the  Sibun 
and  the  Sarstoon  rivers.  The  British  government  in 
reply  assumed  the  untenable  stand  that  the  treaty  was 
merely  prospective  in  its  operation  and  did  not  affect 
existing  British  possessions  in  Central  America. 

The  emphatic  presentation  of  these  conflicting  points 
of  view  produced  a  deadlock  in  Central  American  rela- 
tions lasting  for  more  than  a  year.  During  this  time 
the  American  government  displayed  an  active  deter- 
mination to  stand  upon  its  own  view  of  the  treaty,  and 
to  force  Great  Britain  to  recede  from  her  extreme  inter- 
pretation. 

In  the  autumn  of  1855  the  question  became  compli- 
cated with  the  recruiting  dispute ;  suspicion  increased 
on  both  sides,  and  the  situation  grew  more  serious. 
The  British  government,  however,  somewhat  relieved 
the  tension  early  in  1856  by  a  formal  offer  to  submit 
the  Central  American  controversy  to  arbitration.  But 
the  evident  determination  of  the  American  government 
to  dismiss  Crampton,  and  the  growth  of  suspicion  in 


RESUME  325 

both  countries  that  each  nation  was  interested  to  some 
degree  in  the  fihbustering  movements  in  their  relation 
to  the  Central  American  dispute  gave  a  bad  turn  to 
affairs,  so  that  by  the  last  of  May,  1856,  the  possibility 
of  war  was  freely  discussed  by  both  nations. 

But  the  British  government  had  no  intention  of  pro- 
voking war  with  the  United  States.  It  had  come  fully 
to  realize  how  unjustifiable  was  its  position  upon  the 
Central  American  question  and  was  convinced  by  the 
determined  attitude  of  the  United  States  that  an  attempt 
to  maintain  this  position  would  be  likely  to  end  in  open 
hostilities  between  the  two  nations.  The  British  gov- 
ernment knew,  moreover,  that  it  would  lack  the  support 
of  the  British  people  in  a  war  over  such  a  question. 
Finally,  Great  Britain,  government  and  people  alike, 
was  anxious  to  avoid  a  conflict  with  the  United  States, 
under  any  circumstances,  because  of  the  resulting  dam- 
age to  commerce  between  the  two  countries — especially 
commerce  in  raw  cotton  and  cotton  products.  Con- 
sequently, the  British  foreign  secretary  quickly  re- 
sponded to  the  firm  but  conciliatory  tone  assumed  by 
the  American  government  during  the  height  of  the 
crisis,  and  the  relations  of  the  two  countries  took  on  a 
more  friendly  appearance. 

In  a  spirit  of  good  understanding  negotiations  were 
resumed,  and  produced  the  Dallas-Clarendon  treaty. 
This  was  a  compromise  arrangement,  providing  for 
British  withdrawal  from  Mosquito  Shore  and  the  Bay 
Islands ;  but  by  it  the  United  States  acquiesced  in  the 
Sarstoon  as  the  southern  boundary  of  Belize.  The 
treaty  failed  of  ratification,  however,  largely  because 
an  earlier  treaty  made  between  Great  Britain  and  Hon- 


326     ANGLO-AMERCIAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

duras  for  the  transfer  of  the  Bay  Islands  was  rejected 
by  the  Honduran  Senate. 

After  the  failure  of  the  Dallas-Clarendon  treaty,  a 
strong  movement  towards  the  abrogation  of  the  Clay- 
ton-Bulwer  treaty  by  congressional  action  was  mani- 
fested in  the  United  States.  In  order  to  avert  this,  and 
consequent  hostile  relations  between  the  two  govern- 
ments. Great  Britain  determined  to  settle  the  question 
by  direct  negotiation  with  the  Central  American  states. 
The  American  government  was  notified  of  this  plan, 
and  in  order  further  to  allay  unfriendly  feeling  in  the 
United  States,  the  offer  of  arbitration  was  renewed. 
The  aim  of  the  mission  to  be  sent  to  Central  America, 
the  British  government  explained,  was  to  carry  out 
the  general  tenor  of  the  American  interpretation  of  the 
Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  as  reflected  in  the  Dallas-Claren- 
don arrangement.  President  Buchanan,  however,  was 
not  satisfied  with  such  an  adjustment;  he  showed  httle 
cordiality  towards  the  plan,  and  in  his  message  of  1857 
evinced  a  strong  inclination  towards  abrogation. 

This  attitude  on  the  part  of  the  American  govern- 
ment and  the  British  determination  not  to  take  any 
action  until  an  answer  had  been  received  to  the  offer  of 
arbitration  produced  a  deadlock  which  lasted  for  several 
weeks. 

]\Ieanwhile,  the  American  government  was  officially 
notified  by  Napier,  the  British  minister,  that  Great 
Britain  would  consent  to  an  unconditional  abrogation 
of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty,  which  would  mean  a 
return  to  the  status  quo,  Great  Britain  retaining  her 
former  possessions,  including  the  Bay  Islands.  This 
communication  was  influential  in  bringing  the  Ameri- 
can government  to  a  decision,  and  it  replied  by  reject- 


RESUME  327 

ing  arbitration  and  expressing  a  preference  for  direct 
settlement  by  a  special  British  commissioner.  There- 
fore, the  British  government  determined  that  Ouseley, 
the  British  commissioner,  who  had  lingered  at  Wash- 
ington pending  a  decision  on  the  part  of  the  American 
government,  should  proceed  immediately  to  Central 
America.  But  Ouseley's  original  instructions  were 
modified,  because  of  the  attitude  of  the  United  States, 
and  he  was  authorized  only  to  arrange  for  the  disposal 
of  the  Mosquito  protectorate,  of  which  Great  Britain 
had  for  some  time  been  anxious  to  free  herself. 

The  American  government,  when  it  realized  that 
Great  Britain  would  not  consent  to  abrogation  of  the 
Clayton-Bulwer  treaty,  in  addition  to  abandonment  of 
her  Central  American  claims  and  possessions,  soon 
assumed  a  more  cordial  manner  and  displayed  a  friendly 
interest  in  the  British  plan  of  settlement.  The  inclina- 
tion of  Congress,  however,  was  still  strongly  towards 
the  abrogation  of  the  treaty,  and  there  was  danger  that 
if  the  dispute  was  not  settled  before  December,  1859, 
Congress,  which  would  then  meet,  would  attempt  to  set 
aside  the  arrangement.  Consequently,  the  British  gov- 
ernment, in  order  to  expedite  matters,  appointed  Wyke, 
who  had  already  formed  a  treaty  with  Guatemala, 
defining  the  Belize  boundaries,  to  take  the  place  of 
Ouseley.  The  latter,  indeed,  had  conducted  his  mission 
in  an  unsatisfactory  manner  and  had  accomplished 
nothing  towards  the  settlement  of  the  Central  American 
question.  Wyke,  accordingly,  made  a  treaty  with  Hon- 
duras for  the  transfer  of  the  Bay  Islands  and  the 
sovereignty  over  the  Mosquitos  within  the  limits  of 
Honduras  to  that  republic ;  and  by  treaty  with  Nica- 
ragua he  transferred  to  her  Greytown  as  well  as  the 


328     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

remainder  of  the  Nicaraguan  part  of  the  Mosquito 
Shore.  The  arrangements  made  by  Wyke  were  de- 
clared by  President  Buchanan,  in  his  message  of 
December,  i860,  to  be  entirely  satisfactory. 

During  the  years  1856  to  i860  a  shifting  of  interests 
had  taken  place  in  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States  ; 
the  former  lost  her  territorial  interest  in  Central  Amer- 
ica and,  with  it,  her  jealousy  of  the  United  States ;  the 
latter,  on  the  other  hand,  had  become  convinced  that 
Central  America  must  eventually  be  hers — a  conviction 
which  probably  would  have  become  a  fact  had  not  the 
Civil  War  swept  aside  slavery. 

Shortly  after  the  close  of  the  war  the  United  States 
began  to  show  a  tendency — hinted  at  by  her  actions  in 
1856  and  1857 — to  regard  the  terms  of  the  Clayton- 
Bulwer  treaty  as  not  applying  to  the  Panama  route. 
This  tendency  became  an  open  declaration  with  the 
granting  of  the  Panama  concession  to  de  Lesseps,  and 
with  it  came  the  demand  for  an  American  canal  con- 
trolled by  Americans.  In  order  to  obtain  this,  a  strong 
effort  was  made,  from  1881  to  1883,  by  the  United 
States  to  secure  the  modification  or  abrogation  of  the 
Clayton-Bulwer  treaty.  This  attempt  was  resisted  by 
the  British  government,  which  showed  that  the  Ameri- 
can arguments  were  unsound,  that  the  Clayton-Bulwer 
treaty  by  its  eighth  article  had  established  a  general 
principle  of  neutralization  for  all  routes  on  the  Ameri- 
can isthmus,  and  that  this  principle  had  been  recogfnized 
by  the  American  government  in  subsequent  treaties. 

Following  the  vain  attempt  against  the  Clayton- 
Bulwer  treaty,  the  United  States  still  manifested  a 
determination  to  secure  an  American  canal ;  but  with 
the  failure  of  de  Lesseps's  undertaking  interest  was 


RESUME  329 

shifted  from  the  Panama  to  the  Nicaragua  route.  This 
called  attention  to  the  fact  that  Great  Britain,  in  spite 
of  the  treaty  of  Managua,  was  still  interfering  with  the 
Mosquito  Indians.  American  jealousy  was  roused 
because  of  the  proximity  of  the  Mosquito  reserve  to  the 
canal  route ;  and  the  opposition  of  the  American  goV' 
ernment  to  the  British  policy  was  influential  in  pro- 
ducing the  incorporation  of  the  Indians  with  Nicaragua 
in  1894,  which  removed  all  further  cause  of  dispute 
over  the  Mosquitos. 

In  the  closing  years  of  the  nineteenth  century  an 
unusual  feeling  of  friendliness  developed  between  the 
United  States  and  Great  Britain.  The  British  govern- 
ment, in  particular,  was  anxious  to  preserve  this  cor- 
diality. Therefore,  in  1901  it  consented  to  the  Hay- 
Pauncefote  treaty,  which  superseded  the  Clayton- 
Bulwer  arrangement  and  made  possible  an  American 
transisthmian  canal,  controlled  and  protected  by  Amer- 
icans. When  the  canal  was  nearing  completion  the 
American  government  passed  an  act  for  regulating  its 
use  which  discriminated  in  favor  of  American  coast- 
wise vessels.  The  act  was  protested  against  by  the 
British  government  as  a  violation  of  treaty  engage- 
ments and  was  disapproved  by  a  large  proportion  of 
Americans.  In  consequence  of  this,  the  objectionable 
clause  was  repealed,  June,  1914. 

The  Hay-Pauncefote  treaty  produced  a  marked 
change  in  British  and  American  relations  towards  Cen- 
tral America ;  British  interest  lessened,  while  that  of 
the  United  States  increased ;  and  there  developed  a 
system  of  American  interference  in  Central  American 
afifairs  which  has  become  objectionable  to  the  Central 
American  states  and  has  seemed  little  productive  of 


330     ANGLO-AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  DIPLOMACY 

good.  The  unsatisfactory  nature  of  the  situation,  how- 
ever, has  come  to  be  reahzed  in  the  United  States, 
where  a  distinct  revolution  in  Latin-American  policy 
has  begun,  which  seems  likely  to  terminate  in  more 
satisfactory  relations  between  the  United  States  and 
her  southern  neighbors,  including  Central  America. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

The  critical  comments  following  the  titles  listed  below  are 
based  wholly  upon  an  estimation  of  the  value  of  the  writings 
to  this  present  study. 

GUIDES  AND  BIBLIOGRAPHIES. 

Cannon,  Henry  Lewin,  Reading  References  for  English  His- 
tory, Boston,  [c.  1910]. 

Channing,  Edward,  Albert  Bushnell  Hart,  and  Frederick  Jack- 
son Turner,  Guide  to  the  Study  and  Reading  of  American 
History,  revised  and  augmented  edition,  Boston,  1912. 

Paullin,  Charles  O.,  and  Frederic  L.  Paxson,  Guide  to  the 
Materials  in  Lotidon  Archives  for  the  History  of  the 
United  States  since  1783,  Carnegie  Institution  of  Washing- 
ton, Publication  No.  90-B,  Washington,  1914.  A  valuable 
guide  for  the  subject,  but  it  appeared  too  late  to  be  of  aid 
in  the  preparation  of  this  work. 

Phillips,  P.  Lee,  A  List  of  Books,  Magazine  Articles,  and  Maps 
Relating  to  Central  America,  Including  the  Republics  of 
Costa  Rica,  Guatemala,  Honduras,  Nicaragua  and  Sal- 
vador, 1800-igoo,  Washington,  1902.  Valuable;  includes 
many  obscure  works  as  well  as  those  better  known. 

Van  Tyne,  Claude  Halstead,  and  Waldo  Gifford  Leland,  Guide 
to  the  Archives  of  the  Government  of  the  United  States 
in  Washington,  second  edition,  Carnegie  Institution  of 
Washington,  Publication  No.  92,  Washington,  1907.  Espe- 
cially useful,  as  the  arrangement  of  the  Central  American 
correspondence  in  the  State  Department  is  unusually  com- 
plicated. 

MANUSCRIPT  SOURCES. 
Department  of   State,   Washington,  Bureau  of   Indexes  and 
Archives.    Offers  much  material  not  printed  in  the  Amer- 
ican State  Papers,  the  United  States  Documents,  or  the 
writings  of  Buchanan  and  Webster.     Especially  valuable 

331 


332  BIBLIOGRAPHY 

for  instructions  to  and  despatches  from  American  diplo- 
matic agents  in  Central  America  and  England.    The  manu- 
scripts in  the  Department  of  State  for  the  period  1815-1860, 
inclusive,    were    examined.      For    a    classification    of    the 
American  diplomatic  correspondence  bearing  on  the  pres- 
ent   study,    see    Van    Tyne    and    Leland's    Guide    to    the 
Archives  listed  above. 
Public  Record  Office,  London.    By  far  the  most  valuable  source 
was  found  in  the  British  manuscript  archives,  which  con- 
tain a  vast  amount  of  material  not  printed  in  the  British 
and  Foreign  State  Papers  or  in  the  Parliamentary  Papers. 
The  following  is  a  complete  list  of  the  records  consulted 
for  the  years  1815  to  i860,  inclusive : 
Admiralty    Office. — Admiralty    Secretary's    In-Letters,    Ad- 
miralty Secretary's  Out-Letters.     (Cited  as  "Ad.  Sec.  In- 
Letters",  etc.) 
Colonial  Office. — Honduras.     (Cited  as  "  C.  O.,  Hond.") 
Foreign    Office. — America,    Central    America,    Costa    Rica, 
France,   Guatemala,   Honduras,   Mexico,   Nicaragua,   Sal- 
vador, Spain.     (Cited  as  "  F.  O.,  Am.",  etc.) 

Foreign  Office,  America  was  the  most  important  series, 
but  many  valuable  letters  were  found  in  Foreign  Office, 
Central  America,  Foreign  Office,  Guatemala,  and  Colonial 
Office,  Honduras.  The  material  in  the  other  records  was 
meagre  or  of  less  importance.  In  every  case  throughout 
the  present  work  citations  to  Foreign  Office  material  have 
reference  to  the  Foreign  Office  Records,  which  consist  of 
the  papers,  or  in-letters,  received  by  the  office,  with  their 
inclosures,  and  copies  or  drafts  of  letters  originating  there. 
All  Public  Record  Office  citations  in  the  foot-notes  are  to 
the  old  classification,  as  the  reclassification  was  not  com- 
plete when  the  records  were  examined. 

PRINTED  SOURCES. 

Adams,  John  Quincy,  Memoirs  of  John  Quincy  Adams,  Com- 
prising Portions  of  his  Diary  from  IJQS  to  1848,  edited  by 
Charles  Francis  Adams,  12  vols.,  Philadelphia,  1874- 1877. 
A  little  material. 


I 


BIBLIOGRAPHY  Z2Z 

American  State  Papers,  Foreif^n  Relations,  6  vols.,  Washing- 
ton, 1833-1859.     Useful  for  Panama  Congress. 

Annual  Register,  London,  1758.    Contains  texts  of  treaties. 

British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  London,  1841.    Valuable. 

Buchanan,  James,  The  IVorks  of  James  Buchanan,  Comprising 
his  Speeches,  State  Papers,  and  Private  Correspondence, 
collected  and  edited  by  John  Bassett  Moore,  12  vols., 
Philadelphia,  1908-1911.  Extremely  important.  Besides 
the  Buchanan  correspondence  found  in  the  Department  of 
State,  it  includes  copies  of  that  in  the  collection  of  the 
Historical  Society  of  Pennsylvania,  as  well  as  in  some 
private  collections. 

Calendar  of  State  Papers,  Colonial  Series,  America  and  West 
Indies,   1675-1700,    London,    1893-1910.     Slightly   useful. 

"  Canning  and  Cuba",  in  Publications  of  the  Southern  History 
Association,  vol.  11,  no.  i.  Two  illuminating  letters  from 
George   Canning. 

"  Canning  to  Vaughan,"  in  Massachusetts  Historical  Society, 
Proceedings,  XLVI,  233-235.  A  pertinent  letter  from 
George  Canning,  not  found  elsewhere  in  print. 

The  "Coastwise  Exemption":  the  Nation  against  it.  New 
York,  1913.    A  compilation  of  expressions  of  opinion. 

Congressional  Globe,  Washington,  1834-1873. 

Congressional  Record,  Washington,  1873-. 

Fox,  Charles  James,  Memoirs  and  Correspondence  of  Charles 
James  Fox,  edited  by  John  Russell,  2  vols.,  Philadelphia, 
1853.    Contains  a  few  letters  of  worth. 

Hertslet,  Lewis,  [and  others],  A  Complete  Collection  of  the 
Treaties  between  Great  Britain  and  Foreign  Powers,  22 
vols.,  London,  1840-1901.  Valuable  for  texts  of  treaties 
difficult  to  find  elsewhere. 

Historical  Manuscripts  Commission,  Report  on  the  Manu- 
scripts of  Mrs.  Stopford-Sackville,  vol.  2,  London,  1910. 
A  few  letters  regarding  the  British  expedition  to  Nica- 
ragua, 1780-1781. 
'/  Took  the  Isthmus":  Ex-President  Roosevelt's  Confession, 
Colombia's  Protest,  and  Editorial  Comment  by  American 
Newspapers  on  "How  the  United  States  Acquired  the 
Right  to  Build  the  Panama  Canal",  New  York,  191 1. 


334  BIBLIOGRAPHY 

"  Letters  of  Bancroft  and  Buchanan,  on  the  Clayton-Bulwer 

Treaty,   1849,   1850",  in  American  Historical  Review,  V, 

95-102.     Important;  not  found  elsewhere  in  print.  I 

MacDonald,  William,  Select  Charters  and  Other  Documents 

Illustrative  of  American  History,  1606-1775,  New  York, 

1906. 
Moore,  John  Bassett,  A  Digest  of  International  Law,  8  vols., 

Washington,  1906. 
New  York  Historical  Society,  Collections,  1884,  Kemhle  Papers, 

II,  New  York,  1885.     Material  on  the  British  expedition 

to  Nicaragua,  1780- 1781. 
Panama  Canal  Question:  a  Plea  for  Colombia,  New  York,  1904. 

Diplomatic  correspondence. 
Parliamentary  Debates,  edited  by  T.  C.  Hansard  [and  others], 

London,   1812- 
Parliamentary  Papers,  London,  1801-.     These  papers,  with  the 

United  States  Documents,  are  essential  to  any  study  of  the 

subject  from  printed  sources  alone. 
Polk,  James  K.,  The  Diary  of  James  K.  Polk,  1843-1849,  edited 

by  Milo  Milton  Quaife,  4  vols.,  Chicago,   1910.     Slightly 

useful. 
Richardson,  James  D.,  A   Compilation  of  the  Messages  and 

Papers  of  the  Presidents,  1789-1897,  8  vols.,  Washington, 

1896- 1898. 
Rush,  Richard,  A  Residence  at  the  Court  of  London,  London, 

1833.    A  small  contribution. 

Memoranda  of  a  Residence  at  the  Court  of  London, 

Philadelphia,  1845.     A  continuation  of  the  preceding. 

The  Court  of  Loudon  from  1819  to  1825,  with  Subse- 


quent Occasional  Productions,  noiv  First  Published  in 
Europe,  edited  by  Benjamin  Rush,  London,  1873.  Sub- 
ject matter  largely  similar  to  that  of  two  preceding  works. 
United  States  Documents,  Washington,  1817-.  Under  this 
title  are  included  all  public  documents  of  the  American 
government.  They  are  an  indispensable  complement  to 
the  Parliamentary  Papers.  The  new  classification  by  serial 
numbers  has  been  used  in  the  foot-notes. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY  335 

Webster,  Daniel,  The  Writings  and  Speeches  of  Daniel 
Webster,  National  Edition,  i8  vols.,  Boston,  1903.  Very 
valuable ;  contains  copies  of  private  correspondence  as 
v*^ell  as  of  that  existing  in  the  Department  of  State. 

Wells,  William  V.,  Walker's  Expedition  to  Nicaragua;  a  His- 
tory of  the  Central  American  War,  New  York,  1856.  Con- 
tains copies  of  useful  letters,  speeches,  etc.  See  same  title 
below  under  "  Contemporary  Special  Works  and  Articles." 

Wharton,  Francis,  A  Digest  of  International  Law  of  the 
United  States,  second  edition,  3  vols.,  Washington,  1887. 
Includes  a  few  extracts  from  American  diplomatic  cor- 
respondence, subsequent  to  i860,  not  printed  in  the  United 
States  Documents  or  Moore's  Digest. 

CONTEMPORARY  SPECIAL  WORKS  AND  ARTICLES. 
(Written  before  1861.) 

Alcedo,  Antonio  de.  The  Geographical  and  Historical  Dic- 
tionary of  America  and  the  West  Indies,  translated  and 
enlarged  by  G.  A.  Thompson,  5  vols.,  London,  1812-1815. 
Useful. 

Allen,  Bird,  "  Sketch  of  the  Eastern  Coast  of  Central  Amer- 
ica ",  in  Journal  of  the  Royal  Geographical  Society,  XI, 
76-89. 

Appleton,  Nathan,  "  Memoir  of  Hon.  Abbott  Lawrence ",  in 
Massachusetts  Historical  Society,  Proceedings,  III,  68-82. 

Baily,  John,  Central  America;  Describing  each  of  the  States 
of  Guatemala,  Honduras,  Salvador,  Nicaragua,  and  Costa 
Rica,  London,  1850.    Almost  valueless. 

Bard,  Samuel  A.  [Ephraim  George  Squier],  Waikna;  or 
Adventures  on  the  Mosquito  Shore,  London,  1855.  Im- 
portant. Squier  was  bitterly  opposed  to  British  encroach- 
ments in  Central  America,  but  this  does  not  appear  to 
have  made  his  writings  any  the  less  authoritative. 

Bonnycastle,  R.  H.,  Spanish  America;  or  a  Descriptive,  Histor- 
ical and  Geographical  Account  of  the  Dominion  of  Spain 
iti  the  Western  Hemisphere,  2  vols.,  London,  1818.  Largely 
descriptive,  but  contains  a  little  material. 


336  BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Burney,  James,  History  of  the  Buccaneers  of  America,  re- 
printed from  the  edition  of  1816,  London,  1891.  Valuable, 
though  prejudiced  in  favor  of  the  British. 

Byam,  George,  Wild  Life  in  the  Interior  of  Central  America, 
London,  1849.    Useless. 

Churchill,  Awnsham,  and  John,  A  Collection  of  Voyages  and 
Travels,  Some  Noiv  First  Printed  from  Original  Manu- 
scripts, Others  Now  First  Published  in  English,  8  vols., 
London,  1752.  Volume  six  contains  an  account  of  "  The 
Mosqueto  Indian  and  his  Golden  River ;  Being  a  familiar 
Description  of  the  Mosqueto  Kingdom  in  America  .  .  . 
Written  [in  or  about  the  Year  1699.]  by  M.  W. ".  An  im- 
portant source,  written  by  one  who  had  spent  some  time  on 
the  Mosquito  Shore. 

Crowe,  Frederick,  The  Gospel  in  Central  America,  Containing 
a  Sketch  of  the  Country,  London,  1850.  Crowe  was  a 
British  missionary  at  Belize.  Authorities  generally  cited. 
Reliable  and  very  important. 

Dampier,  William,  Voyages,  3  vols.,  London,  1703-1705.  A 
valuable  source. 

Dunlop,  Robert  Glasgow,  Travels  in  Central  America,  London, 
1847.  Contains  a  clear  and  fairly  accurate  account  of 
Central  American  history  from  1821  to  1846. 

Edwards,  Bryan,  The  History,  Civil  and  Commercial,  of  the 
British  West  Indies,  unth  a  Continuation  to  the  Present 
Time,  fifth  edition,  5  vols.,  London,  1818-1819.    Important. 

Esquemeling,  John,  The  Buccaneers  of  America,  a  reprint 
from  an  early  translation,  London,  191 1.  Esquemeling 
was  a  buccaneer.    Of  slight  value. 

Fancourt,  Charles  St.  John,  The  History  of  Yucatan  from  its 
Discovery  to  the  Close  of  the  Seventeenth  Century, 
London,  1854.  This  volume  was  meant  by  the  author,  who 
was  superintendent  of  Belize,  as  an  introduction  to  a 
history  of  Belize,  which  seems  never  to  have  been  written. 
The  introductory  volume  covers  a  too  early  period  to  be 
of  much  use. 

Froebel,  Julius,  Seven  Years'  Travel  in  Central  Ameriai. 
Northern  Mexico,  and  the  Far  West  of  the  United  States, 
London,  1859.    Somewhat  helpful. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY  337 

Galindo,  Juan,  "Notice  of  the  Caribs  in  Central  America", 
in  Journal  of  the  Royal  Geographical  Society,  III,  290-91. 

"  On  Central  America  ",  in  Journal  of  the  Royal  Geo- 
graphical Society,  VI,  119-136. 

Henderson,  George,  An  Account  of  the  British  Settlement  of 
Honduras,  London,  181 1.  Good.  Henderson  was  superin- 
tendent of  Belize. 

Johnson,  Charles,  A  General  History  of  the  Pyrates,  2  vols., 
fourth  edition,  London,  1726.    An  account  by  a  pirate. 

Juarros,  Domingo,  A  Statistical  and  Commercial  History  of 
the  Kingdom  of  Guatemala,  translated  by  J.  Baily,  London, 
1825.    Some  material ;  used  by  later  writers. 

L.  L.,  "  Note  sur  la  colonie  anglaise  de  Balise,  et  ses  rapports 
sur  le  Yucatan  mexicain ",  in  Nouvelles  Annales  des 
Voyages  et  des  Sciences  Geographiques,  C.  51-67. 

Long,  Edward,  The  History  of  Jamaica;  or  General  Survey 
of  the  Antient  and  Modern  State  of  that  Island,  3  vols., 
London,  1774.    Valuable. 

Michell,  R.  C,  "  A  Statistical  Account  and  Description  of  the 
Island  of  Ruatan",  in  United  Service  Magazine  and  Naval 
and  Military  Journal,  1850,  pt.  2,  pp.  541-546. 

Scherzer,  Carl,  Travels  in  the  Free  States  of  Central  America; 
Nicaragua,  Honduras,  and  San  Salvador,  2  vols.,  London, 
1857.    Of  slight  use. 

Sloane,  Hans,  A  Voyage  to  the  Islands  Madera,  Barbados, 
Nieves,  S.  Christophers  and  Jamaica,  unth  the  Natural 
History  of  the  Herbs  and  Trees,  Four-footed  Beasts, 
Fishes,  Birds,  Insects,  Reptiles,  etc.,  of  the  Last  of  those 
Islands,  etc.,  2  vols.,  London,  1707-1725.    Useful. 

Squier,  E.  G.,  Nicaragua,  its  People,  Scenery,  Monuments,  and 
the  Proposed  Interoceanic  Canal,  2  vols..  New  York,  1852. 
Good  account  of  British  encroachments. 

Notes  on  Central  America;  Particularly  the  States  of 

Honduras   and  San   Salvador,   New   York,    1855.     Good ; 
supplements  the  author's  Nicaragua. 

Travels  in  Central  America,  2  vols..  New  York,  1853. 

Valuable ;  subject  matter  similar  to  that  in  two  preceding 
works. 
23 


338  BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Stephens,  John  L.,  Incidents  of  Travel  in  Central  America, 
Chiapas,  and  Yucatan,  2  vols.,  New  York,  1841.  Slightly 
useful. 

Stout,  Peter  F.,  Nicaragua;  Past,  Present  and  Future,  Phila- 
delphia, 1859.  Contains  considerable  material,  fairly  ac- 
curate, but  shows  bias  against  England.  Stout  was  Amer- 
ican vice-consul  in  Central  America. 

Strangeways,  Thomas,  Sketch  of  the  Mosquito  Shore,  Edin- 
burgh, 1822.    Good. 

Roberts,  Orlando  W.,  Narrative  of  Voyages  and  Excursions 
on  the  East  Coast  and  in  the  Interior  of  Central  America, 
Edinburgh,  1827.  Much  useful  material ;  written  by  a 
resident  British  trader. 

Wafer,  Lionel,  A  New  Voyage  and  Description  of  the  Isthmus 
of  America,  reprinted  from  the  original  edition  of  1699, 
edited  by  George  Parker  Winship,  Cleveland,  1903.  Of 
little  worth. 

Walker,  William,  The  War  in  Nicaragua,  Mobile,  i860.  An 
account  from  Walker's  point  of  view  of  his  career  in 
Nicaragua  previous  to  May,  1857. 

Wells,  William  V.,  Explorations  and  Adventures  in  Honduras, 
New  York,  1857.    Helpful. 

Walker's  Expedition  to  Nicaragua;  a  History  of  the 

Central  American  War,  New  York,  1856.  Considerable 
material,  but  poorly  organized.  Wells  was  a  strong  sup- 
porter of  Walker.  See  same  title  above  under  "Printed 
Documentary  Sources." 

CONTEMPORARY  REVIEWS  AND  NEWSPAPERS. 

Blackivood's  Magazine,  vols.  79,  80,  81. 

Boston  Post,  July  31,  1854. 

Boston  Transcript,  July  28,  29,  Aug.  3,  1854. 

Daily  Alta  California,  Dec.  5,  16,  1855,  Jan.  22.  1859. 

De  Bow's  Review,  vol.  27. 

Dublin  Review,  vol.  40. 

Harper's  Magazine,  vols.  10,  12. 

Littell's  Living  /Ige,  vol.  14. 

London  Daily  News,  Jan.  31,  1853,  April  2,  1854. 


I 


BIBLIOGRAPHY  339 

London  Daily  Times,  Nov.  i,  1849,  June  13,  1850,  Jan.  19,  1856. 

Dec.  20,  1858. 
London  Economist,  vol.  14. 
London  Globe,  Mar.  3,  1853. 

London  Morning  Post,  Dec.  5,  1854,  Dec.  22,,  1857. 
New  York  Times,  July  26,  31,  Aug.  i,  2,  1854,  Jan.  3,  19,  Feb.  I, 

23,  Mar.  6,  July  15,  1856. 
New  York  Tribune,  Aug.  2,  3,  5,  16,  1854. 
Niles'  Register,  vol.  61. 

San  Francisco  Evening  Bulletin,  July  18,  Aug.  i,  1856. 
United  States  Magazine  and  Democratic  Review,  vols.  17,  21, 

25- 

GENERAL   HISTORIES   AND   BIOGRAPHIES. 

Babcock,  Kendric  Charles,  The  Rise  of  American  Nationality, 

1811-1819,  New  York,  1906. 
Bancroft,  Hubert  Howe,  History  of  Central  America,  3  vols, 

San  Francisco,  1886-1887.    Useful  for  study  of  early  period. 
Bourne,  Edward  Gaylord,  Spain  in  America,  1 450-1 580,  New 

York,  1904. 
Crichfield,  George  W.,  The  Rise  and  Progress  of  the  South 

American  Republics,  2  vols.,  London,  1909.    Of  little  use. 
Curtis,  George  Ticknor,  Life  of  Daniel,  Webster,  2  vols.,  New 

York,  1889. 

Life  of  James  Buchanan,  2  vols.,  New  York,  1883. 

Dewey,  Davis  Rich,  National  Problems,  1885-1897,  New  York, 

1907.     Some  material. 
Fortier,  Alcee,  and  John  Rose  Ficklen,  Central  America  and 

Mexico,  Philadelphia,   [c.  1907].     Good  brief  account  of 

Central  American  history. 
Foster,  John  W.,  A  Century  of  American  Diplomacy,  Boston, 

1900. 
Garcia  Calderon,  F.,  Latin  America:  its  Rise  and  Progress, 

translated   by   Bernard   Maill,    New   York,    1913.     Latin- 

x\merican  viewpoint. 
Garrison,  George  Pierce,  Westward  Extension,  1841-1850,  New 

York,  1906.    Helpful  for  background. 
Hart,  Albert  Bushnell,  The  Foundations  of  American  Foreign 

Policy,  New  York,  1901. 


340  BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Helps,   Arthur,    The   Spanish   Conquest  in  America   and   its 

Relation  to  the  History  of  Slavery  and  to  the  Government 

of  Colonies,  3  vols.,  London,  1855-1857.     Some  material. 
Henderson,   John   B.,   American  Diplomatic   Questions,  New 

York,  1901.    General  account. 
Hoist,  Hermann  Edouard  von,  The  Constitutional  and  Political 

History  of  the  United  States,  8  vols.,  Chicago,  1881-1892. 
Keane,  A.  H.,  Central  and  South  America,  2  vols.,  edited  by 

Clements  Markham,  London,  vol.  i,  revised  1909;  vol.  2, 

first  edition,  1901. 
Latane,   John   Halladay,  America  as  a   World  Power,   New 

York,  1907.     Useful. 
Lucas,  C.  P.,  A  Historical  Geography  of  the  British  Colonies, 

6  vols.,  Oxford,  1888-1907.    Helpful  for  early  period. 
McMaster,  John  Bach,  A  History  of  the  People  of  the  United 

States  from  the  Revolution  to  the  Civil  War,  8  vols.,  New 

York,  1907-1913. 
Rhodes,  James  Ford,  History  of  the  United  States  from  the 

Compromise  of  1850,  7  vols.,  New  York,  1900-1906. 
Schouler,  James,   History  of  the   United  States  of  America 

under  the  Constitution,  7  vols..  New  York,  [c.  1894-1913]. 
Smith,  Edward,  England  and  America  after  Independence:  a 

Short   Examination    of    their   International   Intercourse, 

1783-1872,  Westminster,  1900.    Strongly  prejudiced  against 

America. 
Smith,  Theodore  Clark,  Parties  and  Slavery,  1850-1859,  New 

York,  1906.    Good. 
Snow,  Freeman,  Treaties  and  Topics  in  American  Diplomacy, 

Boston,  1894.    Good  perspective. 
Sparks,  Edwin  Earle,  National  Development,  1877-1885,  New 

York,  1907. 
Trendell,  A.  H.  R.,  Her  Majesty's  Colonies,  London,  1886.    Of 

little  use. 
Turner,  Frederick  Jackson,  Rise  of  the  New  West,  1819-1829, 

New    York,    1906.      Contribution    to    the    background    of 

the  study. 
Winsor,   Justin,    editor.    Narrative   and    Critical   History   of 

America,  8  vols.,  Boston,  1884-1889. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY  341 

Woodward,  William  Harrison,  A  Short  History  of  the  Expan- 
sion of  the  British  Empire,  1500-1902,  Cambridge,  1907. 
Slightly  useful. 

Woolsey,  Theodore  Salisbury,  American  Foreign  Policy,  New 
York,  1898. 

RECENT  SPECIAL  WORKS. 
(Written  since  i860.) 

Adams,  Ephraim  Douglass,  British  Interests  and  Activities  in 
Texas,  1838-1846,  Baltimore,  1910.  Valuable  for  back- 
ground. Based  principally  on  documents  in  the  Public 
Record  Office. 

Anderson,  C.  L.  G.,  Old  Panama  and  Castilla  del  Oro,  Wash- 
ington, 191 1.  Contains  brief  general  account  of  the 
filibusters. 

Arias,  Harmodio,  The  Panama  Canal:  a  Study  in  International 
Law  and  Diplomacy,  London,  191 1.  Good  general  account 
of  the  American  canal  policy. 

Barral-Montferrat,  H.  D.  de,  De  Monroe  a  Roosevelt,  1823- 
1905,  Paris,  1905.     Unreliable. 

Beaumarchais,  Maurice  D.  de.  La  doctrine  de  Monroe; 
revolution  de  la  politique  des  £tats-Unis  au  XIX'  siecle, 
deuxieme  edition,  Paris,  1898.    Of  slight  value. 

Bingham,  Hiram,  The  Monroe  Doctrine:  an  Obsolete  Shib- 
boleth, New  Haven,  1913. 

Bryce,  James,  South  America:  Observations  and  Impressions, 
New  York,  1912.    Good  for  general  background  of  study. 

Butte,  George  G.,  Great  Britain  and  the  Panama  Canal:  a 
Study  of  the  Tolls  Question,  1913.  A  defense  of  exemption 
in  favor  of  American  vessels. 

Colquhoun,  Archibald  Ross,  The  Key  of  the  Pacific,  the  Nica- 
ragua Canal,  New  York,  1898.  An  uncritical  but  fair 
treatment. 

Coolidge,  Archibald  Cary,  The  United  States  as  a  World 
Power,  New  York,  1908.    General  view;  good  prospective. 

Dunning,  John  C,  Die  Neuesten  Anwendungen  der  Monroe 
Doktrin,  Borna-Leipzig,  1908. 

Edgington,  T.  B.,  The  Monroe  Doctrine,  Boston,  1905.  A 
mediocre  work. 


342  BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Edwards,  Albert,  Panama:  the  Canal,  the  Country,  and  the 
People,  New  York,  1912.     A  popular  account. 

Egerton,  Hugh  Edward,  A  Short  History  of  the  British 
Colonial  Policy,  London,  1897. 

Fiske,  Amos  Kidder,  The  West  Indies,  New  York,  1906. 

Froude,  James  Anthony,  The  English  in  the  West  Indies, 
London,  1888.     Slightly  useful. 

Gibbs,  Archibald  Robertson,  British  Honduras:  an  Historical 
and  Descriptive  Account  of  the  Colony  from  its  Settle- 
ment, 1670,  London,  1883.  The  best  history  of  British 
Honduras. 

Haring,  C.  H.,  The  Buccaneers  in  the  West  Indies  in  the 
XVI I th  Century,  London,  [1910].    A  careful,  critical  work. 

Johnson,  Willis  Fletcher,  Four  Centuries  of  the  Panama  Canal, 
New  York,  1906.  Contains  considerable  information  on 
the  Panama  question,  but  is  biased  in  favor  of  the  Amer- 
ican government. 

Keasbey,  Lindley  Miller,  The  Nicaragua  Canal  and  the  Monroe 
Doctrine,  New  York,  1896.  Sound  as  to  simple  facts ;  but 
conclusions  colored  by  an  anti-British  feeling,  and  a 
prejudice  in  favor  of  a  Nicaragua  as  against  a  Panama 
canal. 

Latane,  John  Halladay,  The  Diplomatic  Relations  of  the  United 
States  and  Spanish  America,  Baltimore,  1899.  Good  gen- 
eral account. 

Lawrence,  T.  J.,  Essays  on  Some  Disputed  Questions  in 
Modern  International  Law,  second  edition,  Cambridge, 
1885.  Good  general  discussion  by  an  Englishman,  with 
emphasis  upon  the  American  attack  on  the  Clayton-Bulwer 
treaty,  1880-1883. 

Lindsay,  Forbes,  Panama  and  the  Canal  Today,  new  revised 
edition,  Boston,  1912.     Fair  general  account. 

Lucas,  Daniel  B.,  Nicaragua:  War  of  the  Filibusters,  Rich- 
mond, 1896.  A  popular  account  based  largely  upon 
Walker's  War  in  Nicaragua. 

Mahan,  A.  T.,  The  Interest  of  America  in  Sea  Pou'er,  Present 
and  Future,  Boston,  1898. 

Martin,  Percy  F.,  Salvador  of  the  Twentieth  Century,  New 
York,  191 1. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY  343 

Moses,  Bernard,  The  Establishment  of  Spanish  Rule  in  Amer- 
ica, New  York,  1898.     Slightly  useful. 

Nicaise,  Auguste,  Les  flibustiers  americains:  Walker  et  I'Ame- 
rique  Centrale,  Paris,  1861.    Fair  brief  account. 

Oppenheim,  L.,  The  Panama  Canal  Conflict  between  Great 
Britain  and  the  United  States  of  America:  a  Study,  Cam- 
bridge, 1913.    A  British  view. 

Palmer,  Frederick,  Central  America  and  its  Problems,  New 
York,  1910.  A  clear,  unbiased  view  of  the  present  situation 
in  Central  America. 

Paxson,  Frederic  L.,  The  Independence  of  the  South  American 
Republics:  a  Study  in  Recognition  and  Foreign  Policy, 
Philadelphia,  1903. 

Reddaway,  W.  F.,  The  Monroe  Doctrine,  second  edition.  New 
York,  1905.    Good. 

Reeves,  Jesse  S.,  American  Diplomacy  under  Tyler  and  Polk, 
Baltimore,  1907. 

Roche,  James  Jeffrey,  By-ways  of  War;  the  Story  of  the 
Filibusters,  Boston,  1901.    A  popular  account. 

Rodway,  James,  The  West  Indies  and  the  Spanish  Main, 
London,  1896.    A  popular  history  of  the  buccaneer  period. 

Siegfried,  A.,  [and  others],  Les  questions  actuelles  de  politique 
etrangere  dans  I'Amerique  du  Nord,  Paris,  191 1.  Of  little 
use. 

Smith,  Justin  Harvey,  The  Annexation  of  Texas,  New  York, 
191 1.  Useful  for  background.  Based  chiefly  upon  manu- 
script records. 

Squier,  E.  G.,  Honduras;  Descriptive,  Historical  and  Statistical, 
London,  1870.  Ground  covered  very  similar  to  the  author's 
Notes  on  Central  America. 

Travis,  Ira  D.,  British  Rule  in  Central  America:  or  a  Sketch 
of  Mosquito  History,  Publication  No.  5,  Michigan  Political 
Science  Association,  July,  1895.    Good. 

The  History  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty,  Publica- 
tion No.  8,  vol.  3,  Michigan  Political  Science  Association, 
Jan.,  1900.  Carefully  prepared  and  reliable  as  to  facts, 
but  conclusions  at  times  unsound.  The  best  work  on  the 
subject. 

Tucker,  George  F.,  The  Monroe  Doctrine:  a  Concise  History 
of  its  Origin  and  Growth,  Boston,  1885. 


i 


344  BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Walker,  J.  W.  G.,  Ocean  to  Ocean:  an  Account,  Personal  and 

Historical,  of  Nicaragua  and  its  People,  Chicago,   1902. 

General    account    of    the    Central    American    question. 

Perspective  good,  but  some  inaccuracies. 
Winter,    Nevin    O.,    Guatemala   and   her  People    of    Today, 

Boston,  1909. 

RECENT  ARTICLES  IN  PERIODICALS  AND 
NEWSPAPERS. 

(Signed  Articles.) 

Bell,  Charles  N.,  "  Remarks  on  the  Mosquito  Territory,  its 
Climate,  People,  Productions,  etc.",  in  Journal  of  the 
Royal  Geographical  Society,  XXXII,  242-268. 

Bingham,  Hiram,  "  The  Monroe  Doctrine :  an  Obsolete  Shib- 
boleth ",  in  Atlantic  Monthly,  CII,  721-734. 

Brown,  L.  Ames,  "A  New  Era  of  Good  Feeling",  in  Atlantic 
Monthly,  CXV,  99-1 11. 

Conant,  Charles  A.,  "  Our  Mission  in  Nicaragua  ",  in  North 
American  Review,  CXCVI,  63-72.  Useful  for  recent 
period. 

Grahame,  Leopold,  "  The  Canal  Diplomacy :  a  British  View  ", 
in  North  American  Review,  CXCVII,  30-40. 

Hale,  William  Bayard,  "  Our  Danger  in  Central  America  ",  in 
World's  Work,  XXIV,  443-452.    Valuable. 

"  With   the    Knox   Mission   to   Central    America ",   in 

World's  Work,  XXIV,  179-194,  Z22-2,^7-     Valuable. 

Keasbey,  Lindley  M.,  "  The  National  Canal  Policy  ",  in  Amer- 
ican Historical  Association,  Annual  Report,  1902,  I,  275- 
288. 

"  Terms  and  Tenor  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty  ",  in 

Annals  of  the  American  Academy,  Nov.,  1899. 

Keely,  Robert  N.,  Jr.,  "  Nicaragua  and  the  Mosquito  Coast ", 
in  Popular  Science  Monthly,  XLV,  160-175.  A  good  de- 
scription. 

Latane,  John  H.,  "  Neutralization  Features  of  the  Hay- 
Paimcefote  Treaty  ",  in  American  Historical  Association, 
Annual  Report,  1902,  I,  289-303.    A  valuable  discussion. 

Moore,  John  Bassett,  "Is  there  a  Latin  America?"  in  Inde- 
pendent, LXXXI,  91-93.    Good. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY  345 

Paxson.  Frederic  Logan,  "  Enj^land  and  Mexico,  1824-1825  ", 
in  Colorado  University  Studies,  III,  11 5- 119.  Contribution 
towards  the  background  of  the  study. 

Rives,  George  L.,  "  Mexican  Diplomacy  on  the  Eve  of  War 
with  the  United  States  ",  in  American  Historical  Review, 
XVIII,  275-295.    Useful. 

Root,  Elihu,  "  The  Obligations  of  the  United  States  as  to 
Panama  Canal  Tolls  ",  in  World  Peace  Foundation  Pam- 
phlet Series,  III,  no.  3.  Speech  delivered  in  the  Senate 
against  exemption  of  American  vessels,  January  13,  1913. 

Scroggs,  William  Oscar,  "  William  Walker  and  the  Steam- 
ship Corporation  in  Nicaragua",  in  American  Historical 
Review,  X,  792-812.     Valuable. 

Showalter,  William  Joseph,  "  The  Countries  of  the  Carib- 
bean", in  National  Geographic  Magaaine,  XXIV,  227-249. 
Describes  present  conditions. 

Temperley,  H.  W.  V.,  "  The  Later  American  Policy  of  George 
Canning",  in  American  Historical  Review,  XI,  779-798. 
Valuable  for  understanding  of  early  period. 

Woolsejs  Theodore  S.,  "  Suez  and  Panama — a  Parallel ",  in 
American  Historical  Association,  Annual  Report,  1902,  I, 
307-312.    A  helpful  comparison. 

(Unsigned  Articles.) 

American  Review  of  Reviews,  vols.  46,  47. 

Century  Magazine,  vol.  85. 

Current  Literature,  vol.  53. 

Current  Opinion,  vols.  54,  56. 

Harper's  Weekly,  vol.  60. 

Independent,  vols.  74,  77. 

Literary  Digest,  vols.  44,  45,  46. 

London  Daily  Nezvs,  Nov.  18,  Dec.  17,  1901. 

London  Daily  Times,  Nov.  19,  Dec.  18,  1901. 

Nation,  vols.  96,  97,  98,  99. 

North  American  Revieiv,  vol.  97. 

Outlook,  vols.  91,  92,  93,  96. 


24 


INDEX 


"A.  B.  C.  republics",  319-320. 

Aberdeen,  Earl  of  (George  Gor- 
don), Central  American  policy, 
36,  68;  attitude  toward  California 
question,  46;  resignation  of,  196- 
197- 

Accessory  Transit  Company,  and 
Greytown  dispute,  171-174,  177, 
178,  183;  and  Kinney  expedition, 
190;  and  Walker  expeditions, 
194.  See  also  American  Atlantic 
and  Pacific  Ship-Canal  Company. 

Adams,  Charles  Francis,  and  desire 
of  U.  S.  for  Tigre  Island,  270- 
271. 

Alarm,  British  war  vessel,  50. 

Alaskan  boundary,  settlement  of, 
302. 

American  Atlantic  and  Pacific  Ship- 
Canal  Company,  60,  62,  144,  158 
contract  secured  from  Nicaragua 
75,  81;  difficulty  concerning  ves 
sel  of,  1 19-123;  new  charter  for 
171  n.  See  also  Accessory  Tran- 
sit Company. 

American  Union,  212. 

Amiens,  peace  of,  8. 

Anson,  expedition  of,  16. 

Argentina,  relations  with  U.  S., 
319-320. 

Arthur,  Pres.  Chester  A.,  canal 
policy  of,  28. 

Austria,  Emperor  of,  arbitration  of, 
289,  290,  291,  292. 

Baker,  Lewis,  and  Bluefields  affair, 
294,  295 ;  and  the  Mosquito-Nic- 
aragua dispute,  298-299. 

Bancroft,  George,  mission  at  Lon- 
don, 67-79,  81,  84. 

Barclay,  British  consul  at  New 
York,  59. 


Barrow,  Col.,  in  Belize,  7. 

Bay  Islands,  settlement  of,  9-12; 
British  claim  to,  102,  103,  104; 
erection  of  British  colony  of, 
139;  negotiations  concerning, 
139-167,  197,  216,  219-221,  225- 
230,  232,  236,  237,  239,  244,  246- 
248,  251,  252,  259,  261,  264,  267, 
324,  325,  327;  protest  against 
British  acquisition  of,  273.  See 
also    Bonacca;    Ruatan. 

Bayard,  Thomas  F.,  and  the  Nic- 
aragua-Mosquito dispute,  289- 
290;  minister  to  England,  and 
Bluefields  affair,  294,  295,  296; 
letter  from,  296. 

Baymen,  6,  7,  9. 

Belize,  settlement  of,  2-9;  British 
settlement  at,  31-32,  35,  36; 
duties  upon  goods  from,  35,  36; 
Mosquito  chiefs  crowned  at,  39; 
claim  to,  102-103,  104,  142,  143, 
145-146,  150-153.  157,  160,  162, 
163,  164,  166,  284;  boundary  dis- 
pute, 188,  216,  220,  224-225,  227, 
232,  236,  239,  248,  249,  251,  257, 
259,  260,  327;  trade,  258;  en- 
croachments of  British  from,  272. 
See  also  British  Honduras. 

Belly,  Felix,  mission  for  French 
Company,  254,  255. 

Bermuda,  British  schooner,  179. 

Bingham,  British  consul,  293. 

Black  River,  fort  at,  16,  18,  21,  23. 

Blaine,  James  G.,  canal  policy,  276, 
277,  278,  280-281,  286,  288. 

Bluefields,  British  settlement  at,  14, 
19;  post  office  established  at,  290; 
siege  of,  293-294,  295,  297. 

Boer  War,  300. 

Bonacca,  claim  to,  37,  100,  163;  in 
colony  of  Bay  Islands,  139. 


347 


348 


INDEX 


Borland,  Solon,  in  Central  Amer- 
ica, 168-170,  174,  175,  183,  184; 
wounded  at  Greytown,  174-175, 
178. 

Braida,  American  consul,  294. 

Brazil,  relations  with  U.  S.,  319- 
320. 

British  Honduras  established,  35; 
boundaries,  239,  252;  negotia- 
tions concerning,  283-284.  See 
also   Belize ;   Honduras. 

Bryce,  James,  protest  against  canal 
bill,  312. 

Buccaneering,  2-3,  9-10,   14. 

Buchanan,  Tames,  opinion  concern- 
ing Costa  Rican  offer,  71;  ne- 
gotiations concerning  Central 
America,  149-160,  163,  164,  165, 
166,  167,  196-204,  207-208;  and 
Greytown  difficulty,  181,  182-184; 
and  Dallas-Clarendon  treaty,  227- 
228;  and  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty, 
231,  233,  235-237,  245,  247,  251, 
253,  260;  messages  concerning 
Central  America,  240-241,  263- 
264,  266,  281. 

Bulwer,  Sir  Henry,  mission  of,  89- 
109,  112-114,  116,  117,  118;  letter 
to  Palmerston,  110;  return  of, 
119. 

California,  acquisition  of,  46,  322; 
discovery  of  gold  in,  58,  322;  im- 
migration to,  129. 

Canadian  fisheries  and  reciprocity, 
149-150. 

Canal  projects,  53,  57,  58-59,  60, 
91,  165,  273-288,  300,  301-314, 
322-323.  See  also  Colombia; 
Costa  Rica;  Nicaragua;  Panama; 
Suez  Canal;  Transit  routes. 

Canning,  George,  and  the  Holy  Al- 
liance, 27;  and  the  Monroe 
Doctrine,  27-28;  Central  Amer- 
ican policy  of,  321. 

Carcache,  Nicaraguan  agent,  mis- 
sion of,  90-91. 

Caribs,  transportation  of,  11-12;  in- 
tercourse with  Mosquitos,   13. 


Cass,  Lewis,  resolution  offered  con- 
cerning Bay  Islands  colony,  142, 
146;  Central  American  negotia- 
tions, 228-229,  230,  231,  234,  242, 
244-249,  251-253,  259,  260,  262, 
266. 

Cass-Yrissari  treaty,  243,  254,  355. 

Castellon,  Francisco,  Nicaraguan 
charge  at  London,  51-52;  note 
concerning  American  Union,  72; 
and  Central  American  dispute, 
67-68,  73,  74,  75,  81;  Nicaraguan 
secretary  of  foreign  affairs,  135. 

Central  America,  British  in,  before 
1815,  1-25;  and  the  Monroe 
Doctrine,  28-30;  interest  of  U. 
S.  in,  to  1850,  29-66;  Great  Bri- 
tain in,  to  1850,  28-66,  68-109; 
further  relations  with  Great  Bri- 
tain and  U.  S.,  passim.  See  also 
names  of  particular  countries  ana 
places. 

Central  American  Agricultural  and 
Mining  .Association,  187,  190.  . 

Ceylon,   Dutch  possessions  in,  8. 

Chatfield,  Frederick,  British  consul 
in  Central  America,  33,  34,  38, 
40-42,  47,  48,  55-56,  59,  61-66, 
93,  115,  116;  relations  with 
Honduras,  109;  removal  of,  116. 

Chile,  relations  with  U.  S.,  319- 
320. 

Churchill,  captain  of  the  Prome- 
theus, 120. 

Civil  War,  U.  S.,  269,  270. 

Clarence,  Mosquito  chief,  297. 

Clarendon,  Earl  of  (George  V'il- 
liers),  and  Central  American 
negotiations,  148-149,  153-161, 
163-166,  197-199,  201,  202,  204- 
205,  207-208,  215,  216,  224-229, 
231,  234,  237,  238,  241,  244;  and 
Greytown  dispute,  173,  180-182. 
186;  statement  concerning  Clay- 
ton-BuKver  treaty,  177;  and  fili- 
bustering in  Central  .America, 
187,  188,  189,  191,  19,5:  and 
desire  of  U.  S.  for  Tigre  Island. 
271.  See  also  Dallas-Clarendon 
treaty;  Herran-Clarendon  treaty. 


INDEX 


349 


ft 


Clarke,  Beverly,  U.  S.  minister  at 
Guatemala,  263. 

Clayton,  John  M.,  letters  of,  59-60; 
disavowal  demanded  by,  66; 
negotiations  of,  68-109;  criticism 
of,  143;  elected  U.  S.  senator, 
143.  See  also  Clayton-Bulwer 
treaty. 

Clayton-Bulwer  treaty,  discussed, 
1-2,  67-109,  323,  324;  re-adjust- 
ment under,  1 10-138;  reference 
to  Bay  Islands,  197,  199;  opera- 
tion of,  206,  211,  212,  216,  220, 
224;  threatened  abrogation  of, 
231-254,  260,  264,  326-327;  inter- 
pretation of,  239,  240,  243,  266, 
267;  development  of  American 
opposition  to,  270-288. 

Cleopatra,  British  vessel,  293,  294. 

Cleveland,  Pres.  Grover,  canal 
policy,  286-287. 

Cobden,  Richard,  request  for  Cen- 
tral American  correspondence, 
205-206. 

Cockburn,  British  superintendent 
at  Belize,  34. 

Colombia,  alliance  with  Guatemala, 
31;  canal  negotiations,  2-3-274, 
276,  278,  279,  286,  310-311.  See 
also  New  Granada. 

Comayagua,  Bishop  of,  10. 

Congress,  U.  S.,  Bay  Islands  dis- 
pute in  Senate,  142-146;  and 
Central  American  question,  203, 
204,  209;  and  Dallas-Clarendon 
treaty,  227-228,  229;  and  Clayton- 
Bulwer  treaty,  231,  232,  247, 
250,  264,  327;  and  canal  projects, 
275,  276,  287,  302,  304-307,  309, 
3 1 1-3 1 2,  313;  and  Dawson  treaty, 
317. 

Costa  Rica,  Serviles  in  power,  56; 
boundary  dispute  with  Nicara- 
gua, 56,  71,  73,  112-114,  124,  133, 
227,  254-255;  relations  with  Great 
Britain,  62,  70-72,  96,  97,  168, 
211,  213,  249;  relations  with  U. 
S.,  70-72;  boundary  dispute  with 
New  Granada,  71;  treaty  negotia- 


tions concerning,  83,  84,  226. 
227;  boundary  dispvite  with  Mos- 
quito Shore,  111-112,  113;  op- 
position to  Walker,  211;  canal 
projects,  302. 

Coxe,  S.,  letter  to,  220. 

Crampton,  John  F.  T.,  instructions 
to,  55,  171;  arrival  in  U.  S.,  118; 
and  the  Prometheus  affair,  122; 
negotiations  of,  125-127,  130-13 1, 
i34i  136,  146-149,  206,  208,  210; 
and  Greytown  difficulties,  180- 
182,  185-186;  and  filibustering 
movements  in  Central  America, 
189,  190,  191,  193,  194;  demand 
for  recall  of,  205,  210,  213,  214, 
216,   217. 

Crimean  War,  196;  attempt  to 
recruit  in  U.  S.  for,  199-200,  209, 
213,  219;   close  of,  218. 

Cuba,  proposal  concerning,  144. 

Cyane,  sloop-of-war,  172,  173,  175, 
178,    179,    183. 

Dallas,  George  M.,  Central  Ameri- 
can negotiations,  212,  213,  215- 
218,  224-226,  228.  See  also  Dal- 
las-Clarendon treaty. 

Dallas-Clarendon  treaty,  227,  228, 
239,  240,  245,  267,  325. 

Balling,  Gov.  Sir  John,  undertaking 
in  Mosquito  Shore  country,  20. 

Darien,  canal  project,  274. 

Dawson.  Thomas  C,  mission  in 
Nicaragua,   316-317. 

Democratic  Review,   cited,   142. 

Derby,  Lord,  speech  on  Central 
American  question,  204. 

Dimitry,  Alexander,  American  min- 
ister to  Nicaragua  and  Costa 
Rica,  mission  of,  262-263. 

Dix,  John  A.,  speech  of,  55. 

"  Dollar  diplomacy",  318. 

Douglas,  Stephen  A.,  opposition  to 
Clayton-Bulwer  treaty,  98,  231. 

England.    See  Great  Britain. 
Eurydice,  British  vessel,  212. 


350 


INDEX 


Evarts,  William  M.,  protest  against 

British      acquisition       of       Bay 

Islands,  273. 
Everett,    Edward,   negotiations   of, 

148. 
Express,    British    brig-of-war,    and 

the  Prometheus,  120-123. 

Fabens,  U.  S.  consul  at  Greytown, 
174-178,   183,   193- 

Fead,  captain  of  the  Express,  120, 
121,  122,  123,  126. 

Filibustering,  in  Central  Amer- 
ica, 186,  189,  190-191,  192-195, 
210,  255. 

Fillmore,  Pres.  Millard,  Central 
American  policy  of,  131-132,  134, 
136,   152. 

Fish,  Hamilton,  protest  against 
British  encroachment,  272-273. 

Florida,  Jackson's  proceedings  in, 
26. 

Fonseca,  Bay  of,  British  design  on 
islands  in,  63,  64. 

Forsyth,  John,  and  Guatemalan 
boundary  question,  34. 

Fox,  Charles,  and  Central  Ameri- 
can policy,  22. 

France,  negotiations  with  Nicara- 
gua, 255-256. 

Frelinghuysen,  Frederick  T.,  canal 
negotiations,  280,  281,  284,  286, 
288. 

French  Company,  canal  projects, 
276,  310. 

Galindo,  Co!.,  Guatemalan  agent, 
34,  45  n. 

Goethals,  Maj.  G.  W.,  head  of 
Canal  Commission,  311. 

Gracias  a  Dios,  British  settlement 
at,  14,  19,  21;  Nicaraguan  com- 
mandant carried  to,  41. 

Grand  Cayman  Islands,  slaves 
from,  38. 

Granville,  Lord,  and  the  Prome- 
theus affair,  121-123;  instructions 
from,  125,  126-128;  canal  negotia- 
tions, 277,  278,  279-280,  282-284. 


Great  Britain,  in  Central  America 
before  1815,  1-25;  relations  with 
Spain  in  Central  America,  2-25; 
relations  with  Mosquitos,  14-18, 
20,  23-24,  39-41.  77,  78,  81,  84,  85, 
88,  92,  96,  102,  109,  iio-iii,  151, 
155,  288,  291,  292,  323;  attitude 
of  cabinet  toward  Central  Amer- 
ican settlements,  21-22;  relations 
with  U.  S.  after  War  of  1812,  26- 
27;  in  Central  America,  to  1850, 
28-66,  68-109;  relations  with 
Mexico,  31-32,  44;  relations  with 
Guatemala,  33-34.  248,  257-358; 
relations  with  Nicaragua,  41-42, 
49-52.  56,  61,  67-68,  72-77,  81- 
86,  88,  107,  117-119,  188,  248, 
249,  255-257,  264,  265,  283;  atti- 
tude toward  Texas  question,  45- 
46,  52;  and  California  question, 
53;  relations  with  Honduras,  56, 
62,  64,  95,  109  n.,  225-226,  229, 
248,  252,  264-265,  283;  relations 
with  Salvador,  56,  168;  claim  to 
Mosquito  Shore,  59,  69-70,  73-74. 
75-78,  85-86,  87-88,  96-97,  102, 
107,  108-109;  relations  with  Costa 
Rica,  62,  70-72,  96,  97,  211,  213, 
249. 

Green,  British  consul,  and  the 
Prometheus  aifia.\r,  120,  122,  123; 
and  Greytown  situation,   130. 

Gresham,  Walter  Q.,  and  Bluefields 
affair,  294,  295,  296. 

Grey,  Sir  Edward,  and  U.  S.  canal 
projects,  288. 

Greytown,  name  changed  to,  5'; 
dispute  concerning,  67-68,  86,  87, 
130-133,  135.  136;  dispute  with 
transit  company,  171-174;  nego- 
tiations concerning,  117,  118, 
146,  147,  227;  difficulties  at,  119- 
123,  125-129,  171-186;  shooting 
of  negro  citizen  of,  174;  bom- 
bardment of,  179-186,  221;  plan 
to  seize,  190;  declared  a  free 
port,  265;  transfer  of,  327.  See 
also  San  Juan. 


INDEX 


351 


Guanacaste,  negotiations  concern- 
ing, 131. 

Guanacca.     See  Bonacca. 

Guatemela,  British  in,  10-11,  31, 
168,  272;  alliance  with  Colombia, 
31;  cession  bj',  33-34;  relations 
with  Great  Britain,  33-34,  248, 
257-258;  Serviles  in  power,  56; 
treaty  negotiations  concerning, 
83-84;  Belize  declared  part  of, 
145;  right  to  territory  in,  166, 
167;  war  with  Honduras,  170; 
negotiations  concerning  Belize, 
188,  239;  trade,  258. 

Harrison,  Pres.  Benjamin,  canal 
policy,  287. 

Hawaii,  acquisition  of,  301. 

Hay,  John,  negotiations  with 
Pauncefote,  302-309.  See  also 
Hay-Pauncefote  treaty. 

Hay- Pauncefote  treaty,  312-314, 
329- 

Hayes,  Pres.  Rutherford  B.,  canal 
policy,  275. 

Hempstead,  Christopher,  U.  S. 
consul  at  Belize,  95. 

Henderson,  Capt.,  in  Ruatan,  12. 

Herran,  Pedro  A.,  agent  from  Hon- 
duras, mission  of,  225,  227,  228, 
229.  See  also  Herran-Clarendon 
treaty. 

Herran-Clarendon  treaty,  225,  227, 
228,  230. 

Hise,  Elijah,  charge  in  Guatemala, 
54.  55,  56-57,  67,  81;  recall  of, 
60.     See  also  Hise  treaty. 

Hise  treaty,  84,  89. 

Hodgson,  Capt.  Robert,  operations 
on  Mosquito  Shore,  16-18. 

Hodgson  Robert  (son),  superinten- 
dent,  19. 

Hollins,  Capt.  George  N.,  at  Grey- 
town,  172-173,  175-185,  221. 

Holy  Alliance,  Canning's  position 
towards  designs  of,  27. 

Honduras,  and  the  British  in 
Ruatan,  38-39;  claim  to  Mosquito 
Shore,  48;  relations  with  Great 
Britain,    56,    62,    64,    95,    109  n.. 


225-226,  229,  248,  252,  264-265, 
283;  relations  with  U.  S.,  65,  168- 
169,  283;  Tigre  restored  to,  66; 
and  the  American  Union,  72; 
negotiations  concerning,  S3,  105- 
106;  proposed  federation  with 
Nicaragua  and  Salvador,  124; 
and  Bay  Islands,  140,  144,  226, 
228,  229,  230,  239,  252;  war  with 
Guatemala,  170;  transfer  of  Mos- 
quito frontier  to,  261,  265;  war 
with  Nicaragua,  293.  See  also 
Belize;  British  Honduras. 

Honduras,  Bay  of,  English  settle- 
ments on,  5,  18,  19. 

Honduras,  British.  See  British 
Honduras. 

Hornby,  Adm.  Sir  Phipps,  and  the 
Tigre  incident,  66. 

Howe,  Capt.,  provisional  govern- 
ment formed  by,  294. 

Irisarri.    See  Yrisarri. 

Jackson,  Andrew,  proceedings  in 
Florida,  26. 

Jamaica,  adventurers  from,  14;  at- 
tack incited  by  English  of,  17; 
instructions  to  governor  of,   39, 

lOI. 

Jeremy,  chief  of  Mosquitos,   15. 
Johnson,  Reverdy,  and  the  Clayton- 

Bulwer  treaty,  104,  108. 
Joint  High  Commission,  302. 
Jolly,    Lieut.,    at    Greytown,    179, 

182. 


Kansas-Nebraska      question,      196, 

199,  244. 
Kerr,    John    B.,    appointment    of, 

116;   mission   of,    124,    134,    135, 

136. 
Kimberley,   Earl  of    (John   Wode- 

house),     and     Bluefields     affair, 

294-295,  296. 
King,  William  R.,  and  the  Clayton- 

Bulwer  treaty,  98,  99,   100,   103, 

104,   105. 


352 


INDEX 


Kinney,  Col.  H.  L.,  colonization 
plan  of,  187,  190-193,  221;  in- 
dictment of,  193. 

Knowles,  Gov.  Sir  Charles,  attitude 
toward  Mosquito  Shore  settle- 
ment, 17-18. 

Lacayo,  Gen.,  Nicaraguan  commis- 
sioner, 293,  294. 

Lansdowne,  Marquis  of,  and  canal 
negotiations,  305-306,  307. 

Lawrence,  Abbott,  and  Central 
American  disputes,  66,  76,  79, 
83-90 ;  and  the  Prometheus  affair, 
121-123. 

Leeward  Islands,  Caribs  from,  11- 
12. 

Lesseps,  Ferdinand  de,  canal  con- 
cession secured  by,  274,  286,  287, 
328. 

Liberals,  in  Central  America,  33. 

Loch,  Capt.,  treaty  made  by,  50. 

Logan,  Cornelius  A.,  protest  to, 
regarding  Bay  Islands,  273. 

Logwood,  cutting  of,  3-5,  6. 

London  Examiner,  cited,  215. 

London  Globe,  cited,  185  n. 

London  News,  cited,  185  n.,  204. 

London  Press,  cited,  215. 

London  Telegraph,  215. 

London  Times,  cited,  80,  81,  92, 
180,  200,  201,  204,  214,  215,  225. 

Lyons,  Lord  (Richard),  negotia- 
tions of,  259,  260,  262,  263,  266. 

Macdonald,  British  superintendent 
of  Belize,  36,  38,  39;  mission  to 
IMosquito  Shore,  41-44. 

McGregor,  John,  report  on  Mos- 
quito Shore  by,  47-4S. 

McKinley,  Pres.  William,  canal 
policy  of,  301. 

McLeLachein,  grant  to,  40  n. 

Mahogany,  trade,  3,  6. 

Malmesbury,  Lord,  and  Central 
American  question,  244,  248,  249, 
250,  251,  252,  254,  256,  257. 

Managua,  treaty  of,  288,  289,  290, 
291,  294,  295. 

Manchester,  Duke  of,  inslruction 
to,  22. 


Mann,  U.  S.  agent  in  Guatemala, 
29  n. 

Marblehead,  American  vessel,  297. 

Marcoleta,  Jose  de,  Nicaraguan 
charge,  67,  74,  75;  Nicaraguan 
minister,  mission  of,  117-119,  124, 
133;  and  the  Kinney  expedition, 
190,  191,  192,  193,  195. 

Marcy,  William  L.,  Central  Amer- 
ican negotiations,  149-153,  156, 
171,  197-199,  207,  210,  213,  216, 
224;  and  Greytown  disputes,  173, 
176,  177,  181,  185;  and  filibuster- 
ing in  Central  America,  189-192. 

Maritime  Canal  Company,  work  of, 
287,  289. 

Mena,  Nicaraguan  leader,  318. 

Merlin,  ship,  7. 

Mexico,  relations  with  Great 
Britain,  31-32,  44;  relations  with 
U.  S.,  46,  189,  319-320;  and  Cen- 
tral American  question,  166,  167. 

Modyford,  Gov.  Sir  Thomas,  3. 

Molina,  Felipe,  Costa  Rican  min- 
ister, 70,  71,  72,  113,  118,  133, 
195- 

Monroe  Doctrine,  British  attitude 
toward,  27-28,  81,  321;  and  U.  S. 
Central  American  policy,  31S-319. 

Morazan,  Liberal  leader  in  Central 
America,  33. 

Morgan,  Capt.,  operations  of,  2-3. 

Moscos.     See  Mosquito  Indians. 

Mosquitia.     See  Mosquito. 

Mosquito,  settlement  of,  12-25; 
Great  Britain  in,  39-44,  47-48; 
renamed  Mosquitia,  44;  British 
claim  to,  59,  69-70,  73-74,  75-78, 
85-86,  87-88,  96-97,  102,  107,  108- 
109;  negotiations  concerning, 
110-113,  118,  123,  125,  130-132, 
146-149,  157,  160-161,  165,  188, 
219-220,  224-226,  236,  261,  365; 
boundary  dispute  with  Costa 
Rica,  111-112,  113;  rights  of  Nic- 
aragua and  Costa  Rica  to,  115; 
protectorate,  184;  American  col- 
onization society  in,  186-187; 
boundary  question,  216. 


INDEX 


353 


Mosquito  Indians,  13;  relations 
with  England,  14-18,  20,  23-24, 
39-41.  77,  78,  81,  84,  85,  88,  92, 
96,  102,  109-111,  151,  15s,  288, 
291,  292,  323;  grants  by,  40  n., 
187,  190;  boundary  claims,  41- 
42,  47,  49;  negotiations  concern- 
ing, 132-133,  146,  226,  227,  248, 
249,  252,  256-257,  259,  261,  263- 
265;  Nicaraguan  sovereignty  for, 
239;  dispute  with  Nicaragua,  288- 
293,  295-298. 

Moss,  Capt.,  naval  force  under,  7. 

Murphy,  U.  S.  agent  to  Central 
America,  45  n. 

Napier,  Lord  (Francis),  and  Dallas- 
Clarendon  treaty,  229-230;  and 
Clayton-Bulwer  treaty,  231,  232, 
234-238;  and  Central  American 
question,  239,  241-253,  259. 

National  Intelligencer,  cited,  106. 

Nebraska.  See  Kansas-Nebraska 
question. 

Negroes,  in  Ruatan,  12;  inter- 
course with  Mosquitos,  13.  See 
also  Slavery. 

New  Granada,  claim  to  Mosquito 
Shore,  47  n. ;  treaty  relations,  53, 
282,  283 ;  boundary  dispute  with 
Costa  Rica,  71;  proposals  to,  233- 
234;  American  claims  against, 
237-238.     See  also  Colombia. 

New  York,  Russian  privateers  built 
at,  20:,  202. 

New  York  Times,  cited,  179-180. 

Nicaragua,  relations  with  Great 
Britain,  41-42,  49-52,  56,  61,  67- 
68,  72-77,  81-86,  88,  107,  117- 
119,  188,  248,  249,  255,  256,  257, 
264,  265,  283;  canal  projects,  46- 
47,  53,  60,  62-63,  75-83.  112,  124- 
125,  133,  243,  255,  322,  323; 
claim  to  Mosquito  Shore,  48-50 ; 
boundary  dispute  with  Costa 
Rica,  56,  71,  73,  112-114,  124, 
133,  227,  254-255;  relations  with 
U.  S.,  57-58,  62-63,  68-69,  72-81, 
83-90,  116-119,  124,  135-136,  168- 


170,  283,  286,  287,  289,  302,  310, 
315-318;  and  the  American  Un- 
ion, 72;  treaty  negotiations  con- 
cerning, 83,  84,  226-227;  claim  to 
the  San  juan,  113,  117;  political 
conditions  in,  114;  proposed  fed- 
eration with  Honduras  and  Sal- 
vador, 124;  and  the  Greytown 
dispute,  130-133,  135,  136;  and 
Mosquito  Indians,  239,  288-293, 
295-298;  Walker  in,  242;  and  the 
Cass-Yrissari  treaty,  254;  nego- 
tiations with  France,  255-256; 
transfer  of  Mosquito  frontier  to, 
265;  war  with  Honduras,  293; 
disturbance  in,  317-318. 
Northern  Light,  steamer,   175. 

Oldman,  chief  of  Mosquitos,   15. 

O'Leary,  British  agent  at  Bogota, 
47- 

Olney,  Richard,  and  U.  S.  canal 
policy,  288. 

Omoa,  capture  of,  6. 

O'Niel,  governor  of  Yucatan,  ex- 
pedition under,  7. 

Oregon,  cruise  of,  301. 

Oregon  question,  26-27,  45,  46,  285. 

Orizaba,  American  packet,  212. 

Otway,  British  superintendent,   18. 

Ouseley,  Sir  William  G.,  mission 
of,  235-239,  242,  245-250,  252- 
257,  259-261,  327. 

Palmerston,  Viscount  (Henry 
Temple),  Central  American  pol- 
icy, 33-36,  40,  43,  47,  SI,  55,  63- 
64,  68-90,  94-96,  99,  102-103,  113, 
197,  201,  202,  205-207,  217,  218; 
letter  from  Bulwer,  no;  letter 
concerning  Mosquito  territory, 
111,  112;  resignation  of,  121, 
123;  declaration  regarding  Belize, 
157,  160,  203. 

Panama,  transit  projects,  53,  233, 
234,  238,  274,  276,  281,  282,  284, 
286,  310,  311;  revolution  in,  311. 

Panama  Canal  Zone,  315. 

Panama  Congress,  29. 


354 


INDEX 


Panama  Herald,  cited,  233. 
Panama   Railroad,   attack  on,  233; 

control  of,  234;  building  of,  270; 

treaty      stipulation      concerning, 

ignored,  273,  281-282. 
Panama  Union,  cited,  233. 
Pan-American  Union,  320. 
Parker,  Commodore,  at  San  Juan, 

121,  126-127,  128. 
Parliament,    British,    and    Central 

American     question,     204,     217, 

222;   and   U.    S.    canal   projects, 

288. 
Pauncefote,  Sir  Julian,  and  U.   S. 

canal  negotiations,  301-309. 
Paynter,   Capt.   J  A.,  Tigre  seized 

by,  65. 
Phelps,  Edward  J.,  letter  to,  290. 
Philippines,  acquisition  of,  301. 
Pierce,    Pres.    Franklin,    and    the 

Central  American  question,   150, 

152,  157,  19s,  209,  221,  227,  324. 
Point  Arenas,  concession  on,   172, 

173. 
Polk,    Pres.    James    K.,   policy    of, 

52-54,  322. 
Porto  Rico,  acquisition  of,  301. 
Prometheus,  vessel,  affair  at  Grey- 
town,  1 19-123. 

Rattan.     See  Ruatan. 

Realejo,  British  design  on,  63. 

Rives,  William  C,  minister  to 
France,  negotiations,  75-79,  82. 

Roatan.      See   Ruatan. 

Roebuck,  John  A.,  in  House  of 
Commons,  206-207. 

Routh,  steamer,   174. 

Ruatan,  discovery  and  possession 
of,  9-12;  seized  by  British  agent, 
37;  British  claim  to,  37,  38-39, 
140,  141,  154,  159,  :63,  164; 
settlement  of  slaves  in,  38; 
American  settlement  reported, 
100,  102;  in  colony  of  Bay 
Islands,  139;  Central  American 
sovereignty  over,  220;  negotia- 
tions concerning,  225. 


Russell,  Lord  John,  and  Central 
American  negotiations,  43,  261, 
262,  266;  and  the  Mosquito  ques- 
tion, 146-147;  in  House  of 
Commons,  217. 

Russia,  quarrel  with  Turkey,  157, 
159. 

Saint  George's  Cay,  burning  of 
houses  on,  7. 

Saint  Vincent,  Caribs  from,   11-12. 

Salisbury,  Marquis  of,  and  the  Nic-       J 
aragua-Mosquito  dispute,  291. 

Salvador,  relations  with  Great 
Britain,  56,  168;  and  the  Ameri- 
can Union,  72:  proposed  federa- 
tion with  Honduras  and  Nic- 
aragua, 124;  threatened  invasion 
of,  315. 

San  Carlos,  British  design  on  port 
of,  63. 

San  Francisco,  American  vessel, 
293  n.,  295. 

San  Jose,  port  of,  communications 
with  Guatemala,  258. 

San  Juan,  renamed  Greytown,  51; 
control  of,  114;  meeting  of  Amer- 
icans at,  128-129.  See  also  Grey- 
town. 

San  Juan  River,  dispute  concern- 
ing, 41-42,  48,  49-51,  69,  72-74, 
77,  80,  88,  113,  117,  161-162, 
227;  canal  route,  58,  62,  165. 

Savage,  American  agent  in  Guate- 
mala, 54  n. 

Schenck,  Robert  C,  instructions 
concerning  British  in  Belize, 
272-273. 

Scott,  agent  of  transit  company, 
178,  179- 

Serviles,  in  Central  America,  33, 
56. 

Seward,  W.  H.,  Taylor  administra- 
tion defended  by,  143;  letter  con- 
cerning need  of  coaling  station, 
270-271. 

Seymour,  Vice-Admiral,  and  the 
Protnetheus  affair,  122,  123;  and 
Greytown  affairs,  126,  127,  138. 


INDEX 


355 


Shepherd,  Peter  and  Samuel,  grant 
to,  187. 

Slavery,  influence  on  Central  Amer- 
ican question,  269,  270. 

Smith,  Capt.,  shooting  by,  174. 

Southwest,  annexation  of,  285. 

Spain,  buccaneering  against,  2-3, 
9-10,  14;  relations  with  Great 
Britain  in  Central  America,  2-25  ; 
right  to  Belize,  32-33,  36;  and 
the  Central  American  question, 
160-161,  166,  167. 

Spanish- American  War,  300-301. 

Squier,  Ephraim  G.,  charge  in 
Guatemala,  60-66;  letter  to,  107; 
activities  of,  115;  recall  of,  116; 
in  Honduras,  170-17 1;  rumors 
concerning,  187.  See  also  Squier 
treaty. 

Squier  treaty,  75,  83,  86-87,  90-91, 
95-96,  99,  1 13-1 14,  243. 

Suez  Canal,  opening  of,  274,  286; 
rules  for  navigation  of,  303. 

Taft,  Pres.  William  H.,  canal  bill 

signed  by,  312;  Central  American 

policy  of,  318. 
Tarleton,  captain  of  the  Enrydice, 

212. 
Taylor,     Pres.     Zachary,     Central 

American   policy   of,    59-60,    68; 

and    Squier    treaty,    91;    policy 

regarding    Bay    Islands    colony, 

142-143,  144. 
Texas,     independence     of,     44-45; 

admission  of,  46;  annexation  of, 

52. 
Tigre  Island,  British  design  on,  64, 

6s;  seized  by  British,  65,  66,  90, 

93;  cession  to  U.  S.,  65;  restored 

to  Honduras,  66;  evacuation  of, 

94-95;    seized    by    Squier,     115; 

American  desire  for,  271. 
Transit  routes,  251,  254,  258,  269. 

See  also  Canal  projects. 
Trelawney,  Gov.  Edward,  plan  of 

revolt,  16. 
Trinidad,  possession  of,  8. 
Turkey,  quarrel  with  Russia,   157, 

159. 


Union,  cited,   191. 

United  States,  relations  with  Great 
Britain  after  War  of  18 12,  26- 
27;  in  Central  -America,  1815- 
1850,  26-66;  war  with  Mexico, 
46;  and  Texas  question,  52; 
treaty  with  New  Granada,  53; 
relations  with  Nicaragua,  57-58, 
62-63,  68-69,  72-81,  83-90,  116- 
119,  124,  135-136,  168-170,  283, 
286,  287,  289,  302,  310,  31S-318; 
treaty  with  Honduras,  65,  168- 
169,  283;  relations  with  Costa 
Rica,  70-72;  relations  with  Mex- 
ico, 189,  319-320;  relations  with 
"A.  B.  C.  republics",  319-320. 

\^anderbilt,  Cornelius,  and  the 
Prometheus  affair,  120. 

Vaughan,  Sir  Charles,  and  Guate- 
malan boundary  question,  34. 

Vera  Paz,  territory  of,  166. 

Vernon,  Adin.  Edward,  expedition 
of,  16. 

Vijil,  Padre,  representative  of 
Walker,  212,  213. 

Villiers,  British  representative  at 
Madrid,  instructions  to,  35,  37. 

Vixen,  British  war  vessel,  50. 

Walker,  Patrick,  Mosquito  superin- 
tendent, 44,  47;  at  San  Juan,  49, 
50;  death  of,  50. 

Walker,  William,  filibustering  ex- 
peditions of,  189,  193-195,  210- 
211,  213,  242,  255;  U.  S.  attitude 
toward,  199,  210,  213. 

Walsh,  Robert,  agent  to  Costa  Rica, 
134- 

Washington,  D.  C,  convention  of 
Central  American  delegates  at, 
315. 

Watson,  Capt.,  report  concerning 
Bluefields  affair,  295. 

Webster,  Daniel,  negotiations  of, 
113,  116-118,  123,  125,  127-128, 
130-131,  134,  136;  and  the 
Prometheus  affair,  121-123;  death 
of,  148. 


356 


INDEX 


West  Indies,  British  naval  station 
in,  171;  British  withdrawal  from, 
315- 

Wheeler,  minister  to  Central  Amer- 
ica, and  Greytown  claims,  185; 
and  Walker's  expedition,  195. 

White,  counsel  for  transit  company, 
120,   177-178. 

Wilson,  Pres.  Woodrow,  and  canal 
bill,  314;  Central  American 
policy,  319. 

Wyke,  Charles  "L,,  negotiations  of, 
134,  136,  254,  257-258,  261,  263- 


267,  284,  288,  327;  instructions 
to,  187;  and  Belize  boundary, 
188;  despatch  concerning  Herran- 
Clarendon  treaty,  230. 

Vrissari,    Antonio    Jose    de,     195. 

See  also  Cass-Yrissari  treaty. 
Yucatan,  log-cutting  settlement  in, 

4- 

Zelaya,  Nicaraguan  ruler,  315-316. 
Zelaya,  department  of,  298. 


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